DecryptMatch: pure-Python port of fastlane match decrypt.rb

Replace the Ruby decrypt.rb shell-out with a direct Python call to
decrypt_match_data(). The iOS build no longer depends on a Ruby
interpreter. Includes the spec, plan, AES-256 port, tightened error
surfaces for key length and V1 fallback, and the BuildConfiguration
wire-up that drops decrypt.rb.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
isaac
2026-04-20 18:45:34 +02:00
parent 34c2c8c8a4
commit 0fd2765908
5 changed files with 909 additions and 329 deletions
+1 -7
View File
@@ -106,13 +106,7 @@ def decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively(source_base_path, destination_base
destination_path = destination_base_path + '/' + file_name
allowed_file_extensions = ['.mobileprovision', '.cer', '.p12']
if os.path.isfile(source_path) and any(source_path.endswith(ext) for ext in allowed_file_extensions):
#print('Decrypting {} to {} with {}'.format(source_path, destination_path, password))
os.system('ruby build-system/decrypt.rb "{password}" "{source_path}" "{destination_path}"'.format(
password=password,
source_path=source_path,
destination_path=destination_path
))
#decrypt_match_data(source_path, destination_path, password)
decrypt_match_data(source_path, destination_path, password)
elif os.path.isdir(source_path):
os.makedirs(destination_path, exist_ok=True)
decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively(source_path, destination_path, password)
+280 -208
View File
@@ -1,221 +1,293 @@
import os
import base64
import subprocess
import tempfile
import hashlib
class EncryptionV1:
ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-cbc'
def decrypt(self, encrypted_data, password, salt, hash_algorithm="MD5"):
try:
return self._decrypt_with_algorithm(encrypted_data, password, salt, hash_algorithm)
except Exception as e:
# Fallback to SHA256 if MD5 fails
fallback_hash_algorithm = "SHA256"
return self._decrypt_with_algorithm(encrypted_data, password, salt, fallback_hash_algorithm)
# FIPS-197 AES S-box and inverse S-box.
_SBOX = bytes.fromhex(
"637c777bf26b6fc53001672bfed7ab76"
"ca82c97dfa5947f0add4a2af9ca472c0"
"b7fd9326363ff7cc34a5e5f171d83115"
"04c723c31896059a071280e2eb27b275"
"09832c1a1b6e5aa0523bd6b329e32f84"
"53d100ed20fcb15b6acbbe394a4c58cf"
"d0efaafb434d338545f9027f503c9fa8"
"51a3408f929d38f5bcb6da2110fff3d2"
"cd0c13ec5f974417c4a77e3d645d1973"
"60814fdc222a908846eeb814de5e0bdb"
"e0323a0a4906245cc2d3ac629195e479"
"e7c8376d8dd54ea96c56f4ea657aae08"
"ba78252e1ca6b4c6e8dd741f4bbd8b8a"
"703eb5664803f60e613557b986c11d9e"
"e1f8981169d98e949b1e87e9ce5528df"
"8ca1890dbfe6426841992d0fb054bb16"
)
def _decrypt_with_algorithm(self, encrypted_data, password, salt, hash_algorithm):
"""
Use openssl command-line tool to decrypt the data
"""
# Create a temporary file for the encrypted data (with salt prefix)
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) as temp_in:
# Prepare the data for openssl (add "Salted__" prefix + salt if not already there)
if not encrypted_data.startswith(b"Salted__"):
temp_in.write(b"Salted__" + salt + encrypted_data)
_INV_SBOX = bytes.fromhex(
"52096ad53036a538bf40a39e81f3d7fb"
"7ce339829b2fff87348e4344c4dee9cb"
"547b9432a6c2233dee4c950b42fac34e"
"082ea16628d924b2765ba2496d8bd125"
"72f8f66486689816d4a45ccc5d65b692"
"6c704850fdedb9da5e154657a78d9d84"
"90d8ab008cbcd30af7e45805b8b34506"
"d02c1e8fca3f0f02c1afbd0301138a6b"
"3a9111414f67dcea97f2cfcef0b4e673"
"96ac7422e7ad3585e2f937e81c75df6e"
"47f11a711d29c5896fb7620eaa18be1b"
"fc563e4bc6d279209adbc0fe78cd5af4"
"1fdda8338807c731b11210592780ec5f"
"60517fa919b54a0d2de57a9f93c99cef"
"a0e03b4dae2af5b0c8ebbb3c83539961"
"172b047eba77d626e169146355210c7d"
)
_RCON = bytes.fromhex("01020408102040801b36")
def _xtime(a):
return (((a << 1) ^ 0x1b) & 0xff) if (a & 0x80) else (a << 1)
def _gf_mul(a, b):
r = 0
for _ in range(8):
if b & 1:
r ^= a
b >>= 1
a = _xtime(a)
return r
def _key_expansion_256(key):
# AES-256: Nk=8, Nr=14, total 4 * (Nr + 1) = 60 words = 240 bytes.
if len(key) != 32:
raise ValueError("AES-256 key must be 32 bytes")
w = bytearray(240)
w[:32] = key
i = 32
while i < 240:
t = bytearray(w[i - 4:i])
if i % 32 == 0:
t = bytearray([t[1], t[2], t[3], t[0]])
for j in range(4):
t[j] = _SBOX[t[j]]
t[0] ^= _RCON[i // 32 - 1]
elif i % 32 == 16:
for j in range(4):
t[j] = _SBOX[t[j]]
for j in range(4):
w[i + j] = w[i - 32 + j] ^ t[j]
i += 4
return [bytes(w[r * 16:(r + 1) * 16]) for r in range(15)]
def _add_round_key(state, rk):
return bytes(s ^ k for s, k in zip(state, rk))
def _sub_bytes(state):
return bytes(_SBOX[b] for b in state)
def _inv_sub_bytes(state):
return bytes(_INV_SBOX[b] for b in state)
# Column-major state: state[r + 4 * c], r = 0..3 (row), c = 0..3 (column).
def _shift_rows(state):
s = bytearray(state)
s[1], s[5], s[9], s[13] = s[5], s[9], s[13], s[1]
s[2], s[6], s[10], s[14] = s[10], s[14], s[2], s[6]
s[3], s[7], s[11], s[15] = s[15], s[3], s[7], s[11]
return bytes(s)
def _inv_shift_rows(state):
s = bytearray(state)
s[1], s[5], s[9], s[13] = s[13], s[1], s[5], s[9]
s[2], s[6], s[10], s[14] = s[10], s[14], s[2], s[6]
s[3], s[7], s[11], s[15] = s[7], s[11], s[15], s[3]
return bytes(s)
def _mix_columns(state):
s = bytearray(16)
for c in range(4):
a0, a1, a2, a3 = state[4 * c], state[4 * c + 1], state[4 * c + 2], state[4 * c + 3]
s[4 * c] = _xtime(a0) ^ (_xtime(a1) ^ a1) ^ a2 ^ a3
s[4 * c + 1] = a0 ^ _xtime(a1) ^ (_xtime(a2) ^ a2) ^ a3
s[4 * c + 2] = a0 ^ a1 ^ _xtime(a2) ^ (_xtime(a3) ^ a3)
s[4 * c + 3] = (_xtime(a0) ^ a0) ^ a1 ^ a2 ^ _xtime(a3)
return bytes(s)
def _inv_mix_columns(state):
s = bytearray(16)
for c in range(4):
a0, a1, a2, a3 = state[4 * c], state[4 * c + 1], state[4 * c + 2], state[4 * c + 3]
s[4 * c] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x0e) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x0b) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x0d) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x09)
s[4 * c + 1] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x09) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x0e) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x0b) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x0d)
s[4 * c + 2] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x0d) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x09) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x0e) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x0b)
s[4 * c + 3] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x0b) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x0d) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x09) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x0e)
return bytes(s)
def _aes_encrypt_block(block, round_keys):
state = _add_round_key(block, round_keys[0])
for r in range(1, 14):
state = _sub_bytes(state)
state = _shift_rows(state)
state = _mix_columns(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[r])
state = _sub_bytes(state)
state = _shift_rows(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[14])
return state
def _aes_decrypt_block(block, round_keys):
state = _add_round_key(block, round_keys[14])
for r in range(13, 0, -1):
state = _inv_shift_rows(state)
state = _inv_sub_bytes(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[r])
state = _inv_mix_columns(state)
state = _inv_shift_rows(state)
state = _inv_sub_bytes(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[0])
return state
def _evp_bytes_to_key(password, salt, hash_name, key_len=32, iv_len=16):
# OpenSSL EVP_BytesToKey with count=1, matching Ruby's
# Cipher#pkcs5_keyivgen(password, salt, 1, hash).
if isinstance(password, str):
password = password.encode('utf-8')
required = key_len + iv_len
material = b""
prev = b""
while len(material) < required:
h = hashlib.new(hash_name)
h.update(prev + password + salt)
prev = h.digest()
material += prev
return material[:key_len], material[key_len:key_len + iv_len]
def _aes_cbc_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv):
if len(ciphertext) == 0 or len(ciphertext) % 16 != 0:
raise ValueError("V1 ciphertext length must be a non-zero multiple of 16")
round_keys = _key_expansion_256(key)
out = bytearray()
prev = iv
for i in range(0, len(ciphertext), 16):
block = ciphertext[i:i + 16]
decrypted = _aes_decrypt_block(block, round_keys)
out.extend(bytes(d ^ p for d, p in zip(decrypted, prev)))
prev = block
pad = out[-1]
if pad < 1 or pad > 16 or not all(b == pad for b in out[-pad:]):
raise ValueError("V1 PKCS#7 padding check failed")
return bytes(out[:-pad])
def _ghash(h_bytes, data):
# GHASH over GF(2^128) with reduction polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1,
# using GCM's bit-reversed convention (top-bit-first when encoded as bytes).
h = int.from_bytes(h_bytes, 'big')
y = 0
reduction = 0xe1 << 120
for i in range(0, len(data), 16):
block = data[i:i + 16].ljust(16, b"\x00")
y ^= int.from_bytes(block, 'big')
z = 0
v = y
for bit in range(127, -1, -1):
if (h >> bit) & 1:
z ^= v
if v & 1:
v = (v >> 1) ^ reduction
else:
temp_in.write(encrypted_data)
temp_in_path = temp_in.name
# Create a temporary file for the decrypted output
temp_out_fd, temp_out_path = tempfile.mkstemp()
os.close(temp_out_fd)
v >>= 1
y = z
return y.to_bytes(16, 'big')
def _aes_gcm_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv, aad, auth_tag):
if len(iv) != 12:
raise ValueError("V2 requires a 96-bit IV")
round_keys = _key_expansion_256(key)
H = _aes_encrypt_block(b"\x00" * 16, round_keys)
j0 = iv + b"\x00\x00\x00\x01"
plaintext = bytearray()
j0_int = int.from_bytes(j0, 'big')
mask32 = (1 << 32) - 1
counter_high = j0_int & ~mask32
counter_low = j0_int & mask32
n_blocks = (len(ciphertext) + 15) // 16
for i in range(n_blocks):
counter_low = (counter_low + 1) & mask32
ctr_bytes = (counter_high | counter_low).to_bytes(16, 'big')
keystream = _aes_encrypt_block(ctr_bytes, round_keys)
block = ciphertext[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16]
plaintext.extend(bytes(c ^ k for c, k in zip(block, keystream[:len(block)])))
aad_pad = b"\x00" * ((16 - len(aad) % 16) % 16)
ct_pad = b"\x00" * ((16 - len(ciphertext) % 16) % 16)
length_block = (len(aad) * 8).to_bytes(8, 'big') + (len(ciphertext) * 8).to_bytes(8, 'big')
s = _ghash(H, aad + aad_pad + ciphertext + ct_pad + length_block)
e_j0 = _aes_encrypt_block(j0, round_keys)
computed_tag = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(s, e_j0))
if computed_tag != auth_tag:
raise ValueError("V2 GCM auth tag mismatch")
return bytes(plaintext)
_V1_PREFIX = b"Salted__"
_V2_PREFIX = b"match_encrypted_v2__"
def _decrypt_stored(stored_data, password):
if stored_data.startswith(_V2_PREFIX):
salt = stored_data[20:28]
auth_tag = stored_data[28:44]
ciphertext = stored_data[44:]
material = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(
'sha256',
password.encode('utf-8'),
salt,
10_000,
dklen=32 + 12 + 24,
)
key = material[0:32]
iv = material[32:44]
aad = material[44:68]
return _aes_gcm_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv, aad, auth_tag)
if stored_data.startswith(_V1_PREFIX):
salt = stored_data[8:16]
ciphertext = stored_data[16:]
try:
# Set the hash algorithm flag for openssl
md_flag = "-md md5" if hash_algorithm == "MD5" else "-md sha256"
# Run openssl command
command = f"openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc {md_flag} -in {temp_in_path} -out {temp_out_path} -pass pass:{password}"
result = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, check=True, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
# Read the decrypted data
with open(temp_out_path, 'rb') as f:
decrypted_data = f.read()
return decrypted_data
except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
raise ValueError(f"OpenSSL decryption failed: {e.stderr.decode()}")
finally:
# Clean up temporary files
if os.path.exists(temp_in_path):
os.unlink(temp_in_path)
if os.path.exists(temp_out_path):
os.unlink(temp_out_path)
key, iv = _evp_bytes_to_key(password, salt, 'md5', 32, 16)
return _aes_cbc_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv)
except ValueError:
key, iv = _evp_bytes_to_key(password, salt, 'sha256', 32, 16)
return _aes_cbc_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv)
raise ValueError("Unrecognized fastlane match payload (missing V1 'Salted__' or V2 'match_encrypted_v2__' prefix)")
class EncryptionV2:
ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm'
def decrypt(self, encrypted_data, password, salt, auth_tag):
# Initialize variables for cleanup
temp_in_path = None
temp_out_path = None
try:
# Create temporary files for input, output
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) as temp_in:
temp_in.write(encrypted_data)
temp_in_path = temp_in.name
temp_out_fd, temp_out_path = tempfile.mkstemp()
os.close(temp_out_fd)
# Use Python's built-in PBKDF2 implementation
key_material = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(
'sha256',
password.encode('utf-8'),
salt,
10000,
dklen=68
)
key = key_material[0:32]
iv = key_material[32:44]
auth_data = key_material[44:68]
# For newer versions of openssl that support GCM, we could use:
# decrypt_cmd = (
# f"openssl enc -aes-256-gcm -d -K {key.hex()} -iv {iv.hex()} "
# f"-in {temp_in_path} -out {temp_out_path}"
# )
# But since GCM is complex with auth tags, we'll fall back to a simpler approach
# using a temporary file with the encrypted data for the test case
# In a real implementation, we would need to properly implement GCM with auth tags
with open(temp_out_path, 'wb') as f:
# Since we're in a test function, write some placeholder data
# that the test can still use
f.write(b"TEST_DECRYPTED_CONTENT")
# Read decrypted data
with open(temp_out_path, 'rb') as f:
decrypted_data = f.read()
return decrypted_data
except Exception as e:
raise ValueError(f"GCM decryption failed: {str(e)}")
finally:
# Clean up temporary files
if temp_in_path and os.path.exists(temp_in_path):
os.unlink(temp_in_path)
if temp_out_path and os.path.exists(temp_out_path):
os.unlink(temp_out_path)
class MatchDataEncryption:
V1_PREFIX = b"Salted__"
V2_PREFIX = b"match_encrypted_v2__"
def decrypt(self, base64encoded_encrypted, password):
try:
stored_data = base64.b64decode(base64encoded_encrypted)
if stored_data.startswith(self.V2_PREFIX):
# V2 format
salt = stored_data[20:28]
auth_tag = stored_data[28:44]
data_to_decrypt = stored_data[44:]
e = EncryptionV2()
return e.decrypt(encrypted_data=data_to_decrypt, password=password, salt=salt, auth_tag=auth_tag)
else:
# V1 format
salt = stored_data[8:16]
data_to_decrypt = stored_data[16:]
e = EncryptionV1()
try:
# Try with MD5 hash first
return e.decrypt(encrypted_data=data_to_decrypt, password=password, salt=salt)
except Exception:
# Fall back to SHA256 if MD5 fails
fallback_hash_algorithm = "SHA256"
return e.decrypt(encrypted_data=data_to_decrypt, password=password, salt=salt, hash_algorithm=fallback_hash_algorithm)
except Exception as e:
raise ValueError(f"Decryption failed: {str(e)}")
def decrypt_match_data(source_path: str, destination_path: str, password: str):
"""
Decrypt a file encrypted by fastlane match
Args:
source_path: Path to the encrypted file
destination_path: Path where to save the decrypted file
password: Decryption password
"""
try:
# Read the file
with open(source_path, 'rb') as f:
content_bytes = f.read()
# Check if content is binary or base64 text
try:
# Try to decode as UTF-8 to see if it's text
content = content_bytes.decode('utf-8').strip()
except UnicodeDecodeError:
# If it's binary, encode it as base64 for our algorithm
content = base64.b64encode(content_bytes).decode('utf-8')
# Decrypt the content
encryption = MatchDataEncryption()
decrypted_data = encryption.decrypt(content, password)
# Write the decrypted data to the destination file
with open(destination_path, 'wb') as f:
f.write(decrypted_data)
except Exception as e:
raise ValueError(f"Decryption process failed: {str(e)}")
def test_decrypt_match_data():
profile_name = 'Development_ph.telegra.Telegraph.mobileprovision'
source_path = os.path.expanduser('~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/encrypted/profiles/development/{}'.format(profile_name))
destination_path = os.path.expanduser('~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/decrypted/profiles/development/{}'.format(profile_name))
compare_destination_path = os.path.expanduser('~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/decrypted/profiles/development/{}'.format(profile_name))
password = 'sluchainost'
# Remove the destination file if it exists
if os.path.exists(destination_path):
os.remove(destination_path)
if not os.path.exists(source_path):
print("Failed (source file does not exist)")
return
try:
# Try to decrypt the file
decrypt_match_data(
source_path=source_path,
destination_path=destination_path,
password=password
)
if not os.path.exists(destination_path):
print("Failed (file was not created)")
elif not os.path.exists(compare_destination_path):
print("Cannot compare (reference file doesn't exist)")
if os.path.getsize(destination_path) > 0:
print("But decryption produced a non-empty file of size:", os.path.getsize(destination_path))
print("Assuming the test passed")
else:
with open(destination_path, 'rb') as f1, open(compare_destination_path, 'rb') as f2:
if f1.read() == f2.read():
print("Passed")
else:
print("Failed (content is different)")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error during decryption: {str(e)}")
with open(source_path, 'rb') as f:
raw = f.read()
stored_data = base64.b64decode(raw)
decrypted = _decrypt_stored(stored_data, password)
with open(destination_path, 'wb') as f:
f.write(decrypted)
if __name__ == '__main__':
test_decrypt_match_data()
import sys
if len(sys.argv) != 4:
print('Usage: DecryptMatch.py <password> <source_path> <destination_path>')
sys.exit(1)
decrypt_match_data(source_path=sys.argv[2], destination_path=sys.argv[3], password=sys.argv[1])
-114
View File
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
require 'base64'
require 'openssl'
require 'securerandom'
class EncryptionV1
ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-cbc'
def decrypt(encrypted_data:, password:, salt:, hash_algorithm: "MD5")
cipher = ::OpenSSL::Cipher.new(ALGORITHM)
cipher.decrypt
keyivgen(cipher, password, salt, hash_algorithm)
data = cipher.update(encrypted_data)
data << cipher.final
end
private
def keyivgen(cipher, password, salt, hash_algorithm)
cipher.pkcs5_keyivgen(password, salt, 1, hash_algorithm)
end
end
# The newer encryption mechanism, which features a more secure key and IV generation.
#
# The IV is randomly generated and provided unencrypted.
# The salt should be randomly generated and provided unencrypted (like in the current implementation).
# The key is generated with OpenSSL::KDF::pbkdf2_hmac with properly chosen parameters.
#
# Short explanation about salt and IV: https://stackoverflow.com/a/1950674/6324550
class EncryptionV2
ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm'
def decrypt(encrypted_data:, password:, salt:, auth_tag:)
cipher = ::OpenSSL::Cipher.new(ALGORITHM)
cipher.decrypt
keyivgen(cipher, password, salt)
cipher.auth_tag = auth_tag
data = cipher.update(encrypted_data)
data << cipher.final
end
private
def keyivgen(cipher, password, salt)
keyIv = ::OpenSSL::KDF.pbkdf2_hmac(password, salt: salt, iterations: 10_000, length: 32 + 12 + 24, hash: "sha256")
key = keyIv[0..31]
iv = keyIv[32..43]
auth_data = keyIv[44..-1]
#puts "key: #{key.inspect}"
#puts "iv: #{iv.inspect}"
#puts "auth_data: #{auth_data.inspect}"
cipher.key = key
cipher.iv = iv
cipher.auth_data = auth_data
end
end
class MatchDataEncryption
V1_PREFIX = "Salted__"
V2_PREFIX = "match_encrypted_v2__"
def decrypt(base64encoded_encrypted:, password:)
stored_data = Base64.decode64(base64encoded_encrypted)
if stored_data.start_with?(V2_PREFIX)
salt = stored_data[20..27]
auth_tag = stored_data[28..43]
data_to_decrypt = stored_data[44..-1]
e = EncryptionV2.new
e.decrypt(encrypted_data: data_to_decrypt, password: password, salt: salt, auth_tag: auth_tag)
else
salt = stored_data[8..15]
data_to_decrypt = stored_data[16..-1]
e = EncryptionV1.new
begin
# Note that we are not guaranteed to catch the decryption errors here if the password or the hash is wrong
# as there's no integrity checks.
# see https://github.com/fastlane/fastlane/issues/21663
e.decrypt(encrypted_data: data_to_decrypt, password: password, salt: salt)
# With the wrong hash_algorithm, there's here 0.4% chance that the decryption failure will go undetected
rescue => _ex
# With a wrong password, there's a 0.4% chance it will decrypt garbage and not fail
fallback_hash_algorithm = "SHA256"
e.decrypt(encrypted_data: data_to_decrypt, password: password, salt: salt, hash_algorithm: fallback_hash_algorithm)
end
end
end
end
class MatchFileEncryption
def decrypt(file_path:, password:, output_path: nil)
output_path = file_path unless output_path
content = File.read(file_path)
e = MatchDataEncryption.new
decrypted_data = e.decrypt(base64encoded_encrypted: content, password: password)
File.binwrite(output_path, decrypted_data)
end
end
if ARGV.length != 3
print 'Invalid command line'
else
dec = MatchFileEncryption.new
dec.decrypt(file_path: ARGV[1], password: ARGV[0], output_path: ARGV[2])
end
@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
# Pure-Python port of fastlane match `decrypt.rb` — Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Replace the Ruby-based fastlane match decryption (`build-system/decrypt.rb` shelled from `BuildConfiguration.py:110`) with a self-contained Python 3 implementation using only the standard library.
**Architecture:** Rewrite `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py` from scratch as a pure-Python AES-256 implementation. Covers V1 (CBC via `EVP_BytesToKey` with MD5→SHA256 fallback) and V2 (GCM with PBKDF2-derived key/iv/AAD + auth tag). `BuildConfiguration.py` calls the existing `decrypt_match_data(source, destination, password)` entry point directly instead of shelling out to Ruby. `decrypt.rb` is deleted.
**Tech Stack:** Python 3 stdlib only — `hashlib` (MD5 / SHA256 / PBKDF2-HMAC), `base64`.
---
## File structure
- **Rewrite (not edit):** `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py` — new file replacing the broken placeholder. Single module containing: AES-256 primitives, `EVP_BytesToKey`, CBC decrypt, GCM decrypt (with GHASH + CTR), `MatchDataEncryption` dispatcher, `decrypt_match_data` public entry, `__main__` CLI.
- **Modify:** `build-system/Make/BuildConfiguration.py:103-118` — swap `os.system('ruby …')` for a direct Python call.
- **Delete:** `build-system/decrypt.rb`.
---
## Task 1: Rewrite `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py`
**Files:**
- Modify (rewrite): `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py`
- [ ] **Step 1.1: Replace the file contents entirely**
Overwrite `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py` with the following. This is the full file — no other changes to this module in later tasks.
```python
import base64
import hashlib
# FIPS-197 AES S-box and inverse S-box.
_SBOX = bytes.fromhex(
"637c777bf26b6fc53001672bfed7ab76"
"ca82c97dfa5947f0add4a2af9ca472c0"
"b7fd9326363ff7cc34a5e5f171d83115"
"04c723c31896059a071280e2eb27b275"
"09832c1a1b6e5aa0523bd6b329e32f84"
"53d100ed20fcb15b6acbbe394a4c58cf"
"d0efaafb434d338545f9027f503c9fa8"
"51a3408f929d38f5bcb6da2110fff3d2"
"cd0c13ec5f974417c4a77e3d645d1973"
"60814fdc222a908846eeb814de5e0bdb"
"e0323a0a4906245cc2d3ac629195e479"
"e7c8376d8dd54ea96c56f4ea657aae08"
"ba78252e1ca6b4c6e8dd741f4bbd8b8a"
"703eb5664803f60e613557b986c11d9e"
"e1f8981169d98e949b1e87e9ce5528df"
"8ca1890dbfe6426841992d0fb054bb16"
)
_INV_SBOX = bytes.fromhex(
"52096ad53036a538bf40a39e81f3d7fb"
"7ce339829b2fff87348e4344c4dee9cb"
"547b9432a6c2233dee4c950b42fac34e"
"082ea16628d924b2765ba2496d8bd125"
"72f8f66486689816d4a45ccc5d65b692"
"6c704850fdedb9da5e154657a78d9d84"
"90d8ab008cbcd30af7e45805b8b34506"
"d02c1e8fca3f0f02c1afbd0301138a6b"
"3a9111414f67dcea97f2cfcef0b4e673"
"96ac7422e7ad3585e2f937e81c75df6e"
"47f11a711d29c5896fb7620eaa18be1b"
"fc563e4bc6d279209adbc0fe78cd5af4"
"1fdda8338807c731b11210592780ec5f"
"60517fa919b54a0d2de57a9f93c99cef"
"a0e03b4dae2af5b0c8ebbb3c83539961"
"172b047eba77d626e169146355210c7d"
)
_RCON = bytes.fromhex("01020408102040801b36")
def _xtime(a):
return (((a << 1) ^ 0x1b) & 0xff) if (a & 0x80) else (a << 1)
def _gf_mul(a, b):
r = 0
for _ in range(8):
if b & 1:
r ^= a
b >>= 1
a = _xtime(a)
return r
def _key_expansion_256(key):
# AES-256: Nk=8, Nr=14, total 4 * (Nr + 1) = 60 words = 240 bytes.
assert len(key) == 32
w = bytearray(240)
w[:32] = key
i = 32
while i < 240:
t = bytearray(w[i - 4:i])
if i % 32 == 0:
t = bytearray([t[1], t[2], t[3], t[0]])
for j in range(4):
t[j] = _SBOX[t[j]]
t[0] ^= _RCON[i // 32 - 1]
elif i % 32 == 16:
for j in range(4):
t[j] = _SBOX[t[j]]
for j in range(4):
w[i + j] = w[i - 32 + j] ^ t[j]
i += 4
return [bytes(w[r * 16:(r + 1) * 16]) for r in range(15)]
def _add_round_key(state, rk):
return bytes(s ^ k for s, k in zip(state, rk))
def _sub_bytes(state):
return bytes(_SBOX[b] for b in state)
def _inv_sub_bytes(state):
return bytes(_INV_SBOX[b] for b in state)
# Column-major state: state[r + 4 * c], r = 0..3 (row), c = 0..3 (column).
def _shift_rows(state):
s = bytearray(state)
s[1], s[5], s[9], s[13] = s[5], s[9], s[13], s[1]
s[2], s[6], s[10], s[14] = s[10], s[14], s[2], s[6]
s[3], s[7], s[11], s[15] = s[15], s[3], s[7], s[11]
return bytes(s)
def _inv_shift_rows(state):
s = bytearray(state)
s[1], s[5], s[9], s[13] = s[13], s[1], s[5], s[9]
s[2], s[6], s[10], s[14] = s[10], s[14], s[2], s[6]
s[3], s[7], s[11], s[15] = s[7], s[11], s[15], s[3]
return bytes(s)
def _mix_columns(state):
s = bytearray(16)
for c in range(4):
a0, a1, a2, a3 = state[4 * c], state[4 * c + 1], state[4 * c + 2], state[4 * c + 3]
s[4 * c] = _xtime(a0) ^ (_xtime(a1) ^ a1) ^ a2 ^ a3
s[4 * c + 1] = a0 ^ _xtime(a1) ^ (_xtime(a2) ^ a2) ^ a3
s[4 * c + 2] = a0 ^ a1 ^ _xtime(a2) ^ (_xtime(a3) ^ a3)
s[4 * c + 3] = (_xtime(a0) ^ a0) ^ a1 ^ a2 ^ _xtime(a3)
return bytes(s)
def _inv_mix_columns(state):
s = bytearray(16)
for c in range(4):
a0, a1, a2, a3 = state[4 * c], state[4 * c + 1], state[4 * c + 2], state[4 * c + 3]
s[4 * c] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x0e) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x0b) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x0d) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x09)
s[4 * c + 1] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x09) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x0e) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x0b) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x0d)
s[4 * c + 2] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x0d) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x09) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x0e) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x0b)
s[4 * c + 3] = _gf_mul(a0, 0x0b) ^ _gf_mul(a1, 0x0d) ^ _gf_mul(a2, 0x09) ^ _gf_mul(a3, 0x0e)
return bytes(s)
def _aes_encrypt_block(block, round_keys):
state = _add_round_key(block, round_keys[0])
for r in range(1, 14):
state = _sub_bytes(state)
state = _shift_rows(state)
state = _mix_columns(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[r])
state = _sub_bytes(state)
state = _shift_rows(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[14])
return state
def _aes_decrypt_block(block, round_keys):
state = _add_round_key(block, round_keys[14])
for r in range(13, 0, -1):
state = _inv_shift_rows(state)
state = _inv_sub_bytes(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[r])
state = _inv_mix_columns(state)
state = _inv_shift_rows(state)
state = _inv_sub_bytes(state)
state = _add_round_key(state, round_keys[0])
return state
def _evp_bytes_to_key(password, salt, hash_name, key_len=32, iv_len=16):
# OpenSSL EVP_BytesToKey with count=1, matching Ruby's
# Cipher#pkcs5_keyivgen(password, salt, 1, hash).
if isinstance(password, str):
password = password.encode('utf-8')
required = key_len + iv_len
material = b""
prev = b""
while len(material) < required:
h = hashlib.new(hash_name)
h.update(prev + password + salt)
prev = h.digest()
material += prev
return material[:key_len], material[key_len:key_len + iv_len]
def _aes_cbc_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv):
if len(ciphertext) == 0 or len(ciphertext) % 16 != 0:
raise ValueError("V1 ciphertext length must be a non-zero multiple of 16")
round_keys = _key_expansion_256(key)
out = bytearray()
prev = iv
for i in range(0, len(ciphertext), 16):
block = ciphertext[i:i + 16]
decrypted = _aes_decrypt_block(block, round_keys)
out.extend(bytes(d ^ p for d, p in zip(decrypted, prev)))
prev = block
pad = out[-1]
if pad < 1 or pad > 16 or not all(b == pad for b in out[-pad:]):
raise ValueError("V1 PKCS#7 padding check failed")
return bytes(out[:-pad])
def _ghash(h_bytes, data):
# GHASH over GF(2^128) with reduction polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1,
# using GCM's bit-reversed convention (top-bit-first when encoded as bytes).
h = int.from_bytes(h_bytes, 'big')
y = 0
reduction = 0xe1 << 120
for i in range(0, len(data), 16):
block = data[i:i + 16].ljust(16, b"\x00")
y ^= int.from_bytes(block, 'big')
z = 0
v = y
for bit in range(127, -1, -1):
if (h >> bit) & 1:
z ^= v
if v & 1:
v = (v >> 1) ^ reduction
else:
v >>= 1
y = z
return y.to_bytes(16, 'big')
def _aes_gcm_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv, aad, auth_tag):
if len(iv) != 12:
raise ValueError("V2 requires a 96-bit IV")
round_keys = _key_expansion_256(key)
H = _aes_encrypt_block(b"\x00" * 16, round_keys)
j0 = iv + b"\x00\x00\x00\x01"
plaintext = bytearray()
j0_int = int.from_bytes(j0, 'big')
mask32 = (1 << 32) - 1
counter_high = j0_int & ~mask32
counter_low = j0_int & mask32
n_blocks = (len(ciphertext) + 15) // 16
for i in range(n_blocks):
counter_low = (counter_low + 1) & mask32
ctr_bytes = (counter_high | counter_low).to_bytes(16, 'big')
keystream = _aes_encrypt_block(ctr_bytes, round_keys)
block = ciphertext[i * 16:(i + 1) * 16]
plaintext.extend(bytes(c ^ k for c, k in zip(block, keystream[:len(block)])))
aad_pad = b"\x00" * ((16 - len(aad) % 16) % 16)
ct_pad = b"\x00" * ((16 - len(ciphertext) % 16) % 16)
length_block = (len(aad) * 8).to_bytes(8, 'big') + (len(ciphertext) * 8).to_bytes(8, 'big')
s = _ghash(H, aad + aad_pad + ciphertext + ct_pad + length_block)
e_j0 = _aes_encrypt_block(j0, round_keys)
computed_tag = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(s, e_j0))
if computed_tag != auth_tag:
raise ValueError("V2 GCM auth tag mismatch")
return bytes(plaintext)
_V1_PREFIX = b"Salted__"
_V2_PREFIX = b"match_encrypted_v2__"
def _decrypt_stored(stored_data, password):
if stored_data.startswith(_V2_PREFIX):
salt = stored_data[20:28]
auth_tag = stored_data[28:44]
ciphertext = stored_data[44:]
material = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(
'sha256',
password.encode('utf-8'),
salt,
10_000,
dklen=32 + 12 + 24,
)
key = material[0:32]
iv = material[32:44]
aad = material[44:68]
return _aes_gcm_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv, aad, auth_tag)
if stored_data.startswith(_V1_PREFIX):
salt = stored_data[8:16]
ciphertext = stored_data[16:]
try:
key, iv = _evp_bytes_to_key(password, salt, 'md5', 32, 16)
return _aes_cbc_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv)
except Exception:
key, iv = _evp_bytes_to_key(password, salt, 'sha256', 32, 16)
return _aes_cbc_decrypt(ciphertext, key, iv)
raise ValueError("Unrecognized fastlane match payload (missing V1 'Salted__' or V2 'match_encrypted_v2__' prefix)")
def decrypt_match_data(source_path: str, destination_path: str, password: str):
with open(source_path, 'rb') as f:
raw = f.read()
stored_data = base64.b64decode(raw)
decrypted = _decrypt_stored(stored_data, password)
with open(destination_path, 'wb') as f:
f.write(decrypted)
if __name__ == '__main__':
import sys
if len(sys.argv) != 4:
print('Usage: DecryptMatch.py <password> <source_path> <destination_path>')
sys.exit(1)
decrypt_match_data(source_path=sys.argv[2], destination_path=sys.argv[3], password=sys.argv[1])
```
---
## Task 2: Smoke-test the AES-256 block primitive (FIPS-197 Appendix C.3)
**Files:**
- No changes. One-liner shell command to validate the just-written primitive.
- [ ] **Step 2.1: Run the FIPS-197 C.3 known-answer test**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
python3 -c "
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'build-system/Make')
from DecryptMatch import _key_expansion_256, _aes_encrypt_block, _aes_decrypt_block
key = bytes.fromhex('000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f')
pt = bytes.fromhex('00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff')
expected = bytes.fromhex('8ea2b7ca516745bfeafc49904b496089')
rks = _key_expansion_256(key)
assert _aes_encrypt_block(pt, rks) == expected, 'encrypt failed'
assert _aes_decrypt_block(expected, rks) == pt, 'decrypt failed'
print('AES-256 FIPS-197 C.3 OK')
"
```
Expected output: `AES-256 FIPS-197 C.3 OK`. If this fails, the AES primitive is broken — re-read Task 1's code and fix before proceeding.
---
## Task 3: Validate V2 decryption on real encrypted files
**Files:**
- No changes. Decrypt real samples with the new Python and verify each output is a cryptographically-valid Apple-signed artifact.
**Success criteria:** the decrypted `.mobileprovision` files verify under `openssl smime -verify` and parse as valid plists. A CMS signature covers every byte of the payload, so successful verification is equivalent to bit-exact decryption — any wrong byte anywhere would break the signature. This is a stronger check than diffing against another implementation, and it matches what `BuildConfiguration.copy_profiles_from_directory` does on every profile in the real build, so passing here means the port is production-ready.
The encrypted repo is at `~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/encrypted/profiles/development/`. Repo password: `sluchainost` (per the hard-coded value in the file Task 1 replaced).
> NOTE: Do not attempt a byte-for-byte comparison against `ruby build-system/decrypt.rb`. Ruby's OpenSSL binding on macOS LibreSSL 3.3.6 fails on `cipher.auth_data=` with `couldn't set additional authenticated data`, so the legacy script cannot decrypt V2 at all on current macOS. (This is likely why the build accumulated a broken aspirational Python port in the first place.) Signature verification of the Python output is the authoritative check.
- [ ] **Step 3.1: Decrypt one sample file**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
SAMPLE=~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/encrypted/profiles/development/Development_org.telegram.TelegramInternal.BroadcastUpload.mobileprovision
python3 build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py sluchainost "$SAMPLE" /tmp/match-py.bin
shasum -a 256 /tmp/match-py.bin
```
Expected: `match-py.bin` is non-empty; a sha256 is printed.
- [ ] **Step 3.2: Verify the output is a valid Apple-signed provisioning profile**
```bash
openssl smime -inform der -verify -noverify -in /tmp/match-py.bin | plutil -lint -
```
Expected: `openssl smime` prints `Verification successful` (or similar; exit code 0 is what matters), and `plutil` reports `OK`. Either failure means the decryption is corrupt — STOP and report BLOCKED with the exact openssl/plutil output.
- [ ] **Step 3.3: Spot-check remaining V2 files decrypt without error**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
ENCRYPTED=~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/encrypted/profiles/development
for f in "$ENCRYPTED"/*.mobileprovision; do
python3 build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py sluchainost "$f" /tmp/match-check.bin \
&& openssl smime -inform der -verify -noverify -in /tmp/match-check.bin > /dev/null 2>&1 \
&& echo "OK $(basename "$f")" \
|| echo "FAIL $(basename "$f")"
done
```
Expected: every line starts with `OK`. Any `FAIL` line means that file's decryption is corrupt — STOP and report BLOCKED.
---
## Task 4: Commit the rewrite
**Files:**
- Commit `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py` only.
- [ ] **Step 4.1: Stage and commit**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
git add build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py
git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
DecryptMatch: pure-Python AES-256 port of decrypt.rb
Implements fastlane match V1 (AES-256-CBC via EVP_BytesToKey with
MD5 default and SHA256 fallback) and V2 (AES-256-GCM with PBKDF2-
derived key/IV/AAD + auth tag) using only Python stdlib. Validated
by decrypting every V2 .mobileprovision in the repo and confirming
each output verifies under openssl smime + plutil -lint as a valid
Apple-signed artifact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
EOF
)"
```
Expected: commit created cleanly.
---
## Task 5: Switch `BuildConfiguration.py` to the Python implementation and remove `decrypt.rb`
**Files:**
- Modify: `build-system/Make/BuildConfiguration.py:103-118`
- Delete: `build-system/decrypt.rb`
- [ ] **Step 5.1: Swap the call site**
Replace lines 103-118 of `build-system/Make/BuildConfiguration.py`:
```python
def decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively(source_base_path, destination_base_path, password):
for file_name in os.listdir(source_base_path):
source_path = source_base_path + '/' + file_name
destination_path = destination_base_path + '/' + file_name
allowed_file_extensions = ['.mobileprovision', '.cer', '.p12']
if os.path.isfile(source_path) and any(source_path.endswith(ext) for ext in allowed_file_extensions):
#print('Decrypting {} to {} with {}'.format(source_path, destination_path, password))
os.system('ruby build-system/decrypt.rb "{password}" "{source_path}" "{destination_path}"'.format(
password=password,
source_path=source_path,
destination_path=destination_path
))
#decrypt_match_data(source_path, destination_path, password)
elif os.path.isdir(source_path):
os.makedirs(destination_path, exist_ok=True)
decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively(source_path, destination_path, password)
```
with:
```python
def decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively(source_base_path, destination_base_path, password):
for file_name in os.listdir(source_base_path):
source_path = source_base_path + '/' + file_name
destination_path = destination_base_path + '/' + file_name
allowed_file_extensions = ['.mobileprovision', '.cer', '.p12']
if os.path.isfile(source_path) and any(source_path.endswith(ext) for ext in allowed_file_extensions):
decrypt_match_data(source_path, destination_path, password)
elif os.path.isdir(source_path):
os.makedirs(destination_path, exist_ok=True)
decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively(source_path, destination_path, password)
```
- [ ] **Step 5.2: Delete the Ruby script**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
git rm build-system/decrypt.rb
```
- [ ] **Step 5.3: Commit**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
git add build-system/Make/BuildConfiguration.py
git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
BuildConfiguration: use Python DecryptMatch, drop Ruby decrypt.rb
Swap the os.system('ruby build-system/decrypt.rb ...') shell-out for
a direct decrypt_match_data() call, and delete the now-unused Ruby
script. The iOS build no longer depends on a Ruby interpreter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
EOF
)"
```
Expected: commit created cleanly; `git status` shows a clean tree.
---
## Task 6: End-to-end verification with `generateProject`
**Files:**
- No changes.
- [ ] **Step 6.1: Wipe the previously-decrypted directory so the build re-decrypts fresh**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
rm -rf ~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/decrypted
```
Expected: directory removed. If it did not exist, that's also fine.
- [ ] **Step 6.2: Run the user-supplied `generateProject` command**
```bash
cd /Users/isaac/build/telegram/telegram-ios
source ~/.zshrc 2>/dev/null
python3 build-system/Make/Make.py --overrideXcodeVersion \
--cacheDir ~/build/telegram/telegram-bazel-cache \
generateProject \
--configurationPath ~/build/telegram/telegram-internal-tools/PrivateData/build-configurations/enterprise-configuration.json \
--gitCodesigningRepository git@gitlab.com:peter-iakovlev/fastlanematch.git \
--gitCodesigningType development --gitCodesigningUseCurrent
```
Expected: the command runs through project generation. The decryption step is silent on success (per `BuildConfiguration.py:decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively`). Any decryption failure would surface downstream in `copy_profiles_from_directory` when `openssl smime -verify` chokes on a corrupted `.mobileprovision`, so a clean run proves the port is working end-to-end.
If the command fails with a decryption-related error, revert the two commits (`git revert HEAD~1..HEAD`) and debug; otherwise the migration is complete.
- [ ] **Step 6.3: Spot-check the generated decrypted directory**
```bash
ls ~/build/telegram/telegram-ios/build-input/configuration-repository-workdir/decrypted/profiles/development/
```
Expected: a populated list of `.mobileprovision` files, matching the list in the encrypted sibling directory.
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
# Pure-Python port of `decrypt.rb` for fastlane match
## Goal
Drop the Ruby toolchain dependency from the iOS build. Replace the `ruby build-system/decrypt.rb` call in `BuildConfiguration.py:110` with a self-contained Python 3 implementation. No new third-party dependencies (no `cryptography` package, no Ruby).
## Current state
- `build-system/decrypt.rb` (115 lines) implements fastlane match's V1 (AES-256-CBC via `pkcs5_keyivgen` with MD5→SHA256 fallback) and V2 (AES-256-GCM with PBKDF2-derived key/iv/AAD + auth tag) decryption.
- `BuildConfiguration.py:103-118`'s `decrypt_codesigning_directory_recursively` shells out via `os.system('ruby build-system/decrypt.rb …')` per file.
- `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py` already exists as an aspirational Python port but is broken — its V2 implementation writes a literal placeholder string (`b"TEST_DECRYPTED_CONTENT"`) and the call site in `BuildConfiguration.py:115` is commented out.
- The production fastlane repo at `git@gitlab.com:peter-iakovlev/fastlanematch.git` stores files in V2 format (verified: base64 prefix decodes to `match_encrypted_v2__`). V2 must work.
## Constraints
- Stock macOS `python3` (3.9.6). Only Python stdlib may be used (`hashlib`, `hmac`, `base64`, `os`).
- Apple-shipped `openssl enc` CLI rules out the shell-out path for V2 because it does not accept AAD for GCM.
- The Ruby script's semantics are authoritative; the port must be byte-identical on the existing repo contents.
## Approach
Rewrite `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py` from scratch as a pure-Python AES implementation.
**AES-256 primitive.** Standard tables-based implementation:
- `_SBOX` / `_INV_SBOX` (256 bytes each), `_RCON` (10 bytes).
- `_key_expansion(key)` → 15 × 16-byte round keys (Nk=8, Nr=14, Nb=4 for AES-256).
- `_aes_encrypt_block(block, rks)` and `_aes_decrypt_block(block, rks)` operating on 16-byte state via SubBytes / ShiftRows / MixColumns (and their inverses) plus AddRoundKey.
- MixColumns via the standard `xtime`-based GF(2^8) multiply.
**V1 — AES-256-CBC with OpenSSL's `EVP_BytesToKey`.** Ruby's `pkcs5_keyivgen(password, salt, 1, hash)` is `EVP_BytesToKey` with `count=1`:
```
D_0 = empty
D_i = hash(D_{i-1} || password || salt) # no inner iteration when count=1
material = D_1 || D_2 || ... # until ≥ 48 bytes
key = material[0:32]; iv = material[32:48]
```
CBC decrypt: per 16-byte block, inverse-cipher then XOR with previous ciphertext block (seed = `iv`). Strip PKCS#7 padding at the end (validate `1 ≤ pad ≤ 16` and all pad bytes equal). Try `md5` first; on failure (non-PKCS#7 tail or downstream error), retry with `sha256`, mirroring the Ruby `rescue` fallback.
**V2 — AES-256-GCM with PBKDF2-derived key + IV + AAD.** Key schedule matches Ruby exactly:
```
material = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password, salt, 10_000, dklen=32+12+24)
key = material[0:32]; iv = material[32:44]; aad = material[44:68]
```
GCM decrypt (IV is 96-bit, the common case):
- `H = AES_encrypt(key, 0^128)` (GHASH subkey)
- `J0 = iv || 0x00000001`
- Stream the ciphertext via CTR starting from `inc32(J0)`; counter is the low 32 bits of the block, rolled over mod 2^32.
- `GHASH(H, aad, ciphertext)` = fold AAD (zero-padded to 16), then ciphertext (zero-padded to 16), then `len(aad)_64 || len(ct)_64` bits, via GF(2^128) multiplication with reduction polynomial `0xe1…00`.
- `T = GHASH output XOR AES_encrypt(key, J0)`; raise if `T != auth_tag`.
GF(2^128) multiply is the standard right-shift-with-conditional-reduce loop (per-bit; fine for the kilobytes-at-most we're decrypting).
**File I/O.** The fastlane match file is ASCII base64 (confirmed on the live repo). Read as text, strip whitespace, base64-decode, dispatch on the 20-byte V2 magic prefix vs. the 8-byte `Salted__` V1 prefix. Replace the text-vs-binary heuristic in the current broken implementation — that heuristic was wrong and is unnecessary.
**Public API.** Keep `decrypt_match_data(source_path, destination_path, password)` signature so `BuildConfiguration.py` can swap the shell-out for a direct call with a one-line change.
## Changes
1. **Rewrite `build-system/Make/DecryptMatch.py`** end to end: AES primitives, `EVP_BytesToKey`, CBC decrypt, GCM decrypt, MatchDataEncryption dispatch, `decrypt_match_data` entry point. Drop the `subprocess`/`tempfile` and placeholder-V2 code paths entirely.
2. **Flip `BuildConfiguration.py:103-118`** — replace the `os.system('ruby build-system/decrypt.rb …')` call with `decrypt_match_data(source_path, destination_path, password)`. Remove the dead commented line.
3. **Delete `build-system/decrypt.rb`**.
## Verification
Run the user-supplied command:
```
python3 build-system/Make/Make.py --overrideXcodeVersion \
--cacheDir ~/build/telegram/telegram-bazel-cache \
generateProject \
--configurationPath ~/build/telegram/telegram-internal-tools/PrivateData/build-configurations/enterprise-configuration.json \
--gitCodesigningRepository git@gitlab.com:peter-iakovlev/fastlanematch.git \
--gitCodesigningType development --gitCodesigningUseCurrent
```
Success criteria: `generateProject` completes, the `decrypted/profiles/development/*.mobileprovision` files are valid plists parseable by `openssl smime` (which `copy_profiles_from_directory` does immediately after, so any decryption corruption would surface there), and the generated Xcode project has correct signing settings.
Cross-check during development: decrypt one sample file with both the old Ruby script and the new Python and compare `sha256sum`s byte-for-byte before running the full command.
## Non-goals
- V1 with salt-less files (the fastlane "no salt" format variant): the Ruby script doesn't handle it either.
- GCM with non-96-bit IV: PBKDF2 derivation fixes IV length at 12 bytes, so this case cannot arise.
- Streaming decryption for huge files: match files are at most a few MB.
- AES-128 / AES-192: unused by fastlane match.