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Author SHA1 Message Date
David Benjamin 907ae62b9d ASN1_get_object should not accept large universal tags.
The high bits of the type get used for the V_ASN1_NEG bit, so when used with
ASN1_ANY/ASN1_TYPE, universal tags become ambiguous. This allows one to create
a negative zero, which should be impossible. Impose an upper bound on universal
tags accepted by crypto/asn1 and add a test.

BUG=590615

(Cherry-picked from fb2c6f8c8565e1e2d85c24408050c96521acbcdc.)

Change-Id: Ia988acf73fd11807869510a2b3825637a8d98853
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7298
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-03-03 22:13:54 +00:00
David Benjamin 65be20fe2f Fix encoding bug in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER
(Imported from upstream's 3661bb4e7934668bd99ca777ea8b30eedfafa871.)

Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.

Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and Hanno Böck
<hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.

BUG=590615

(Cherry-picked from c4eec0c16b02c97a62a95b6a08656c3a9ddb6baa.)

Change-Id: I61c5556e8a065817e3d36569433bff83a104d4c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7297
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-03-03 22:11:56 +00:00
David Benjamin ab441a3a39 Remove support for mis-encoded PKCS#8 DSA keys.
Previously, OpenSSL supported many different DSA PKCS#8 encodings. Only
support the standard format. One of the workaround formats (SEQUENCE of
private key and public key) seems to be a workaround for an old Netscape
bug. From inspection, NSS seems to have fixed this from the first open
source commit.

Change-Id: I1e097b675145954b4d7a0bed8733e5a25c25fd8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7074
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2016-02-22 15:20:12 -05:00
David Benjamin afe57cb14d Add a tool to generate Ed25519 keys.
Make it slightly easier for people to use.

Change-Id: I567e95bf1a5c203170a0b9732fd522fcbe5b7bc1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6773
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-18 23:34:13 +00:00
Adam Langley 77c3c0b025 Enable Ed25519 when building with OPENSSL_SMALL.
OPENSSL_SMALL will still cause the smaller base-point table to be used
and so won't be as fast at signing as the full version, but Ed25519 will
now work in those builds.

Without OPENSSL_SMALL:

Did 20000 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1008347us (19834.4 ops/sec)
Did 20000 Ed25519 signing operations in 1025594us (19500.9 ops/sec)
Did 6138 Ed25519 verify operations in 1001712us (6127.5 ops/sec)
Did 21000 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1019237us (20603.6 ops/sec)
Did 7095 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1065986us (6655.8 ops/sec)

With (on the same machine):

Did 8415 Ed25519 key generation operations in 1020958us (8242.3 ops/sec)
Did 8952 Ed25519 signing operations in 1077635us (8307.1 ops/sec)
Did 6358 Ed25519 verify operations in 1047533us (6069.5 ops/sec)
Did 6620 Curve25519 base-point multiplication operations in 1008922us (6561.5 ops/sec)
Did 7183 Curve25519 arbitrary point multiplication operations in 1096285us (6552.1 ops/sec)

Change-Id: Ib443c0e2bdfd11e044087e66efd55b651a5667e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6772
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-18 23:15:33 +00:00
David Benjamin 9f897b2580 Remove the stitched RC4-MD5 code and use the generic one.
This removes 16k from a release-mode build of the bssl tool. Now that we've
finished the AEAD refactor, there's no use in keeping this around as a
prototype for "stateful AEADs".

Before:
Did 2264000 RC4-MD5 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000430us (2263026.9 ops/sec): 36.2 MB/s
Did 266000 RC4-MD5 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000984us (265738.5 ops/sec): 358.7 MB/s
Did 50000 RC4-MD5 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014209us (49299.5 ops/sec): 403.9 MB/s
After:
Did 1895000 RC4-MD5 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000239us (1894547.2 ops/sec): 30.3 MB/s
Did 199000 RC4-MD5 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001361us (198729.5 ops/sec): 268.3 MB/s
Did 39000 RC4-MD5 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014832us (38430.0 ops/sec): 314.8 MB/s

There is a non-trivial performance hit, but this cipher doesn't matter much and
the stitched mode code reaches into MD5_CTX and RC4_KEY in somewhat unfortunate
ways.

Change-Id: I9ecd28d6afb54e90ce61baecc641742af2ae6269
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6752
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:57:42 +00:00
David Benjamin 1741a9d143 Save some mallocs in computing the MAC for e_tls.c.
We can reuse the HMAC_CTX that stores the key. The API is kind of unfortunate
as, in principle, it should be possible to do an allocation-averse HMAC with a
shared key on multiple threads at once (EVP_AEAD_CTX is normally logically
const). At some point it may be worth rethinking those APIs somewhat.  But
these "stateful AEADs" are already stateful in their EVP_CIPHER_CTX, so this is
fine.

Each cipher was run individually to minimize the effect of other ciphers doing
their mallocs. (Although the cost of a malloc is presumably going to depend a
lot on the malloc implementation and what's happened before in the process, so
take these numbers with a bucket of salt. They vary widely even with the same
arguments.)

Taking malloc out of seal/open also helps with the malloc tests. DTLS currently
cannot distinguish a malloc failure (should be fatal) from a decryption failure
(not fatal), so the malloc tests get stuck. But this doesn't completely get us
there since tls_cbc.c mallocs. This also assumes EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_MD_CTX,
and HMAC_CTX are all clever about reusing their allocations when reset (which
they are).

Before:
Did 1315000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000087us (1314885.6 ops/sec): 21.0 MB/s
Did 181000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004918us (180114.2 ops/sec): 243.2 MB/s
Did 34000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1024250us (33195.0 ops/sec): 271.9 MB/s
After:
Did 1766000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000319us (1765436.8 ops/sec): 28.2 MB/s
Did 187000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004002us (186254.6 ops/sec): 251.4 MB/s
Did 35000 AES-128-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014885us (34486.7 ops/sec): 282.5 MB/s

Before:
Did 391000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000038us (390985.1 ops/sec): 6.3 MB/s
Did 16000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1060226us (15091.1 ops/sec): 20.4 MB/s
Did 2827 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1035971us (2728.8 ops/sec): 22.4 MB/s
After:
Did 444000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1001814us (443196.0 ops/sec): 7.1 MB/s
Did 17000 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1042535us (16306.4 ops/sec): 22.0 MB/s
Did 2590 DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1012378us (2558.3 ops/sec): 21.0 MB/s

Before:
Did 1316000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000510us (1315329.2 ops/sec): 21.0 MB/s
Did 157000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1002944us (156539.1 ops/sec): 211.3 MB/s
Did 29000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1030284us (28147.6 ops/sec): 230.6 MB/s
After:
Did 1645000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000313us (1644485.3 ops/sec): 26.3 MB/s
Did 162000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1003060us (161505.8 ops/sec): 218.0 MB/s
Did 36000 AES-256-CBC-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1014819us (35474.3 ops/sec): 290.6 MB/s

Before:
Did 1435000 RC4-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000245us (1434648.5 ops/sec): 23.0 MB/s
Did 207000 RC4-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1004675us (206036.8 ops/sec): 278.1 MB/s
Did 38000 RC4-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1022712us (37156.1 ops/sec): 304.4 MB/s
After:
Did 1853000 RC4-SHA1 (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000433us (1852198.0 ops/sec): 29.6 MB/s
Did 206000 RC4-SHA1 (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1002370us (205512.9 ops/sec): 277.4 MB/s
Did 42000 RC4-SHA1 (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1024209us (41007.3 ops/sec): 335.9 MB/s

Change-Id: I0edb89bddf146cf91a8e7a99c56b2278c8f38094
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:56:28 +00:00
David Benjamin df571631cc Add RC4-SHA1 and DES-EDE3-CBC-SHA1 to bssl speed.
For completeness. In so far as we care about legacy ciphers' performance at
all, we should have the others too.

Change-Id: Idd2d93345f3af8b6ac5772a1cb3c201f84fe3197
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:53:23 +00:00
David Benjamin 13414b3a04 Implement draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04.
Only ECDHE-based ciphers are implemented. To ease the transition, the
pre-standard cipher shares a name with the standard one. The cipher rule parser
is hacked up to match the name to both ciphers. From the perspective of the
cipher suite configuration language, there is only one cipher.

This does mean it is impossible to disable the old variant without a code
change, but this situation will be very short-lived, so this is fine.

Also take this opportunity to make the CK and TXT names align with convention.

Change-Id: Ie819819c55bce8ff58e533f1dbc8bef5af955c21
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6686
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:34:56 +00:00
David Benjamin 37489902ba Implement draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04 in Go.
This will be used to test the C implementation against.

Change-Id: I2d396d27630937ea610144e381518eae76f78dab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6685
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:33:54 +00:00
David Benjamin 2089fdd10e Implement RFC 7539 in Go.
In preparation for a Go implementation of the new TLS ciphers to test
against, implement the AEAD primitive.

Change-Id: I69b5b51257c3de16bdd36912ed2bc9d91ac853c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6684
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:33:39 +00:00
David Benjamin 86e412dc18 Add client cert support to bssl client.
Handy to test servers with misbehaving client auth.

Change-Id: I93f7b77c35e223761edade648bc03d1f97ed82fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6614
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 23:15:41 +00:00
David Benjamin 23a681b9f9 Fix build.
There were a couple more asm lines to turn into __asm__ when the patches got
reordered slightly.

Change-Id: I44be5caee6d09bb3db5dea4791592b12d175822c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6741
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:26:12 +00:00
David Benjamin e3203923b5 Rename the Go ChaCha20-Poly1305 implementation.
In preparation for implementing the RFC 7539 variant to test against.

Change-Id: I0ce5e856906e00925ad1d849017f9e7fda087a8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6683
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:24:00 +00:00
David Benjamin 8ffab72683 Point EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305 at the standardized version.
The consumers have all been updated, so we can move EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305
to its final state. Unfortunately, the _rfc7539-suffixed version will need to
stick around for just a hair longer. Also the tls1.h macros, but the remaining
consumers are okay with that changing underneath them.

Change-Id: Ibbb70ec1860d6ac6a7e1d7b45e70fe692bf5ebe5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6600
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:22:11 +00:00
David Benjamin fef6fb592b Fix ChaCha20-Poly1305 tests.
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6101 was mismerged from *ring* and
lost some tests. Also add the corresponding tag truncation tests for the new
construction. So long as we have that feature, we should have tests for it.
(Although, do we actually need to support it?)

Change-Id: I70784cbac345e0ad11b496102856c53932b7362e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6682
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:20:49 +00:00
David Benjamin 60a08ac211 Remove unreachable code to duplicate DH keys.
dh_tmp can only contain parameters, now that DHE always generates keys fresh
for each connection.

Change-Id: I56dad4cbec7e21326360d79df211031fd9734004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6702
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:20:12 +00:00
David Benjamin 4ec0cce743 Slightly tweak some array allocations.
clang scan-build is annoyed it's not obvious the sizeof line matches the
pointer type. This is easy to fix and makes it be quiet.

Change-Id: Iec80d2a087f81179c88cae300f56d3f76b32b347
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6701
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:19:32 +00:00
David Benjamin 2936170d68 Fix memory leak in DSA redo case.
Found by clang scan-build.

Change-Id: I44a9d5ea165ede836c72aed8725d0bb0981b1004
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6700
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:17:09 +00:00
David Benjamin a01deee96b Make CBB_len relative to its argument.
Rather than the length of the top-level CBB, which is kind of odd when ASN.1
length prefixes are not yet determined, return the number of bytes written to
the CBB so far. This can be computed without increasing the size of CBB at all.
Have offset and pending_*.

This means functions which take in a CBB as argument will not be sensitive to
whether the CBB is a top-level or child CBB. The extensions logic had to be
careful to only ever compare differences of lengths, which was awkward.

The reversal will also allow for the following pattern in the future, once
CBB_add_space is split into, say, CBB_reserve and CBB_did_write and we add a
CBB_data:

  uint8_t *signature;
  size_t signature_len = 0;
  if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &cert, CBB_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
      /* Emit the TBSCertificate. */
      !CBB_add_asn1(&cert, &tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
      !CBB_add_tbs_cert_stuff(&tbs_cert, stuff) ||
      !CBB_flush(&cert) ||
      /* Feed it into md_ctx. */
      !EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) ||
      !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, CBB_data(&cert), CBB_len(&cert)) ||
      /* Emit the signature algorithm. */
      !CBB_add_asn1(&cert, &sig_alg, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
      !CBB_add_sigalg_stuff(&sig_alg, other_stuff) ||
      /* Emit the signature. */
      !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
      !CBB_reserve(&cert, &signature, signature_len) ||
      !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, signature, &signature_len) ||
      !CBB_did_write(&cert, signature_len)) {
    goto err;
  }

(Were TBSCertificate not the first field, we'd still have to sample
CBB_len(&cert), but at least that's reasonable straight-forward. The
alternative would be if CBB_data and CBB_len somehow worked on
recently-invalidated CBBs, but that would go wrong once the invalidated CBB's
parent flushed and possibly shifts everything.)

And similar for signing ServerKeyExchange.

Change-Id: I7761e492ae472d7632875b5666b6088970261b14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6681
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 21:16:12 +00:00
Adam Langley 77385bb43d Mark platform-specific HOST_[c2l|l2c] as (void).
I skipped a patch when landing and so 793c21e2 caused a build failure
when platform-specific versions of these macros were used.

Change-Id: I8ed6dbb92a511ef306d45087c3eb87781fdfed31
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6740
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 20:16:46 +00:00
David Benjamin 6969971fef Remove a dead prototype.
Change-Id: I05cf52b31bd532505393e9a1ccae27f89f81f6f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6680
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 20:03:53 +00:00
David Benjamin 1b36716ce2 Remove crypto/header_removed.h.
This is a remnant from when the headers in include/ where still
symlinks.

Change-Id: Ice27c412c0cdcc43312f5297119678091dcd5d38
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6670
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 20:03:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 017231a544 Remove asm __asm__ define.
It's only used in one file. No sense in polluting the namespace here.

Change-Id: Iaf3870a4be2d2cad950f4d080e25fe7f0d3929c7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6660
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 20:03:17 +00:00
David Benjamin 793c21e266 Make HOST_l2c return void.
Nothing ever uses the return value. It'd be better off discarding it rather
than make callers stick (void) everywhere.

Change-Id: Ia28c970a1e5a27db441e4511249589d74408849b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6653
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 20:02:37 +00:00
David Benjamin 0aff3ffb88 Store the partial block as uint8_t, not uint32_t.
The uint32_t likely dates to them using HASH_LONG everywhere. Nothing ever
touches c->data as a uint32_t, only bytes. (Which makes sense seeing as it
stores the partial block.)

Change-Id: I634cb7f2b6306523aa663f8697b7dc92aa491320
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6651
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 19:59:29 +00:00
David Benjamin 5a19d7dfa8 Use the straight-forward ROTATE macro.
I would hope any sensible compiler would recognize the rotation. (If
not, we should at least pull this into crypto/internal.h.) Confirmed
that clang at least produces the exact same instructions for
sha256_block_data_order for release + NO_ASM. This is also mostly moot
as SHA-1 and SHA-256 both have assembly versions on x86 that sidestep
most of this.

For the digests, take it out of md32_common.h since it doesn't use the
macro. md32_common.h isn't sure whether it's a multiply-included header
or not. It should be, but it has an #include guard (doesn't quite do
what you'd want) and will get HOST_c2l, etc., confused if one tries to
include it twice.

Change-Id: I1632801de6473ffd2c6557f3412521ec5d6b305c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6650
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 19:57:31 +00:00
David Benjamin 78fefbf3bb Reformat md32_common.h, part 2.
Manual tweaks and then clang-formatted again.

Change-Id: I809fdb71b2135343e5c1264dd659b464780fc54a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6649
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 19:52:06 +00:00
David Benjamin fea1137e55 Reformat md32_common.h, part 1.
We've tweaked it already and upstream's using a different indentation
style now anyway. This is the first of two commits. For verifiability,
this is the output of clang-format with no modifications.

Change-Id: Ia30f20bee0cc8046aedf9ac7106cc4630e8d93e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6648
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 19:47:50 +00:00
David Benjamin 871fff076b *_Update of length zero is legal.
We can slightly simplify tls1_P_hash. (Confirmed md32_common.h emits
code with the check.)

Change-Id: I0293ceaaee261a7ac775b42a639f7a9f67705456
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6647
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 19:46:57 +00:00
David Benjamin d9f0671bbe Remove |need_record_splitting| from |SSL3_STATE|.
It is redundant given the other state in the connection.

Change-Id: I5dc71627132659ab4316a5ea360c9ca480fb7c6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6646
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 18:45:48 +00:00
David Benjamin cd480380fa Remove unused fields from SSL3_STATE.
These have been unused since we unified everything on EVP_AEAD. I must
have missed them when clearing out dead state. This shaves 136 bytes of
per-connection state.

Change-Id: I705f8de389fd34ab4524554ee9e4b1d6be198994
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6645
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 18:42:56 +00:00
David Benjamin 7fc010014c Slightly simplify SSL3_RECORD.
There's no need to track consumed bytes, so rr->data and rr->off may be
merged together.

Change-Id: I8842d005665ea8b4d4a0cced941f3373872cdac4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6644
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 18:41:59 +00:00
David Benjamin ece5ba2797 Reset ssl error codes.
38 error codes have fallen off the list since the last time we did this.

Change-Id: Id7ee30889a5da2f6ab66957fd8e49e97640c8489
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6643
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 18:38:20 +00:00
David Benjamin a41280d8cb Pull ChangeCipherSpec into the handshake state machine.
This uses ssl3_read_bytes for now. We still need to dismantle that
function and then invert the handshake state machine, but this gets
things closer to the right shape as an intermediate step and is a large
chunk in itself. It simplifies a lot of the CCS/handshake
synchronization as a lot of the invariants much more clearly follow from
the handshake itself.

Tests need to be adjusted since this changes some error codes. Now all
the CCS/Handshake checks fall through to the usual
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD codepath. Most of what used to be a special-case
falls out naturally. (If half of Finished was in the same record as the
pre-CCS message, that part of the handshake record would have been left
unconsumed, so read_change_cipher_spec would have noticed, just like
read_app_data would have noticed.)

Change-Id: I15c7501afe523d5062f0e24a3b65f053008d87be
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6642
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 18:36:57 +00:00
David Benjamin 8fd5c23218 Simplify fragmented HelloRequest state.
With server-side renegotiation gone, handshake_fragment's only purpose
in life is to handle a fragmented HelloRequest (we probably do need to
support those if some server does 1/n-1 record-splitting on handshake
records). The logic to route the data into
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) never happens, and the contents are
always a HelloRequest prefix.

This also trims a tiny bit of per-connection state.

Change-Id: Ia1b0dda5b7e79d817c28da1478640977891ebc97
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6641
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 17:45:31 +00:00
David Benjamin ef5dfd2980 Add tests for malformed HelloRequests.
Change-Id: Iff053022c7ffe5b01c0daf95726cc7d49c33cbd6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6640
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 17:40:29 +00:00
David Benjamin 8411b248c3 Add tests for bad ChangeCipherSpecs.
Change-Id: I7eac3582b7b23b5da95be68277609cfa63195b02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6629
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 17:39:43 +00:00
David Benjamin 502a843dee Switch unrolled loop in BN_usub with memcpy.
See also upstream's 06cf881a3a10d5af3c1255c08cfd0c6ddb5f1cc3,
9f040d6decca7930e978784c917f731e5c45e8f0, and
9f6795e7d2d1e35668ad70ba0afc480062be4e2e.

Change-Id: I27d90e382867a5fe988d152b31f8494e001a6a9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6628
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 17:38:48 +00:00
David Benjamin c3ae38b4f8 Remove DH EVP_PKEY hooks.
They would never work. Better notice when callers depend on it than fail at
runtime.

This depends on https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/183610/ in
Conscrypt.

Change-Id: I3411f291416df834cf85850890617625a2e76939
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6552
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 17:38:06 +00:00
Nico Weber 7100ee9832 Chromium's update.sh is dead, long live update.py
update.py used to be used only on Windows until very recently, but
Windows and non-Windows have been at the same clang revision for
a while now.  So even a few months ago update.py and update.sh
would've contained the same clang revision.

BUG=chromium:494442

Change-Id: Ie9127a1c49e31a7810ee431f8e662350c245917c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6620
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 17:30:31 +00:00
David Benjamin f28dd64d43 Fix flaky BadRSAClientKeyExchange-1 test.
Sometimes BadRSAClientKeyExchange-1 fails with DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS if
the corruption brings the ciphertext above the RSA modulus. Ensure this does
not happen.

Change-Id: I0d8ea6887dfcab946fdf5d38f5b196f5a927c4a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6731
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-16 15:40:18 +00:00
David Benjamin 423488557c Remove unused functions.
Change-Id: I48d6db3b2e521c726962c291cce7baa029e09623
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6627
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 21:32:44 +00:00
David Benjamin 45dab251f3 Skip free callbacks on empty CRYPTO_EX_DATAs.
Avoids bouncing on the lock, but it doesn't really matter since it's all
taking read locks. If we're declaring that callbacks don't get to see
every object being created, they shouldn't see every object being
destroyed.

CRYPTO_dup_ex_data also already had this optimization, though it wasn't
documented.

BUG=391192

Change-Id: I5b8282335112bca3850a7c0168f8bd7f7d4a2d57
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6626
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 21:32:14 +00:00
David Benjamin 8a58933db0 Remove the CRYPTO_EX_new callback.
This callback is never used. The one caller I've ever seen is in Android
code which isn't built with BoringSSL and it was a no-op.

It also doesn't actually make much sense. A callback cannot reasonably
assume that it sees every, say, SSL_CTX created because the index may be
registered after the first SSL_CTX is created. Nor is there any point in
an EX_DATA consumer in one file knowing about an SSL_CTX created in
completely unrelated code.

Replace all the pointers with a typedef to int*. This will ensure code
which passes NULL or 0 continues to compile while breaking code which
passes an actual function.

This simplifies some object creation functions which now needn't worry
about CRYPTO_new_ex_data failing. (Also avoids bouncing on the lock, but
it's taking a read lock, so this doesn't really matter.)

BUG=391192

Change-Id: I02893883c6fa8693682075b7b130aa538a0a1437
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6625
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 21:29:46 +00:00
David Benjamin 0abd6f2eb6 Get struct timeval from sys/time.h.
The naclports patch switches sys/types.h to sys/time.h. Per
http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009604499/basedefs/sys/time.h.html
this is correct.

Change-Id: If6d56cb28fa16a1d8b4515a45532434f6c23a29d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6624
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 20:32:36 +00:00
David Benjamin 1246670caa Use UINT64_C in sha512.c table.
From the naclports patch:
https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/naclports/+/master/ports/boringssl/nacl.patch

Change-Id: I37ad45fbde0b1b1437d3abd8ed7422bd72cfd959
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6623
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 20:30:10 +00:00
David Benjamin 5ddffbb8bc Make SSL_(CTX_)?set_tmp_ecdh call SSL_(CTX_)?set1_curves.
Then deprecate the old functions. Thanks to upstream's
6977e8ee4a718a76351ba5275a9f0be4e530eab5 for the idea.

Change-Id: I916abd6fca2a3b2a439ec9902d9779707f7e41eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6622
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 20:28:47 +00:00
David Benjamin 53e5c2c225 Remove SSL_(CTX_)?set_ecdh_callback.
It has no callers. I prepped for its removal earlier with
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/conscrypt/+/c05697c2c50fe1331f08c6f32d0bc9636eecdc2d
and then completely forgot.

Thanks to upstream's 6f78b9e824c053d062188578635c575017b587c5 for
the reminder. Quoth them:

> This only gets used to set a specific curve without actually checking
> that the peer supports it or not and can therefor result in handshake
> failures that can be avoided by selecting a different cipher.

It's also a very confusing API since it does NOT pass ownership of the
EC_KEY to the caller.

Change-Id: I6a00643b3a2d6746e9e0e228b47c2bc9694b0084
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6621
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 20:07:37 +00:00
David Benjamin 756ad17337 Initialize |one_index| in OAEP padding check.
This was a mistake in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6611.

Change-Id: Ifb5c52cc7571b6f1ada4af9b46eab1f9b080b4f6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6730
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:46:39 +00:00
David Benjamin 1634a33495 Convert rsa/padding.c to constant-time helpers.
Remove the custom copy of those helpers.

Change-Id: I810c3ae8dbf7bc0654d3e9fb9900c425d36f64aa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6611
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:39:37 +00:00
David Benjamin b36a395a9a Add slightly better RSA key exchange tests.
Cover not just the wrong version, but also other mistakes.

Change-Id: I46f05a9a37b7e325adc19084d315a415777d3a46
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6610
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:26:28 +00:00
David Benjamin 0bd71eb85d Remove weird ret negation logic.
This is a remnant of ssl3_get_client_hello's old DTLS cookie logic, which has
since been removed. (If we ever need HelloVerifyRequest support on the server,
we'll implement something stateless in front.) We can switch this to something
more straightforward now.

See also upstream's 94f98a9019e1c0a3be4ca904b2c27c7af3d937c0,

Change-Id: Ie733030209a381a4915d6744fa12a79ffe972fa5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6601
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:24:51 +00:00
David Benjamin e9cddb8879 Remove SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT.
I don't think we're ever going to manage to enforce this, and it doesn't
seem worth the trouble. We don't support application protocols which use
renegotiation outside of the HTTP/1.1 mid-stream client auth hack.
There, it's on the server to reject legacy renegotiations.

This removes the last of SSL_OP_ALL.

Change-Id: I996fdeaabf175b6facb4f687436549c0d3bb0042
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6580
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:22:53 +00:00
David Benjamin 3e052de5a0 Tighten SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT to align with RFC 5746.
RFC 5746 forbids a server from downgrading or upgrading
renegotiation_info support. Even with SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT set
(the default), we can still enforce a few things.

I do not believe this has practical consequences. The attack variant
where the server half is prefixed does not involve a renegotiation on
the client. The converse where the client sees the renegotiation and
prefix does, but we only support renego for the mid-stream HTTP/1.1
client auth hack, which doesn't do this. (And with triple-handshake,
HTTPS clients should be requiring the certificate be unchanged across
renego which makes this moot.)

Ultimately, an application which makes the mistake of using
renegotiation needs to be aware of what exactly that means and how to
handle connection state changing mid-stream. We make renego opt-in now,
so this is a tenable requirement.

(Also the legacy -> secure direction would have been caught by the
server anyway since we send a non-empty RI extension.)

Change-Id: I915965c342f8a9cf3a4b6b32f0a87a00c3df3559
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6559
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:17:56 +00:00
David Benjamin 03f000577f Remove SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER.
This dates to SSLeay 0.8.0 (or earlier). The use counter sees virtually
no hits.

Change-Id: Iff4c8899d5cb0ba4afca113c66d15f1d980ffe41
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6558
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:14:00 +00:00
David Benjamin ef5e515819 Remove SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG.
This dates to SSLeay 0.9.0. The Internet seems to have completely
forgotten what "D5" is. (I can't find reference to it beyond
documentation of this quirk.) The use counter we added sees virtually no
hits.

Change-Id: I9781d401acb98ce3790b1b165fc257a6f5e9b155
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6557
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:11:41 +00:00
David Benjamin c100ef4379 Limit depth of ASN1 parse printing.
(Imported from upstream's d88ef40a1e5c81d0d32b4a431e55f5456e678dd2 and
943c4ca62b3f5a160340d57aecb9413407a06e15.)

Change-Id: Idd52aebae6839695be0f3a8a7659adeec6650b98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6556
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:06:04 +00:00
David Benjamin 2205093e7e Add a comment in SetTestState from bssl_shim.
Per Nico's comment in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/3342/3/ssl/test/bssl_shim.cc.

Also remove unnecessary cast and change the variable name to |state|. |async|
is a remnant from when it was |AsyncState| rather than |TestState|.

Change-Id: I83f23593b0c4e64b0ddd056573f75c0aabe96f9e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6555
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:05:46 +00:00
Piotr Sikora 6ae67dfee8 Don't leak Android hacks to other build platforms.
Previously, android_compat_hacks.c and android_compat_keywrap.c
were added to crypto_sources when multiple build platforms were
specified in one invocation.

Change-Id: I4fd8bffc4785bef0148d12cd6f292d79c043b806
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6566
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 19:02:31 +00:00
Brian Smith a0ef7b0a56 Enforce that |EC_KEY| private key is in [0, group->order).
Change-Id: I16abea5769737c7edd1be717f9a4f38678af43ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6564
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 18:45:03 +00:00
Brian Smith 533a273871 Add |EC_METHOD| method for verifying public key order.
In some cases it would be good to restrict the input range of scalars
given to |EC_METHOD::mul| to be [0, order-1]. This is a first step
towards that goal.

Change-Id: I58a25db06f6c7a68a0ac1fe79794b04f7a173b23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6562
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 18:39:07 +00:00
Brian Smith a3d9de05fb Add |EC_GROUP_get0_order| to replace |EC_GROUP_get_order|.
|EC_GROUP_get0_order| doesn't require any heap allocations and never
fails, so it is much more convenient and more efficient for callers to
call.

Change-Id: Ic60f768875e7bc8e74362dacdb5cbbc6957b05a6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6532
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 18:18:13 +00:00
Sam Clegg 88478562a4 Include <sys/time.h> in packeted_bio.h for 'timeval'
At least for newlib (Native Client) including sys/types.h
is not enough to get a timeval declaration.

Change-Id: I4971a1aacc80b6fdc12c0e81c5d8007ed13eb8b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6722
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 18:11:18 +00:00
Sam Clegg dca63cfa75 Don't abort in |init_once| if |fcntl| returns ENOSYS
Native Client doesn't support fcntl natively and its default
implemention just returns ENOSYS.

Change-Id: Id8615e2f6f0a75a1140f8efd75afde471ccdf466
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6721
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-15 18:10:40 +00:00
Joachim Bauch afd565ff9c Add defines for SRTP profiles using GCM ciphers from RFC 7714.
BUG=webrtc:5222

Change-Id: I8399bd595564dedbe5492b8ea6eb915f41367cbf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6690
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2015-12-10 23:18:16 +00:00
Adam Langley 902870e3b5 Gate SHA_CTX compatibility on !WINDOWS.
Windows does support anonymous unions but warns about it. Since I'm not
sure what warnings we have enabled in Chromium, this change just drops
the union for Windows.

Change-Id: I914f8cd5855eb07153105250c0f026eaedb35365
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6631
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-04 22:13:19 +00:00
Adam Langley 34aa55c05e Support the SHA_CTX hack without ANDROID.
wpa_supplicant needs access to the internals of SHA_CTX. We supported
this only for builds with ANDROID defined previously but that's a pain
for wpa_supplicant to deal with. Thus this change enables it
unconditionally.

Perhaps in the future we'll be able to get a function to do this into
OpenSSL and BoringSSL.

Change-Id: Ib5d088c586fe69249c87404adb45aab5a7d5cf80
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6630
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-04 20:23:46 +00:00
David Benjamin 6d9e5a7448 Re-apply 75b833cc81
I messed up and missed that we were carrying a diff on x86_64-mont5.pl. This
was accidentally dropped in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6616.

To confirm the merge is good now, check out at this revision and run:

  git diff e701f16bd69b6f251ed537e40364c281e85a63b2^ crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl > /tmp/A

Then in OpenSSL's repository:

  git diff d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72^ d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl  > /tmp/B

And confirm the diffs vary in only metadata:

  diff -u /tmp/A /tmp/B

--- /tmp/A	2015-12-03 11:53:23.127034998 -0500
+++ /tmp/B	2015-12-03 11:53:53.099314287 -0500
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
-index 38def07..3c5a8fc 100644
+index 388e3c6..64e668f 100755
 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
 +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
-@@ -1770,6 +1770,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
+@@ -1784,6 +1784,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
  .align	32
  .L8x_tail_done:
  	add	(%rdx),%r8		# can this overflow?
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  	xor	%rax,%rax

  	neg	$carry
-@@ -3116,6 +3125,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
+@@ -3130,6 +3139,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
  .align	32
  .Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
  	add	24+8(%rsp),%r8		# can this overflow?
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
  	mov	$carry,%rax		# xor	%rax,%rax

  	sub	16+8(%rsp),$carry	# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
-@@ -3159,13 +3177,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
+@@ -3173,13 +3191,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
  my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
  my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
  $code.=<<___;

Change-Id: I3fb5253783ed82e4831f5bffde75273bd9609c23
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6618
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-03 17:25:12 +00:00
David Benjamin 28243c08db Add PSS parameter check.
Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.

Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.

CVE-2015-3194

(Imported from upstream's c394a488942387246653833359a5c94b5832674e and test
data from 00456fded43eadd4bb94bf675ae4ea5d158a764f.)

Change-Id: Ic97059d42722fd810973ccb0c26c415c4eaae79a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6617
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-03 16:47:12 +00:00
David Benjamin e701f16bd6 bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix carry propagating bug (CVE-2015-3193).
(Imported from upstream's d73cc256c8e256c32ed959456101b73ba9842f72.)

Change-Id: I673301fee57f0ab5bef24553caf8b2aac67fb3a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6616
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-03 16:44:35 +00:00
David Benjamin cb852981cd Fix leak with ASN.1 combine.
When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
this will leak any additional components in the parent.

This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.

CVE-2015-3195.

Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.

PR#4131

(Imported from upstream's cc598f321fbac9c04da5766243ed55d55948637d, with test
from our original report. Verified ASan trips up on the test without the fix.)

Change-Id: I007d93f172b2f16bf6845d685d72717ed840276c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6615
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-03 16:43:34 +00:00
Adam Langley c4f25ce0c6 Work around yaSSL bug.
yaSSL has a couple of bugs in their DH client implementation. This
change works around the worst of the two.

Firstly, they expect the the DH public value to be the same length as
the prime. This change pads the public value as needed to ensure this.

Secondly, although they handle the first byte of the shared key being
zero, they don't handle the case of the second, third, etc bytes being
zero. So whenever that happens the handshake fails. I don't think that
there's anything that we can do about that one.

Change-Id: I789c9e5739f19449473305d59fe5c3fb9b4a6167
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6578
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-30 22:41:24 +00:00
Brian Smith c5eb4676b6 Remove dead code in p256-x86_64.
Change-Id: I9d0b3fa39445d08202c67d905d2c676d5d968c33
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6561
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-20 23:45:43 +00:00
David Benjamin 758d12732a Add get0 getters for EVP_PKEY.
Right now your options are:
- Bounce on a reference and deal with cleanup needlessly.
- Manually check the type tag and peek into the union.

We probably have no hope of opaquifying this struct, but for new code, let's
recommend using this function rather than the more error-prone thing.

Change-Id: I9b39ff95fe4264a3f7d1e0d2894db337aa968f6c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-20 23:34:12 +00:00
Mostyn Bramley-Moore fde89b43c3 avoid clashes with libc's 'open' in e_chacha20poly1305.c
Some strange toolchains can have an implicit (or explicit) fcntl.h include,
so let's avoid using the name 'open' for local functions.  This should not
cause any trouble.

Change-Id: Ie131b5920ac23938013c2c03302b97a7418c7180
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6540
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-20 20:02:23 +00:00
Brian Smith 60a45aa7cc Remove reference to removed |RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME| flag.
Change-Id: I0bfdccf009772d4ff8cd419758ab5bfae95f5cc5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6530
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-20 19:59:29 +00:00
David Benjamin 81edc9beb6 Do away with BN_LLONG in favor of BN_ULLONG.
BN_LLONG is only ever used in #ifdefs. The actual type is BN_ULLONG. Switch the
ifdefs to check on BN_ULLONG and remove BN_LLONG. Also fix signedness of all
the constants (potentially avoiding undefined behavior in some operations).

Change-Id: I3e7739bbe14c50ea7db04fc507a034a8cb315a5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6518
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-20 19:59:07 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite e8fe07fcc4 Fix AES XTS mode key size.
I screwed up the |EVP_CIPHER| parameters for XTS when I first imported
it, and there were no tests to catch it.  (The problem was that
|EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE| means “the key size is actually twice what it says
here.”)

With these changes, OpenSSL's tests pass.

(Along the way, make a few other things about XTS slightly less
decrepit.)

Change-Id: Icbfbc5e6d532d1c132392ee366f9cab42802d674
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6529
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 18:08:33 +00:00
David Benjamin 93a5b44296 Make CRYPTO_library_init use a CRYPTO_once_t.
Initialization by multiple consumers on ARM is still problematic due to
CRYPTO_set_NEON_{capable,functional}, until we reimplement that in-library, but
if that is called before the first CRYPTO_library_init, this change makes it
safe.

BUG=556462

Change-Id: I5845d09cca909bace8293ba7adf09a3bd0d4f943
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6519
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 18:05:22 +00:00
Brian Smith bf762186c6 Remove the |ri| field of |BN_MONT_CTX|.
The |ri| field was only used in |BN_MONT_CTX_set|, so make it a local
variable of that function.

Change-Id: Id8c3d44ac2e30e3961311a7b1a6731fe2c33a0eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6526
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:40:13 +00:00
Brian Smith 596ab10b0f s/BN_BITS/BN_BITS2/ in |BN_mod_inverse_ex|; remove |BN_BITS| & |BN_MASK|.
The comment in |BN_mod_inverse_ex| makes it clear that |BN_BITS2| was
intended. Besides fixing the code to match the comment, remove
the now-unused |BN_BITS| and the already-unused |BN_MASK| to prevent
future confusion of this sort.

On MSVC builds there seems to be very little difference in performance
between the two code paths according to |bssl speed|.

Change-Id: I765b7b3d464e2057b1d7952af25b6deb2724976a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6525
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:39:32 +00:00
Brian Smith 7af36e1e38 Share common definitions of |TOBN| and |BIGNUM_STATIC|.
Previously, both crypto/dh and crypto/ec defined |TOBN| macros that did
the same thing, but which took their arguments in the opposite order.
This change makes the code consistently use the same macro. It also
makes |STATIC_BIGNUM| available for internal use outside of crypto/bn.

Change-Id: Ide57f6a5b74ea95b3585724c7e1a630c82a864d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6528
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:38:52 +00:00
David Benjamin ff2df337a0 Reformat the cipher suite table.
clang-format packing them tightly made newlines inconsistent which
wasn't very helpful.

Change-Id: I46a787862ed1f5b0eee101394e24c779b6bc652b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:32:55 +00:00
David Benjamin 9f2e2770e1 Remove strength_bits.
Trim the cipher table further. Those values are entirely determined by
algorithm_enc.

Change-Id: I355c245b0663e41e54e62d15903a4a9a667b4ffe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6516
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:32:28 +00:00
David Benjamin d6e9eec3f8 Remove algo_strength.
FIPS is the same as HIGH (but for CHACHA20), so those are redundant.
Likewise, MEDIUM vs HIGH was just RC4. Remove those in favor of
redefining those legacy rules to mean this.

One less field to keep track of in each cipher.

Change-Id: I2b2489cffb9e16efb0ac7d7290c173cac061432a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6515
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:30:44 +00:00
David Benjamin dcb6ef0f0b Remove algorithm_ssl.
It's redundant with other cipher properties. We can express these in code.
Cipher rule matching gets a little bit complicated due to the confusing legacy
protocol version cipher rules, so add some tests for it. (It's really hard to
grep for uses of them, so I've kept them working to be safe.)

Change-Id: Ic6b3fcd55d76d4a51b31bf7ae629a2da50a7450e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6453
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:28:24 +00:00
David Benjamin d28f59c27b Switch the keylog BIO to a callback.
The keylog BIO is internally synchronized by the SSL_CTX lock, but an
application may wish to log keys from multiple SSL_CTXs. This is in
preparation for switching Chromium to use a separate SSL_CTX per profile
to more naturally split up the session caches.

It will also be useful for routing up SSLKEYLOGFILE in WebRTC. There,
each log line must be converted to an IPC up from the renderer
processes.

This will require changes in Chromium when we roll BoringSSL.

BUG=458365,webrtc:4417

Change-Id: I2945bdb4def0a9c36e751eab3d5b06c330d66b54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6514
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:23:49 +00:00
David Benjamin fba735cfd8 Register the *25519 tests as dependencies of all_tests.
This ensures the run_tests target updates those binaries.

Change-Id: I32b68026da4852424b5621e014e71037c8a5754c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6513
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:09:09 +00:00
Brian Smith f3376ace43 Remove |EC_POINTs_mul| & simplify p256-x86_64.
Without |EC_POINTs_mul|, there's never more than one variable point
passed to a |EC_METHOD|'s |mul| method. This allows them to be
simplified considerably. In this commit, the p256-x86_64 implementation
has been simplified to eliminate the heap allocation and looping
related that was previously necessary to deal with the possibility of
there being multiple input points. The other implementations were left
mostly as-is; they should be similarly simplified in the future.

Change-Id: I70751d1d5296be2562af0730e7ccefdba7a1acae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6493
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 01:08:46 +00:00
Brian Smith 301efc8cea Fix error handling in |p256-x86_64|.
This makes similar fixes as were done in the following OpenSSL commits:

    c028254b12a8ea0d0f8a677172eda2e2d78073f3: Correctly set Z_is_one on
    the return value in the NISTZ256 implementation.

    e22d2199e2a5cc9b243f45c2b633d1e31fadecd7: Error checking and memory
    leak leak fixes in NISTZ256.

    4446044a793a9103a4bc70c0214005e6a4463767: NISTZ256: set Z_is_one to
    boolean 0/1 as is customary.

    a4d5269e6d0dba0c276c968448a3576f7604666a: NISTZ256: don't swallow
    malloc errors.

The fixes aren't exactly the same. In particular, the comments "This is
an unusual input, we don't guarantee constant-timeness" and the changes
to |ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute| (which isn't in BoringSSL) were
omitted.

Change-Id: Ia7bb982daa62fb328e8bd2d4dd49a8857e104096
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6492
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 00:52:33 +00:00
Brian Smith e2136d9c28 Remove |EC_GROUP_precompute_mult| and |EC_KEY_precompute_mult|.
Change-Id: I1663ec6046b8f1f67a62e4c6483af719d6f362ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6486
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 00:35:59 +00:00
Brian Smith 9b26297608 Make |EC_GROUP_precompute_mult|/|EC_KEY_precompute_mult| no-ops.
This moves us closer to having |EC_GROUP| and |EC_KEY| being immutable.
The functions are left as no-ops for backward compatibility.

Change-Id: Ie23921ab0364f0771c03aede37b064804c9f69e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6485
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 00:27:39 +00:00
Brian Smith 5058d79948 Remove p224-64 and p256-64 dead code for non-default generators.
This extends 9f1f04f313 to the other
implementations.

|EC_GFp_nistp224_method| and |EC_GFp_nistp256_method| are not marked
|OPENSSL_EXPORT|. |EC_GROUP_set_generator| doesn't allow the generator
to be changed for any |EC_GROUP| for built-in curves. Consequently,
there's no way (except some kind of terrible abuse) that this code
could be executed with a non-default generator.

Change-Id: I5d9b6be4e6f9d384159cb3d708390a8e3c69f23f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6489
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 00:23:14 +00:00
Adam Langley b1b6229fc8 Add NEON implementation of curve25519.
Nexus 7 goes from 1002.8 ops/sec to 4704.8 at a cost of 10KB of code.
(It'll actually save code if built with -mfpu=neon because then the
generic version can be discarded by the compiler.)

Change-Id: Ia6d02efb2c2d1bb02a07eb56ec4ca3b0dba99382
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6524
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 00:20:38 +00:00
Adam Langley 9e65d487b8 Allow |CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable| to be known at compile time, if possible.
If -mfpu=neon is passed then we don't need to worry about checking for
NEON support at run time. This change allows |CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable| to
statically return 1 in this case. This then allows the compiler to
discard generic code in several cases.

Change-Id: I3b229740ea3d5cb0a304f365c400a0996d0c66ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6523
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-19 00:15:11 +00:00
Adam Langley 3ac32b1eda Fix curve25519 code for MSVC.
MSVC doesn't like unary minus on unsigned types. Also, the speed test
always failed because the inputs were all zeros and thus had small
order.

Change-Id: Ic2d3c2c9bd57dc66295d93891396871cebac1e0b
2015-11-17 15:15:05 -08:00
Adam Langley 4fb0dc4b03 Add X25519 and Ed25519 support.
(Ed25519 support is disabled when |OPENSSL_SMALL| is defined.)

libcrypto.a sizes:

x86-64 -O3 -march=native: +78012 (1584902 → 1662914)
x86-64 -O3 -march=native -DOPENSSL_SMALL: +10596 (1356206 → 1366802)
Android armv7 Thumb -O2 -DOPENSSL_SMALL: +13132 (1258462 → 1271594)

Change-Id: I6a7e64d481e4ce4daa7d5057578081358746cfb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6497
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-17 21:56:12 +00:00
Piotr Sikora c324f1783e Make sure pthread_once() succeeds.
It can fail on FreeBSD when library is not linked against either
threading library and results in init routine not being executed
at all, leading to errors in other parts of the code.

Change-Id: I1063f6940e381e6470593c063fbfecf3f47991cd
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6522
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-17 21:44:40 +00:00
Piotr Sikora 9361243065 Don't include <alloca.h>, it's no longer needed.
Relevant code was removed in 5d5e39f5d2.

Change-Id: I198844064030c04f88e5541f2bbaa29ae13d14bb
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6521
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-17 19:21:40 +00:00
Adam Langley b00061cea7 Add SSL_CIPHER_is_AES[128|256]CBC.
Change-Id: I3072f884be77b8646e90d316154b96448f0cf2a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6520
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-17 19:15:06 +00:00
David Benjamin 3a59611726 size_t SSL*_use_*_ASN1.
So long as we're not getting rid of them (the certificate variants may
be useful when we decouple from crypto/x509 anyway), get the types and
bounds checks right.

Also reject trailing data and require the input be a single element.
Note: this is a slight compatibility risk, but we did it for
SSL*_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1 previously and I think it's probably worth
seeing if anything breaks here.

Change-Id: I64fa3fc6249021ccf59584d68e56ff424a190082
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6490
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 23:59:14 +00:00
David Benjamin b324159be9 Fix ssl3_send_server_key_exchange error path.
This codepath should not actually be reachable, unless maybe the caller is
doing something really dumb. (Unconfiguring the key partway through the
connection.)

Change-Id: Ic8e0cfc3c426439016370f9a85be9c05509358f1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6483
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 23:27:27 +00:00
David Benjamin f584a5aaa2 Reset epoch state in one place.
TLS resets it in t1_enc.c while DTLS has it sprinkled everywhere.

Change-Id: I78f0f0e646b4dc82a1058199c4b00f2e917aa5bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6511
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 23:19:31 +00:00
David Benjamin 2077cf9152 Use UINT64_C instead of OPENSSL_U64.
stdint.h already has macros for this. The spec says that, in C++,
__STDC_CONSTANT_MACROS is needed, so define it for bytestring_test.cc.
Chromium seems to use these macros without trouble, so I'm assuming we
can rely on them.

Change-Id: I56d178689b44d22c6379911bbb93d3b01dd832a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6510
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 23:18:00 +00:00
David Benjamin af07365b49 Check for overflow when parsing a CBS with d2i_*.
Until we've done away with the d2i_* stack completely, boundaries need
to be mindful of the type mismatch. d2i_* takes a long, not a size_t.

Change-Id: If02f9ca2cfde02d0929ac18275d09bf5df400f3a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6491
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 23:17:42 +00:00
David Benjamin 780cd92b98 modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl: extend Apple fix to all clang cases.
Triggered by RT#3989.

(Imported from upstream's fbab8baddef8d3346ae40ff068871e2ddaf10270. This
doesn't seem to affect us, but avoid getting out of sync.)

Change-Id: I164e2a72e4b75e286ceaa03745ed9bcbf6c3e32e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6512
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 23:11:19 +00:00
Adam Langley f9c77dedfa Drop CBB allocation failure test.
To no great surprise, ASAN didn't like this test and I suspect that
Chromium, with its crashing allocator, won't like it either. Oh well.

Change-Id: I235dbb965dbba186f8f37d7df45f8eac9addc7eb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6496
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 22:25:59 +00:00
Adam Langley a33915d690 Have |CBB_init| zero the |CBB| before any possible failures.
People expect to do:

CBB foo;

if (!CBB_init(&foo, 100) ||
    …
    …) {
  CBB_cleanup(&foo);
  return 0;
}

However, currently, if the allocation of |initial_capacity| fails in
|CBB_init| then |CBB_cleanup| will operate on uninitialised values. This
change makes the above pattern safe.

Change-Id: I3e002fda8f0a3ac18650b504e7e84a842d4165ca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6495
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 21:59:46 +00:00
Adam Langley c5c85defb2 Make RAND_seed read a byte of random data.
OpenSSH calls |RAND_seed| before jailing in the expectation that that
will be sufficient to ensure that later RAND calls are successful.

See internal bug 25695426.

Change-Id: I9d3f5665249af6610328ac767cb83059bb2953dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6494
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-16 21:58:46 +00:00
Adam Langley d9e27021e1 Don't encode or decode ∞.
|EC_POINT_point2oct| would encode ∞, which is surprising, and
|EC_POINT_oct2point| would decode ∞, which is insane. This change
removes both behaviours.

Thanks to Brian Smith for pointing it out.

Change-Id: Ia89f257dc429a69b9ea7b7b15f75454ccc9c3bdd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6488
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 23:52:37 +00:00
Adam Langley e7806fd477 Remove point-on-curve check from |ec_GFp_simple_oct2point|.
In the case of a compressed point, the decompression ensures that the
point is on the curve. In the uncompressed case,
|EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp| checks that the point is on the
curve as of 38feb990a1.

Change-Id: Icd69809ae396838b4aef4fa89b3b354560afed55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6487
Reviewed-by: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 23:51:17 +00:00
David Benjamin 20c373118c Become partially -Wmissing-variable-declarations-clean.
There's a few things that will be kind of a nuisance and possibly not worth it
(crypto/asn1 dumps a lot of undeclared things, etc.). But it caught some
mistakes. Even without the warning, making sure to include the externs before
defining a function helps catch type mismatches.

Change-Id: I3dab282aaba6023e7cebc94ed7a767a5d7446b08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6484
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 20:09:20 +00:00
Brian Smith 7308aaa9b4 Remove EC_GFp_simple_method (dead code).
Change-Id: I1820bd5412313e00a69123370178c0fe3e12b5ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6482
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 20:07:51 +00:00
Brian Smith f872951880 Fix null pointer dereference when using "simple" EC.
This regressed in f0523e9f20.

Change-Id: I70c3fcb0d91ac00e5088b086312384756eda6140
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6481
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 20:05:13 +00:00
Brian Smith 8bde5d2e51 Remove the unused |Ni| member of |BN_MONT_CTX|.
Change-Id: I0a542c48c7adae28f05778d6c34c9b6836fc3449
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6480
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 20:04:43 +00:00
David Benjamin ce7ae6fa27 Enable AVX code for SHA-*.
SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512 get a 12-26%, 17-23%, and 33-37% improvement,
respectively on x86-64. SHA-1 and SHA-256 get a 8-20% and 14-17% improvement on
x86. (x86 does not have AVX code for SHA-512.) This costs us 12k of binary size
on x86-64 and 8k of binary size on x86.

$ bssl speed SHA- (x86-64, before)
Did 4811000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000013us (4810937.5 ops/sec): 77.0 MB/s
Did 1414000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000253us (1413642.3 ops/sec): 361.9 MB/s
Did 56000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1002640us (55852.5 ops/sec): 457.5 MB/s
Did 2536000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000140us (2535645.0 ops/sec): 40.6 MB/s
Did 603000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1001613us (602028.9 ops/sec): 154.1 MB/s
Did 25000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1010132us (24749.2 ops/sec): 202.7 MB/s
Did 1767000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000477us (1766157.5 ops/sec): 28.3 MB/s
Did 638000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1000933us (637405.3 ops/sec): 163.2 MB/s
Did 32000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1025646us (31199.8 ops/sec): 255.6 MB/s

$ bssl speed SHA- (x86-64, after)
Did 5438000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000060us (5437673.7 ops/sec): 87.0 MB/s
Did 1590000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000181us (1589712.3 ops/sec): 407.0 MB/s
Did 71000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1007958us (70439.4 ops/sec): 577.0 MB/s
Did 2955000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000251us (2954258.5 ops/sec): 47.3 MB/s
Did 740000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1000628us (739535.6 ops/sec): 189.3 MB/s
Did 31000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1019619us (30403.5 ops/sec): 249.1 MB/s
Did 2348000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000285us (2347331.0 ops/sec): 37.6 MB/s
Did 878000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1001064us (877066.8 ops/sec): 224.5 MB/s
Did 43000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1002485us (42893.4 ops/sec): 351.4 MB/s

$ bssl speed SHA- (x86, before, SHA-512 redacted because irrelevant)
Did 4319000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000066us (4318715.0 ops/sec): 69.1 MB/s
Did 1306000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000437us (1305429.5 ops/sec): 334.2 MB/s
Did 58000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1014807us (57153.7 ops/sec): 468.2 MB/s
Did 2291000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000343us (2290214.5 ops/sec): 36.6 MB/s
Did 594000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1000684us (593594.0 ops/sec): 152.0 MB/s
Did 25000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1030688us (24255.6 ops/sec): 198.7 MB/s

$ bssl speed SHA- (x86, after, SHA-512 redacted because irrelevant)
Did 4673000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000063us (4672705.6 ops/sec): 74.8 MB/s
Did 1484000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000453us (1483328.1 ops/sec): 379.7 MB/s
Did 69000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1008305us (68431.7 ops/sec): 560.6 MB/s
Did 2684000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000196us (2683474.0 ops/sec): 42.9 MB/s
Did 679000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1000525us (678643.7 ops/sec): 173.7 MB/s
Did 29000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1033251us (28066.8 ops/sec): 229.9 MB/s

Change-Id: I952a3b4fc4c52ebb50690da3b8c97770e8342e98
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6470
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 20:03:32 +00:00
Brian Smith 9f1f04f313 Remove nistz256 dead code for non-default generators.
|EC_GFp_nistz256_method| is not marked |OPENSSL_EXPORT| so only the
built-in P-256 curve uses it. |EC_GROUP_set_generator| doesn't allow
the generator to be changed for any |EC_GROUP| for a built-in curve.
Consequently, there's no way (except some kind of terrible abuse) that
the nistz code could be executed with a non-default generator.

Change-Id: Ib22f00bc74c103b7869ed1e35032b1f3d26cdad2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6446
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-12 19:59:16 +00:00
Piotr Sikora d7421ebf6c Remove condition which always evaluates to true (size_t >= 0).
Found with -Wtype-limits.

Change-Id: I5580f179425bc6b09ff2a8559fce121b0cc8ae14
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6463
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-11 22:20:19 +00:00
Piotr Sikora d386394aad Test for underflow before subtraction.
Found with -Wtype-limits.

Change-Id: I41cdbb7e6564b715dfe445877a89594371fdeef0
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6462
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-11 22:20:04 +00:00
David Benjamin ef14b2d86e Remove stl_compat.h.
Chromium's toolchains may now assume C++11 library support, so we may freely
use C++11 features. (Chromium's still in the process of deciding what to allow,
but we use Google's style guide directly, toolchain limitations aside.)

Change-Id: I1c7feb92b7f5f51d9091a4c686649fb574ac138d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6465
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-11 22:19:36 +00:00
David Benjamin cd24a39f1b Limit DHE groups to 4096-bit.
dh.c had a 10k-bit limit but it wasn't quite correctly enforced. However,
that's still 1.12s of jank on the IO thread, which is too long. Since the SSL
code consumes DHE groups from the network, it should be responsible for
enforcing what sanity it needs on them.

Costs of various bit lengths on 2013 Macbook Air:
1024 - 1.4ms
2048 - 14ms
3072 - 24ms
4096 - 55ms
5000 - 160ms
10000 - 1.12s

UMA says that DHE groups are 0.2% 4096-bit and otherwise are 5.5% 2048-bit and
94% 1024-bit and some noise. Set the limit to 4096-bit to be conservative,
although that's already quite a lot of jank.

BUG=554295

Change-Id: I8e167748a67e4e1adfb62d73dfff094abfa7d215
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-11 22:18:39 +00:00
David Benjamin 99fdfb9f22 Move curve check out of tls12_check_peer_sigalg.
The current check has two problems:

- It only runs on the server, where there isn't a curve list at all. This was a
  mistake in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1843 which flipped it
  from client-only to server-only.

- It only runs in TLS 1.2, so one could bypass it by just negotiating TLS 1.1.
  Upstream added it as part of their Suite B mode, which requires 1.2.

Move it elsewhere. Though we do not check the entire chain, leaving that to the
certificate verifier, signatures made by the leaf certificate are made by the
SSL/TLS stack, so it's reasonable to check the curve as part of checking
suitability of a leaf.

Change-Id: I7c12f2a32ba946a20e9ba6c70eff23bebcb60bb2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6414
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-11 22:15:16 +00:00
Adam Langley 7104cc96b7 Update and fix fuzzing instructions.
It's easier to put libFuzzer.a into the source directory than to install
it globally.

Change-Id: I4dc7b56f81c7aa0371475c68d23368b025186505
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6461
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-10 23:37:36 +00:00
Adam Langley 9a4beb8ad8 Add four, basic fuzz tests.
This change adds fuzzing tests for:
  ∙ Certificate parsing
  ∙ Private key parsing
  ∙ ClientHello parsing
  ∙ Server first flow (ServerHello, Certificate, etc) parsing.

Change-Id: I5f53282263eaaff69b1a03c819cca73750433653
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6460
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-10 19:14:01 +00:00
Adam Langley 4ab254017c Add AArch64 Montgomery assembly.
The file armv8-mont.pl is taken from upstream. The speed ups are fairly
modest (~30%) but seem worthwhile.

Before:

Did 231 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1008671us (229.0 ops/sec)
Did 11208 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1036997us (10808.1 ops/sec)
Did 342 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1021545us (334.8 ops/sec)
Did 32000 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1016162us (31491.0 ops/sec)
Did 45 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1039805us (43.3 ops/sec)
Did 3608 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1060283us (3402.9 ops/sec)

After:

Did 300 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1009772us (297.1 ops/sec)
Did 12740 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1075413us (11846.6 ops/sec)
Did 408 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1016139us (401.5 ops/sec)
Did 33000 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1017510us (32432.1 ops/sec)
Did 52 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1067678us (48.7 ops/sec)
Did 3408 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1062863us (3206.4 ops/sec)

Change-Id: Ife74fac784067fce3668b5c87f51d481732ff855
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6444
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-10 19:13:46 +00:00
Adam Langley ad38dc7452 Enable Montgomery optimisations on ARM.
These were accidently disabled for ARM.

Before:

Did 38 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1051209us (36.1 ops/sec)
Did 1500 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1069611us (1402.4 ops/sec)
Did 65 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1055664us (61.6 ops/sec)
Did 4719 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1029144us (4585.4 ops/sec)
Did 5 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1092346us (4.6 ops/sec)
Did 418 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1069977us (390.7 ops/sec)

After:

Did 156 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1000672us (155.9 ops/sec)
Did 6071 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1068512us (5681.7 ops/sec)
Did 84 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1068847us (78.6 ops/sec)
Did 11000 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1023620us (10746.2 ops/sec)
Did 26 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1028320us (25.3 ops/sec)
Did 1788 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1072479us (1667.2 ops/sec)

Change-Id: I448698f7d8e5b481a06f98d54d608f0278827cd1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6443
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-09 23:06:58 +00:00
Adam Langley 2e64f1b5d5 Check PKCS#8 pkey field is valid before cleansing.
(Imported from upstream's 52e028b9de371da62c1e51b46592517b1068d770.)

Change-Id: If980d774671b9b5ba997db3fd7d4043525a85609
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6445
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-09 23:06:13 +00:00
David Benjamin f606f9831b bssl pkcs12 shouldn't crash on missing key.
PKCS#12 files may not necessarily include keys.

Change-Id: Ibb43b609783b02aa9cbb192fea377081169666ff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6456
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-09 23:05:20 +00:00
David Benjamin e348ff4a72 Fix build.
There seems to have been a merge error.

Change-Id: I72e5c2a45c148e31c90b28bedfff48f8ca6e3c8c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6455
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 22:58:14 +00:00
David Benjamin 6e80765774 Add SSL_get_server_key_exchange_hash.
This exposes the ServerKeyExchange signature hash type used in the most recent
handshake, for histogramming on the client.

BUG=549662

Change-Id: I8a4e00ac735b1ecd2c2df824112c3a0bc62332a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6413
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 22:35:28 +00:00
David Benjamin 788be4a3f4 Remove the hard-coded SHA-1 exception for sigalgs.
This is completely a no-op as currently tls12_get_psigalgs always returns a
hardcoded list which always includes SHA-1. But if this were to be made
configurable in the future, we should reject SHA-1 when configured to do so.

Change-Id: I7ab188eeff850d1e5f70b9522304812bab2d941a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6411
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 22:31:48 +00:00
Brian Smith 5d5e39f5d2 Remove non-ASM version of |bn_mul_mont| in bn/generic.c.
When building in OPENSSL_NO_ASM mode, MSVC complains about unreachable
code. The redundant initialization of |i| is the main problem. The
skipping of the first test of the condition |i < num| with |goto| was
also confusing.

It turns out that |bn_mul_mont| is only called when assembly language
optimizations are available, but in that case the assmebly language
versions will always be used instead. Although this code will be
compiled in |OPENSSL_NO_ASM| builds, it is never called in
|OPENSSL_NO_ASM| builds. Thus, it can just be removed.

Change-Id: Id551899b2602824978edc1a1cb0703b76516808d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 22:28:58 +00:00
Adam Langley 59b0fccb51 Define BORINGSSL_201510.
I've used these defines to easy the update of BoringSSL in Android
because Android's external/boringssl is a different git repository from
the rest of Android and thus it's not possible to land changes the
atomically update several things at once.

For this I tended just to add this define in the Android copy of
BoringSSL, but we're starting to see that bleed into other situations
now so it's looking like this will be generally useful.

These defines may be added when useful but shouldn't build up: once the
change has been done, the #if'ed code elsewhere that uses it should be
cleaned up. So far, that's worked ok. (I.e. we've had a BORINGSSL_201509
that correctly disappeared.)

Change-Id: I8cbb4731efe840cc798c970d37bc040b16a4a755
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6442
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 21:44:17 +00:00
David Benjamin e6d1e5a871 Use typedef names, not struct names.
Not sure if we want to leave bio.h and bytestring.h's instance as-is, but the
evp.h ones are just baffling.

Change-Id: I485c2e355ba93764da0c4c72c48af48b055a8500
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6454
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 21:44:06 +00:00
David Benjamin 16285ea800 Rewrite DTLS handshake message sending logic.
This fixes a number of bugs with the original logic:

- If handshake messages are fragmented and writes need to be retried, frag_off
  gets completely confused.

- The BIO_flush call didn't set rwstate, so it wasn't resumable at that point.

- The msg_callback call gets garbage because the fragment header would get
  scribbled over the handshake buffer.

The original logic was also extremely confusing with how it handles init_off.
(init_off gets rewound to make room for the fragment header.  Depending on
where you pause, resuming may or may not have already been rewound.)

For simplicity, just allocate a new buffer to assemble the fragment in and
avoid clobbering the old one. I don't think it's worth the complexity to
optimize that. If we want to optimize this sort of thing, not clobbering seems
better anyway because the message may need to be retransmitted. We could avoid
doing a copy when buffering the outgoing message for retransmission later.

We do still need to track how far we are in sending the current message via
init_off, so I haven't opted to disconnect this function from
init_{buf,off,num} yet.

Test the fix to the retry + fragment case by having the splitHandshake option
to the state machine tests, in DTLS, also clamp the MTU to force handshake
fragmentation.

Change-Id: I66f634d6c752ea63649db8ed2f898f9cc2b13908
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6421
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 21:43:32 +00:00
David Benjamin c81ee8b40c Add missing state to DTLS state machine.
This was a mistake from when we added async CertificateVerify support.
No test because the final state of each write state is semi-unreachable
due to the buffer BIO that gets installed on each handshake.

Change-Id: I0180926522113c8b1ca58b8c9c6dc37fb0dd8083
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6412
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 20:34:48 +00:00
Brian Smith 2e24b9bf73 Allow SHA-512 unaligned data access in |OPENSSL_NO_ASM| mode.
The previous logic only defined
|SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA| when the assembly language
optimizations were enabled, but
|SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA| is also useful when the C
implementations are used.

If support for ARM processors that don't support unaligned access is
important, then it might be better to condition the enabling of
|SHA512_BLOCK_CAN_MANAGE_UNALIGNED_DATA| on ARM based on more specific
flags.

Change-Id: Ie8c37c73aba308c3ccf79371ce5831512e419989
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6402
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 20:06:54 +00:00
David Benjamin e82e6f6696 Constify more BN_MONT_CTX parameters.
Most functions can take this in as const. Note this changes an
RSA_METHOD hook, though one I would not expect anyone to override.

Change-Id: Ib70ae65e5876b01169bdc594e465e3e3c4319a8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6419
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 20:04:36 +00:00
David Benjamin c7817d8ce2 Add SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version and tidy up SSL_TLSV1_2 logic.
Later when TLS 1.3 comes around, we'll need SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version too. In
the meantime, hide the SSL_TLSV1_2 messiness behind a reasonable API.

Change-Id: Ibcc17cccf48dd99e364d6defdfa5a87d031ecf0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6452
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 19:56:29 +00:00
Brian Smith 9d94d5e4ae Remove untested, unnecessary big-endian SHA-1/SHA-256 optimizations.
Change-Id: I3939923d297b901719cb3fb4cff20e770f780c7a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6441
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 19:36:24 +00:00
Adam Langley 38feb990a1 Require that EC points are on the curve.
This removes a sharp corner in the API where |ECDH_compute_key| assumed
that callers were either using ephemeral keys, or else had already
checked that the public key was on the curve.

A public key that's not on the curve can be in a small subgroup and thus
the result can leak information about the private key.

This change causes |EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp| to require that
points are on the curve. |EC_POINT_oct2point| already does this.

Change-Id: I77d10ce117b6efd87ebb4a631be3a9630f5e6636
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 19:35:42 +00:00
David Benjamin ef793f4b6f Add various functions for SSL_CIPHER.
Change-Id: I21051a6d1594c2606e171449d377663f8eccc847
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6450
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 19:26:22 +00:00
David Benjamin f93995be60 Test that the client doesn't offer TLS 1.2 ciphers when it shouldn't.
Change-Id: I20541e6eb5cfd48e53de5950bce312aae9801a54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6451
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-06 19:18:24 +00:00
Adam Langley 5f88999a1e Fix up several comments and detect problems in the future.
This change fixes up several comments (many of which were spotted by
Kenny Root) and also changes doc.go to detect cases where comments don't
start with the correct word. (This is a common error.)

Since we have docs builders now, these errors will be found
automatically in the future.

Change-Id: I58c6dd4266bf3bd4ec748763c8762b1a67ae5ab3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6440
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-05 20:12:45 +00:00
Adam Langley e57a19203f Add missing newline in aead.h.
c2d3280f was missing a newline before the trailer.

Change-Id: I0118259b7a8ab15aaaa55125a0f92f3a97794b81
2015-11-04 11:53:46 -08:00
Adam Langley c2d3280f0f Add SSL_get_ivs.
This function allows one to extract the current IVs from an SSL
connection. This is needed for the CBC cipher suites with implicit IVs
because, for those, the IV can't be extracted from the handshake key
material.

Change-Id: I247a1d0813b7a434b3cfc88db86d2fe8754344b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6433
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-04 19:45:28 +00:00
David Benjamin a97b737fb0 Separate CCS and handshake writing in DTLS.
They run through completely different logic as only handshake is fragmented.
This'll make it easier to rewrite the handshake logic in a follow-up.

Change-Id: I9515feafc06bf069b261073873966e72fcbe13cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6420
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-04 00:11:14 +00:00
Brian Smith ac9404c3a8 Improve crypto/digest/md32_common.h mechanism.
The documentation in md32_common.h is now (more) correct with respect
to the most important details of the layout of |HASH_CTX|. The
documentation explaining why sha512.c doesn't use md32_common.h is now
more accurate as well.

Before, the C implementations of HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER took a pointer
to the |HASH_CTX| and the assembly language implementations took a
pointer to the hash state |h| member of |HASH_CTX|. (This worked
because |h| is always the first member of |HASH_CTX|.) Now, the C
implementations take a pointer directly to |h| too.

The definitions of |MD4_CTX|, |MD5_CTX|, and |SHA1_CTX| were changed to
be consistent with |SHA256_CTX| and |SHA512_CTX| in storing the hash
state in an array. This will break source compatibility with any
external code that accesses the hash state directly, but will not
affect binary compatibility.

The second parameter of |HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER| is now of type
|const uint8_t *|; previously it was |void *| and all implementations
had a |uint8_t *data| variable to access it as an array of bytes.

This change paves the way for future refactorings such as automatically
generating the |*_Init| functions and/or sharing one I-U-F
implementation across all digest algorithms.

Change-Id: I6e9dd09ff057c67941021d324a4fa1d39f58b0db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6405
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-04 00:01:09 +00:00
David Benjamin 8fb0f525e1 Free BN_MONT_CTX in generic code.
Although those are only created by code owned by RSA_METHOD, custom RSA_METHODs
shouldn't be allowed to squat our internal fields and then change how you free
things.

Remove 'method' from their names now that they're not method-specific.

Change-Id: I9494ef9a7754ad59ac9fba7fd463b3336d826e0b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6423
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 23:39:41 +00:00
David Benjamin bb875350b3 Fix ASan bot.
This restores the original semantics of the finished hook.

Change-Id: I70da393c7e66fb6e3be1e2511e08b34bb54fc0b4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6422
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 23:28:56 +00:00
David Benjamin d93831d71a Make it possible for a static linker to discard unused RSA functions.
Having a single RSA_METHOD means they all get pulled in. Notably, RSA key
generation pulls in the primality-checking code.

Change-Id: Iece480113754da090ddf87b64d8769f01e05d26c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6389
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 23:02:38 +00:00
David Benjamin e8f783ac0d Unwind DH_METHOD and DSA_METHOD.
This will allow a static linker (with -ffunction-sections since things aren't
split into files) to drop unused parts of DH and DSA. Notably, the parameter
generation bits pull in primality-checking code.

Change-Id: I25087e4cb91bc9d0ab43bcb267c2e2c164e56b59
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6388
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 22:54:36 +00:00
David Benjamin 3fc138eccd Don't bother sampling __func__.
Removing the function codes continued to sample __func__ for compatibility with
ERR_print_errors_cb, but not ERR_error_string_n. We can just emit
OPENSSL_internal for both. ERR_print_errors_cb already has the file and line
number available which is strictly more information than the function name.
(ERR_error_string_n does not, but we'd already turned that to
OPENSSL_internal.)

This shaves 100kb from a release build of the bssl tool.

In doing so, put an unused function code parameter back into ERR_put_error to
align with OpenSSL. We don't need to pass an additional string in anymore, so
OpenSSL compatibility with anything which uses ERR_LIB_USER or
ERR_get_next_error_library costs nothing. (Not that we need it.)

Change-Id: If6af34628319ade4145190b6f30a0d820e00b20d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6387
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 22:50:59 +00:00
Adam Langley 165248c24f Fix several MSVC warnings.
MSVC reports lots of:
warning C4090: 'function' : different 'const' qualifiers

Change-Id: If8184538c44e657f6234252d0147396d1a18b36c
2015-11-03 14:31:33 -08:00
Adam Langley 8f7ecb8f0c (Hopefully) fix a warning on Windows.
MSVC unhelpfuly says: warning C4146: unary minus operator applied to
unsigned type, result still unsigned.

Change-Id: Ia1e6b9fc415908920abb1bcd98fc7f7a5670c2c7
2015-11-03 14:29:01 -08:00
Adam Langley 466b9895ac Initialise variable before jump.
Clang finds:

crypto/ec/ec.c:420:7: error: variable 'ok' is used uninitialized
whenever 'if' condition is true [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
  if (ctx == NULL) {
        ^~~~~~~~~~~

Change-Id: I33fc4d74ff3a3bd52ab155f8273fbcd9c6256e35
2015-11-03 14:20:45 -08:00
Adam Langley 1895493868 Add Intel's P-256
This change incorporates Intel's P-256 implementation. The record of
Intel's submission under CLA is in internal bug number 25330687.

Before:
Did 3582 ECDH P-256 operations in 1049114us (3414.3 ops/sec)
Did 8525 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1028778us (8286.5 ops/sec)
Did 3487 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1008996us (3455.9 ops/sec)
build/tool/bssl is 1434704 bytes after strip -s

After:
Did 8618 ECDH P-256 operations in 1027884us (8384.2 ops/sec)
Did 21000 ECDSA P-256 signing operations in 1049490us (20009.7 ops/sec)
Did 8268 ECDSA P-256 verify operations in 1079481us (7659.2 ops/sec)
build/tool/bssl is 1567216 bytes after strip -s

Change-Id: I147971a8e19849779c8ed7e20310d41bd4962299
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6371
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 22:08:47 +00:00
Adam Langley 27a0d086f7 Add ssl_renegotiate_ignore.
This option causes clients to ignore HelloRequest messages completely.
This can be suitable in cases where a server tries to perform concurrent
application data and handshake flow, e.g. because they are trying to
“renew” symmetric keys.

Change-Id: I2779f7eff30d82163f2c34a625ec91dc34fab548
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6431
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 21:58:13 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite fa9eb568b0 Correct the spelling of "primitive".
Spotted by Matt Smart.

Change-Id: Id9c61ba6a293ddc52b2e2c93c427860765848c6d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6430
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 21:47:19 +00:00
Adam Langley f1c1cf8794 Revert "Improve crypto/digest/md32_common.h mechanism."
This reverts commit 00461cf201.

Sadly it broke wpa_supplicant.
2015-11-02 18:14:34 -08:00
Brian Smith 00461cf201 Improve crypto/digest/md32_common.h mechanism.
The documentation in md32_common.h is now (more) correct with respect
to the most important details of the layout of |HASH_CTX|. The
documentation explaining why sha512.c doesn't use md32_common.h is now
more accurate as well.

Before, the C implementations of HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER took a pointer
to the |HASH_CTX| and the assembly language implementations tool a
pointer to the hash state |h| member of |HASH_CTX|. (This worked
because |h| is always the first member of |HASH_CTX|.) Now, the C
implementations take a pointer directly to |h| too.

The definitions of |MD4_CTX|, |MD5_CTX|, and |SHA1_CTX| were changed to
be consistent with |SHA256_CTX| and |SHA512_CTX| in storing the hash
state in an array. This will break source compatibility with any
external code that accesses the hash state directly, but will not
affect binary compatibility.

The second parameter of |HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER| is now of type
|const uint8_t *|; previously it was |void *| and all implementations
had a |uint8_t *data| variable to access it as an array of bytes.

This change paves the way for future refactorings such as automatically
generating the |*_Init| functions and/or sharing one I-U-F
implementation across all digest algorithms.

Change-Id: I30513bb40b5f1d2c8932551d54073c35484b3f8b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6401
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 02:04:38 +00:00
David Benjamin ecc2591b6c Update link to Google style guide.
Change-Id: I0c9d86f188cd20d256620ccbb46546678714e081
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6386
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 02:02:12 +00:00
Adam Langley efb42fbb60 Make BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime take a const context.
BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime does not modify its |BN_MONT_CTX| so that
value should be const.

Change-Id: Ie74e48eec8061899fd056fbd99dcca2a86b02cad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6403
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 01:58:12 +00:00
Adam Langley eb8be01f0c Add ciphers option to bssl.
This simply converts a cipher suite string to the list of cipher suites
that it implies.

Change-Id: Id8b31086715d619ea6601c40a6eb84dc0d8c500d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6370
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 01:17:02 +00:00
Adam Langley 09d68c98c0 Expand a comment.
As a follow up to https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/6340,
this change expands a comment to note the reason for clearing a flag
that I missed.

Change-Id: Ib3cfecbb330f0ae7c46bf44286f4e6b407159fe8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6393
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-03 01:15:55 +00:00
David Benjamin 2e0901b75f Don't use ssl3_write_pending in DTLS.
That function doesn't do anything useful for DTLS. It's meant for tracking the
rest of the record we've already committed to by writing half of one. But one
cannot write half a datagram, so DTLS never tracks this. Just call
ssl_write_buffer_flush straight and don't touch wpend_*.

Change-Id: Ibe191907d64c955c7cfeefba26f5c11ad5e4b939
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6418
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-02 23:17:24 +00:00
David Benjamin 13e81fc971 Fix DTLS asynchronous write handling.
Although the DTLS transport layer logic drops failed writes on the floor, it is
actually set up to work correctly. If an SSL_write fails at the transport,
dropping the buffer is fine. Arguably it works better than in TLS because we
don't have the weird "half-committed to data" behavior. Likewise, the handshake
keeps track of how far its gotten and resumes the message at the right point.

This broke when the buffering logic was rewritten because I didn't understand
what the DTLS code was doing. The one thing that doesn't work as one might
expect is non-fatal write errors during rexmit are not recoverable. The next
timeout must fire before we try again.

This code is quite badly sprinkled in here, so add tests to guard it against
future turbulence. Because of the rexmit issues, the tests need some hacks
around calls which may trigger them. It also changes the Go DTLS implementation
from being completely strict about sequence numbers to only requiring they be
monotonic.

The tests also revealed another bug. This one seems to be upstream's fault, not
mine. The logic to reset the handshake hash on the second ClientHello (in the
HelloVerifyRequest case) was a little overenthusiastic and breaks if the
ClientHello took multiple tries to send.

Change-Id: I9b38b93fff7ae62faf8e36c4beaf848850b3f4b9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6417
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-02 23:16:22 +00:00
David Benjamin ebda9b3736 Make recordingconn emit more useful things for DTLS.
It's somewhat annoying to have to parse out the packetAdaptor mini-language.
Actually seeing those is only useful when debugging the adaptor itself, rather
than DTLS. Switch the order of the two middleware bits and add an escape hatch
to log the funny opcodes.

Change-Id: I249c45928a76b747d69f3ab972ea4d31e0680a62
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6416
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-02 23:01:01 +00:00
Torbjörn Granlund 069bedfe0c Fix documentation typo.
Change-Id: Ia060a9f8c30ea7446ddffcc2221a8f5a37f14d8c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6415
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-11-02 22:53:27 +00:00
Adam Langley ce514698f5 Fix a missing initializer that only Clang warns about.
89d4a68c introduced -Wmissing-field-initializers because it seemed
generally useful. However, Clang and GCC have differing opinions about
what counts as missing. This change should make Clang happy too.

Change-Id: I070c719f5c47f537207200d5399e093cc083e58f
2015-10-30 17:24:03 -07:00
Adam Langley d9e817309a Fix several warnings that arise in Android.
Android is now using Ninja so it doesn't spew so much to the terminal
and thus any warnings in BoringSSL (which builds really early in the
process) and much more obvious.

Thus this change fixes a few warnings that appear in the Android build.

Change-Id: Id255ace90fece772a1c3a718c877559ce920b960
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6400
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-30 21:11:48 +00:00
Adam Langley bb85f3d655 Reorganise |SSL_SESSION| and |SSL| to save a little memory.
This is a fairly timid, first step at trying to pack common structures a
little better.

This change reorders a couple of structures a little and turns some
variables into bit-fields. Much more can still be done.

Change-Id: Idbe0f54d66559c0ad654bf7e8dea277a771a568f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6394
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-30 21:01:09 +00:00
Adam Langley dff504d39a Make the instructions for downloading the ARM compiler easier to copy and paste.
Change-Id: If78cba6abc36999488981db2a12b039024c757df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6391
Reviewed-by: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-30 20:47:08 +00:00
David Benjamin 51a01a5cd4 Revert most of "Refactor ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD nonce handling."
This reverts most of commit 271777f5ac. The old
ChaCha20-Poly1305, though being transitioned to the old name, should not change
in behavior. This also avoids adding a special-case to SSL_AEAD_CTX.

Also revert the name change to SSL_CIPHER_is_CHACHA20POLY1305. The one consumer
for that function doesn't need to distinguish the old and new variants, so
avoid unnecessary turbulence.

Change-Id: I5a6f97fccc5839d4d25e74e304dc002329d21b4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6385
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-29 18:40:33 +00:00
Piotr Sikora 7063b6d062 Fix assert in SSL_set_shutdown.
Added in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/6312/.

Change-Id: I95f0c8d3a119513c50d1d62a78443c6445507bd4
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotrsikora@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6395
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-29 13:19:53 +00:00
Brian Smith 96b9f3b68c Switch rsa_test.cc to use the new RSA encrypt/decrypt API.
Change-Id: I799e289a402612446e08f64f59e0243f164cf695
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6372
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-28 23:36:44 +00:00
David Benjamin 8e4db8b1c2 Fix even more ChaCha20 rename deadlocks.
QUIC code references the TXT macro. Also get rid of
TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 which wasn't renamed for some reason.

Change-Id: I0308e07104b3cec394d748f3f1146bd786d2ace2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6384
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-28 21:09:46 +00:00
David Benjamin 278d34234f Get rid of all compiler version checks in perlasm files.
Since we pre-generate our perlasm, having the output of these files be
sensitive to the environment the run in is unhelpful. It would be bad to
suddenly change what features we do or don't compile in whenever workstations'
toolchains change or if developers do or don't have CC variables set.

Previously, all compiler-version-gated features were turned on in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6260, but this broke the build. I
also wasn't thorough enough in gathering performance numbers. So, flip them all
to off instead. I'll enable them one-by-one as they're tested.

This should result in no change to generated assembly.

Change-Id: Ib4259b3f97adc4939cb0557c5580e8def120d5bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6383
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-28 19:33:04 +00:00
Piotr Sikora 3f5fe608c8 Support Bazel builds on other platforms.
This change causes the generated Bazel files to include the assembly
file lists for other platforms.

Change-Id: Ic474b6900f8c109393baac1ec9cc2d112f155a56
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6390
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-28 19:26:57 +00:00
David Benjamin 87cfcdb6df Resolve another ChaCha20-Poly1305 rename deadlock.
WebRTC can't roll into Chromium without picking up the iOS build fix, but we
can't roll BoringSSL forwards because WebRTC also depends on the previously
exposed ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suite constants.

Define the old constants again.

Change-Id: If8434a0317e42b3aebe1bc1c5a58ed97a89a0230
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6382
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-28 19:25:36 +00:00
David Benjamin 7dd3f77256 Fix aead.h header typo.
EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_old is listed twice instead of
EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305.

Change-Id: I281eee7a8359cd2a2b04047c829ef351ea4a7b82
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6381
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-28 17:50:23 +00:00
David Benjamin f8e9dcaeea iOS builds use the static ARM CPU configuration.
The other codepath is Linux-specific. This should get tidied up a bit but, in
the meantime, fix the Chromium iOS (NO_ASM) build. Even when the assembly gets
working, it seems iOS prefers you make fat binaries rather than detect features
at runtime, so this is what we want anyway.

BUG=548539

Change-Id: If19b2e380a96918b07bacc300a3a27b885697b99
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6380
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-28 17:25:25 +00:00
Adam Langley d84b5aec7e Don't build with OPENSSL_SMALL.
This was submitted to check that it worked on all the builders but, in
normal usage, we should build without OPENSSL_SMALL so that everything
is compiled.

Change-Id: I31ac899862e3b31c55bf265a7ec5ff0cc9770b48
2015-10-27 18:34:44 -07:00
Adam Langley de659cdc2e Fix PKCS#8 on 32-bit systems.
The previous commit fixed a signed/unsigned warning but, on 32-bit
systems, long is only 32 bits, so the fix was incorrect there.

Change-Id: I6afe340164de0e176c7f710fcdd095b2a4cddee4
2015-10-27 16:18:51 -07:00
Adam Langley 13f1dd497f Fix a couple more signed/unsigned compares.
Different compilers find different problems.

Change-Id: I732611005ae1cbfcb4bc70c3f98af2c18b0a04da
2015-10-27 16:07:26 -07:00
Adam Langley 96c2a28171 Fix all sign/unsigned warnings with Clang and GCC.
Change-Id: If2a83698236f7b0dcd46701ccd257a85463d6ce5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4992
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-27 22:48:00 +00:00
Brian Smith 0dc2a8aee2 Clean up |ECDH_compute_key|.
1. Check for the presence of the private key before allocating or
   computing anything.
2. Check the return value of |BN_CTX_get|.
3. Don't bother computing the Y coordinate since it is not used.
4. Remove conditional logic in cleanup section.

Change-Id: I4d8611603363c7e5d16a8e9f1d6c3a56809f27ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6171
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 17:00:25 +00:00
Brian Smith 274341dd6e Change the type of |EC_GROUP_get_degree| and friends to |unsigned|.
These functions ultimately return the result of |BN_num_bits|, and that
function's return type is |unsigned|. Thus, these functions' return
type should also be |unsigned|.

Change-Id: I2cef63e6f75425857bac71f7c5517ef22ab2296b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6170
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 16:48:04 +00:00
David Benjamin e93ffa5da7 Clarify that SSL_get_peer_cert_chain returns the unverified chain.
This came up and I wasn't sure which it was without source-diving.

Change-Id: Ie659096e0f42a7448f81dfb1006c125d292fd7fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6354
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 16:42:30 +00:00
Adam Langley 05ee4fda1c Add no-op functions |CRYPTO_malloc_init| and |ENGINE_load_builtin_engines|.
This reduces the impact on Netty. See
https://github.com/Scottmitch/netty-tcnative/commit/904b84ce41fc44dd1d3955df69912d91906c9877#commitcomment-12159877

Change-Id: I22f9e1edaeb9e721326867ae2b4f3da2c5441437
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5535
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 16:41:40 +00:00
Adam Langley 2e3c978d14 Add OPENSSL_SMALL.
Intel's P-256 code has very large tables and things like Chromium just
don't need that extra size. However, servers generally do so this change
adds an OPENSSL_SMALL define that currently just drops the 64-bit P-224
but will gate Intel's P-256 in the future too.

Change-Id: I2e55c6e06327fafabef9b96d875069d95c0eea81
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6362
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 16:40:20 +00:00
Adam Langley 5dbdad9c33 For now, give the unsuffixed ChaCha20 AEAD name to the old version.
QUIC has a complex relationship with BoringSSL owing to it living both
in Chromium and the Google-internal repository. In order for it to
handle the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD switch more easily this change gives
the unsuffixed name to the old AEAD, for now.

Once QUIC has moved to the “_old” version the unsuffixed name can be
given to the new version.

Change-Id: Id8a77be6e3fe2358d78e022413fe088e5a274dca
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6361
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 16:39:12 +00:00
Brian Smith f0523e9f20 Avoid hard-coded linkage of WNAF-based multiplication.
If the application is only using the P-256 implementation in p256-64.c,
then the WNAF code would all be dead code. The change reorganizes the
code so that all modern toolchains should be able to recognize that
fact and eliminate the WNAF-based code when it is unused.

Change-Id: I9f94bd934ca7d2292de4c29bb89e17c940c7cd2a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6173
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 16:38:25 +00:00
Brian Smith 80c5fabc63 Simplify |EC_METHOD| by removing invariant methods.
None of these methods vary per group. Factoring these out of
|EC_METHOD| should help some toolchains to do a better job optimizing
the code for size.

Change-Id: Ibd22a52992b4d549f12a8d22bddfdb3051aaa891
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6172
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 15:55:47 +00:00
Brian Smith f15e075b73 Add more tests for the RFC 7539 ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD.
The tests in crypto/cipher/test/chacha20_poly1305_deprecated_tests.txt
were adapted to the RFC 7539 AEAD construction by recalculating the tags.
Also a few additional vectors were added. These vectors were verified
against nettle. See
https://github.com/briansmith/nettle/commit/feb7292bf19dfc635f126b9f3c0d147cdee30c87.

Change-Id: Ib3f2797d5825bc1e32c55f845b5070b6993e4aff
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6144
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 01:34:33 +00:00
Brian Smith 271777f5ac Refactor ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD nonce handling.
This change reduces unnecessary copying and makes the pre-RFC-7539
nonces 96 bits just like the AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and RFC 7539
ChaCha20-Poly1305 cipher suites. Also, all the symbols related to
the pre-RFC-7539 cipher suites now have "_OLD" appended, in
preparation for adding the RFC 7539 variants.

Change-Id: I1f85bd825b383c3134df0b6214266069ded029ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6103
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 01:01:42 +00:00
Brian Smith 3e23e4cb58 Add the RFC 7539 ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD.
Change-Id: I07dfde7cc304d903c2253600905cc3e6257716c5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6101
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-27 00:46:36 +00:00
Brian Smith e80a2ecd0d Change |CRYPTO_chacha_20| to use 96-bit nonces, 32-bit counters.
The new function |CRYPTO_chacha_96_bit_nonce_from_64_bit_nonce| can be
used to adapt code from that uses 64 bit nonces, in a way that is
compatible with the old semantics.

Change-Id: I83d5b2d482e006e82982f58c9f981e8078c3e1b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6100
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 23:58:46 +00:00
David Benjamin da084a3ebd Fix shared library build on OS X.
It seems OS X actually cares about symbol resolution and dependencies
when you create a dylib. Probably because they do two-level name
resolution.

(Obligatory disclaimer: BoringSSL does not have a stable ABI and is thus
not suitable for a traditional system-wide library.)

BUG=539603

Change-Id: Ic26c4ad23840fe6c1f4825c44671e74dd2e33870
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6131
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 23:39:47 +00:00
William Hesse 6dc1851f30 Fix aarch64 (64-bit ARM) guard on chacha_vec_arm.S.
Change-Id: Ia3632639daa8655ea5e2f81ba2a5163949f522b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6110
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 23:32:38 +00:00
Brian Smith 953cfc837f Document how to regenerate crypto/chacha/chacha_vec_arm.S.
Also, organize the links in BUILDING.md sensibly.

Change-Id: Ie9c65750849fcdab7a6a6bf11d1c9cdafb53bc00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6140
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 23:29:57 +00:00
Adam Langley 0f9f0ead2e Fix the shared builders by exporting GCM symbols.
gcm_test.cc needs to access the internal GCM symbols. This is
unfortunate because it means that they have to be marked OPENSSL_EXPORT
just for this.

To compensate, modes.h is removed and its contents copied into
crypto/modes/internal.h.

Change-Id: I1777b2ef8afd154c43417137673a28598a7ec30e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6360
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 23:26:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 75885e29c4 Revert "Get rid of all compiler version checks in perlasm files."
This reverts commit b9c26014de.

The win64 bot seems unhappy. Will sniff at it tomorrow. In
the meantime, get the tree green again.

Change-Id: I058ddb3ec549beee7eabb2f3f72feb0a4a5143b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6353
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 23:12:39 +00:00
Brian Smith 0f8bfdeb33 Make |gcm128_context| memcpy-safe.
This removes the confusion about whether |gcm128_context| copies the
key (it didn't) or whether the caller is responsible for keeping the
key alive for the lifetime of the |gcm128_context| (it was).

Change-Id: Ia0ad0a8223e664381fbbfb56570b2545f51cad9f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 22:05:33 +00:00
Brian Smith 3f3f25d8a2 Fix constness of |gcm128_context.key|.
The key is never modified through the key pointer member, and the
calling code relies on that fact for maintaining its own
const-correctness.

Change-Id: I63946451aa7c400cd127895a61c30d9a647b1b8c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6040
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 21:40:04 +00:00
Brian Smith eca509c8da Clarify confusing conditionals in crypto/gcm/gcm.c.
MSVC was warning about the assignment in the |if| condition. Also, the
formatting of the negative number made it look like a subtraction.
Finally, what was being calculated was unclear.

Change-Id: If56c672302c638aac6a87f715e8dcbb87ecb56ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6212
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 21:37:00 +00:00
Brian Smith 9383eab5e9 Avoid signed/unsigned comparison in crypto/bn's |probable_prime|.
Change-Id: I768a348e1e34207bca55c7d093c1ba8975e304ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6213
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 21:27:12 +00:00
Brian Smith 659806d7ff Don't default to SHA-1 in |EVP_DigestSignInit|/|EVP_DigestVerifyInit|.
This removes a hard link-time dependency on the SHA-1 code. The code
was self-contradictory in whether it defaulted to SHA-1 or refused to
default to SHA-1.

Change-Id: I5ad7949bdd529df568904f87870313e3d8a57e72
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5833
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 21:26:51 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite e564a5ba6e |assert| → |OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT| where possible.
Change-Id: If8643c7308e6c3666de4104d097458187dbe268c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6057
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 21:07:31 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite 29d8adbdc6 Better handle IPv6.
∙ host:port parsing, where unavoidable, is now IPv6-friendly.
  ∙ |BIO_C_GET_CONNECT| is simply removed.
  ∙ bssl -accept now listens on both IPv6 and IPv4.

Change-Id: I1cbd8a79c0199bab3ced4c4fd79d2cc5240f250c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6214
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 21:06:01 +00:00
David Benjamin 301afaf223 Add a run_tests target to run all tests.
It's very annoying having to remember the right incant every time I want
to switch around between my build, build-release, build-asan, etc.,
output directories.

Unfortunately, this target is pretty unfriendly without CMake 3.2+ (and
Ninja 1.5+). This combination gives a USES_TERMINAL flag to
add_custom_target which uses Ninja's "console" pool, otherwise the
output buffering gets in the way. Ubuntu LTS is still on an older CMake,
so do a version check in the meantime.

CMake also has its own test mechanism (CTest), but this doesn't use it.
It seems to prefer knowing what all the tests are and then tries to do
its own output management and parallelizing and such. We already have
our own runners. all_tests.go could actually be converted tidily, but
generate_build_files.py also needs to read it, and runner.go has very
specific needs.

Naming the target ninja -C build test would be nice, but CTest squats
that name and CMake grumps when you use a reserved name, so I've gone
with run_tests.

Change-Id: Ibd20ebd50febe1b4e91bb19921f3bbbd9fbcf66c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6270
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 20:33:44 +00:00
David Benjamin b9c26014de Get rid of all compiler version checks in perlasm files.
Since we pre-generate our perlasm, having the output of these files be
sensitive to the environment the run in is unhelpful. It would be bad to
suddenly change what features we do or don't compile in whenever workstations'
toolchains change.

Enable all compiler-version-gated features as they should all be runtime-gated
anyway. This should align with what upstream's files would have produced on
modern toolschains. We should assume our assemblers can take whatever we'd like
to throw at them. (If it turns out some can't, we'd rather find out and
probably switch the problematic instructions to explicit byte sequences.)

This actually results in a fairly significant change to the assembly we
generate. I'm guessing upstream's buildsystem sets the CC environment variable,
while ours doesn't and so the version checks were all coming out conservative.

diffstat of generated files:

 linux-x86/crypto/sha/sha1-586.S              | 1176 ++++++++++++
 linux-x86/crypto/sha/sha256-586.S            | 2248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-avx2.S           | 1644 +++++++++++++++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.S         |  638 ++++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont.S         |  332 +++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.S        | 1130 ++++++++++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S |  754 ++++++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/modes/ghash-x86_64.S     |  475 +++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha1-x86_64.S        | 1121 ++++++++++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha256-x86_64.S      | 1062 +++++++++++
 linux-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha512-x86_64.S      | 2241 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mac-x86/crypto/sha/sha1-586.S                | 1174 ++++++++++++
 mac-x86/crypto/sha/sha256-586.S              | 2248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-avx2.S             | 1637 +++++++++++++++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.S           |  638 ++++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont.S           |  331 +++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.S          | 1130 ++++++++++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.S   |  750 ++++++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/modes/ghash-x86_64.S       |  475 +++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha1-x86_64.S          | 1121 ++++++++++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha256-x86_64.S        | 1062 +++++++++++
 mac-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha512-x86_64.S        | 2241 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 win-x86/crypto/sha/sha1-586.asm              | 1173 ++++++++++++
 win-x86/crypto/sha/sha256-586.asm            | 2248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 win-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-avx2.asm           | 1858 +++++++++++++++++++-
 win-x86_64/crypto/bn/rsaz-x86_64.asm         |  638 ++++++
 win-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont.asm         |  352 +++
 win-x86_64/crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.asm        | 1184 ++++++++++++
 win-x86_64/crypto/modes/aesni-gcm-x86_64.asm |  933 ++++++++++
 win-x86_64/crypto/modes/ghash-x86_64.asm     |  515 +++++
 win-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha1-x86_64.asm        | 1152 ++++++++++++
 win-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha256-x86_64.asm      | 1088 +++++++++++
 win-x86_64/crypto/sha/sha512-x86_64.asm      | 2499 ++++++

SHA* gets faster. RSA and AES-GCM seem to be more of a wash and even slower
sometimes!  This is a little concerning. Though when I repeated the latter two,
it's definitely noisy (RSA in particular), so we may wish to repeat in a more
controlled environment. We could also flip some of these toggles to something
other than the highest setting if it seems some of the variants aren't
desirable. We just shouldn't have them enabled or disabled on accident. This
aligns us closer to upstream though.

$ /tmp/bssl.old speed SHA-
Did 5028000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000048us (5027758.7 ops/sec): 80.4 MB/s
Did 1708000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000257us (1707561.2 ops/sec): 437.1 MB/s
Did 73000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1008406us (72391.5 ops/sec): 593.0 MB/s
Did 3041000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000311us (3040054.5 ops/sec): 48.6 MB/s
Did 779000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1000820us (778361.7 ops/sec): 199.3 MB/s
Did 26000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1009875us (25745.8 ops/sec): 210.9 MB/s
Did 1837000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000251us (1836539.0 ops/sec): 29.4 MB/s
Did 803000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1000969us (802222.6 ops/sec): 205.4 MB/s
Did 41000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1016768us (40323.8 ops/sec): 330.3 MB/s
$ /tmp/bssl.new speed SHA-
Did 5354000 SHA-1 (16 bytes) operations in 1000104us (5353443.2 ops/sec): 85.7 MB/s
Did 1779000 SHA-1 (256 bytes) operations in 1000121us (1778784.8 ops/sec): 455.4 MB/s
Did 87000 SHA-1 (8192 bytes) operations in 1012641us (85914.0 ops/sec): 703.8 MB/s
Did 3517000 SHA-256 (16 bytes) operations in 1000114us (3516599.1 ops/sec): 56.3 MB/s
Did 935000 SHA-256 (256 bytes) operations in 1000096us (934910.2 ops/sec): 239.3 MB/s
Did 38000 SHA-256 (8192 bytes) operations in 1004476us (37830.7 ops/sec): 309.9 MB/s
Did 2930000 SHA-512 (16 bytes) operations in 1000259us (2929241.3 ops/sec): 46.9 MB/s
Did 1008000 SHA-512 (256 bytes) operations in 1000509us (1007487.2 ops/sec): 257.9 MB/s
Did 45000 SHA-512 (8192 bytes) operations in 1000593us (44973.3 ops/sec): 368.4 MB/s

$ /tmp/bssl.old speed RSA
Did 820 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1017008us (806.3 ops/sec)
Did 27000 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1015400us (26590.5 ops/sec)
Did 1292 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1008185us (1281.5 ops/sec)
Did 65000 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1011388us (64268.1 ops/sec)
Did 120 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1061027us (113.1 ops/sec)
Did 8208 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1002717us (8185.8 ops/sec)
$ /tmp/bssl.new speed RSA
Did 760 RSA 2048 signing operations in 1003351us (757.5 ops/sec)
Did 25900 RSA 2048 verify operations in 1028931us (25171.8 ops/sec)
Did 1320 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) signing operations in 1040806us (1268.2 ops/sec)
Did 63000 RSA 2048 (3 prime, e=3) verify operations in 1016042us (62005.3 ops/sec)
Did 104 RSA 4096 signing operations in 1008718us (103.1 ops/sec)
Did 6875 RSA 4096 verify operations in 1093441us (6287.5 ops/sec)

$ /tmp/bssl.old speed GCM
Did 5316000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000082us (5315564.1 ops/sec): 85.0 MB/s
Did 712000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000252us (711820.6 ops/sec): 961.0 MB/s
Did 149000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1003182us (148527.4 ops/sec): 1216.7 MB/s
Did 5919750 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000016us (5919655.3 ops/sec): 94.7 MB/s
Did 800000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000951us (799239.9 ops/sec): 1079.0 MB/s
Did 152000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1000765us (151883.8 ops/sec): 1244.2 MB/s
$ /tmp/bssl.new speed GCM
Did 5315000 AES-128-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000125us (5314335.7 ops/sec): 85.0 MB/s
Did 755000 AES-128-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1000878us (754337.7 ops/sec): 1018.4 MB/s
Did 151000 AES-128-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1005655us (150150.9 ops/sec): 1230.0 MB/s
Did 5913500 AES-256-GCM (16 bytes) seal operations in 1000041us (5913257.6 ops/sec): 94.6 MB/s
Did 782000 AES-256-GCM (1350 bytes) seal operations in 1001484us (780841.2 ops/sec): 1054.1 MB/s
Did 121000 AES-256-GCM (8192 bytes) seal operations in 1006389us (120231.8 ops/sec): 984.9 MB/s

Change-Id: I0efb32f896c597abc7d7e55c31d038528a5c72a1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6260
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 20:31:30 +00:00
David Benjamin e189c86bc7 Consistently disable the Intel SHA Extensions code.
We haven't tested it yet, but it was only disabled on 64-bit. Disable it on
32-bit as well until we're ready to turn it on.

Change-Id: I50e74aef2c5c3ba539a868c2bb6fb90fdf28a5f0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6271
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 20:27:52 +00:00
David Benjamin 178a88c26f Synchronize sha512-x86_64.pl with upstream.
We missed 7eb9680ae1bf5dd9aeb61c401f2c3bd900ac9aeb. This is a no-op as we don't
set shaext right now anyway. This also includes some cosmetic changes to
minimize the diff with upstream. ("cosmetic". Upstream's perl doesn't like
spaces.)

Change-Id: I17fa663ddaa38c27854d4f59fb83960528d9ba78
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6250
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 20:27:28 +00:00
David Benjamin ccf25177bd Only emit RSA_R_BAD_VERSION on bad RSAPrivateKey versions.
I was a little bit too lazy in error handling here.

Change-Id: I9954957d41d610e715c1976a921dedeb8cb49d40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6240
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 20:27:01 +00:00
nagendra modadugu 3398dbf279 Add server-side support for asynchronous RSA decryption.
Change-Id: I6df623f3e9bc88acc52043f16b34649b7af67663
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5531
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 20:26:20 +00:00
David Benjamin 091c4b9869 Add an option to disable NPN on a per-SSL basis.
Right whether NPN is advertised can only be configured globally on the SSL_CTX.
Rather than adding two pointers to each SSL*, add an options bit to disable it
so we may plumb in a field trial to disable NPN.

Chromium wants to be able to route a bit in to disable NPN, but it uses SSL_CTX
incorrectly and has a global one, so it can't disconnect the callback. (That
really needs to get fixed. Although it's not clear this necessarily wants to be
lifted up to SSL_CTX as far as Chromium's SSLClientSocket is concerned since
NPN doesn't interact with the session cache.)

BUG=526713

Change-Id: I49c86828b963eb341c6ea6a442557b7dfa190ed3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6351
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:56:52 +00:00
David Benjamin ff905b09fc Avoid sticking -1 into a size_t.
There's still a size_t/int cast due to the mass of legacy code, but at
least avoid the most egregious case.

Change-Id: Icc1741366e09190216e762ca7ef42ecfc3215edc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6345
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:50:53 +00:00
David Benjamin 0a870c2f7e Correctly free SSL_SESSIONs in ssl_test.
That was silly.

Change-Id: I375c04f725cbb75f9e04fce386e20c4de5e7ae0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6352
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:49:16 +00:00
David Benjamin 12f7737d32 Remove BN_MONT_CTX_init.
One less exported function. Nothing ever stack-allocates them, within BoringSSL
or in consumers. This avoids the slightly odd mechanism where BN_MONT_CTX_free
might or might not free the BN_MONT_CTX itself based on a flag.

(This is also consistent with OpenSSL 1.1.x which does away with the _init
variants of both this and BIGNUM so it shouldn't be a compatibility concern
long-term either.)

Change-Id: Id885ae35a26f75686cc68a8aa971e2ea6767ba88
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6350
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:47:26 +00:00
David Benjamin 911cfb7e6e Unnecessary NULL checks.
Missed a few the last time around.

Change-Id: I42fd57566d64fa1c41cba14573742d42468cc07d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6349
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:45:25 +00:00
David Benjamin 17dd904eb9 do_dirname: Don't change gen on failures
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.

(Imported from upstream's ea9de25f2f577db69d67c39e5cf60be7da17c931.)

This only affects the various config file parsing bits.

Change-Id: I530c09be81bfb40bca931c064c39cbc93dfd454f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6348
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:44:09 +00:00
David Benjamin dc4a554b2c Remove dead code in x509_lu.c.
See also upstream's b62a2f8a373d1889672599834acf95161f2883ce, though
upstream left the lock calls in by accident. Otherwise, the change
appears to be correct. I see no side effects of x509_object_idx_cnt
beyond the return value and *pnmatch, both of which are discarded.

Change-Id: Ic2124a733a61591bd1b264164726ce6c69ce10c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6347
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:41:58 +00:00
David Benjamin 79680ffaed Fix various malloc failure codepaths.
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init needs a CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup. Also a pile of problems
with x509_lu.c I noticed trying to import some upstream change.

Change-Id: I029a65cd2d30aa31f4832e8fbfe5b2ea0dbc66fe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6346
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:41:01 +00:00
David Benjamin 68b4e8933e Slightly simplify some DSA logic.
See also upstream's b62a2f8a373d1889672599834acf95161f2883ce.

Change-Id: I430be5ec21198484b8a874460b224e15bafafe48
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6344
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:28:50 +00:00
David Benjamin 471abb1f21 Update PORTING.md for the new renego API.
SSL_set_renegotiate_mode to avoid my original double-negative confusion.

Change-Id: I23537aeac53c4969fd81307a676f33d6768da55f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6322
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:27:56 +00:00
David Benjamin 1269ddd377 Never use the internal session cache for a client.
The internal session cache is keyed on session ID, so this is completely
useless for clients (indeed we never look it up internally). Along the way,
tidy up ssl_update_cache to be more readable. The slight behavior change is
that SSL_CTX_add_session's return code no longer controls the external
callback. It's not clear to me what that could have accomplished. (It can only
fail on allocation error. We only call it for new sessions, so the duplicate
case is impossible.)

The one thing of value the internal cache might have provided is managing the
timeout. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions logic would flip the not_resumable bit and
cause us not to offer expired sessions (modulo SSL_CTX_flush_sessions's delay
and any discrepancies between the two caches). Instead, just check expiration
when deciding whether or not to offer a session.

This way clients that set SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT blindly don't accidentally
consume gobs of memory.

BUG=531194

Change-Id: If97485beab21874f37737edc44df24e61ce23705
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6321
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:27:28 +00:00
David Benjamin 415660b26b Tidy up SSL_CTX_add_session.
The original logic was rather confusing.

Change-Id: I097e57817ea8ec2dd65a413c8751fba1682e928b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6320
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:22:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 0f653957c1 Add tests for the internal session cache behavior.
In doing so, fix the documentation for SSL_CTX_add_session and
SSL_CTX_remove_session. I misread the code and documented the behavior
on session ID collision wrong.

Change-Id: I6f364305e1f092b9eb0b1402962fd04577269d30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6319
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:18:44 +00:00
David Benjamin dc2aea2231 Remove all the logic around custom session IDs and retrying on collisions.
A random 32-byte (so 256-bit) session ID is never going to collide with
an existing one. (And, if it does, SSL_CTX_add_session does account for
this, so the server won't explode. Just attempting to resume some
session will fail.)

That logic didn't completely work anyway as it didn't account for
external session caches or multiple connections picking the same ID in
parallel (generation and insertion happen at different times) or
multiple servers sharing one cache. In theory one could fix this by
passing in a sufficiently clever generate_session_id, but no one does
that.

I found no callers of these functions, so just remove them altogether.

Change-Id: I8500c592cf4676de6d7194d611b99e9e76f150a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6318
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 19:00:14 +00:00
David Benjamin 60be027625 Style: fix some header guards
Change-Id: I86c30c7fe489c720f83f744696df0a0a20268531
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6317
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:47:51 +00:00
David Benjamin f91fa5cfc6 Documentation typo.
Change-Id: Iedcba0ac15bc14def9c2dc2407ed29d130133c0c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6315
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:47:31 +00:00
David Benjamin dfa9c4a074 Linkify pipe words.
This required switching anchors from <a name> to id attributes, which
also works. HTML gets unhappy when you nest <a> tags inside each other
and tagging the elements is somewhat tidier.

Change-Id: I64094d35a0e820e37be9e5dc8db013a50774190f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6314
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:46:53 +00:00
David Benjamin 5ef619ef2a Hide some sections from the docs.
Private structs shouldn't be shown. Also there's a few sections that are
really more implementation details than anything else.

Change-Id: Ibc5a23ba818ab0531d9c68e7ce348f1eabbcd19a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:44:27 +00:00
David Benjamin 63006a913b Document the rest of ssl.h.
Although Chromium actually uses SSL_(get_)state as part of its fallback
reason heuristic, that function really should go in the deprecated
bucket. I kept SSL_state_string_long since having a human-readable
string is probably useful for logging.

SSL_set_SSL_CTX was only half-documented as the behavior of this
function is very weird. This warrants further investigation and
rethinking.

SSL_set_shutdown is absurd. I added an assert to trip up clearing bits
and set it to a bitwise OR since clearing bits may mess up the state
machine. Otherwise there's enough consumers and it's not quite the same
as SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown that I've left it alone for now.

Change-Id: Ie35850529373a5a795f6eb04222668ff76d84aaa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6312
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:43:38 +00:00
David Benjamin 7a1eefd3cd Deprecate SSL_library_init.
It just calls CRYPTO_library_init and doesn't do anything else. If
anything, I'd like to make CRYPTO_library_init completely go away too.
We have CRYPTO_once now, so I think it's safe to assume that, if ssl/
ever grows initialization needs beyond that of crypto/, we can hide it
behind a CRYPTO_once and not burden callers.

Change-Id: I63dc362e0e9e98deec5516f4620d1672151a91b6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6311
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:36:23 +00:00
David Benjamin 5d8b128095 Document the (formerly) SSL_state wrapper macros.
SSL_in_connect_init and SSL_in_accept_init are removed as they're unused
both within the library and externally. They're also kind of silly.

Expand on how False Start works at the API level in doing so.

Change-Id: Id2a8e34b5bb8f28329e3b87b4c64d41be3f72410
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6310
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:35:01 +00:00
David Benjamin 449c3c7b7b Take some definitions out of the Android compatibility layer.
They were since added to crypto.h and implemented in the library proper.

Change-Id: Idaa2fe2d9b213e67cf7ef61ff8bfc636dfa1ef1f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6309
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:33:10 +00:00
David Benjamin 6e0c17aa3a Private (and deprecated) types.
Change-Id: Ia66e485cb2de45c9fb0a1ecd9a703863ad24d9c9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6308
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:32:35 +00:00
David Benjamin da86cccaf6 Deprecate all the string macros.
They're really not all that helpful, considering they're each used
exactly once. They're also confusing as it is ALMOST the case that
SSL_TXT_FOO expands to "FOO", but SSL_TXT_AES_GCM expand "AESGCM" and
the protocol versions have lowercase v's and dots.

Change-Id: If78ad8edb0c024819219f61675c60c2a7f3a36b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6307
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:15:33 +00:00
David Benjamin 6d5ea9225d Private constants are private.
Change-Id: Id20fcf357d4a0fc28734a7f2ea1fe077d4b34f1e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6306
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:12:57 +00:00
David Benjamin 82170248e7 Document the info callback.
This callback is some combination of arguably useful stuff (bracket
handshakes, alerts) and completely insane things (find out when the
state machine advances). Deprecate the latter.

Change-Id: Ibea5b32cb360b767b0f45b302fd5f1fe17850593
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6305
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 18:12:22 +00:00
David Benjamin 1b92f64b71 Fix comment style in crypto/rand/rand.c.
This compiled, so I guess everything we care about can do C++-style
comments, but better be uniform.

Change-Id: I9950c2df93cd81bb2bddb3a1e14e2de02c7e4807
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6304
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:58:08 +00:00
David Benjamin 7227990ef1 More SSL_SESSION serialization functions.
Change-Id: I2dd8d073521a230b2b0c4e74ec3d6eeb4899623e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6303
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:57:50 +00:00
David Benjamin 066fe0a679 Document fd-based SSL APIs.
Also clean up the code slightly.

Change-Id: I066a389242c46cdc7d41b1ae9537c4b7716c92a2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6302
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:56:25 +00:00
David Benjamin cef1eb4c1c Put renego functions together.
Change-Id: I3bfbf90a790a10e4464e0e39bbd7c0c2bee9fe35
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6301
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:52:22 +00:00
David Benjamin d5635d476c Fix ssl3.h / ssl.h circular dependency.
Like tls1.h, ssl3.h is now just a bundle of protocol constants.
Hopefully we can opaquify this struct in due time, but for now it's
still public.

Change-Id: I68366eb233702e149c92e21297f70f8a4a45f060
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6300
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:50:32 +00:00
David Benjamin 8370bfd6d1 Remove unhelpful warning about changing state numbers.
This dates all the way to SSLeay 0.9.0b. At this point the
application/handshake interleave logic in ssl3_read_bytes was already
present:

((
  (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
  (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
  (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
 ) || (
  (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
  (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
  (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
 )

The comment is attached to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A, so I suspect this is
what it was about. This logic is gone now, so let's remove that scary
warning.

Change-Id: I45f13b53b79e35d80e6074b0942600434deb0684
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6299
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:48:57 +00:00
David Benjamin 9f6b5266d9 Fix typo.
(Imported from upstream's ec3a7c9b3729cd45c550222556100666aedc5bbc.)

Change-Id: I9f281fc03e6ece628d46344cf2c0850dd3bcd703
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6343
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:48:24 +00:00
David Benjamin 036152e6a5 Fix incorrect error-handling in BN_div_recp.
See upstream's e90f1d9b74275c11e3492e521e46f4b1afa6f883.

Change-Id: I68470acb97dac59e586b1c72aad50de6bd0156cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6342
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:48:10 +00:00
David Benjamin 0ea470fdb2 Fix self-signed handling.
Don't mark a certificate as self-signed if keyUsage is present and
certificate signing is not asserted.

PR#3979

(Imported from upstream's e272f8ef8f63298466494adcd29512797ab1eece.)

Change-Id: I3120832f32455e8e099708fa2491d85d3d4a3930
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6341
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:46:22 +00:00
David Benjamin dd6fed9704 Explicitly handle empty NewSessionTickets on the client.
RFC 5077 explicitly allows the server to change its mind and send no
ticket by sending an empty NewSessionTicket. See also upstream's
21b538d616b388fa0ce64ef54da3504253895cf8.

CBS_stow handles this case somewhat, so we won't get confused about
malloc(0) as upstream did. But we'll still fill in a bogus SHA-256
session ID, cache the session, and send a ClientHello with bogus session
ID but empty ticket extension. (The session ID field changes meaning
significantly when the ticket is or isn't empty. Non-empty means "ignore
the session ID, but echo if it resuming" while empty means "I support
tickets, but am offering this session ID".

The other behavior change is that a server which changes its mind on a
resumption handshake will no longer override the client's session cache
with a ticket-less session.

(This is kind of silly. Given that we don't get completely confused due
to CBS_stow, it might not be worth bothering with the rest. Mostly it
bugged me that we send an indicator session ID with no ticket.)

Change-Id: Id6b5bde1fe51aa3e1f453a948e59bfd1e2502db6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6340
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:44:54 +00:00
David Benjamin 07e138425d Move remaining functions out of tls1.h.
Now tls1.h is just a pile of protocol constants with no more circular
dependency problem.

I've preserved SSL_get_servername's behavior where it's simultaneously a
lookup of handshake state and local configuration.  I've removed it from
SSL_get_servername_type. It got the logic wrong anyway with the order of
the s->session check.

(Searching through code, neither is used on the client, but the
SSL_get_servername one is easy.)

Change-Id: I61bb8fb0858b07d76a7835bffa6dc793812fb027
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6298
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-26 17:38:40 +00:00
Adam Langley 10a1a9d32e Update references to the padding draft.
The padding draft is now RFC 7685:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7685.txt

Change-Id: I26945b10e7923e75c016232c663baac11c4389ae
2015-10-21 14:49:23 -07:00
Adam Langley 6a7cfbe06a Allow ARM capabilities to be set at compile time.
Some ARM environments don't support |getauxval| or signals and need to
configure the capabilities of the chip at compile time. This change adds
defines that allow them to do so.

Change-Id: I4e6987f69dd13444029bc7ac7ed4dbf8fb1faa76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-20 22:40:15 +00:00
David Benjamin c2ae53db6d Document alert handling.
SSL_alert_desc_string_long was kept in the undeprecated bucket and one missing
alert was added. We have some uses and it's not completely ridiculous for
logging purposes.

The two-character one is ridiculous though and gets turned into a stub
that returns a constant string ("!" or "!!") because M2Crypto expects
it.

Change-Id: Iaf8794b5d953630216278536236c7113655180af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6297
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 19:03:24 +00:00
David Benjamin b86847c24b Clean up ssl_stat.c slightly.
(Documentation/deprecation will come in later commits.)

Change-Id: I3aba26e32b2e47a1afb5cedd44d09115fc193bce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6296
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:49:51 +00:00
David Benjamin 1a1b34d759 Deprecate SSL_get_(peer_)finished.
The only reason you'd want it is to tls_unique, and we have a better API
for that. (It has one caller and that is indeed what that caller uses it
for.)

Change-Id: I39f8e353f56f18becb63dd6f7205ad31f4192bfd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6295
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:48:41 +00:00
David Benjamin 93d17499e9 Deprecate SSL_want*.
This is redundant with SSL_get_error. Neither is very good API, but
SSL_get_error is more common. SSL_get_error also takes a return code
which makes it harder to accidentally call it at some a point other than
immediately after an operation. (Any other point is confusing since you
can have SSL_read and SSL_write operations going on in parallel and
they'll get mixed up.)

Change-Id: I5818527c30daac28edb552c6c550c05c8580292d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6294
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:42:15 +00:00
David Benjamin 7f393f72a5 Unexport SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION.
It's pretty clearly pointless to put in the public header.

Change-Id: I9527aba09b618f957618e653c4f2ae379ddd0fdb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6293
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:41:08 +00:00
David Benjamin 79a0589dc4 Ditch remaining filename comments from public headers and ssl/
Change-Id: I8fc795d18aacb0c929b82e7d58514b22103e2106
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6292
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:40:05 +00:00
David Benjamin d4c2bceaab Document early callback functions.
Also added a SSL_CTX_set_select_certificate_cb setter for
select_certificate_cb so code needn't access SSL_CTX directly. Plus it
serves as a convenient anchor for the documentation.

Change-Id: I23755b910e1d77d4bea7bb9103961181dd3c5efe
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6291
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:29:33 +00:00
David Benjamin cfdee213f8 Add use counters for SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG and SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER.
These are theh two remaining quirks (SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
aside). Add counters so we can determine whether there are still clients
that trip up these cases.

Change-Id: I7e92f42f3830c1df675445ec15a852e5659eb499
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6290
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:22:47 +00:00
David Benjamin 96e97b1bf1 Convert ssl3_send_channel_id to CBB.
In doing so, simplify the mess around serializing the public key.
Channel ID specifies that you write x and y concatenated. Rather than
using the X9.62 serialization and chopping bits off, get the affine
coordinates and write them out in the same way we write r and s.

Also unify the P-256 sanity check around SSL_set1_tls_channel_id and
actually check the curve NID.

BUG=468889

Change-Id: I228877b736c9722e368d315064ce3ae6893adfc0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6201
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:16:46 +00:00
David Benjamin e97b96224c Convert ssl3_send_next_proto to CBB.
BUG=468889

Change-Id: I841b2816ba47c8c1129e333012272902a52cafd3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6200
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:08:28 +00:00
David Benjamin 5638046cd7 Convert ssl3_send_server_hello to CBB.
BUG=468889

Change-Id: I899d67addbff01c64175f47b19ca2b688626405b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6191
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 18:04:48 +00:00
David Benjamin e8d53508ca Convert ssl3_send_client_hello to CBB.
Start converting the ones we can right now. Some of the messier ones
resize init_buf rather than assume the initial size is sufficient, so
those will probably wait until init_buf is gone and the handshake's
undergone some more invasive surgery. The async ones will also require
some thought. But some can be incrementally converted now.

BUG=468889

Change-Id: I0bc22e4dca37d9d671a488c42eba864c51933638
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6190
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
2015-10-20 17:56:19 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite 978f16ea08 size_t RSA functions.
This extends 79c59a30 to |RSA_public_encrypt|, |RSA_private_encrypt|,
and |RSA_public_decrypt|.  It benefits Conscrypt, which expects these
functions to have the same signature as |RSA_public_private_decrypt|.

Change-Id: Id1ce3118e8f20a9f43fd4f7bfc478c72a0c64e4b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6286
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-19 23:54:47 +00:00
Eric Roman 63fa118f3a Reject iterations=0 when calling PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC().
BUG=https://crbug.com/534961

Change-Id: I69e2434bf8d5564711863c393ee3bafe3763cf24
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5932
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 19:40:55 +00:00
David Benjamin c617413527 Remove SSL_SESSION_print*.
It's missing fields and no one ever calls it.

Change-Id: I450edc1e29bb48edffb5fd3df8da19a03e4185ce
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5821
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 19:24:14 +00:00
Brian Smith e5ae760a96 Silence MSVC warning C4210.
The warning is:

    C4210: nonstandard extension used : function given file scope.

It is caused by function declarations that aren't at the top level in a
file.

Change-Id: Ib1c2ae64e15e66eb0a7255a29c0e560fbf55c2b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6210
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:20:29 +00:00
David Benjamin b735b1b6e4 Document that SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb's id parameter should be const.
See also upstream's bf0fc41266f17311c5db1e0541d3dd12eb27deb6.

Change-Id: Ib692b0ad608f2e3291f2aeab2ad98a7e177d5851
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6150
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:19:28 +00:00
David Benjamin f88b81aa75 Put OCSP and SCT accessors with SSL_get_peer_certificate.
Grouping along two axes is weird. Doesn't hugely matter which one, but
we should be consistent.

Change-Id: I80fb04d3eff739c08fda29515ce81d101d8542cb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6120
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:19:06 +00:00
David Benjamin 8ac00cafbf Document DTLS-specific retransmit and MTU functions.
The caller obligations for retransmit are messy, so I've peppered a few
other functions with mentions of it. There's only three functions, so
they're lumped in with the other core functions. They're irrelevant for
TLS, but important for DTLS.

Change-Id: Ifc995390952eef81370b58276915dcbe4fc7e3b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6093
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:18:54 +00:00
David Benjamin fd8e69f26d Better document the callbacks around client certificates.
Deprecate the client_cert_cb variant since you can't really configure
intermediates with it. (You might be able to by configuring the
intermediates without the leaf or key and leaving the SSL stack to
configure those, but that's really weird. cert_cb is simpler.)

Also document the two functions the callbacks may use to query the
CertificateRequest on the client.

Change-Id: Iad6076266fd798cd74ea4e09978e7f5df5c8a670
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6092
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:18:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 9f85949baf Document a few more miscellaneous things.
Change-Id: Ib4829bf9344341e3d4fe90c7cea66e217366fe97
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6091
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:18:19 +00:00
David Benjamin 9f4913f4a8 Remove the ifdef around ec.h's ec_key.h compatibility include
It doesn't actually do anything.

Change-Id: I8a5748dc86b842406cc656a5b251e1a7c0092377
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6090
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:14:52 +00:00
Brian Smith a655c73b93 Switch rsa_test.cc to use new RSA private key parsing API.
Change-Id: I48885402b88309bb514554d209e1827d31738756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6211
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:14:41 +00:00
Brian Smith b8c1446c1f Fix comment typo in poly1305_test.txt.
Change-Id: Id7391502f08651d018d88400057b18aae9e514e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6102
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:14:26 +00:00
David Benjamin 03bad147b6 Links in README.md, take two.
gitiles seems to mangle the links when viewed from
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/README.md, but not
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/.

This document suggests that it handles absolute and relative links to files
specially. I guess it didn't interpret 'README.md' as either and failed to adjust
it accordingly. Let's see if this works instead.

https://gerrit.googlesource.com/gitiles/+/master/Documentation/markdown.md#Links

Change-Id: Ic181919140f968c88c69ea8f3c21c70f63e4b467
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6230
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:04:43 +00:00
David Benjamin 1d5ef3bb1e Add SSL_set_renegotiate_mode.
Add a slightly richer API. Notably, one can configure ssl_renegotiate_once to
only accept the first renego.

Also, this API doesn't repeat the mistake I made with
SSL_set_reject_peer_renegotiations which is super-confusing with the negation.

Change-Id: I7eb5d534e3e6c553b641793f4677fe5a56451c71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6221
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 18:02:28 +00:00
David Benjamin 324dce4fd7 Unbreak SSL_total_renegotiations.
The logic to update that got removed in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4825. Add tests.

Change-Id: Idc550e8fa3ce6f69a76fa65d7651adde281edba6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6220
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <alangley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 17:53:30 +00:00
Adam Langley 6a2c512a7b Add a README.
Change-Id: I77b1d0efa6cddfcb162be693d53276822780540f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5790
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-13 17:52:28 +00:00
David Benjamin 617eac6a21 Align BIO_get_fd with upstream.
OpenSSL's BIO_get_fd returns the fd or -1, not a boolean.

Change-Id: I12a3429c71bb9c9064f9f91329a88923025f1fb5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6080
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-12 22:18:17 +00:00
David Benjamin c7ce977fb9 Ignore all extensions but renegotiation_info in SSL 3.0.
SSL 3.0 used to have a nice and simple rule around extensions. They don't
exist. And then RFC 5746 came along and made this all extremely confusing.

In an SSL 3.0 server, rather than blocking ServerHello extension
emission when renegotiation_info is missing, ignore all ClientHello
extensions but renegotiation_info. This avoids a mismatch between local
state and the extensions with emit.

Notably if, for some reason, a ClientHello includes the session_ticket
extension, does NOT include renegotiation_info or the SCSV, and yet the
client or server are decrepit enough to negotiate SSL 3.0, the
connection will fail due to unexpected NewSessionTicket message.

See https://crbug.com/425979#c9 for a discussion of something similar
that came up in diagnosing https://poodle.io/'s buggy POODLE check.
This is analogous to upstream's
5a3d8eebb7667b32af0ccc3f12f314df6809d32d.

(Not supporting renego as a server in any form anyway, we may as well
completely ignore extensions, but then our extensions callbacks can't
assume the parse hooks are always called. This way the various NULL
handlers still function.)

Change-Id: Ie689a0e9ffb0369ef7a20ab4231005e87f32d5f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6180
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-11 20:47:19 +00:00
Adam Langley 7bd538d94d Remove an unreachable expression.
The goto always jumps into the loop so the for's initialisation
expression can never be executed. Clang warns about this.

Change-Id: I3c3d4b8430754099e9ca6fd20101868c40165245
2015-10-09 13:04:03 -07:00
Adam Langley f0258fe956 Add optimised version of P-224.
This imports the Google-authored P-224 implementation by Emilia Käsper
and Bodo Möller that is also in upstream OpenSSL.

Change-Id: I16005c74a2a3e374fb136d36f3f6569dab9d8919
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6145
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-08 20:29:22 +00:00
Adam Langley 82aa28fa81 Make |BUF_memdup| look for zero length, not NULL.
BUF_memdup tries to avoid mallocing zero bytes (and thus unduly
returning an error for a NULL return value) by testing whether the input
buffer is NULL. This goes back to the original OpenSSL code.

However, when |ext_npn_parse_serverhello| tries to use |BUF_memdup| to
copy an NPN value returned by a callback, some callbacks just set the
output /length/ to zero to indicate an empty value. Thus, when
|BUF_memdup| tests the pointer, it's an uninitialised value and MSan
throws an error.

Since passing a NULL pointer to |BUF_memdup| better imply that the
length is zero, while the reverse empirically isn't true, testing the
length seems safer.

Change-Id: I06626f7dfb761de631fd997bda60057b76b8da94
2015-10-06 18:11:33 -07:00
Chuck Hays c608d6b02b Updating Bazel outputs to work on other platforms.
Bazel on Mac requires some alterations to the generated build files.
This change updates generate_build_files.py to emit suitable Bazel
files. This will require some tweaks to projects that build with Bazel.

Change-Id: I3d68ec754b8abaa41a348f86c32434477f2c5e1c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6146
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-07 00:57:20 +00:00
Eric Roman 1aec2cbad2 Reject iterationCount == 0 when parsing PBKDF2-params.
Previously a value of 0 would be accepted and intepreted as equivalent
to 1. This contradicts RFC 2898 which defines:

     iterationCount INTEGER (1..MAX),

BUG=https://crbug.com/534961

Change-Id: I89623980f99fde3ca3780880d311955d3f6fe0b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5971
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-02 16:19:04 +00:00
David Benjamin 20c0e90d11 Allow NULL inputs in SSL_SESSION_get_time.
Some code relies on OpenSSL's behavior where it allowed for NULL. But this time
add a comment so people don't think this is the convention for new functions.

BUG=538292

Change-Id: I66566e0e24566fafe17e05369276248be3b05591
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6070
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-10-01 20:16:49 +00:00
Brian Smith 20605684e8 Fix |max_tag_len| for TLS CBC AEADs.
Change-Id: Iba21583a4de08039fab78e526c91003fbd327592
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6058
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 23:59:22 +00:00
Brian Smith d4ebc99122 Remove always-zero |bulk| variables in crypto/cipher/e_aes.c.
Change-Id: I36b2bb0e10c627ae6efa9d133df53b814922e652
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6051
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 23:12:45 +00:00
Brian Smith bc41cdf327 Add tests from cipher_test.txt to the AEAD test suite.
Change-Id: I819b5473e35e1f71192d3a336252ae4506c4230b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6055
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 23:11:40 +00:00
Adam Langley 0dd93002dd Revert section changes for ASM.
This change reverts the following commits:
  72d9cba7cb
  5b61b9ebc5
  3f85e04f40
  2ab24a2d40

Change-Id: I669b83f2269cf96aa71a649a346147b9407a811e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6056
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 22:09:52 +00:00
Adam Langley f4e554e438 Bitwise-or, not logical-or, when hashing.
This didn't actually break anything, but it does make session lookup
quite slow.

Change-Id: I13615e8ccf6a46683a21774eb7c073318ae8c28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6054
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 20:50:18 +00:00
Adam Langley 72d9cba7cb Move .align directives next to their labels for ARM.
2ab24a2d40 added sections to ARM assembly
files. However, in cases where .align directives were not next to the
labels that they were intended to apply to, the section directives would
cause them to be ignored.

Change-Id: I32117f6747ff8545b80c70dd3b8effdc6e6f67e0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6050
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 18:35:29 +00:00
David Benjamin 3b27843b7c Go's darwin filenames have changed.
32-bit is gone (wasn't being used anyway) and the -osx10.8 suffix is gone.
Still looking into why the Linux bots are unhappy.

Change-Id: If3a35d20fb1cc6f1e3f023d792dc78b5c5aac72a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6061
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 18:32:05 +00:00
David Benjamin 3fc9fe3f4a Move the bots to Go 1.5.1.
Nothing in particular, but probably good to match the version of Go on our
workstations.

Change-Id: I5f4828299d56d25cd8c0dadfa91e9f18212a178d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6060
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 18:23:19 +00:00
Adam Langley dc7e9c4043 Make the runner tests a go “test”
This change makes the runner tests (in ssl/test/runner) act like a
normal Go test rather than being a Go binary. This better aligns with
some internal tools.

Thus, from this point onwards, one has to run the runner tests with `go
test` rather than `go run` or `go build && ./runner`.

This will break the bots.

Change-Id: Idd72c31e8e0c2b7ed9939dacd3b801dbd31710dd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6009
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-30 17:10:45 +00:00
David Benjamin 368ef1aa51 Take thread.h out of the documentation.
There's nothing in there that isn't deprecated, since BoringSSL is thread-safe
by default now.

Change-Id: Idfd9de8bd3a6544b1d4176b2d115eef9eefa63d0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6031
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 23:38:09 +00:00
David Benjamin 9a798ecc0e Document the hexadecimal casing thing in PORTING.md.
mab@ seems to be dealing with a fair number of these, so it's probably worth
adding to the list.

Change-Id: Ifaea3c96e7b089f28a87c7728ceb8c671786eb27
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6030
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 23:37:50 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite 4d11aff33a Don't record handshake hashes if no Channel ID
Change-Id: Ic0dcde436024e8d11f9b5986998cf6e808ff036b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6007
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 21:47:05 +00:00
Adam Langley 2492586058 Add |PKCS12_verify_mac|.
This utility function is provided for API-compatibility and simply calls
|PKCS12_parse| internally.

BUG=536939

Change-Id: I86c548e5dfd64b6c473e497b95adfa5947fe9529
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6008
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 20:30:35 +00:00
Adam Langley 5b61b9ebc5 Update ChaCha20 ARM asm with sections.
The ChaCha20 ARM asm is generated from GCC. This change updates the GCC
command line to include -ffunction-sections, which causes GCC to put
each function in its own section so that the linker with --gc-sections
can trim unused functions.

Since the file only has a single function, this is a bit useless, but
it'll now be consistent with the other ARM asm.

Change-Id: If12c675700310ea55af817b5433844eeffc9d029
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6006
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 18:07:54 +00:00
Adam Langley 3f85e04f40 Add sections to Poly1305 ARM asm code.
This code isn't generated by perlasm and so the section directives need
to be added manually.

Change-Id: I46158741743859679decbce99097fe6071bf8012
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6005
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 18:04:14 +00:00
Adam Langley 5f005ccd9d Make dummy functions static.
To avoid too much #if soup, e_aes.c uses a lot of dummy functions that
just call |abort|. This change makes them all static, which they should
have been all along.

Change-Id: I696f8a0560cf99631ed7adb42d1af10003db4a63
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6004
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 18:03:04 +00:00
Adam Langley 2ab24a2d40 Put arm/aarch64 assembly functions in their own section.
This change causes each global arm or aarch64 asm function to be put
into its own section by default. This matches the behaviour of the
-ffunction-sections option to GCC and allows the --gc-sections option to
the linker to discard unused asm functions on a function-by-function
basis.

Sometimes several asm functions will share the same data an, in that
situation, the data is put into the section of one of the functions and
the section of the other function is merged with the added
“.global_with_section” directive.

Change-Id: I12c9b844d48d104d28beb816764358551eac4456
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6003
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-29 18:02:14 +00:00
David Benjamin 502ca43fc8 Fix up pkcs8.h.
Somehow we ended up with duplicate 'Deprecated functions' sections.
PKCS12_get_key_and_certs ended up in one of them was probably an oversight.

Change-Id: Ia6d6a44132cb2730ee1f92a6bbcfa8ce168e7d08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6020
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 23:17:01 +00:00
David Benjamin 43a58ad436 Fix SSL_set_session documentation comment.
I put an extra space in there. Also document ownership and return value.

Change-Id: I0635423be7774a7db54dbf638cc548d291121529
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6010
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:40:30 +00:00
David Benjamin dbb0321014 Clarify that only top-level CBBs get CBB_cleanup.
Also add an assert to that effect.

Change-Id: I1bd0571e3889f1cba968fd99041121ac42ee9e89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5990
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:40:01 +00:00
David Benjamin df6a3f8b95 Move SSL_CIPHER section just above cipher suite configuration.
Putting it at the top was probably a mistake? Even though SSL_CIPHER
(like SSL_SESSION) doesn't depend on SSL, if you're reading through the
header, SSL_CTX and SSL are the most important types. You could even use
the library without touch cipher suite configs if you don't care since
the default is decently reasonable, though it does include a lot of
ciphers. (Hard to change that if we wanted to because DEFAULT is often
used somewhat like ALL and then people subtract from it.)

Change-Id: Ic9ddfc921858f7a4c141972fe0d1e465ca196b9d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5963
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:39:39 +00:00
David Benjamin 32876b3dbb Document cipher suite configuration.
The cipher suite rules could also be anchored on SSL_TXT_* if desired. I
currently documented them in prose largely because SSL_TXT_* also
defines protocol version strings and those are weird; SSL_TXT_TLSV1_1
isn't even a cipher rule. (And, in fact, those are the only SSL_TXT_*
macros that we can't blindly remove. I found some code that #ifdef's the
version SSL_TXT_* macros to decide if version-locked SSL_METHODs are
available.)

Also they clutter the header. I was thinking maybe we should dump a lot
of the random constants into a separate undocumented header or perhaps
just unexport them.

I'm slightly torn on this though and could easily be convinced in the
other direction. (Playing devil's advocate, anchoring on SSL_TXT_* means
we're less likely to forget to document one so long as adding a
SSL_TXT_* macro is the convention.)

Change-Id: Ide2ae44db9d6d8f29c24943090c210da0108dc37
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5962
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:36:22 +00:00
David Benjamin d3a53c8fd9 OCSP stapling and SCT extensions go under certificate verification.
This mirrors how the server halves fall under configuring certificates.

Change-Id: I9bde85eecfaff6487eeb887c88cb8bb0c36b83d8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5961
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:27:01 +00:00
David Benjamin 0cfea3411a Move a few more functions to the catch-all 'obscure' bucket.
Change-Id: I493f26561db2bc8510963a0da5032a758bb1f3ef
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5960
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:19:04 +00:00
David Benjamin 1cee7da07e Documentation typo.
Change-Id: I2dc4253a2456625057c8188c6cb9b0b7300d6c79
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5951
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:18:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 93d8cf557f Add various tests for d2i_PrivateKey.
Change-Id: I030022c240d17df08cf6f59eede0e94373152c40
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5950
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:18:23 +00:00
David Benjamin 382bc29251 Defensively avoid assuming d2i functions don't advance on error.
Although the previous commit should ensure this doesn't happen, the
uint8_t** pattern is very error-prone and we're trying to avoid doing
much to the legacy ASN.1 stack. To that end, maintaining the strong
exception guarantee w.r.t. the input pointer-pointer is best effort and
we won't rely on it, so we needn't spend our time chasing down problems.

Change-Id: Ib78974eb94377fe0b0b379f57d9695dc81f344bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5949
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:15:42 +00:00
David Benjamin 15e4deb165 d2i: don't update input pointer on failure
(Imported from upstream's 728bcd59d3d41e152aead0d15acc51a8958536d3.)

Actually this one was reported by us, but the commit message doesn't
mention this.

This is slightly modified from upstream's version to fix some problems
noticed in import. Specifically one of d2i_X509_AUX's success paths is
bust and d2i_PrivateKey still updates on one error path. Resolve the
latter by changing both it and d2i_AutoPrivateKey to explicitly hit the
error path on ret == NULL. This lets us remove the NULL check in
d2i_AutoPrivateKey.

We'll want to report the problems back upstream.

Change-Id: Ifcfc965ca6d5ec0a08ac154854bd351cafbaba25
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5948
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 22:15:17 +00:00
David Benjamin 97a33939a3 Deprecate basically the entire base64 implementation.
The IUF functions were added for PEM and internally are very lenient to
whitespace and include other PEM-specific behaviors (notably they treat
hyphens as EOF). They also decode a ton of invalid input (see upstream's
RT #3757).

Upstream has a rewrite with tests that resolves the latter issue which
we should review and import. But this is still a very PEM-specific
interface. As this code has basically no callers outside the PEM code
(and any such callers likely don't want a PEM-specific API), it's
probably not worth the trouble to massage this and PEM into a strict IUF
base64 API with PEM whitespace and hyphen bits outside. Just deprecate
it all and leave it in a corner.

Change-Id: I5b98111e87436e287547829daa65e9c1efc95119
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5952
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-28 21:53:39 +00:00
Adam Langley 6daa8268a6 Move the ARM-AES functions inside an #if block.
This fixes an issue with Clang, which doesn't like static functions that
aren't used (to its eyes).

Change-Id: I7cb055aa9f0ab3934352c105abe45f9c30990250
2015-09-25 15:21:34 -07:00
Arve Hjønnevåg 7f64706e37 Use armv8 functions for of AES_[en|de]crypt and AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key, if available.
This change causes ARM and Aarch64 to use the ARMv8 AES instructions, if
provided by the current CPU.

Change-Id: I50cb36270139fcf4ce42e5ebb8afe24ffcab22e3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6002
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-25 22:08:29 +00:00
Adam Langley d75545600d Merge hwrand.c into rand.c.
By doing this the compiler can notice that much of the code is unused in
the case that we know that we can't have a hardware RNG (i.e. ARM).

Change-Id: I72d364a30080364d700f855640e0164c2c62f0de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6001
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-25 22:07:42 +00:00
Adam Langley c8e664b70a Fix several minor points noticed by Kenny.
∙ Some comments had the wrong function name at the beginning.
  ∙ Some ARM asm ended up with two #if defined(__arm__) lines – one from
    the .pl file and one inserted by the translation script.

Change-Id: Ia8032cd09f06a899bf205feebc2d535a5078b521
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6000
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-24 22:08:50 +00:00
Eric Roman 8c9b8783e2 Change some "int" variables to "size_t" in ssl3_handshake_mac().
BUG=https://crbug.com/535039

Change-Id: I94d35ae5acee510b1e6874c37f35eddda9906e71
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5974
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-24 00:04:59 +00:00
Eric Roman f0e8d537de Update comments in digest.h to consistently mention that digest size and block size are measured in bytes.
Change-Id: Ie75c68132fd501549b2ad5203663f6e99867eed6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5970
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-24 00:04:12 +00:00
David Benjamin b50c91b5df Cleaner handling of "cnid" in do_x509_check
Avoid using cnid = 0, use NID_undef instead, and return early instead of
trying to find an instance of that in the subject DN.

(Imported from upstrea's 40d5689458593aeca0d1a7f3591f7ccb48e459ac.)

Change-Id: I1bdf6bf7a4b1f4774a8dbec7e5df421b3a27c7e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5947
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:59:43 +00:00
David Benjamin 5e4158fe12 Fix the comment for POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
The |z| value should be 0x04 not 0x02

RT#3838

(Imported from upstream's 41fe7d2380617da515581503490f1467ee75a521.)

Change-Id: I35745cd2a5a32bd726cb4d3c0613cef2bcbef35b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5946
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:57:01 +00:00
David Benjamin b86b0f2824 RT 3493: fix RSA test
- Pass in the right ciphertext length to ensure we're indeed testing
  ciphertext corruption (and not truncation).
- Only test one mutation per byte to not make the test too slow.
- Add a separate test for truncated ciphertexts.

(Imported from upstream's 5f623eb61655688501cb1817a7ad0592299d894a.)

Change-Id: I425a77668beac9d391387e3afad8d15ae387468f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5945
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:56:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 79c59a30b5 size_t RSA_private_decrypt's input.
Change-Id: If05761052e235b38d9798b2fe4d8ba44293af891
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5944
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:55:18 +00:00
Adam Langley d98dc1311e Upstream Android-specific things under |BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM|
The Android system BoringSSL has a couple of changes:
  ∙ ChaCha20-Poly1305 is disabled because it's not an offical
    cipher suite.
  ∙ P-521 is offered in the ClientHello.

These changes were carried in the Android BoringSSL repo directly. This
change upstreams them when BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM is defined.

Change-Id: If3e787c6694655b56e7701118aca661e97a5f26c
2015-09-23 16:41:33 -07:00
David Benjamin 907bd30dcd Banish more deprecated flags to the bottom.
Change-Id: I7959fc65afae8860804ab9f038e3b5a9c2c8ec7b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5943
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:33:02 +00:00
David Benjamin 59937045ec Document certificate verification functions in SSL.
Or at least group them together and make a passing attempt to document
them. The legacy X.509 stack itself remains largely untouched and most
of the parameters have to do with it.

Change-Id: I9e11e2ad1bbeef53478c787344398c0d8d1b3876
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5942
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:31:18 +00:00
David Benjamin df0905a803 Don't pretend to account for RSA_PSK.
RSA_PSK is really weird in that it takes a Certificate, but you're not
expected to verify it. It's just a funny way to transmit an RSA key.
(They probably should have used the RSA_EXPORT ServerKeyExchange
spelling.) Some code now already doesn't account for it right around
certificate verification.

Given ECDHE_PSK exists, hopefully there will never be any need to add
this.

Change-Id: Ia64dac28099eaa9021f8d915d45ccbfd62872317
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5941
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:18:44 +00:00
David Benjamin 42fea37227 Document Channel ID functions and a few random extras.
Change-Id: I34a6352d265615ee08bb18fd537acf70a558f014
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5940
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 23:08:59 +00:00
Adam Langley 67251f2da9 Use |strtok| rather than |strtok_r|.
As ever, Windows doesn't support the correct function.

Change-Id: If16c979e591abda01ce3bf591b9162c210f03932
2015-09-23 15:01:07 -07:00
Steven Valdez 0d62f26c36 Adding more options for signing digest fallback.
Allow configuring digest preferences for the private key. Some
smartcards have limited support for signing digests, notably Windows
CAPI keys and old Estonian smartcards. Chromium used the supports_digest
hook in SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD to limit such keys to SHA1. However,
detecting those keys was a heuristic, so some SHA256-capable keys
authenticating to SHA256-only servers regressed in the switch to
BoringSSL. Replace this mechanism with an API to configure digest
preference order. This way heuristically-detected SHA1-only keys may be
configured by Chromium as SHA1-preferring rather than SHA1-requiring.

In doing so, clean up the shared_sigalgs machinery somewhat.

BUG=468076

Change-Id: I996a2df213ae4d8b4062f0ab85b15262ca26f3c6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5755
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 21:55:01 +00:00
David Benjamin 4c60d356a9 Work around even more Estonian ID card misissuances.
Not content with signing negative RSA moduli, still other Estonian IDs have too
many leading zeros. Work around those too.

This workaround will be removed in six months.

BUG=534766

Change-Id: Ica23b1b1499f9dbe39e94cf7b540900860e8e135
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5980
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-23 20:35:47 +00:00
Adam Langley d7fe75ca5f Add |SSL_CIPHER_is_RC4|.
We wish to be able to detect the use of RC4 so that we can flag it and
investigate before it's disabled.

Change-Id: I6dc3a5d2211b281097531a43fadf08edb5a09646
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5930
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-18 23:03:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 306ece31bc Fix some malloc failure crashes.
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex was implemented with a memcpy, which doesn't work well when
some of the pointers need to be copied, and ssl_verify_cert_chain didn't
account for set_ex_data failing.

Change-Id: Ieb556aeda6ab2e4c810f27012fefb1e65f860023
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5911
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-18 19:30:09 +00:00
David Benjamin c71567dd50 Update the Estonian workaround comments.
Target date for removal of the workaround is 6 months.

BUG=532048

Change-Id: I402f75e46736936725575559cd8eb194115ab0df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5910
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-18 18:42:34 +00:00
David Benjamin 3fb1ebc541 Deprecated things are deprecated.
Get them out of the way when reading through the header.

Change-Id: Ied3f3601262e74570769cb7f858dcff4eff44813
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5898
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-18 18:41:27 +00:00
David Benjamin 977547b6f9 Group NPN functions in their own section.
Existing documentation was moved to the header, very slightly tweaked.

Change-Id: Ife3c2351e2d7e6a335854284f996918039414446
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5897
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-18 18:39:53 +00:00
David Benjamin 8984f1f6e5 Group ALPN functions into their own section.
These were already documented, though some of the documentation was
expanded on slightly.

Change-Id: I04c6276a83a64a03ab9cce9b9c94d4dea9ddf638
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5896
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-17 22:19:58 +00:00
David Benjamin 58fcfc18f0 ECDHE and DHE functions get grouped into sections.
All these functions were already documented, just not grouped. I put
these above DTLS-SRTP and PSK as they're considerably less niche of
features.

Change-Id: I610892ce9763fe0da4f65ec87e5c7aaecb10388b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5895
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-17 22:17:12 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite cd6f54b193 Add method to query Extended Master Secret support
Change-Id: I4c285f4b3dd77f8fc7249c7504b5e4eb9b62959f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5920
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-17 21:18:28 +00:00
Paul Lietar 62be8ac8da Skip the SCT and OCSP extensions in ServerHello when resuming sessions.
SCT and OCSP are part of the session data and as such shouldn't be sent
again to the client when resuming.

Change-Id: Iaee3a3c4c167ea34b91504929e38aadee37da572
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5900
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-17 21:15:00 +00:00
David Benjamin e8814df699 Document PSK functions in ssl.h.
Change-Id: Iac58d28570d429236de1d2bc40b631e252b8e710
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5893
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-15 23:34:12 +00:00
David Benjamin 9e4e01ee14 Align the SSL stack on #include style.
ssl.h should be first. Also two lines after includes and the rest of the
file.

Change-Id: Icb7586e00a3e64170082c96cf3f8bfbb2b7e1611
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5892
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-15 23:32:07 +00:00
David Benjamin 1ac08feed6 Fix SSL and SSL_CTX ex_data variable names.
Forgot to fix these when I fixed the headers.

Change-Id: Ie45e624abc993e16e2d5a872ef00dba9029a38df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5891
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-15 23:22:07 +00:00
David Benjamin 2079ee70c6 Fix minor documentation mistake.
Change-Id: Ia31c0c04c0dbb00cf55db7fdf2c4641a2287f012
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5890
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-15 23:19:57 +00:00
Brian Smith 1f5e9456a9 Remove superfluous SHA-1 dependency from EVP ECDSA code.
The documentation for |ECDSA_sign| and |ECDSA_verify| says that the
|type| parameter should be zero.

Change-Id: I875d3405455c5443f5a5a5c2960a9a9f486ca5bb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5832
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-15 23:18:44 +00:00
David Benjamin 231cb82145 Work around broken Estonian smart cards. Again.
Estonian IDs issued between September 2014 to September 2015 are broken and use
negative moduli. They last five years and are common enough that we need to
work around this bug.

Add parallel "buggy" versions of BN_cbs2unsigned and RSA_parse_public_key which
tolerate this mistake, to align with OpenSSL's previous behavior. This code is
currently hooked up to rsa_pub_decode in RSA_ASN1_METHOD so that d2i_X509 is
tolerant. (This isn't a huge deal as the rest of that stack still uses the
legacy ASN.1 code which is overly lenient in many other ways.)

In future, when Chromium isn't using crypto/x509 and has more unified
certificate handling code, we can put client certificates under a slightly
different codepath, so this needn't hold for all certificates forever. Then in
September 2019, when the broken Estonian certificates all expire, we can purge
this codepath altogether.

BUG=532048

Change-Id: Iadb245048c71dba2eec45dd066c4a6e077140751
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5894
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-15 21:18:15 +00:00
David Benjamin cfd65b60a6 Fold srtp.h into ssl.h.
This gets the documentation into the ssl.h documentation, and removes
one of the circularly-dependent headers hanging off ssl.h. Also fixes
some typos; there were a few instances of "SSL *ctx".

Change-Id: I2a41c6f518f4780af84d468ed220fe7b0b8eb0d3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5883
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:59:37 +00:00
David Benjamin dafbdd49c7 Document session cache functions.
Also switch to the new variable names (SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL *ssl,
SSL_SESSION *session) for all documented functions.

Change-Id: I15e15a703b96af1727601108223c7ce3b0691f1d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5882
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:58:48 +00:00
David Benjamin 14e2b5070b const-correct a few SSL_SESSION functions.
Change-Id: I64d1e29d1e414add4ae522fd9603c550d426a557
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5881
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:41:36 +00:00
David Benjamin abb6c1c191 Reorder ssl_session.c slightly to match the header.
Change-Id: I43138057689a479ff7aba1543118af4b52bb821b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5880
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:40:55 +00:00
David Benjamin 190ab7f179 Move ex_data functions in ssl.h to a section.
Change-Id: Ie3b7c1956cc9d62091f649d0e621d84fce1d26ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5879
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:40:34 +00:00
David Benjamin 8f3cc26812 Rename ssl_sess.c to ssl_session.c.
Change-Id: Ib730ffe49b30c79b3f30acae4070f6055081a0a3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5878
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:37:52 +00:00
David Benjamin a6b8cdfbe9 Document functions acting on an SSL_SESSION.
Change-Id: I0b4386d1972af0ac10db397716de8161810a87f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5877
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:37:42 +00:00
David Benjamin 79c117a4ac Move structs to a 'Private structures' section in ssl.h.
To be consistent with some of the other headers and because SSL_METHOD
no longer has a place to anchor documentation, move the type
documentation up to the corresponding section headers, rather than
attached to a convenient function.

Also document thread-safety properties of SSL and SSL_CTX.

Change-Id: I7109d704d28dda3f5d83c72d86fe31bc302b816e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5876
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:35:18 +00:00
David Benjamin 361ecc0236 Replace skipPast with strings.TrimPrefix.
There was a bug in skipPast; it was skipping to the start of the string,
rather than the end of it. But more of an issue is that it would skip if
it was in the middle of the string, which caused problems when
STACK_OF(FOO) was used as a parameter.

At some point, we'll probably need to give this a real C declaration
parser. We still have declarations (like those that return function
pointers) which we can't parse. But for now let's clear the low-hanging
fruit.

Change-Id: Ic2cee452cc8cf6887a6ff1b00cea353cec361955
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5875
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:31:43 +00:00
David Benjamin ee0c82789a Move SSL_get_peer_* to Connection information.
This is arguably more commonly queried connection information than the
tls-unique.

Change-Id: I1f080536153ba9f178af8e92cb43b03df37110b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5874
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:30:54 +00:00
David Benjamin 27bbae4682 Reorder functions in ssl_lib.c to match ssl.h.
Just the stuff that has been pulled out into sections already.

Change-Id: I3da6bc61d79ccfe2b18d888075dc32026a656464
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5873
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:30:23 +00:00
David Benjamin 3c1ccc017c Document a bunch of core functions in ssl.h.
Unfortunately, these are also some of the worst APIs in the SSL stack.
I've tried to capture all the things they expose to the caller. 0 vs -1
is intentionally left unexpanded on for now. Upstream's documentation
says 0 means transport EOF, which is a nice idea but isn't true. (A lot
of random functions return 0 on error and pass it up to the caller.)
https://crbug.com/466303 tracks fixing that.

SSL_set_bio is intentionally documented to NOT be usable when they're
already configured. The function tries to behave in this case and even
with additional cases when |rbio| and/or |wbio| are unchanged, but this
is buggy. For instance, this will explode:

     SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio1, bio1);
     SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio2, SSL_get_wbio(ssl));

As will this, though it's less clear this is part of the API contract
due to SSL taking ownership.

     SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio1, bio2);
     SSL_set_bio(ssl, bio2, bio1);

It also tries to handle ssl->bbio already existing, but I doubt it quite
works. Hopefully we can drop ssl->bbio eventually. (Why is this so
complicated...)

Change-Id: I5f9f3043915bffc67e2ebd282813e04afbe076e6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5872
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 23:29:18 +00:00
David Benjamin 72d8693ef2 No-op change to kick the documentation bot.
Change-Id: I8300ab8c4adda2ef4fb0f8b01d73469be6b8851a
2015-09-14 19:15:09 -04:00
David Benjamin c0577626cb Run go fmt over runner.
Last set of changes didn't do that.

Change-Id: Iae24e75103529ce4d50099c5cbfbcef0e10ba663
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5871
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 22:26:06 +00:00
David Benjamin c99807d843 Tidy up dtls1_hm_fragment_new and fix (unreachable) memory leak.
clang scan-build found a memory leak if the overflow codepath in
dtls1_hm_fragment is hit. Along the way, tidy up that function.

Change-Id: I3c4b88916ee56ab3ab63f93d4a967ceae381d187
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5870
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 22:25:17 +00:00
Adam Langley 626c68601c Initialise |supports_digest|.
We were getting this because of C's defaults, but it's fragile to leave
it like this because someone may add another field at the end in the
future.

Change-Id: I8b2dcbbc7cee8062915d15101f99f5a1aae6ad87
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5860
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-14 21:51:18 +00:00
David Benjamin 1d128f369c Make SSL_get_client_CA_list slightly more OpenSSL-compatible.
SSL_get_client_CA_list is one of those dreaded functions which may query either
configuration state or handshake state. Moreover, it does so based on
|ssl->server|, which may not be configured until later. Also check
|ssl->handshake_func| to make sure |ssl| is not in an indeterminate state.

This also fixes a bug where SSL_get_client_CA_list wouldn't work in DTLS due to
the incorrect |ssl->version| check.

Change-Id: Ie564dbfeecd2c8257fd6bcb148bc5db827390c77
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5827
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 22:30:55 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite af096751e8 Restore the NULL-SHA ciphersuite. (Alas.)
Change-Id: Ia5398f3b86a13fb20dba053f730b51a0e57b9aa4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5791
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 22:18:08 +00:00
Paul Lietar 4fac72e638 Add server-side support for Signed Certificate Timestamps.
Change-Id: Ifa44fef160fc9d67771eed165f8fc277f28a0222
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5840
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 21:52:26 +00:00
David Benjamin 1bfce80b44 Generate stable URL fragments.
Using numbers is sensitive to moving things around. Instead, use the
names and enforce, for sections, that they are unique. Names would be
enforced too, but there's a table-of-contents bug around #ifdefs to
resolve first.

Change-Id: I8822e8ba8da9ed3ee4984365b8a64932d16d5baf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5826
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 21:03:50 +00:00
David Benjamin 7e40d4e584 Deprecated functions get their own sections.
A small handful of functions got a 'Deprecated:' prefix instead in
documentation.

Change-Id: Ic151fb7d797514add66bc6465b6851b666a471bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5825
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 20:57:36 +00:00
David Benjamin 6fad7bc586 Some documentation fixes.
We had a few duplicate section names.

Change-Id: I0c9b2a1669ac14392fd577097d5ee8dd80f7c73c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5824
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-11 20:56:53 +00:00
David Benjamin c0125ef8f3 Fix SSL_CIPHER_is_AESGCM.
It was checking algorithm_mac rather than algorithm_enc.
(Coincidentally, it gave the right answer if you compiled out the
ChaCha20 ciphers since SSL_AES128GCM and SSL_AEAD shared a value.)

Change-Id: I17047425ef7fabb98969144965d8db9528ef8497
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5850
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-09 17:56:59 +00:00
Adam Langley a0a8dc208f Move large stack buffer in bssl_shim to heap.
The size of the stack caused by this object is problematic for systems
that have smaller stacks because they expect many threads.

Change-Id: Ib8f03741f9dd96bf474126f001947f879e50a781
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5831
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-09 17:54:24 +00:00
Adam Langley f673831272 Drop urandom_test.
It didn't do too much and I didn't notice that CRYPTO_sysrand wasn't
OPENSSL_EXPORTed, which makes the test impossible on shared-library
builds.

Change-Id: I38986572aa34fa9c0f30075d562b8ee4e1a0c8b8
2015-09-08 18:10:15 -07:00
David Benjamin 7c6d09b9e5 Fold ssl_algs.c into ssl_lib.c.
There's not enough in that file to really justify its own file now.

Change-Id: I6130cfce6c40fe9d46aa83dd83e6f38d87fdcf64
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5823
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-09 01:05:25 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite cc2c7aa91c Buffer reads of urandom, if you promise no forking.
Callers that lack hardware random may obtain a speed improvement by
calling |RAND_enable_fork_unsafe_buffering|, which enables a
thread-local buffer around reads from /dev/urandom.

Change-Id: I46e675d1679b20434dd520c58ece0f888f38a241
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5792
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-09 01:02:54 +00:00
David Benjamin 443a1f65e2 Toss file-related convenience bits of ssl/ into a corner.
Quite a lot of consumers of the SSL stack will never need to touch files from
the SSL stack, but enough do that we can't just ditch them. Toss that all into
their own file so a static linker can drop it.

Change-Id: Ia07de939889eb09e3ab16aebcc1b6869ca8b75a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5820
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-08 23:34:40 +00:00
Adam Langley 06fa67c8d3 Stop using |ERR_peek_last_error| in RSA blinding.
History has shown there are bugs in not setting the error code
appropriately, which makes any decision making based on
|ERR_peek_last_error|, etc. suspect. Also, this call was interfering
with the link-time optimizer's ability to discard the implementations of
many functions in crypto/err during dead code elimination.

Change-Id: Iba9e553bf0a72a1370ceb17ff275f5a20fca31ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5748
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-08 23:32:48 +00:00
Paul Lietar 8f1c268692 Wait for CertificateStatus message to verify certificate.
Applications may require the stapled OCSP response in order to verify
the certificate within the verification callback.

Change-Id: I8002e527f90c3ce7b6a66e3203c0a68371aac5ec
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5730
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-08 19:04:43 +00:00
Adam Langley 8748920ca7 Don't forget to free the TLS 1.0 ciphers.
Change-Id: I38517e0b13c9fc75b3964bc980d16daee9aed5b5
2015-09-03 15:52:29 -07:00
Adam Langley cef7583633 Add cipher suite settings for TLS ≥ 1.0.
This change adds the ability to configure ciphers specifically for
TLS ≥ 1.0. This compliments the existing ability to specify ciphers
for TLS ≥ 1.1.

This is useful because TLS 1.0 is the first version not to suffer from
POODLE. (Assuming that it's implemented correctly[1].) Thus one might
wish to reserve RC4 solely for SSLv3.

[1] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html

Change-Id: I774d5336fead48f03d8a0a3cf80c369692ee60df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5793
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-03 22:44:36 +00:00
Paul Lietar 23b185a3cf Allow out_present to be NULL in CBS_get_optional_asn1
This is useful to skip an optional element, and mirrors the behaviour of
CBS_get_optional_asn1_octet_string.

Change-Id: Icb538c5e99a1d4e46412cae3c438184a94fab339
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5800
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-03 18:46:17 +00:00
David Benjamin c9d40ba5b0 Remove unnecessary field initializations.
SSL_CTX gets memset to zero, so many of the values needn't be explicitly
initialized.

Change-Id: I0e707a0dcc052cd6f0a5dc8d037400170bd75594
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5812
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-03 18:39:54 +00:00
David Benjamin 95aaf4a61c Markdown-ify BUILDING.
Change-Id: Icd3cba6522ce47a4dfe699204982b5b692d3d62e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5811
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-03 18:38:21 +00:00
David Benjamin 0e3f1d80f8 Markdown-ify STYLE.
Since we're able to render it fancy, may as well.

Change-Id: Ia1ab4b7ad0cdd78c8ffb75342ee62365843e7d5f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5810
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-03 18:37:39 +00:00
David Benjamin 809829ee9f Fix a typo in PORTING.md and mention one more renego restriction.
Change-Id: I59b30882178222000dd90b051856bb2816eeb9fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5789
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-03 18:37:14 +00:00
David Benjamin 65703b45c4 Add a PORTING document which describes some major API differences.
There are a few things that differ in ways that are not source-compatible, so
it's probably worth documenting them.

Change-Id: I4ef26173a9347d9fd517c1b5215e08ced660b79d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5788
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-02 21:58:35 +00:00
David Benjamin ac8302a092 Don't set need_record_splitting until aead_write_ctx is set.
setup_key_block is called when the first CCS resolves, but for resumptions this
is the incoming CCS (see ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec). Rather than set
need_record_splitting there, it should be set in the write case of
tls1_change_cipher_state.

This fixes a crash from the new record layer code in resumption when
record-splitting is enabled. Tweak the record-splitting tests to cover this
case.

This also fixes a bug where renego from a cipher which does require record
splitting to one which doesn't continues splitting. Since version switches are
not allowed, this can only happen after a renego from CBC to RC4.

Change-Id: Ie4e1b91282b10f13887b51d1199f76be4fbf09ad
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5787
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 22:30:48 +00:00
David Benjamin 4f75aaf661 Test various cases where plaintexts and ciphertexts are too large.
Note that DTLS treats oversized ciphertexts different from everything else.

Change-Id: I71cba69ebce0debdfc96a7fdeb2666252e8d28ed
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5786
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 22:11:39 +00:00
David Benjamin 76c2efc0e9 Forbid a server from negotiating both ALPN and NPN.
If the two extensions select different next protocols (quite possible since one
is server-selected and the other is client-selected), things will break. This
matches the behavior of NSS (Firefox) and Go.

Change-Id: Ie1da97bf062b91a370c85c12bc61423220a22f36
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5780
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 20:46:42 +00:00
David Benjamin 2c99d289fd Fix buffer size computation.
The maximum buffer size computation wasn't quite done right in
ssl_buffer.c, so we were failing with BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for sufficiently
large records. Fix this and, as penance, add 103 tests.

(Test that we can receive maximum-size records in all cipher suites.
Also test SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER while I'm here.)

BUG=526998

Change-Id: I714c16dda2ed13f49d8e6cd1b48adc5a8491f43c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5785
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 20:18:21 +00:00
David Benjamin 43c4d17230 Add X509_CRL_up_ref.
(Imported from upstream's 65cbf983ca4f69b8954f949c2edaaa48824481b3.)

Change-Id: I1e5d26ed8da5a44f68d22385b31d413628229c50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5784
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 19:12:56 +00:00
David Benjamin 5148345282 BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime: check for zero modulus.
Don't dereference |d| when |top| is zero. Also test that various BIGNUM
methods behave correctly on zero/even inputs.

(Imported from upstream's cf633fa00244e39eea2f2c0b623f7d5bbefa904e.)

We already had the BN_div and BN_MONT_CTX_set tests, but align them with
upstream's for consistency.

Change-Id: Ice5d04f559b4d5672e23c400637c07d8ee401727
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5783
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 19:12:28 +00:00
David Benjamin fe71f1d4a5 Fix spurious bn_test failures.
BN_rand generates a single-word zero BIGNUM with quite a large
probability.

A zero BIGNUM in turn will end up having a NULL |d|-buffer, which we
shouldn't dereference without checking.

(Imported from upstream's 9c989aaa749d88b63bef5d5beeb3046eae62d836.)

Change-Id: Ic4d113e4fcf4ea4c0a4e905a1c4ba3fb758d9fc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5782
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 19:10:01 +00:00
David Benjamin 8d100366e5 Fix dsa keygen for too-short seed
If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error.

(Imported from upstream's 1d7df236dcb4f7c95707110753e5e77b19b9a0aa and
df1565ed9cebb6933ee7c6e762abcfefd1cd3846.)

This switches the trigger for random seed from seed_len = 0 to seed_in =
NULL.

Change-Id: I2e07abed754c57ef9d96b02a52ba6d260c3f5fb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5781
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-09-01 19:09:22 +00:00
David Benjamin ee0b02a10d Don't confuse TLS bidirectional shutdown on record type zero.
The bidi shutdown code uses type = 0 as a special signal value, but code
elsewhere doesn't account for this.

BUG=526437

Change-Id: I090cee421633d70ef3b84f4daa811608031b9ed9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5771
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-31 19:08:24 +00:00
David Benjamin e9cb2ec832 Don't support bidirectional shutdown over DTLS.
Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense over DTLS; you can't reuse the
underlying channel after receiving close_notify because the channel is
unordered. This removes one caller of dtls1_read_bytes.

Really close_notify makes no sense in DTLS. It can't even protect
against some kind of truncation because it's all unordered. But continue
to send it in case anything is (unreliably since the channel is lossy)
relying on close_notify to signal some kind of session end. This only
makes SSL_shutdown stop trying to wait for one once we've already
decided to shut down the connection.

BUG=526437

Change-Id: I6afad7cb7209c4aba0b96f9246b04c81d90987a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5770
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-31 19:08:06 +00:00
David Benjamin 30789da28e Add tests for bidirectional shutdown.
Now that it even works at all (type = 0 bug aside), add tests for it.
Test both close_notify being received before and after SSL_shutdown is
called. In the latter case, have the peer send some junk to be ignored
to test that works.

Also test that SSL_shutdown fails on unclean shutdown and that quiet
shutdowns ignore it.

BUG=526437

Change-Id: Iff13b08feb03e82f21ecab0c66d5f85aec256137
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5769
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-31 19:06:50 +00:00
David Benjamin aa9361bc66 Fix discarding records in bidirectional shutdown.
When discarding a record, it's important to start reading the next one,
or the state machine retry signaling doesn't work.

BUG=526437

Change-Id: I5e4a5155310d097c0033cdf5d06712410a01ee08
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5768
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-31 18:55:49 +00:00
David Benjamin 885fc046a5 Fix memory leaks on error in x_x509a.c.
See also upstream's c8491de393639dbc4508306b7dbedb3872b74293.

Change-Id: I017fb137d6d93b6abb82fdb03f02be8292963d0d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5767
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-31 18:54:17 +00:00
David Benjamin 1f9f9c4b51 Tidy up the ssl3_send_server_key_exchange slightly.
The handshake state machine is still rather messy (we should switch to CBB,
split the key exchanges apart, and also pull reading and writing out), but this
version makes it more obvious to the compiler that |p| and |sig_len| are
initialized. The old logic created a synchronous-only state which, if enterred
directly, resulted in some variables being uninitialized.

Change-Id: Ia3ac9397d523fe299c50a95dc82a9b26304cea96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5765
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:53:43 +00:00
David Benjamin 6ca9355f25 runner: check bounds on packets in skipPacket.
Our tests shouldn't panic if the program misbehaves.

Change-Id: I113e050222bcf48e5f25883f860dbc1c5c77e77e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5764
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:49:43 +00:00
David Benjamin ed50cee007 Check fread's return value in tool/server.cc.
Some compilers complain and it's worth checking. Maybe the file changed in size
between ftell and fread.

Change-Id: I7898b8517556ec6899bd6e8866ba3d1cd7efd5f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5763
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:47:26 +00:00
David Benjamin ffadb3969f fread returns a size_t, not int.
Change-Id: I305fd40a887b1dedf23eeddfb5231fc61b355ea8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5762
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:46:40 +00:00
David Benjamin 26416e9dde Remove the last of SESS_CERT.
Move cert_chain to the SSL_SESSION. Now everything on an SSL_SESSION is
properly serialized. The cert_chain field is, unfortunately, messed up
since it means different things between client and server.

There exists code which calls SSL_get_peer_cert_chain as both client and
server and assumes the existing semantics for each. Since that function
doesn't return a newly-allocated STACK_OF(X509), normalizing between the
two formats is a nuisance (we'd either need to store both cert_chain and
cert_chain_full on the SSL_SESSION or create one of the two variants
on-demand and stash it into the SSL).

This CL does not resolve this and retains the client/server difference
in SSL_SESSION. The SSL_SESSION serialization is a little inefficient
(two copies of the leaf certificate) for a client, but clients don't
typically serialize sessions. Should we wish to resolve it in the
future, we can use a different tag number. Because this was historically
unserialized, existing code must already allow for cert_chain not being
preserved across i2d/d2i.

In keeping with the semantics of retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs,
cert_chain is not retained when that flag is set.

Change-Id: Ieb72fc62c3076dd59750219e550902f1ad039651
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5759
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:45:59 +00:00
David Benjamin a1fadd399f Fix MSVC build.
The difference of two pointers is signed, even though it's always
non-negative here, so MSVC is complaining about signedness mismatch.

Change-Id: I5a042d06ed348540706b93310af3f60f3ab5f303
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5766
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:27:33 +00:00
David Benjamin 8be79a3355 Slightly refactor SSL_SESSION parsing.
Rather than parse the fields in two passes, group the code relating to
one field together. Somewhat less annoying to add new fields. To keep
this from getting too unwieldy, add a few more helper functions for the
common field types.

Change-Id: Ia86c6bbca9dd212d5c35029363ea4d6b6426164a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5758
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:18:17 +00:00
David Benjamin b1bdc5b325 Remove peer_cert from SESS_CERT.
It's completely redundant with the copy in the SSL_SESSION except it
isn't serialized.

Change-Id: I1d95a14cae064c599e4bab576df1dd156da4b81c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5757
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:06:21 +00:00
David Benjamin 6505567172 Move peer_dh_tmp and peer_ecdh_tmp out of SESS_CERT.
Gets another field out of the SSL_SESSION.

Change-Id: I9a27255533f8e43e152808427466ec1306cfcc60
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5756
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:05:53 +00:00
David Benjamin 621f95a3ea Add -session-in and -session-out to bssl client.
This is analogous to openssl s_client's -sess_in and -sess_out. Use PEM to
align with OpenSSL. This is useful for debugging session resumption and also
generating things to test serialization against.

Change-Id: Idc58e8fa3dd4c2385f6a2d647e66ef11427be60d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5761
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:04:30 +00:00
David Benjamin ba13402c1b Fix the type of ASN1_i2d_bio's last argument.
It's supposed to be void*. The only reason this was working was that it was
only called in C which happily casts from void* to T*. (But if called in C++ in
a macro, it breaks.)

Change-Id: I7f765c3572b9b4815ae58da852be1e742de1bd96
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5760
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:03:54 +00:00
David Benjamin 4cf369b920 Reject empty records of unexpected type.
The old empty record logic discarded the records at a very low-level.
Let the error bubble up to ssl3_read_bytes so the type mismatch logic
may kick in before the empty record is skipped.

Add tests for when the record in question is application data, before
before the handshake and post ChangeCipherSpec.

BUG=521840

Change-Id: I47dff389cda65d6672b9be39d7d89490331063fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5754
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:03:00 +00:00
David Benjamin b8d28cf532 Factor out the buffering and low-level record code.
This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering
logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and
ssl->packet_length are gone.

ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and
dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns
the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was
redundant with the buffer length.

Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake.
Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but
return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the
handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing
SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc.,
combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why
ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly
different needs.)

The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since
it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added
if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to
avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and
not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if
enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record
would fit in the buffer.)

The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather
than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally
switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see
3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.)

BUG=468889

Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 22:01:02 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite e000472166 pkcs8.c: Add PBES2 to list of password-based encryption methods.
This consists mostly of re-adding OpenSSL's implementation of PBKDF2
(very loosely based upon e0d26bb3).  The meat of it, namely
|PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC|, was already present, but unused.

In addition, |PKCS8_encrypt| and |PKCS8_decrypt| must be changed to
not perform UCS-2 conversion in the PBES2 case.

Change-Id: Id170ecabc43c79491600051147d1d6d3c7273dbc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5745
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-28 20:33:33 +00:00
Adam Langley 73415b6aa0 Move arm_arch.h and fix up lots of include paths.
arm_arch.h is included from ARM asm files, but lives in crypto/, not
openssl/include/. Since the asm files are often built from a different
location than their position in the source tree, relative include paths
are unlikely to work so, rather than having crypto/ be a de-facto,
second global include path, this change moves arm_arch.h to
include/openssl/.

It also removes entries from many include paths because they should be
needed as relative includes are always based on the locations of the
source file.

Change-Id: I638ff43d641ca043a4fc06c0d901b11c6ff73542
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5746
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-26 01:57:59 +00:00
David Benjamin 61821bf149 Add EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero.
Match the other stack-allocated types in that we expose a wrapper function to
get them into the zero state. Makes it more amenable to templates like
ScopedOpenSSLContext.

Change-Id: Ibc7b2b1bc0421ce5ccc84760c78c0b143441ab0f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5753
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:37:58 +00:00
David Benjamin be8a869d96 Fill in alg_bits for CHACHA20_POLY1305 ciphers.
Apparently we left those as zero. Oh well. This only affects
SSL_CIPHER_get_bits, but so long as we have the field, it ought to be correct.

Change-Id: I2878ec22c2f5a6263f805e04d9fd8448994639b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5752
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:36:56 +00:00
David Benjamin f2aa1e1a71 Remove Go implementation of non-standard ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
The BoringSSL implementation was removed in
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5051. No need to have the runner half
around.

Change-Id: I49857f4d01be161df89fb7df93a83240b6a8cb02
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5751
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:35:43 +00:00
David Benjamin ec4353498c Remove DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305.
This made sense when the cipher might have been standardized as-is, so a
DHE_RSA variant could appease the IETF. Since the standardized variant is going
to have some nonce tweaks anyway, there's no sense in keeping this around. Get
rid of one non-standard cipher suite value early. (Even if they were to be
standardized as-is, it's not clear we should implement new DHE cipher suites at
this point.)

Chrome UMA, unsurprisingly, shows that it's unused.

Change-Id: Id83d73a4294b470ec2e94d5308fba135d6eeb228
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 23:35:25 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite c4ef5ff112 In |NCONF_load|, strdup section names rather than adding refs.
The fact that |value_free| expects to free() value->section is
inconsistent with the behavior of |add_string|, which adds a reference
to an existing string.

Along the way, add a |CONF_VALUE_new| method to simplify things a bit.

Change-Id: I438abc80575394e4d8df62a4fe2ff1050e3ba039
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5744
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 22:08:08 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite 50485c7c0c Fix a memory leak in |NCONF_free|.
As I read it:

1. |_LHASH| contains
2.   buckets of |LHASH_ITEMS|, which contain
3.     |CONF_VALUE|s, which contain
4.       various bits of data.

The previous code was freeing #1 and #2 in |lh_free|, and #4 in
|value_free_contents|, but was failing to free the |CONF_VALUE|s
themselves.  The fix is to call |value_free| rather than
|value_free_contents|.

Change-Id: I1d5b48692ca9ac04df688e45d7fc113dc5cd6ddf
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5742
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-24 20:30:06 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite 685402fadd Recognize PEM-encoded DSA private keys.
This change makes |EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str|, which is used by
|PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey|, recognize "DSA" as well as "EC" and "RSA".

Change-Id: I39cce12f600cec6a71df75312a41f8395429af62
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5743
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-21 17:39:05 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite e9c283025e Use |OPENSSL_strdup| instead of insane alternatives.
Change-Id: I1e6fd4abb7709d53f3663b1626f0bc147b9cd453
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5741
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-21 00:58:28 +00:00
Adam Langley 28bc6eba28 Don't use the uint128_t P-256 code under MSAN.
MSAN appears to have a bug that causes this code to be miscompiled when
compiled with optimisations. In order to prevent that bug from holding
everything up, this change disables that code when MEMORY_SANITIZER is
defined. The generic elliptic-curve code can pick up the slack in that
case.

Change-Id: I7ce26969b3ee0bc0b0496506f06a8cf9b2523cfa
2015-08-20 15:15:30 -07:00
Matt Braithwaite 4838d8aa90 Add do-nothing function |ERR_load_SSL_strings|.
This benefits pyOpenSSL.

Change-Id: Ie7a35d6f9e9a1f0c7fe42ba105c68c327f7d0b0e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5740
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-20 21:33:50 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite d82a7b24be Re-add |EVP_des_ede|, which is ECB.
(I couldn't find an authoritative source of test data, including in
OpenSSL's source, so I used OpenSSL's implementation to produce the
test ciphertext.)

This benefits globalplatform.

Change-Id: Ifb79e77afb7efed1c329126a1a459bbf7ce6ca00
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5725
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-20 21:33:21 +00:00
Matt Braithwaite 8c413a2d94 Re-add |EVP_des_ede_cbc|.
Note that while |DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt| exists, I didn't use it: I
think it's easier to see what's happening this way.

(I couldn't find an authoritative source of test data, including in
OpenSSL's source, so I used OpenSSL's implementation to produce the
test ciphertext.)

This benefits globalplatform.

Change-Id: I7e17ca0b69067d7b3f4bc213b4616eb269882ae0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5724
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-20 21:11:20 +00:00
Adam Langley 6a2de3c1d4 Don't use a C99 for loop.
Because it's 2015 and we can't depend on C99 support yet.

Change-Id: Ie33fddc2a27024d4d3d50dea725062b59670a060
2015-08-20 14:03:31 -07:00
Matt Braithwaite 98d2f1fbe0 Add |EVP_des_ecb| from OpenSSL at fd682e4c.
|DES_ecb_encrypt| was already present.

This benefits globalplatform.

Change-Id: I2ab41eb1936b3026439b5981fb27e29a12672b66
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5723
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-20 20:57:00 +00:00
Paul Lietar aeeff2ceee Server-side OCSP stapling support.
This is a simpler implementation than OpenSSL's, lacking responder IDs
and request extensions support. This mirrors the client implementation
already present.

Change-Id: I54592b60e0a708bfb003d491c9250401403c9e69
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5700
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-08-20 17:55:31 +00:00
974 changed files with 45767 additions and 16668 deletions
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Build Prerequisites:
* CMake[1] 2.8.8 or later is required.
* Perl 5.6.1 or later is required. On Windows, Strawberry Perl and MSYS Perl
have both been reported to work. If not found by CMake, it may be configured
explicitly by setting PERL_EXECUTABLE.
* On Windows you currently must use Ninja[2] to build; on other platforms,
it is not required, but recommended, because it makes builds faster.
* If you need to build Ninja from source, then a recent version of
Python[3] is required (Python 2.7.5 works).
* On Windows only, Yasm[4] is required. If not found by CMake, it may be
configured explicitly by setting CMAKE_ASM_NASM_COMPILER.
* A C compiler is required. On Windows, MSVC 12 (Visual Studio 2013) or later
with Platform SDK 8.1 or later are supported. Recent versions of GCC and
Clang should work on non-Windows platforms, and maybe on Windows too.
* Go[5] is required. If not found by CMake, the go executable may be
configured explicitly by setting GO_EXECUTABLE.
Using Ninja (note the 'N' is capitalized in the cmake invocation):
mkdir build
cd build
cmake -GNinja ..
ninja
Using makefiles (does not work on Windows):
mkdir build
cd build
cmake ..
make
You usually don't need to run cmake again after changing CMakeLists.txt files
because the build scripts will detect changes to them and rebuild themselves
automatically.
Note that the default build flags in the top-level CMakeLists.txt are for
debugging - optimisation isn't enabled.
If you want to cross-compile then there is an example toolchain file for
32-bit Intel in util/. Wipe out the build directory, recreate it and run cmake
like this:
cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../util/32-bit-toolchain.cmake -GNinja ..
If you want to build as a shared library, pass -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=1. On
Windows, where functions need to be tagged with "dllimport" when coming from a
shared library, define BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY in any code which #includes the
BoringSSL headers.
Building for Android:
It's possible to build BoringSSL with the Android NDK using CMake. This has
been tested with version 10d of the NDK.
Unpack the Android NDK somewhere and export ANDROID_NDK to point to the
directory. Clone https://github.com/taka-no-me/android-cmake into util/.
Then make a build directory as above and run CMake *twice* like this:
cmake -DANDROID_NATIVE_API_LEVEL=android-9 \
-DANDROID_ABI=armeabi-v7a \
-DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../util/android-cmake/android.toolchain.cmake \
-DANDROID_NATIVE_API_LEVEL=16 \
-GNinja ..
Once you've run that twice, ninja should produce Android-compatible binaries.
You can replace "armeabi-v7a" in the above with "arm64-v8a" to build aarch64
binaries.
Known Limitations on Windows:
* Versions of cmake since 3.0.2 have a bug in its Ninja generator that causes
yasm to output warnings "yasm: warning: can open only one input file, only
the last file will be processed". These warnings can be safely ignored.
The cmake bug is http://www.cmake.org/Bug/view.php?id=15253.
* cmake can generate Visual Studio projects, but the generated project files
don't have steps for assembling the assembly language source files, so they
currently cannot be used to build BoringSSL.
[1] http://www.cmake.org/download/
[2] https://martine.github.io/ninja/
[3] https://www.python.org/downloads/
[4] http://yasm.tortall.net/
[5] https://golang.org/dl/
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# Building BoringSSL
## Build Prerequisites
* [CMake](http://www.cmake.org/download/) 2.8.8 or later is required.
* Perl 5.6.1 or later is required. On Windows,
[Strawberry Perl](http://strawberryperl.com/) and MSYS Perl have both been
reported to work. If not found by CMake, it may be configured explicitly by
setting `PERL_EXECUTABLE`.
* On Windows you currently must use [Ninja](https://martine.github.io/ninja/)
to build; on other platforms, it is not required, but recommended, because
it makes builds faster.
* If you need to build Ninja from source, then a recent version of
[Python](https://www.python.org/downloads/) is required (Python 2.7.5 works).
* On Windows only, [Yasm](http://yasm.tortall.net/) is required. If not found
by CMake, it may be configured explicitly by setting
`CMAKE_ASM_NASM_COMPILER`.
* A C compiler is required. On Windows, MSVC 12 (Visual Studio 2013) or later
with Platform SDK 8.1 or later are supported. Recent versions of GCC and
Clang should work on non-Windows platforms, and maybe on Windows too.
* [Go](https://golang.org/dl/) is required. If not found by CMake, the go
executable may be configured explicitly by setting `GO_EXECUTABLE`.
* If you change crypto/chacha/chacha\_vec.c, you will need the
arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc compiler:
```
wget https://releases.linaro.org/14.11/components/toolchain/binaries/arm-linux-gnueabihf/gcc-linaro-4.9-2014.11-x86_64_arm-linux-gnueabihf.tar.xz && \
echo bc4ca2ced084d2dc12424815a4442e19cb1422db87068830305d90075feb1a3b gcc-linaro-4.9-2014.11-x86_64_arm-linux-gnueabihf.tar.xz | sha256sum -c && \
tar xf gcc-linaro-4.9-2014.11-x86_64_arm-linux-gnueabihf.tar.xz && \
sudo mv gcc-linaro-4.9-2014.11-x86_64_arm-linux-gnueabihf /opt/
```
## Building
Using Ninja (note the 'N' is capitalized in the cmake invocation):
mkdir build
cd build
cmake -GNinja ..
ninja
Using Make (does not work on Windows):
mkdir build
cd build
cmake ..
make
You usually don't need to run `cmake` again after changing `CMakeLists.txt`
files because the build scripts will detect changes to them and rebuild
themselves automatically.
Note that the default build flags in the top-level `CMakeLists.txt` are for
debugging—optimisation isn't enabled.
If you want to cross-compile then there is an example toolchain file for 32-bit
Intel in `util/`. Wipe out the build directory, recreate it and run `cmake` like
this:
cmake -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../util/32-bit-toolchain.cmake -GNinja ..
If you want to build as a shared library, pass `-DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=1`. On
Windows, where functions need to be tagged with `dllimport` when coming from a
shared library, define `BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY` in any code which `#include`s
the BoringSSL headers.
In order to serve environments where code-size is important as well as those
where performance is the overriding concern, `OPENSSL_SMALL` can be defined to
remove some code that is especially large.
### Building for Android
It's possible to build BoringSSL with the Android NDK using CMake. This has
been tested with version 10d of the NDK.
Unpack the Android NDK somewhere and export `ANDROID_NDK` to point to the
directory. Clone https://github.com/taka-no-me/android-cmake into `util/`. Then
make a build directory as above and run CMake *twice* like this:
cmake -DANDROID_NATIVE_API_LEVEL=android-9 \
-DANDROID_ABI=armeabi-v7a \
-DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=../util/android-cmake/android.toolchain.cmake \
-DANDROID_NATIVE_API_LEVEL=16 \
-GNinja ..
Once you've run that twice, Ninja should produce Android-compatible binaries.
You can replace `armeabi-v7a` in the above with `arm64-v8a` to build aarch64
binaries.
## Known Limitations on Windows
* Versions of CMake since 3.0.2 have a bug in its Ninja generator that causes
yasm to output warnings
yasm: warning: can open only one input file, only the last file will be processed
These warnings can be safely ignored. The cmake bug is
http://www.cmake.org/Bug/view.php?id=15253.
* CMake can generate Visual Studio projects, but the generated project files
don't have steps for assembling the assembly language source files, so they
currently cannot be used to build BoringSSL.
## Embedded ARM
ARM, unlike Intel, does not have an instruction that allows applications to
discover the capabilities of the processor. Instead, the capability information
has to be provided by the operating system somehow.
BoringSSL will try to use `getauxval` to discover the capabilities and, failing
that, will probe for NEON support by executing a NEON instruction and handling
any illegal-instruction signal. But some environments don't support that sort
of thing and, for them, it's possible to configure the CPU capabilities
at compile time.
If you define `OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP` then you can define any of the following
to enabling the corresponding ARM feature.
* `OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_NEON` or `__ARM_NEON__` (note that the latter is set by compilers when NEON support is enabled).
* `OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_AES`
* `OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_SHA1`
* `OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_SHA256`
* `OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_PMULL`
Note that if a feature is enabled in this way, but not actually supported at
run-time, BoringSSL will likely crash.
# Running tests
There are two sets of tests: the C/C++ tests and the blackbox tests. For former
are built by Ninja and can be run from the top-level directory with `go run
util/all_tests.go`. The latter have to be run separately by running `go test`
from within `ssl/test/runner`.
Both sets of tests may also be run with `ninja -C build run_tests`, but CMake
3.2 or later is required to avoid Ninja's output buffering.
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endif()
if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCXX OR CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "Clang")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -ggdb -fvisibility=hidden")
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -ggdb -std=c++0x -fvisibility=hidden")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-field-initializers -ggdb -fvisibility=hidden")
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -Wall -Werror -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-field-initializers -ggdb -std=c++0x -fvisibility=hidden")
elseif(MSVC)
set(MSVC_DISABLED_WARNINGS_LIST
"C4100" # 'exarg' : unreferenced formal parameter
"C4127" # conditional expression is constant
"C4200" # nonstandard extension used : zero-sized array in
# struct/union.
"C4210" # nonstandard extension used : function given file scope
"C4242" # 'function' : conversion from 'int' to 'uint8_t',
# possible loss of data
"C4244" # 'function' : conversion from 'int' to 'uint8_t',
@@ -81,6 +80,17 @@ if((CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCXX AND CMAKE_C_COMPILER_VERSION VERSION_GREATER "4.8.9
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -std=c11 -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=700")
endif()
if(FUZZ)
if(!CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "Clang")
message("You need to build with Clang for fuzzing to work")
endif()
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -fsanitize-coverage=edge,indirect-calls")
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address -fsanitize-coverage=edge,indirect-calls")
set(CMAKE_EXE_LINKER_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -fsanitize=address")
link_directories(.)
endif()
add_definitions(-DBORINGSSL_IMPLEMENTATION)
if (BUILD_SHARED_LIBS)
@@ -138,8 +148,31 @@ if (OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
set(ARCH "generic")
endif()
# Declare a dummy target to build all unit tests. Test targets should inject
# themselves as dependencies next to the target definition.
add_custom_target(all_tests)
add_subdirectory(crypto)
add_subdirectory(ssl)
add_subdirectory(ssl/test)
add_subdirectory(tool)
add_subdirectory(decrepit)
if(FUZZ)
add_subdirectory(fuzz)
endif()
if (NOT ${CMAKE_VERSION} VERSION_LESS "3.2")
# USES_TERMINAL is only available in CMake 3.2 or later.
set(MAYBE_USES_TERMINAL USES_TERMINAL)
endif()
add_custom_target(
run_tests
COMMAND ${GO_EXECUTABLE} run util/all_tests.go -build-dir
${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}
COMMAND cd ssl/test/runner
COMMAND ${GO_EXECUTABLE} test -shim-path $<TARGET_FILE:bssl_shim>
WORKING_DIRECTORY ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}
DEPENDS all_tests bssl_shim
${MAYBE_USES_TERMINAL})
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# Fuzz testing
Modern fuzz testers are very effective and we wish to use them to ensure that no silly bugs creep into BoringSSL.
We primarily use Clang's [libFuzzer](http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html) for fuzz testing and there are a number of fuzz testing functions in `fuzz/`. They are not built by default because they require libFuzzer at build time.
In order to build the fuzz tests you will need at least Clang 3.7. Pass `-DFUZZ=1` on the CMake command line to enable building BoringSSL with coverage and AddressSanitizer, and to build the fuzz test binaries. You'll probably need to set the `CC` and `CXX` environment variables too, like this:
```
CC=clang CXX=clang++ cmake -GNinja -DFUZZ=1 ..
```
In order for the fuzz tests to link, the linker needs to find libFuzzer. This is not commonly provided and you may need to download the [Clang source code](http://llvm.org/releases/download.html) and do the following:
```
cd llvm-3.7.0.src/lib
clang -c -g -O2 -std=c++11 Fuzzer/*.cpp -IFuzzer
ar q libFuzzer.a *.o
```
Then copy `libFuzzer.a` to the top-level of your BoringSSL source directory.
From the `build/` directory, you can then run the fuzzers. For example:
```
./fuzz/cert -max_len=4000 -jobs=32 -workers=32 ../fuzz/cert_corpus/
```
The `max_len` argument is often important because, without it, libFuzzer defaults to limiting all test cases to 64 bytes, which is often insufficient for the formats that we wish to fuzz. The arguments to `jobs` and `workers` should be the number of cores that you wish to dedicate to fuzzing.
There are directories in `fuzz/` for each of the fuzzing tests which contain seed files for fuzzing. Some of the seed files were generated manually but many of them are “interesting” results generated by the fuzzing itself. (Where “interesting” means that it triggered a previously unknown path in the code.)
Here are the recommended values of `max_len` for each test.
| Test | `max_len` value |
|-----------|-----------------|
| `privkey` | 2048 |
| `cert` | 3072 |
| `server` | 1024 |
| `client` | 4096 |
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# Porting from OpenSSL to BoringSSL
BoringSSL is an OpenSSL derivative and is mostly source-compatible, for the
subset of OpenSSL retained. Libraries ideally need little to no changes for
BoringSSL support, provided they do not use removed APIs. In general, see if the
library compiles and, on failure, consult the documentation in the header files
and see if problematic features can be removed.
In some cases, BoringSSL-specific code may be necessary. In that case, the
`OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL` preprocessor macro may be used in `#ifdef`s. This macro
should also be used in lieu of the presence of any particular function to detect
OpenSSL vs BoringSSL in configure scripts, etc., where those are necessary.
For convenience, BoringSSL defines upstream's `OPENSSL_NO_*` feature macros
corresponding to removed features. These may also be used to disable code which
uses a removed feature.
Note: BoringSSL does *not* have a stable API or ABI. It must be updated with its
consumers. It is not suitable for, say, a system library in a traditional Linux
distribution. For instance, Chromium statically links the specific revision of
BoringSSL it was built against. Likewise, Android's system-internal copy of
BoringSSL is not exposed by the NDK and must not be used by third-party
applications.
## Major API changes
### Integer types
Some APIs have been converted to use `size_t` for consistency and to avoid
integer overflows at the API boundary. (Existing logic uses a mismash of `int`,
`long`, and `unsigned`.) For the most part, implicit casts mean that existing
code continues to compile. In some cases, this may require BoringSSL-specific
code, particularly to avoid compiler warnings.
Most notably, the `STACK_OF(T)` types have all been converted to use `size_t`
instead of `int` for indices and lengths.
### Reference counts
Some external consumers increment reference counts directly by calling
`CRYPTO_add` with the corresponding `CRYPTO_LOCK_*` value.
These APIs no longer exist in BoringSSL. Instead, code which increments
reference counts should call the corresponding `FOO_up_ref` function, such as
`EVP_PKEY_up_ref`. Note that not all of these APIs are present in OpenSSL and
may require `#ifdef`s.
### Error codes
OpenSSL's errors are extremely specific, leaking internals of the library,
including even a function code for the function which emitted the error! As some
logic in BoringSSL has been rewritten, code which conditions on the error may
break (grep for `ERR_GET_REASON` and `ERR_GET_FUNC`). This danger also exists
when upgrading OpenSSL versions.
Where possible, avoid conditioning on the exact error reason. Otherwise, a
BoringSSL `#ifdef` may be necessary. Exactly how best to resolve this issue is
still being determined. It's possible some new APIs will be added in the future.
Function codes have been completely removed. Remove code which conditions on
these as it will break with the slightest change in the library, OpenSSL or
BoringSSL.
### `*_ctrl` functions
Some OpenSSL APIs are implemented with `ioctl`-style functions such as
`SSL_ctrl` and `EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl`, combined with convenience macros, such as
# define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \
SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL)
In BoringSSL, these macros have been replaced with proper functions. The
underlying `_ctrl` functions have been removed.
For convenience, `SSL_CTRL_*` values are retained as macros to `doesnt_exist` so
existing code which uses them (or the wrapper macros) in `#ifdef` expressions
will continue to function. However, the macros themselves will not work.
Switch any `*_ctrl` callers to the macro/function versions. This works in both
OpenSSL and BoringSSL. Note that BoringSSL's function versions will be
type-checked and may require more care with types.
### HMAC `EVP_PKEY`s
`EVP_PKEY_HMAC` is removed. Use the `HMAC_*` functions in `hmac.h` instead. This
is compatible with OpenSSL.
### DSA `EVP_PKEY`s
`EVP_PKEY_DSA` is deprecated. It is currently still possible to parse DER into a
DSA `EVP_PKEY`, but signing or verifying with those objects will not work.
### DES
The `DES_cblock` type has been switched from an array to a struct to avoid the
pitfalls around array types in C. Where features which require DES cannot be
disabled, BoringSSL-specific codepaths may be necessary.
### TLS renegotiation
OpenSSL enables TLS renegotiation by default and accepts renegotiation requests
from the peer transparently. Renegotiation is an extremely problematic protocol
feature, so BoringSSL rejects peer renegotiations by default.
To enable renegotiation, call `SSL_set_renegotiate_mode` and set it to
`ssl_renegotiate_once` or `ssl_renegotiate_freely`. Renegotiation is only
supported as a client in SSL3/TLS and the HelloRequest must be received at a
quiet point in the application protocol. This is sufficient to support the
common use of requesting a new client certificate between an HTTP request and
response in (unpipelined) HTTP/1.1.
Things which do not work:
* There is no support for renegotiation as a server.
* There is no support for renegotiation in DTLS.
* There is no support for initiating renegotiation; `SSL_renegotiate` always
fails and `SSL_set_state` does nothing.
* Interleaving application data with the new handshake is forbidden.
* If a HelloRequest is received while `SSL_write` has unsent application data,
the renegotiation is rejected.
### Lowercase hexadecimal
BoringSSL's `BN_bn2hex` function uses lowercase hexadecimal digits instead of
uppercase. Some code may require changes to avoid being sensitive to this
difference.
## Optional BoringSSL-specific simplifications
BoringSSL makes some changes to OpenSSL which simplify the API but remain
compatible with OpenSSL consumers. In general, consult the BoringSSL
documentation for any functions in new BoringSSL-only code.
### Return values
Most OpenSSL APIs return 1 on success and either 0 or -1 on failure. BoringSSL
has narrowed most of these to 1 on success and 0 on failure. BoringSSL-specific
code may take advantage of the less error-prone APIs and use `!` to check for
errors.
### Initialization
OpenSSL has a number of different initialization functions for setting up error
strings and loading algorithms, etc. All of these functions still exist in
BoringSSL for convenience, but they do nothing and are not necessary.
The one exception is `CRYPTO_library_init`. In `BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER`
builds, it must be called to query CPU capabitilies before the rest of the
library. In the default configuration, this is done with a static initializer
and is also unnecessary.
### Threading
OpenSSL provides a number of APIs to configure threading callbacks and set up
locks. Without initializing these, the library is not thread-safe. Configuring
these does nothing in BoringSSL. Instead, BoringSSL calls pthreads and the
corresponding Windows APIs internally and is always thread-safe where the API
guarantees it.
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# BoringSSL
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general
use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing
so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI
stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update
everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to
mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it
may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and,
over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while
tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex,
more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all
these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's
not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful:
* [PORTING.md](/PORTING.md): how to port OpenSSL-using code to BoringSSL.
* [BUILDING.md](/BUILDING.md): how to build BoringSSL
* [STYLE.md](/STYLE.md): rules and guidelines for coding style.
* include/openssl: public headers with API documentation in comments. Also [available online](https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/headers.html).
* [FUZZING.md](/FUZZING.md): information about fuzzing BoringSSL.
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BoringSSL Style Guide.
BoringSSL usually follows the Google C++ style guide, found below. The
rest of this document describes differences and clarifications on top
of the base guide.
https://google-styleguide.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/cppguide.html
Legacy code.
As a derivative of OpenSSL, BoringSSL contains a lot of legacy code
that does not follow this style guide. Particularly where public API
is concerned, balance consistency within a module with the benefits of
a given rule. Module-wide deviations on naming should be respected
while integer and return value conventions take precedence over
consistency.
Some modules have seen few changes, so they still retain the original
indentation style for now. When editing these, try to retain the
original style. For Emacs, doc/c-indentation.el from OpenSSL may be
helpful in this.
Language.
The majority of the project is in C, so C++-specific rules in the
Google style guide do not apply. Support for C99 features depends on
our target platforms. Typically, Chromium's target MSVC is the most
restrictive.
Variable declarations in the middle of a function are allowed.
Comments should be /* C-style */ for consistency.
When declaration pointer types, * should be placed next to the variable
name, not the type. So
uint8_t *ptr;
not
uint8_t* ptr;
Rather than malloc() and free(), use the wrappers OPENSSL_malloc() and
OPENSSL_free(). Use the standard C assert() function freely.
For new constants, prefer enums when the values are sequential and typed
constants for flags. If adding values to an existing set of #defines, continue
with #define.
Formatting.
Single-statement blocks are not allowed. All conditions and loops must
use braces:
if (foo) {
do_something();
}
not
if (foo)
do_something();
Integers.
Prefer using explicitly-sized integers where appropriate rather than
generic C ones. For instance, to represent a byte, use uint8_t, not
unsigned char. Likewise, represent a two-byte field as uint16_t, not
unsigned short.
Sizes are represented as size_t.
Within a struct that is retained across the lifetime of an SSL
connection, if bounds of a size are known and it's easy, use a smaller
integer type like uint8_t. This is a "free" connection footprint
optimization for servers. Don't make code significantly more complex
for it, and do still check the bounds when passing in and out of the
struct. This narrowing should not propagate to local variables and
function parameters.
When doing arithmetic, account for overflow conditions.
Except with platform APIs, do not use ssize_t. MSVC lacks it, and
prefer out-of-band error signaling for size_t (see Return values).
Naming.
Follow Google naming conventions in C++ files. In C files, use the
following naming conventions for consistency with existing OpenSSL and C
styles:
Define structs with typedef named TYPE_NAME. The corresponding struct
should be named struct type_name_st.
Name public functions as MODULE_function_name, unless the module
already uses a different naming scheme for legacy reasons. The module
name should be a type name if the function is a method of a particular
type.
Some types are allocated within the library while others are
initialized into a struct allocated by the caller, often on the
stack. Name these functions TYPE_NAME_new/TYPE_NAME_free and
TYPE_NAME_init/TYPE_NAME_cleanup, respectively. All TYPE_NAME_free
functions must do nothing on NULL input.
If a variable is the length of a pointer value, it has the suffix
_len. An output parameter is named out or has an out_ prefix. For
instance, For instance:
uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len,
Name public headers like include/openssl/evp.h with header guards like
OPENSSL_HEADER_EVP_H. Name internal headers like crypto/ec/internal.h
with header guards like OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H.
Name enums like unix_hacker_t. For instance:
enum should_free_handshake_buffer_t {
free_handshake_buffer,
dont_free_handshake_buffer,
};
Return values.
As even malloc may fail in BoringSSL, the vast majority of functions
will have a failure case. Functions should return int with one on
success and zero on error. Do not overload the return value to both
signal success/failure and output an integer. For example:
OPENSSL_EXPORT int CBS_get_u16(CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out);
If a function needs more than a true/false result code, define an enum
rather than arbitrarily assigning meaning to int values.
If a function outputs a pointer to an object on success and there are no
other outputs, return the pointer directly and NULL on error.
Parameters.
Where not constrained by legacy code, parameter order should be:
1. context parameters
2. output parameters
3. input parameters
For example,
/* CBB_add_asn sets |*out_contents| to a |CBB| into which the contents of an
* ASN.1 object can be written. The |tag| argument will be used as the tag for
* the object. It returns one on success or zero on error. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int CBB_add_asn1(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents, uint8_t tag);
Documentation.
All public symbols must have a documentation comment in their header
file. The style is based on that of Go. The first sentence begins with
the symbol name, optionally prefixed with "A" or "An". Apart from the
initial mention of symbol, references to other symbols or parameter
names should be surrounded by |pipes|.
Documentation should be concise but completely describe the exposed
behavior of the function. Pay special note to success/failure behaviors
and caller obligations on object lifetimes. If this sacrifices
conciseness, consider simplifying the function's behavior.
/* EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate appends |len| bytes from |data| to the data which
* will be verified by |EVP_DigestVerifyFinal|. It returns one on success and
* zero otherwise. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
size_t len);
Explicitly mention any surprising edge cases or deviations from common
return value patterns in legacy functions.
/* RSA_private_encrypt encrypts |flen| bytes from |from| with the private key in
* |rsa| and writes the encrypted data to |to|. The |to| buffer must have at
* least |RSA_size| bytes of space. It returns the number of bytes written, or
* -1 on error. The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING|
* values. If in doubt, |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is the most common.
*
* WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
* convention. Use |RSA_sign_raw| instead. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from,
uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
Document private functions in their internal.h header or, if static,
where defined.
+197
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
# BoringSSL Style Guide
BoringSSL usually follows the
[Google C++ style guide](https://google.github.io/styleguide/cppguide.html),
The rest of this document describes differences and clarifications on
top of the base guide.
## Legacy code
As a derivative of OpenSSL, BoringSSL contains a lot of legacy code that
does not follow this style guide. Particularly where public API is
concerned, balance consistency within a module with the benefits of a
given rule. Module-wide deviations on naming should be respected while
integer and return value conventions take precedence over consistency.
Some modules have seen few changes, so they still retain the original
indentation style for now. When editing these, try to retain the
original style. For Emacs, `doc/c-indentation.el` from OpenSSL may be
helpful in this.
## Language
The majority of the project is in C, so C++-specific rules in the
Google style guide do not apply. Support for C99 features depends on
our target platforms. Typically, Chromium's target MSVC is the most
restrictive.
Variable declarations in the middle of a function are allowed.
Comments should be `/* C-style */` for consistency.
When declaration pointer types, `*` should be placed next to the variable
name, not the type. So
uint8_t *ptr;
not
uint8_t* ptr;
Rather than `malloc()` and `free()`, use the wrappers `OPENSSL_malloc()`
and `OPENSSL_free()`. Use the standard C `assert()` function freely.
For new constants, prefer enums when the values are sequential and typed
constants for flags. If adding values to an existing set of `#define`s,
continue with `#define`.
## Formatting
Single-statement blocks are not allowed. All conditions and loops must
use braces:
if (foo) {
do_something();
}
not
if (foo)
do_something();
## Integers
Prefer using explicitly-sized integers where appropriate rather than
generic C ones. For instance, to represent a byte, use `uint8_t`, not
`unsigned char`. Likewise, represent a two-byte field as `uint16_t`, not
`unsigned short`.
Sizes are represented as `size_t`.
Within a struct that is retained across the lifetime of an SSL
connection, if bounds of a size are known and it's easy, use a smaller
integer type like `uint8_t`. This is a "free" connection footprint
optimization for servers. Don't make code significantly more complex for
it, and do still check the bounds when passing in and out of the
struct. This narrowing should not propagate to local variables and
function parameters.
When doing arithmetic, account for overflow conditions.
Except with platform APIs, do not use `ssize_t`. MSVC lacks it, and
prefer out-of-band error signaling for `size_t` (see Return values).
## Naming
Follow Google naming conventions in C++ files. In C files, use the
following naming conventions for consistency with existing OpenSSL and C
styles:
Define structs with typedef named `TYPE_NAME`. The corresponding struct
should be named `struct type_name_st`.
Name public functions as `MODULE_function_name`, unless the module
already uses a different naming scheme for legacy reasons. The module
name should be a type name if the function is a method of a particular
type.
Some types are allocated within the library while others are initialized
into a struct allocated by the caller, often on the stack. Name these
functions `TYPE_NAME_new`/`TYPE_NAME_free` and
`TYPE_NAME_init`/`TYPE_NAME_cleanup`, respectively. All `TYPE_NAME_free`
functions must do nothing on `NULL` input.
If a variable is the length of a pointer value, it has the suffix
`_len`. An output parameter is named `out` or has an `out_` prefix. For
instance, For instance:
uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len,
const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len,
Name public headers like `include/openssl/evp.h` with header guards like
`OPENSSL_HEADER_EVP_H`. Name internal headers like
`crypto/ec/internal.h` with header guards like
`OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_INTERNAL_H`.
Name enums like `enum unix_hacker_t`. For instance:
enum should_free_handshake_buffer_t {
free_handshake_buffer,
dont_free_handshake_buffer,
};
## Return values
As even `malloc` may fail in BoringSSL, the vast majority of functions
will have a failure case. Functions should return `int` with one on
success and zero on error. Do not overload the return value to both
signal success/failure and output an integer. For example:
OPENSSL_EXPORT int CBS_get_u16(CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out);
If a function needs more than a true/false result code, define an enum
rather than arbitrarily assigning meaning to int values.
If a function outputs a pointer to an object on success and there are no
other outputs, return the pointer directly and `NULL` on error.
## Parameters
Where not constrained by legacy code, parameter order should be:
1. context parameters
2. output parameters
3. input parameters
For example,
/* CBB_add_asn sets |*out_contents| to a |CBB| into which the contents of an
* ASN.1 object can be written. The |tag| argument will be used as the tag for
* the object. It returns one on success or zero on error. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int CBB_add_asn1(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents, uint8_t tag);
## Documentation
All public symbols must have a documentation comment in their header
file. The style is based on that of Go. The first sentence begins with
the symbol name, optionally prefixed with "A" or "An". Apart from the
initial mention of symbol, references to other symbols or parameter
names should be surrounded by |pipes|.
Documentation should be concise but completely describe the exposed
behavior of the function. Pay special note to success/failure behaviors
and caller obligations on object lifetimes. If this sacrifices
conciseness, consider simplifying the function's behavior.
/* EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate appends |len| bytes from |data| to the data which
* will be verified by |EVP_DigestVerifyFinal|. It returns one on success and
* zero otherwise. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
size_t len);
Explicitly mention any surprising edge cases or deviations from common
return value patterns in legacy functions.
/* RSA_private_encrypt encrypts |flen| bytes from |from| with the private key in
* |rsa| and writes the encrypted data to |to|. The |to| buffer must have at
* least |RSA_size| bytes of space. It returns the number of bytes written, or
* -1 on error. The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING|
* values. If in doubt, |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is the most common.
*
* WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
* convention. Use |RSA_sign_raw| instead. */
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const uint8_t *from,
uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
Document private functions in their `internal.h` header or, if static,
where defined.
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. ../include)
include_directories(../include)
if(APPLE)
if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "x86")
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ add_subdirectory(rc4)
add_subdirectory(conf)
add_subdirectory(chacha)
add_subdirectory(poly1305)
add_subdirectory(curve25519)
# Level 1, depends only on 0.*
add_subdirectory(digest)
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ add_library(
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:conf>
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:chacha>
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:poly1305>
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:curve25519>
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:buf>
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:bn>
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:bio>
@@ -210,6 +212,7 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(constant_time_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests constant_time_test)
add_executable(
thread_test
@@ -220,6 +223,7 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(thread_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests thread_test)
add_executable(
refcount_test
@@ -228,3 +232,4 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(refcount_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests refcount_test)
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "x86_64")
set(
@@ -69,3 +69,4 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(aes_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests aes_test)
+61 -4
View File
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/cpu.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -1057,6 +1060,44 @@ void AES_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
#else
#if defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
static int hwaes_capable(void) {
return CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_AES_capable();
}
int aes_v8_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, const int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
int aes_v8_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, const int bits,
AES_KEY *key);
void aes_v8_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
void aes_v8_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
#else
static int hwaes_capable(void) {
return 0;
}
static int aes_v8_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
static int aes_v8_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
static void aes_v8_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
static void aes_v8_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
#endif
/* In this case several functions are provided by asm code. However, one cannot
* control asm symbol visibility with command line flags and such so they are
* always hidden and wrapped by these C functions, which can be so
@@ -1064,22 +1105,38 @@ void AES_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
void asm_AES_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
void AES_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
asm_AES_encrypt(in, out, key);
if (hwaes_capable()) {
aes_v8_encrypt(in, out, key);
} else {
asm_AES_encrypt(in, out, key);
}
}
void asm_AES_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key);
void AES_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
asm_AES_decrypt(in, out, key);
if (hwaes_capable()) {
aes_v8_decrypt(in, out, key);
} else {
asm_AES_decrypt(in, out, key);
}
}
int asm_AES_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits, AES_KEY *aeskey);
int AES_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits, AES_KEY *aeskey) {
return asm_AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, aeskey);
if (hwaes_capable()) {
return aes_v8_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, aeskey);
} else {
return asm_AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, aeskey);
}
}
int asm_AES_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits, AES_KEY *aeskey);
int AES_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *key, unsigned bits, AES_KEY *aeskey) {
return asm_AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, aeskey);
if (hwaes_capable()) {
return aes_v8_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, aeskey);
} else {
return asm_AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, aeskey);
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM || (!OPENSSL_X86 && !OPENSSL_X86_64 && !OPENSSL_ARM) */
+1 -1
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ $rounds="r12";
$code=<<___;
#if defined(__arm__)
#ifndef __KERNEL__
# include "arm_arch.h"
# include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
#else
# define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__
#endif
+1 -1
View File
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ $inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5";
$inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6";
$inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7";
# AESNI extenstion
# AESNI extension
sub aeskeygenassist
{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
$prefix="aes_v8";
$code=<<___;
#include "arm_arch.h"
#include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
#if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7
.text
+1 -3
View File
@@ -701,9 +701,8 @@ ___
}
$code.=<<___;
#if defined(__arm__)
#ifndef __KERNEL__
# include "arm_arch.h"
# include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
# define VFP_ABI_PUSH vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15}
# define VFP_ABI_POP vldmia sp!,{d8-d15}
@@ -2497,7 +2496,6 @@ ___
}
$code.=<<___;
#endif
#endif
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;
+2 -2
View File
@@ -48,9 +48,9 @@
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include "assert.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
#include "../modes/internal.h"
void AES_ctr128_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
+12 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
asn1
@@ -43,3 +43,14 @@ add_library(
x_bignum.c
x_long.c
)
add_executable(
asn1_test
asn1_test.cc
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:test_support>
)
target_link_libraries(asn1_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests asn1_test)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d, FILE *out, void *x)
return(ret);
}
int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x)
int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, void *x)
{
char *b;
unsigned char *p;
+3 -1
View File
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
ret=a->length;
i=a->data[0];
if (ret == 1 && i == 0)
neg = 0;
if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
pad=1;
pb=0;
@@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
p += a->length - 1;
i = a->length;
/* Copy zeros to destination as long as source is zero */
while(!*n) {
while(!*n && i > 1) {
*(p--) = 0;
n--;
i--;
+5
View File
@@ -161,6 +161,11 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
p++;
if (--max == 0) goto err;
}
/* To avoid ambiguity with V_ASN1_NEG, impose a limit on universal tags. */
if (xclass == V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL && tag > V_ASN1_MAX_UNIVERSAL)
goto err;
*ptag=tag;
*pclass=xclass;
if (!asn1_get_length(&p,&inf,plength,(int)max)) goto err;
+9
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass,int constructed,
int indent);
static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
@@ -125,6 +127,13 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int offse
#else
dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
#endif
if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH)
{
BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
return 0;
}
p= *pp;
tot=p+length;
op=p-1;
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "../test/scoped_types.h"
// kTag258 is an ASN.1 structure with a universal tag with number 258.
static const uint8_t kTag258[] = {
0x1f, 0x82, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
};
static_assert(V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER == 258,
"V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER changed. Update kTag258 to collide with it.");
bool TestLargeTags() {
const uint8_t *p = kTag258;
ScopedASN1_TYPE obj(d2i_ASN1_TYPE(NULL, &p, sizeof(kTag258)));
if (obj) {
fprintf(stderr, "Parsed value with illegal tag (type = %d).\n", obj->type);
return false;
}
return true;
}
int main() {
CRYPTO_library_init();
if (!TestLargeTags()) {
return 1;
}
printf("PASS\n");
return 0;
}
+6 -4
View File
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
@@ -359,9 +360,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
@@ -515,9 +516,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
default:
@@ -526,7 +527,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
auxerr:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
err:
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
if (combine == 0)
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
if (errtt)
ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
", Type=", it->sname);
@@ -742,7 +744,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
{
/* Nothing special */
ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-1, 0, opt, ctx);
-1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
if (!ret)
{
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
/* ASN1_PCTX routines */
ASN1_PCTX default_pctx =
static ASN1_PCTX default_pctx =
{
ASN1_PCTX_FLAGS_SHOW_ABSENT, /* flags */
0, /* nm_flags */
+2 -1
View File
@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ static const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS bignum_pf = {
bn_free,
0,
bn_c2i,
bn_i2c
bn_i2c,
NULL /* prim_print */,
};
ASN1_ITEM_start(BIGNUM)
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
base64
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(base64_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests base64_test)
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
bio
@@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ target_link_libraries(bio_test crypto)
if (WIN32)
target_link_libraries(bio_test ws2_32)
endif()
add_dependencies(all_tests bio_test)
+6 -4
View File
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
uint8_t header[6];
static const size_t kInitialHeaderLen = 2;
if (BIO_read(bio, header, kInitialHeaderLen) != kInitialHeaderLen) {
if (BIO_read(bio, header, kInitialHeaderLen) != (int) kInitialHeaderLen) {
return 0;
}
@@ -559,7 +559,8 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
return 0;
}
if (BIO_read(bio, header + kInitialHeaderLen, num_bytes) != num_bytes) {
if (BIO_read(bio, header + kInitialHeaderLen, num_bytes) !=
(int)num_bytes) {
return 0;
}
header_len = kInitialHeaderLen + num_bytes;
@@ -585,7 +586,8 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
}
if (len + header_len < len ||
len + header_len > max_len) {
len + header_len > max_len ||
len > INT_MAX) {
return 0;
}
len += header_len;
@@ -597,7 +599,7 @@ int BIO_read_asn1(BIO *bio, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_len) {
}
memcpy(*out, header, header_len);
if (BIO_read(bio, (*out) + header_len, len - header_len) !=
len - header_len) {
(int) (len - header_len)) {
OPENSSL_free(*out);
return 0;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int mem_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl) {
if (INT_MAX - blen < inl) {
goto err;
}
if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, blen + inl) != (blen + inl)) {
if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, blen + inl) != ((size_t) blen) + inl) {
goto err;
}
memcpy(&b->data[blen], in, inl);
+70 -64
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ typedef struct bio_connect_st {
char *param_port;
int nbio;
uint8_t ip[4];
unsigned short port;
struct sockaddr_storage them;
@@ -114,23 +113,59 @@ static int closesocket(int sock) {
}
#endif
/* maybe_copy_ipv4_address sets |*ipv4| to the IPv4 address from |ss| (in
* big-endian order), if |ss| contains an IPv4 socket address. */
static void maybe_copy_ipv4_address(uint8_t *ipv4,
const struct sockaddr_storage *ss) {
const struct sockaddr_in *sin;
/* split_host_and_port sets |*out_host| and |*out_port| to the host and port
* parsed from |name|. It returns one on success or zero on error. Even when
* successful, |*out_port| may be NULL on return if no port was specified. */
static int split_host_and_port(char **out_host, char **out_port, const char *name) {
const char *host, *port = NULL;
size_t host_len = 0;
if (ss->ss_family != AF_INET) {
return;
*out_host = NULL;
*out_port = NULL;
if (name[0] == '[') { /* bracketed IPv6 address */
const char *close = strchr(name, ']');
if (close == NULL) {
return 0;
}
host = name + 1;
host_len = close - host;
if (close[1] == ':') { /* [IP]:port */
port = close + 2;
} else if (close[1] != 0) {
return 0;
}
} else {
const char *colon = strchr(name, ':');
if (colon == NULL || strchr(colon + 1, ':') != NULL) { /* IPv6 address */
host = name;
host_len = strlen(name);
} else { /* host:port */
host = name;
host_len = colon - name;
port = colon + 1;
}
}
sin = (const struct sockaddr_in*) ss;
memcpy(ipv4, &sin->sin_addr, 4);
*out_host = BUF_strndup(host, host_len);
if (*out_host == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (port == NULL) {
*out_port = NULL;
return 1;
}
*out_port = OPENSSL_strdup(port);
if (*out_port == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(*out_host);
*out_host = NULL;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int conn_state(BIO *bio, BIO_CONNECT *c) {
int ret = -1, i;
char *p, *q;
int (*cb)(const BIO *, int, int) = NULL;
if (c->info_callback != NULL) {
@@ -140,36 +175,30 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *bio, BIO_CONNECT *c) {
for (;;) {
switch (c->state) {
case BIO_CONN_S_BEFORE:
p = c->param_hostname;
if (p == NULL) {
/* If there's a hostname and a port, assume that both are
* exactly what they say. If there is only a hostname, try
* (just once) to split it into a hostname and port. */
if (c->param_hostname == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_NO_HOSTNAME_SPECIFIED);
goto exit_loop;
}
for (; *p != 0; p++) {
if (*p == ':' || *p == '/') {
break;
}
}
i = *p;
if (i == ':' || i == '/') {
*(p++) = 0;
if (i == ':') {
for (q = p; *q; q++) {
if (*q == '/') {
*q = 0;
break;
}
}
OPENSSL_free(c->param_port);
c->param_port = BUF_strdup(p);
}
}
if (c->param_port == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_NO_PORT_SPECIFIED);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", c->param_hostname);
goto exit_loop;
char *host, *port;
if (!split_host_and_port(&host, &port, c->param_hostname) ||
port == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(host);
OPENSSL_free(port);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_NO_PORT_SPECIFIED);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "host=", c->param_hostname);
goto exit_loop;
}
OPENSSL_free(c->param_port);
c->param_port = port;
OPENSSL_free(c->param_hostname);
c->param_hostname = host;
}
if (!bio_ip_and_port_to_socket_and_addr(
@@ -180,9 +209,6 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *bio, BIO_CONNECT *c) {
goto exit_loop;
}
memset(c->ip, 0, 4);
maybe_copy_ipv4_address(c->ip, &c->them);
if (c->nbio) {
if (!bio_socket_nbio(bio->num, 1)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_ERROR_SETTING_NBIO);
@@ -196,7 +222,7 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *bio, BIO_CONNECT *c) {
ret = setsockopt(bio->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (char *)&i,
sizeof(i));
if (ret < 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(setsockopt);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR();
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_KEEPALIVE);
ERR_add_error_data(4, "host=", c->param_hostname, ":", c->param_port);
goto exit_loop;
@@ -210,7 +236,7 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *bio, BIO_CONNECT *c) {
c->state = BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT;
bio->retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT;
} else {
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(connect);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR();
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(4, "host=", c->param_hostname, ":",
c->param_port);
@@ -231,7 +257,7 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *bio, BIO_CONNECT *c) {
ret = -1;
} else {
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(connect);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR();
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, BIO_R_NBIO_CONNECT_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(4, "host=", c->param_hostname, ":", c->param_port);
ret = 0;
@@ -376,7 +402,6 @@ static int conn_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int in_len) {
static long conn_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) {
int *ip;
const char **pptr;
long ret = 1;
BIO_CONNECT *data;
@@ -397,25 +422,6 @@ static long conn_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
case BIO_C_GET_CONNECT:
/* TODO(fork): can this be removed? (Or maybe this whole file). */
if (ptr != NULL) {
pptr = (const char **)ptr;
if (num == 0) {
*pptr = data->param_hostname;
} else if (num == 1) {
*pptr = data->param_port;
} else if (num == 2) {
*pptr = (char *) &data->ip[0];
} else if (num == 3) {
*((int *)ptr) = data->port;
}
if (!bio->init) {
*pptr = "not initialized";
}
ret = 1;
}
break;
case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT:
if (ptr != NULL) {
bio->init = 1;
@@ -445,9 +451,9 @@ static long conn_ctrl(BIO *bio, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) {
if (ip != NULL) {
*ip = bio->num;
}
ret = 1;
ret = bio->num;
} else {
ret = 0;
ret = -1;
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -208,9 +208,9 @@ static long fd_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) {
if (ip != NULL) {
*ip = b->num;
}
return 1;
return b->num;
} else {
ret = 0;
ret = -1;
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE:
+7 -8
View File
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode) {
file = open_file(filename, mode);
if (file == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(fopen);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR();
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
if (errno == ENOENT) {
@@ -182,20 +182,19 @@ static int file_free(BIO *bio) {
}
static int file_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) {
int ret = 0;
if (!b->init) {
return 0;
}
ret = fread(out, 1, outl, (FILE *)b->ptr);
size_t ret = fread(out, 1, outl, (FILE *)b->ptr);
if (ret == 0 && ferror((FILE *)b->ptr)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(fread);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR();
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
ret = -1;
return -1;
}
return ret;
/* fread reads at most |outl| bytes, so |ret| fits in an int. */
return (int)ret;
}
static int file_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) {
@@ -259,7 +258,7 @@ static long file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) {
}
fp = open_file(ptr, p);
if (fp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(fopen);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR();
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BIO, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
ret = 0;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -256,8 +256,8 @@ int BIO_zero_copy_get_read_buf_done(BIO* bio, size_t bytes_read) {
return 0;
}
assert(peer_b->len >= bytes_read);
peer_b->len -= bytes_read;
assert(peer_b->len >= 0);
assert(peer_b->offset + bytes_read <= peer_b->size);
/* Move read offset. If zero_copy_write_lock == 1 we must advance the
+5 -1
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,11 @@ int BIO_printf(BIO *bio, const char *format, ...) {
}
#endif
if (out_len >= sizeof(buf)) {
if (out_len < 0) {
return -1;
}
if ((size_t) out_len >= sizeof(buf)) {
const int requested_len = out_len;
/* The output was truncated. Note that vsnprintf's return value
* does not include a trailing NUL, but the buffer must be sized
+2 -2
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int bio_ip_and_port_to_socket_and_addr(int *out_sock,
ret = 0;
for (cur = result; cur; cur = cur->ai_next) {
if (cur->ai_addrlen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)) {
if ((size_t) cur->ai_addrlen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)) {
continue;
}
memset(out_addr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage));
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int bio_ip_and_port_to_socket_and_addr(int *out_sock,
*out_sock = socket(cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, cur->ai_protocol);
if (*out_sock < 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR(socket);
OPENSSL_PUT_SYSTEM_ERROR();
goto out;
}
+11 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "x86_64")
set(
@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "arm")
)
endif()
if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "aarch64")
set(
BN_ARCH_SOURCES
armv8-mont.${ASM_EXT}
)
endif()
add_library(
bn
@@ -66,6 +74,7 @@ perlasm(bn-586.${ASM_EXT} asm/bn-586.pl)
perlasm(co-586.${ASM_EXT} asm/co-586.pl)
perlasm(x86-mont.${ASM_EXT} asm/x86-mont.pl)
perlasm(armv4-mont.${ASM_EXT} asm/armv4-mont.pl)
perlasm(armv8-mont.${ASM_EXT} asm/armv8-mont.pl)
add_executable(
bn_test
@@ -76,3 +85,4 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(bn_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests bn_test)
+4 -21
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
@@ -311,27 +313,8 @@ int BN_usub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) {
}
}
if (rp != ap) {
for (;;) {
if (!dif--) {
break;
}
rp[0] = ap[0];
if (!dif--) {
break;
}
rp[1] = ap[1];
if (!dif--) {
break;
}
rp[2] = ap[2];
if (!dif--) {
break;
}
rp[3] = ap[3];
rp += 4;
ap += 4;
}
if (dif > 0 && rp != ap) {
memcpy(rp, ap, sizeof(*rp) * dif);
}
r->top = max;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ $_n0="$num,#14*4";
$_num="$num,#15*4"; $_bpend=$_num;
$code=<<___;
#include "arm_arch.h"
#include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
.text
.code 32
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+7 -23
View File
@@ -79,29 +79,13 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
$addx = ($1>=2.23);
}
if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
`nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($1>=2.09) + ($1>=2.10);
$addx = ($1>=2.10);
}
if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
$addx = ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
# In upstream, this is controlled by shelling out to the compiler to check
# versions, but BoringSSL is intended to be used with pre-generated perlasm
# output, so this isn't useful anyway.
#
# TODO(davidben): Enable these after testing. $avx goes up to 2 and $addx to 1.
$avx = 0;
$addx = 0;
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT = *OUT;
+6 -19
View File
@@ -98,25 +98,12 @@ die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$addx = ($1>=2.23);
}
if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
`nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$addx = ($1>=2.10);
}
if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
# In upstream, this is controlled by shelling out to the compiler to check
# versions, but BoringSSL is intended to be used with pre-generated perlasm
# output, so this isn't useful anyway.
#
# TODO(davidben): Enable this after testing. $addx goes up to 1.
$addx = 0;
($out, $inp, $mod) = ("%rdi", "%rsi", "%rbp"); # common internal API
{
+6 -14
View File
@@ -53,20 +53,12 @@ die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$addx = ($1>=2.23);
}
if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
`nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$addx = ($1>=2.10);
}
if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
# In upstream, this is controlled by shelling out to the compiler to check
# versions, but BoringSSL is intended to be used with pre-generated perlasm
# output, so this isn't useful anyway.
#
# TODO(davidben): Enable this option after testing. $addx goes up to 1.
$addx = 0;
# int bn_mul_mont(
$rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp,
+25 -17
View File
@@ -38,20 +38,12 @@ die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$addx = ($1>=2.23);
}
if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
`nasm -v 2>&1` =~ /NASM version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$addx = ($1>=2.10);
}
if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./) {
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
# In upstream, this is controlled by shelling out to the compiler to check
# versions, but BoringSSL is intended to be used with pre-generated perlasm
# output, so this isn't useful anyway.
#
# TODO(davidben): Enable this after testing. $addx goes up to 1.
$addx = 0;
# int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
$rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp,
@@ -1778,6 +1770,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
.align 32
.L8x_tail_done:
add (%rdx),%r8 # can this overflow?
adc \$0,%r9
adc \$0,%r10
adc \$0,%r11
adc \$0,%r12
adc \$0,%r13
adc \$0,%r14
adc \$0,%r15 # can't overflow, because we
# started with "overhung" part
# of multiplication
xor %rax,%rax
neg $carry
@@ -3124,6 +3125,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
.align 32
.Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
add 24+8(%rsp),%r8 # can this overflow?
adc \$0,%r9
adc \$0,%r10
adc \$0,%r11
adc \$0,%r12
adc \$0,%r13
adc \$0,%r14
adc \$0,%r15 # can't overflow, because we
# started with "overhung" part
# of multiplication
mov $carry,%rax # xor %rax,%rax
sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf
@@ -3167,13 +3177,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
$code.=<<___;
xor %rbx,%rbx
xor %ebx,%ebx
sub %r15,%rsi # compare top-most words
adc %rbx,%rbx
mov %rcx,%r10 # -$num
.byte 0x67
or %rbx,%rax
.byte 0x67
mov %rcx,%r9 # -$num
xor \$1,%rax
sar \$3+2,%rcx # cf=0
+3 -4
View File
@@ -166,11 +166,10 @@ void BN_clear(BIGNUM *bn) {
}
const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void) {
static const BN_ULONG data_one = 1;
static const BIGNUM const_one = {(BN_ULONG *)&data_one, 1, 1, 0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA};
static const BN_ULONG kOneLimbs[1] = { 1 };
static const BIGNUM kOne = STATIC_BIGNUM(kOneLimbs);
return &const_one;
return &kOne;
}
void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *in, int flags) {
+115 -32
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <utility>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -211,7 +213,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (!sample) {
return 1;
}
if (!test_lshift(bc_file.get(), ctx.get(), bssl::move(sample))) {
if (!test_lshift(bc_file.get(), ctx.get(), std::move(sample))) {
return 1;
}
flush_fp(bc_file.get());
@@ -328,6 +330,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
return 0;
}
static int HexToBIGNUM(ScopedBIGNUM *out, const char *in) {
BIGNUM *raw = NULL;
int ret = BN_hex2bn(&raw, in);
out->reset(raw);
return ret;
}
static bool test_add(FILE *fp) {
ScopedBIGNUM a(BN_new());
ScopedBIGNUM b(BN_new());
@@ -423,6 +432,16 @@ static bool test_div(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
return false;
}
if (!BN_one(a.get())) {
return false;
}
BN_zero(b.get());
if (BN_div(d.get(), c.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n");
return false;
}
ERR_clear_error();
for (int i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
if (i < num1) {
if (!BN_rand(a.get(), 400, 0, 0) ||
@@ -491,14 +510,6 @@ static bool test_div(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
return false;
}
// Test the BN_div checks for division by zero.
BN_zero(b.get());
if (BN_div(d.get(), c.get(), a.get(), b.get(), ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Divided by zero!\n");
return false;
}
ERR_clear_error();
return true;
}
@@ -828,18 +839,17 @@ static bool test_div_word(FILE *fp) {
}
for (int i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
BN_ULONG s;
do {
if (!BN_rand(a.get(), 512, -1, 0) ||
!BN_rand(b.get(), BN_BITS2, -1, 0)) {
return false;
}
s = b->d[0];
} while (!s);
} while (BN_is_zero(b.get()));
if (!BN_copy(b.get(), a.get())) {
return false;
}
BN_ULONG s = b->d[0];
BN_ULONG r = BN_div_word(b.get(), s);
if (r == (BN_ULONG)-1) {
return false;
@@ -882,8 +892,27 @@ static bool test_mont(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
ScopedBIGNUM B(BN_new());
ScopedBIGNUM n(BN_new());
ScopedBN_MONT_CTX mont(BN_MONT_CTX_new());
if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !A || !B || !n || !mont ||
!BN_rand(a.get(), 100, 0, 0) ||
if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !A || !B || !n || !mont) {
return false;
}
BN_zero(n.get());
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont.get(), n.get(), ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n");
return false;
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (!BN_set_word(n.get(), 16)) {
return false;
}
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont.get(), n.get(), ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n");
return false;
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (!BN_rand(a.get(), 100, 0, 0) ||
!BN_rand(b.get(), 100, 0, 0)) {
return false;
}
@@ -924,13 +953,6 @@ static bool test_mont(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
}
}
BN_zero(n.get());
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont.get(), n.get(), ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero!\n");
return false;
}
ERR_clear_error();
return true;
}
@@ -984,6 +1006,16 @@ static bool test_mod_mul(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
return false;
}
if (!BN_one(a.get()) || !BN_one(b.get())) {
return false;
}
BN_zero(c.get());
if (BN_mod_mul(e.get(), a.get(), b.get(), c.get(), ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return false;
}
ERR_clear_error();
for (int j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
if (!BN_rand(c.get(), 1024, 0, 0)) {
return false;
@@ -1038,8 +1070,21 @@ static bool test_mod_exp(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
ScopedBIGNUM c(BN_new());
ScopedBIGNUM d(BN_new());
ScopedBIGNUM e(BN_new());
if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !e ||
!BN_rand(c.get(), 30, 0, 1)) { // must be odd for montgomery
if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !e) {
return false;
}
if (!BN_one(a.get()) || !BN_one(b.get())) {
return false;
}
BN_zero(c.get());
if (BN_mod_exp(d.get(), a.get(), b.get(), c.get(), ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (!BN_rand(c.get(), 30, 0, 1)) { // must be odd for montgomery
return false;
}
for (int i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
@@ -1069,6 +1114,27 @@ static bool test_mod_exp(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
return false;
}
}
// Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction.
if (!HexToBIGNUM(&a, "050505050505") ||
!HexToBIGNUM(&b, "02") ||
!HexToBIGNUM(
&c,
"4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
"4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
"4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001") ||
!BN_mod_exp(d.get(), a.get(), b.get(), c.get(), ctx) ||
!BN_mul(e.get(), a.get(), a.get(), ctx)) {
return false;
}
if (BN_cmp(d.get(), e.get()) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
return false;
}
return true;
}
@@ -1078,8 +1144,32 @@ static bool test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(FILE *fp, BN_CTX *ctx) {
ScopedBIGNUM c(BN_new());
ScopedBIGNUM d(BN_new());
ScopedBIGNUM e(BN_new());
if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !e ||
!BN_rand(c.get(), 30, 0, 1)) { // must be odd for montgomery
if (!a || !b || !c || !d || !e) {
return false;
}
if (!BN_one(a.get()) || !BN_one(b.get())) {
return false;
}
BN_zero(c.get());
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d.get(), a.get(), b.get(), c.get(), ctx,
nullptr)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (!BN_set_word(c.get(), 16)) {
return false;
}
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d.get(), a.get(), b.get(), c.get(), ctx,
nullptr)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
ERR_clear_error();
if (!BN_rand(c.get(), 30, 0, 1)) { // must be odd for montgomery
return false;
}
for (int i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
@@ -1483,13 +1573,6 @@ static bool test_dec2bn(BN_CTX *ctx) {
return true;
}
static int HexToBIGNUM(ScopedBIGNUM *out, const char *in) {
BIGNUM *raw = NULL;
int ret = BN_hex2bn(&raw, in);
out->reset(raw);
return ret;
}
static bool test_hex2bn(BN_CTX *ctx) {
ScopedBIGNUM bn;
int ret = HexToBIGNUM(&bn, "0");
+6 -6
View File
@@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
q = BN_MASK2;
} else {
/* n0 < d0 */
#ifdef BN_LLONG
#ifdef BN_ULLONG
BN_ULLONG t2;
#if defined(BN_LLONG) && !defined(div_asm)
#if defined(BN_ULLONG) && !defined(div_asm)
q = (BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG)n0) << BN_BITS2) | n1) / d0);
#else
q = div_asm(n0, n1, d0);
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
}
t2 -= d1;
}
#else /* !BN_LLONG */
#else /* !BN_ULLONG */
BN_ULONG t2l, t2h;
#if defined(div_asm)
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor,
}
t2l -= d1;
}
#endif /* !BN_LLONG */
#endif /* !BN_ULLONG */
}
l0 = bn_mul_words(tmp->d, sdiv->d, div_n, q);
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
}
BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
#ifndef BN_LLONG
#ifndef BN_ULLONG
BN_ULONG ret = 0;
#else
BN_ULLONG ret = 0;
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w) {
w &= BN_MASK2;
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
#ifndef BN_LLONG
#ifndef BN_ULLONG
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
#else
+57 -72
View File
@@ -123,6 +123,17 @@
#define RSAZ_ENABLED
#include "rsaz_exp.h"
void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num,
int power);
void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG *inp, size_t num, void *table, size_t power);
void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG *out, size_t num, void *table, size_t power);
void bn_power5(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const void *table,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num, int power);
int bn_from_montgomery(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap,
const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
#endif
int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) {
@@ -274,10 +285,10 @@ static int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
if (BN_ucmp(m, &recp->N) < 0) {
BN_zero(d);
if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
return 0;
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return 1;
@@ -602,17 +613,17 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
}
int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) {
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, window;
int start = 1;
BIGNUM *d, *r;
const BIGNUM *aa;
/* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *new_mont = NULL;
if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, mont);
}
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
@@ -633,18 +644,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
goto err;
}
/* If this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part */
if (in_mont != NULL) {
mont = in_mont;
} else {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (mont == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) {
/* Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. */
if (mont == NULL) {
new_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (new_mont == NULL || !BN_MONT_CTX_set(new_mont, m, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
mont = new_mont;
}
if (a->neg || BN_ucmp(a, m) >= 0) {
@@ -763,9 +769,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
ret = 1;
err:
if (in_mont == NULL) {
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(new_mont);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -851,10 +855,10 @@ static int copy_from_prebuf(BIGNUM *b, int top, unsigned char *buf, int idx,
*/
int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) {
const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
int i, bits, ret = 0, window, wvalue;
int top;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *new_mont = NULL;
int numPowers;
unsigned char *powerbufFree = NULL;
@@ -862,12 +866,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
unsigned char *powerbuf = NULL;
BIGNUM tmp, am;
top = m->top;
if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return 0;
}
top = m->top;
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
ret = BN_one(rr);
@@ -876,15 +881,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
/* Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller.
* If this is not done, things will break in the montgomery part. */
if (in_mont != NULL) {
mont = in_mont;
} else {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (mont == NULL || !BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) {
/* Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. */
if (mont == NULL) {
new_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (new_mont == NULL || !BN_MONT_CTX_set(new_mont, m, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
mont = new_mont;
}
#ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED
@@ -993,20 +996,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/* Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
* 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size... */
if (window == 5 && top > 1) {
void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG * rp, const BN_ULONG * ap,
const void * table, const BN_ULONG * np,
const BN_ULONG * n0, int num, int power);
void bn_scatter5(const BN_ULONG * inp, size_t num, void * table,
size_t power);
void bn_gather5(BN_ULONG * out, size_t num, void * table, size_t power);
void bn_power5(BN_ULONG * rp, const BN_ULONG * ap, const void * table,
const BN_ULONG * np, const BN_ULONG * n0, int num,
int power);
int bn_from_montgomery(BN_ULONG * rp, const BN_ULONG * ap,
const BN_ULONG * not_used, const BN_ULONG * np,
const BN_ULONG * n0, int num);
BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0, *np2;
const BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0, *np2;
/* BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top
* [in BN_DEBUG[_DEBUG] build]... */
@@ -1020,9 +1010,11 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
if (top & 7) {
np2 = np;
} else {
for (np2 = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++) {
np2[2 * i] = np[i];
BN_ULONG *np_double = am.d + top;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++) {
np_double[2 * i] = np[i];
}
np2 = np_double;
}
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
@@ -1187,10 +1179,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (in_mont == NULL) {
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(new_mont);
if (powerbuf != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(powerbuf, powerbufLen);
OPENSSL_free(powerbufFree);
@@ -1200,8 +1191,9 @@ err:
}
int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) {
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
BN_MONT_CTX *new_mont = NULL;
int b, bits, ret = 0;
int r_is_one;
BN_ULONG w, next_w;
@@ -1259,13 +1251,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
goto err;
}
if (in_mont != NULL) {
mont = in_mont;
} else {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (mont == NULL || !BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) {
/* Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. */
if (mont == NULL) {
new_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (new_mont == NULL || !BN_MONT_CTX_set(new_mont, m, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
mont = new_mont;
}
r_is_one = 1; /* except for Montgomery factor */
@@ -1347,9 +1339,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
ret = 1;
err:
if (in_mont == NULL) {
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(new_mont);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
@@ -1358,7 +1348,7 @@ err:
int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m,
BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) {
BN_CTX *ctx, const BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
int i, j, bits, b, bits1, bits2, ret = 0, wpos1, wpos2, window1, window2,
wvalue1, wvalue2;
int r_is_one = 1;
@@ -1366,7 +1356,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
const BIGNUM *a_mod_m;
/* Tables of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
BIGNUM *val1[TABLE_SIZE], *val2[TABLE_SIZE];
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *new_mont = NULL;
if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
@@ -1390,16 +1380,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
goto err;
}
if (in_mont != NULL) {
mont = in_mont;
} else {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (mont == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) {
/* Allocate a montgomery context if it was not supplied by the caller. */
if (mont == NULL) {
new_mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (new_mont == NULL || !BN_MONT_CTX_set(new_mont, m, ctx)) {
goto err;
}
mont = new_mont;
}
window1 = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits1);
@@ -1551,9 +1538,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
ret = 1;
err:
if (in_mont == NULL) {
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(new_mont);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
+22 -8
View File
@@ -223,20 +223,23 @@ err:
}
/* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */
static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *out, int *out_no_inverse,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
BN_CTX *ctx);
BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_ex(BIGNUM *out, int *out_no_inverse, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) {
BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
int sign;
if ((a->flags & BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0 ||
(n->flags & BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(out, a, n, ctx);
return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(out, out_no_inverse, a, n, ctx);
}
*out_no_inverse = 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -276,7 +279,7 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
*/
if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= (BN_BITS <= 32 ? 450 : 2048))) {
if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= (BN_BITS2 <= 32 ? 450 : 2048))) {
/* Binary inversion algorithm; requires odd modulus.
* This is faster than the general algorithm if the modulus
* is sufficiently small (about 400 .. 500 bits on 32-bit
@@ -522,6 +525,7 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
}
}
} else {
*out_no_inverse = 1;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
goto err;
}
@@ -535,16 +539,25 @@ err:
return ret;
}
BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
int no_inverse;
return BN_mod_inverse_ex(out, &no_inverse, a, n, ctx);
}
/* BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse.
* It does not contain branches that may leak sensitive information. */
static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) {
static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *out, int *out_no_inverse,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
BN_CTX *ctx) {
BIGNUM *A, *B, *X, *Y, *M, *D, *T, *R = NULL;
BIGNUM local_A, local_B;
BIGNUM *pA, *pB;
BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
int sign;
*out_no_inverse = 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -682,6 +695,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *a,
}
}
} else {
*out_no_inverse = 1;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(BN, BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
goto err;
}
+13 -125
View File
@@ -69,13 +69,7 @@
(!defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_X86)) || \
(defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS))
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#define alloca _alloca
#else
#include <alloca.h>
#endif
#ifdef BN_LLONG
#ifdef BN_ULLONG
#define mul_add(r, a, w, c) \
{ \
BN_ULLONG t; \
@@ -222,9 +216,9 @@
(c) = h & BN_MASK2; \
(r) = l & BN_MASK2; \
}
#endif /* !BN_LLONG */
#endif /* !BN_ULLONG */
#if defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
#if defined(BN_ULLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
BN_ULONG w) {
@@ -304,7 +298,7 @@ void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) {
}
}
#else /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */
#else /* !(defined(BN_ULLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */
BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
BN_ULONG w) {
@@ -390,9 +384,9 @@ void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) {
}
}
#endif /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */
#endif /* !(defined(BN_ULLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */
#if defined(BN_LLONG)
#if defined(BN_ULLONG)
BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
return (BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG)h) << BN_BITS2) | l) / (BN_ULLONG)d);
@@ -470,9 +464,9 @@ BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) {
return ret;
}
#endif /* !defined(BN_LLONG) */
#endif /* !defined(BN_ULLONG) */
#ifdef BN_LLONG
#ifdef BN_ULLONG
BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
int n) {
BN_ULLONG ll = 0;
@@ -512,7 +506,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
return (BN_ULONG)ll;
}
#else /* !BN_LLONG */
#else /* !BN_ULLONG */
BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
int n) {
@@ -569,7 +563,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
return (BN_ULONG)c;
}
#endif /* !BN_LLONG */
#endif /* !BN_ULLONG */
BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
int n) {
@@ -631,7 +625,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
/* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
#ifdef BN_LLONG
#ifdef BN_ULLONG
/* Keep in mind that additions to multiplication result can not overflow,
* because its high half cannot be all-ones. */
@@ -722,7 +716,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
#define sqr_add_c2(a, i, j, c0, c1, c2) mul_add_c2((a)[i], (a)[j], c0, c1, c2)
#else /* !BN_LLONG */
#else /* !BN_ULLONG */
/* Keep in mind that additions to hi can not overflow, because
* the high word of a multiplication result cannot be all-ones. */
@@ -774,7 +768,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
} while (0)
#define sqr_add_c2(a, i, j, c0, c1, c2) mul_add_c2((a)[i], (a)[j], c0, c1, c2)
#endif /* !BN_LLONG */
#endif /* !BN_ULLONG */
void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b) {
BN_ULONG c1, c2, c3;
@@ -1022,110 +1016,4 @@ void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a) {
r[7] = c2;
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) || (!defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && !defined(OPENSSL_X86_64))
/* This is essentially reference implementation, which may or may not
* result in performance improvement. E.g. on IA-32 this routine was
* observed to give 40% faster rsa1024 private key operations and 10%
* faster rsa4096 ones, while on AMD64 it improves rsa1024 sign only
* by 10% and *worsens* rsa4096 sign by 15%. Once again, it's a
* reference implementation, one to be used as starting point for
* platform-specific assembler. Mentioned numbers apply to compiler
* generated code compiled with and without -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT and
* can vary not only from platform to platform, but even for compiler
* versions. Assembler vs. assembler improvement coefficients can
* [and are known to] differ and are to be documented elsewhere. */
int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0p, int num) {
BN_ULONG c0, c1, ml, *tp, n0;
#ifdef mul64
BN_ULONG mh;
#endif
volatile BN_ULONG *vp;
int i = 0, j;
#if 0 /* template for platform-specific implementation */
if (ap==bp) return bn_sqr_mont(rp,ap,np,n0p,num);
#endif
vp = tp = alloca((num + 2) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
n0 = *n0p;
c0 = 0;
ml = bp[0];
#ifdef mul64
mh = HBITS(ml);
ml = LBITS(ml);
for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) {
mul(tp[j], ap[j], ml, mh, c0);
}
#else
for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) {
mul(tp[j], ap[j], ml, c0);
}
#endif
tp[num] = c0;
tp[num + 1] = 0;
goto enter;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
c0 = 0;
ml = bp[i];
#ifdef mul64
mh = HBITS(ml);
ml = LBITS(ml);
for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) {
mul_add(tp[j], ap[j], ml, mh, c0);
}
#else
for (j = 0; j < num; ++j) {
mul_add(tp[j], ap[j], ml, c0);
}
#endif
c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2;
tp[num] = c1;
tp[num + 1] = (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0);
enter:
c1 = tp[0];
ml = (c1 * n0) & BN_MASK2;
c0 = 0;
#ifdef mul64
mh = HBITS(ml);
ml = LBITS(ml);
mul_add(c1, np[0], ml, mh, c0);
#else
mul_add(c1, ml, np[0], c0);
#endif
for (j = 1; j < num; j++) {
c1 = tp[j];
#ifdef mul64
mul_add(c1, np[j], ml, mh, c0);
#else
mul_add(c1, ml, np[j], c0);
#endif
tp[j - 1] = c1 & BN_MASK2;
}
c1 = (tp[num] + c0) & BN_MASK2;
tp[num - 1] = c1;
tp[num] = tp[num + 1] + (c1 < c0 ? 1 : 0);
}
if (tp[num] != 0 || tp[num - 1] >= np[num - 1]) {
c0 = bn_sub_words(rp, tp, np, num);
if (tp[num] != 0 || c0 == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < num + 2; i++) {
vp[i] = 0;
}
return 1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
rp[i] = tp[i], vp[i] = 0;
}
vp[num] = 0;
vp[num + 1] = 0;
return 1;
}
#endif
#endif
+23 -20
View File
@@ -144,44 +144,41 @@ BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t bits);
#if !defined(_MSC_VER)
/* MSVC doesn't support two-word integers on 64-bit. */
#define BN_LLONG __int128_t
#define BN_ULLONG __uint128_t
#endif
#define BN_BITS 128
#define BN_BITS2 64
#define BN_BYTES 8
#define BN_BITS4 32
#define BN_MASK (0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffLL)
#define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffL)
#define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffL)
#define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000L)
#define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000L)
#define BN_TBIT (0x8000000000000000L)
#define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffffffffffUL)
#define BN_MASK2l (0xffffffffUL)
#define BN_MASK2h (0xffffffff00000000UL)
#define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffffffff80000000UL)
#define BN_TBIT (0x8000000000000000UL)
#define BN_DEC_CONV (10000000000000000000UL)
#define BN_DEC_NUM 19
#define TOBN(hi, lo) ((BN_ULONG)hi << 32 | lo)
#elif defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT)
#define BN_LLONG int64_t
#define BN_ULLONG uint64_t
#define BN_MASK (0xffffffffffffffffLL)
#define BN_BITS 64
#define BN_BITS2 32
#define BN_BYTES 4
#define BN_BITS4 16
#define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffL)
#define BN_MASK2l (0xffff)
#define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000L)
#define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000L)
#define BN_TBIT (0x80000000L)
#define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000L)
#define BN_MASK2 (0xffffffffUL)
#define BN_MASK2l (0xffffUL)
#define BN_MASK2h1 (0xffff8000UL)
#define BN_MASK2h (0xffff0000UL)
#define BN_TBIT (0x80000000UL)
#define BN_DEC_CONV (1000000000UL)
#define BN_DEC_NUM 9
#define TOBN(hi, lo) lo, hi
#else
#error "Must define either OPENSSL_32_BIT or OPENSSL_64_BIT"
#endif
/* Pentium pro 16,16,16,32,64 */
/* Alpha 16,16,16,16.64 */
#define BN_MULL_SIZE_NORMAL (16) /* 32 */
@@ -190,7 +187,13 @@ BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *bn, size_t bits);
#define BN_MUL_LOW_RECURSIVE_SIZE_NORMAL (32) /* 32 */
#define BN_MONT_CTX_SET_SIZE_WORD (64) /* 32 */
#if defined(BN_LLONG)
#define STATIC_BIGNUM(x) \
{ \
(BN_ULONG *)x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG), \
sizeof(x) / sizeof(BN_ULONG), 0, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA \
}
#if defined(BN_ULLONG)
#define Lw(t) (((BN_ULONG)(t))&BN_MASK2)
#define Hw(t) (((BN_ULONG)((t)>>BN_BITS2))&BN_MASK2)
#endif
@@ -220,7 +223,7 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int cl, int dl);
int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
const BN_ULONG *np, const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
#if !defined(BN_LLONG)
#if !defined(BN_ULLONG)
#define LBITS(a) ((a) & BN_MASK2l)
#define HBITS(a) (((a) >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)
@@ -252,7 +255,7 @@ int bn_mul_mont(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,
(h) = ht; \
}
#endif /* !defined(BN_LLONG) */
#endif /* !defined(BN_ULLONG) */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2
+13 -23
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,9 @@
#include "../internal.h"
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \
defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
#define OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT
#endif
@@ -130,16 +131,11 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void) {
return NULL;
}
BN_MONT_CTX_init(ret);
ret->flags = BN_FLG_MALLOCED;
return ret;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX));
BN_init(&ret->RR);
BN_init(&ret->N);
void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
memset(mont, 0, sizeof(BN_MONT_CTX));
BN_init(&mont->RR);
BN_init(&mont->N);
BN_init(&mont->Ni);
return ret;
}
void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
@@ -149,23 +145,18 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont) {
BN_free(&mont->RR);
BN_free(&mont->N);
BN_free(&mont->Ni);
if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED) {
OPENSSL_free(mont);
}
OPENSSL_free(mont);
}
BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from) {
BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, const BN_MONT_CTX *from) {
if (to == from) {
return to;
}
if (!BN_copy(&to->RR, &from->RR) ||
!BN_copy(&to->N, &from->N) ||
!BN_copy(&to->Ni, &from->Ni)) {
!BN_copy(&to->N, &from->N)) {
return NULL;
}
to->ri = from->ri;
to->n0[0] = from->n0[0];
to->n0[1] = from->n0[1];
return to;
@@ -198,8 +189,6 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) {
tmod.dmax = 2;
tmod.neg = 0;
mont->ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (BN_BITS2 <= 32)
/* Only certain BN_BITS2<=32 platforms actually make use of
* n0[1], and we could use the #else case (with a shorter R
@@ -283,9 +272,10 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx) {
mont->n0[1] = 0;
#endif
/* setup RR for conversions */
/* RR = (2^ri)^2 == 2^(ri*2) == 1 << (ri*2), which has its (ri*2)th bit set. */
int ri = (BN_num_bits(mod) + (BN_BITS2 - 1)) / BN_BITS2 * BN_BITS2;
BN_zero(&(mont->RR));
if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), mont->ri * 2)) {
if (!BN_set_bit(&(mont->RR), ri * 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(&(mont->RR), &(mont->RR), &(mont->N), ctx)) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ loop:
if (!BN_add_word(rnd, delta)) {
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(rnd) != bits) {
if (BN_num_bits(rnd) != (unsigned)bits) {
goto again;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
buf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ size_t BUF_strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dst_size) {
void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t dst_size) {
void *ret;
if (data == NULL) {
if (dst_size == 0) {
return NULL;
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
bytestring
@@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(bytestring_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests bytestring_test)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static int cbs_convert_ber(CBS *in, CBB *out, char squash_header,
char squash_child_headers = is_primitive_type(tag);
/* This is a hack, but it sufficies to handle NSS's output. If we find
* an indefinite length, context-specific tag with a definite, primtive
* an indefinite length, context-specific tag with a definite, primitive
* tag inside it, then we assume that the context-specific tag is
* implicit and the tags within are fragments of a primitive type that
* need to be concatenated. */
+68 -13
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#if !defined(__STDC_CONSTANT_MACROS)
#define __STDC_CONSTANT_MACROS
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -22,7 +26,6 @@
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
#include "../test/scoped_types.h"
@@ -341,12 +344,14 @@ static bool TestCBBPrefixed() {
size_t buf_len;
CBB cbb, contents, inner_contents, inner_inner_contents;
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0)) {
return false;
}
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &contents) ||
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
CBB_len(&cbb) != 0 ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 1) ||
CBB_len(&contents) != 1 ||
!CBB_flush(&cbb) ||
CBB_len(&cbb) != 3 ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&cbb, &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0x203) ||
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&cbb, &contents) ||
@@ -365,6 +370,55 @@ static bool TestCBBPrefixed() {
return buf_len == sizeof(kExpected) && memcmp(buf, kExpected, buf_len) == 0;
}
static bool TestCBBDiscardChild() {
ScopedCBB cbb;
CBB contents, inner_contents, inner_inner_contents;
if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 0) ||
!CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), 0xaa)) {
return false;
}
// Discarding |cbb|'s children preserves the byte written.
CBB_discard_child(cbb.get());
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0xbb) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0xcccc) ||
!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u24(&contents, 0xdddddd) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &contents) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&contents, 0xff) ||
!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&contents, &inner_contents) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&inner_contents, 0x42) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&inner_contents, &inner_inner_contents) ||
!CBB_add_u8(&inner_inner_contents, 0x99)) {
return false;
}
// Discard everything from |inner_contents| down.
CBB_discard_child(&contents);
uint8_t *buf;
size_t buf_len;
if (!CBB_finish(cbb.get(), &buf, &buf_len)) {
return false;
}
ScopedOpenSSLBytes scoper(buf);
static const uint8_t kExpected[] = {
0xaa,
0,
1, 0xbb,
0, 2, 0xcc, 0xcc,
0, 0, 3, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
1, 0xff,
};
return buf_len == sizeof(kExpected) && memcmp(buf, kExpected, buf_len) == 0;
}
static bool TestCBBMisuse() {
CBB cbb, child, contents;
uint8_t *buf;
@@ -434,7 +488,7 @@ static bool TestCBBASN1() {
return false;
}
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &contents, 0x30) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, bssl::vector_data(&test_data), 130) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, test_data.data(), 130) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &buf_len)) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return false;
@@ -443,7 +497,7 @@ static bool TestCBBASN1() {
if (buf_len != 3 + 130 ||
memcmp(buf, "\x30\x81\x82", 3) != 0 ||
memcmp(buf + 3, bssl::vector_data(&test_data), 130) != 0) {
memcmp(buf + 3, test_data.data(), 130) != 0) {
return false;
}
@@ -451,7 +505,7 @@ static bool TestCBBASN1() {
return false;
}
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &contents, 0x30) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, bssl::vector_data(&test_data), 1000) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&contents, test_data.data(), 1000) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &buf_len)) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return false;
@@ -460,7 +514,7 @@ static bool TestCBBASN1() {
if (buf_len != 4 + 1000 ||
memcmp(buf, "\x30\x82\x03\xe8", 4) != 0 ||
memcmp(buf + 4, bssl::vector_data(&test_data), 1000)) {
memcmp(buf + 4, test_data.data(), 1000)) {
return false;
}
@@ -469,7 +523,7 @@ static bool TestCBBASN1() {
}
if (!CBB_add_asn1(&cbb, &contents, 0x30) ||
!CBB_add_asn1(&contents, &inner_contents, 0x30) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&inner_contents, bssl::vector_data(&test_data), 100000) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&inner_contents, test_data.data(), 100000) ||
!CBB_finish(&cbb, &buf, &buf_len)) {
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return false;
@@ -478,7 +532,7 @@ static bool TestCBBASN1() {
if (buf_len != 5 + 5 + 100000 ||
memcmp(buf, "\x30\x83\x01\x86\xa5\x30\x83\x01\x86\xa0", 10) != 0 ||
memcmp(buf + 10, bssl::vector_data(&test_data), 100000)) {
memcmp(buf + 10, test_data.data(), 100000)) {
return false;
}
@@ -578,9 +632,9 @@ static const ASN1Uint64Test kASN1Uint64Tests[] = {
{127, "\x02\x01\x7f", 3},
{128, "\x02\x02\x00\x80", 4},
{0xdeadbeef, "\x02\x05\x00\xde\xad\xbe\xef", 7},
{OPENSSL_U64(0x0102030405060708),
{UINT64_C(0x0102030405060708),
"\x02\x08\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08", 10},
{OPENSSL_U64(0xffffffffffffffff),
{UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff),
"\x02\x09\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 11},
};
@@ -670,6 +724,7 @@ int main(void) {
!TestCBBFinishChild() ||
!TestCBBMisuse() ||
!TestCBBPrefixed() ||
!TestCBBDiscardChild() ||
!TestCBBASN1() ||
!TestBerConvert() ||
!TestASN1Uint64() ||
+40 -22
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void CBB_zero(CBB *cbb) {
}
static int cbb_init(CBB *cbb, uint8_t *buf, size_t cap) {
/* This assumes that |cbb| has already been zeroed. */
struct cbb_buffer_st *base;
base = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct cbb_buffer_st));
@@ -37,16 +38,15 @@ static int cbb_init(CBB *cbb, uint8_t *buf, size_t cap) {
base->cap = cap;
base->can_resize = 1;
memset(cbb, 0, sizeof(CBB));
cbb->base = base;
cbb->is_top_level = 1;
return 1;
}
int CBB_init(CBB *cbb, size_t initial_capacity) {
uint8_t *buf;
CBB_zero(cbb);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(initial_capacity);
uint8_t *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(initial_capacity);
if (initial_capacity > 0 && buf == NULL) {
return 0;
}
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ int CBB_init(CBB *cbb, size_t initial_capacity) {
}
int CBB_init_fixed(CBB *cbb, uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
CBB_zero(cbb);
if (!cbb_init(cbb, buf, len)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -70,6 +72,10 @@ int CBB_init_fixed(CBB *cbb, uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
void CBB_cleanup(CBB *cbb) {
if (cbb->base) {
/* Only top-level |CBB|s are cleaned up. Child |CBB|s are non-owning. They
* are implicitly discarded when the parent is flushed or cleaned up. */
assert(cbb->is_top_level);
if (cbb->base->can_resize) {
OPENSSL_free(cbb->base->buf);
}
@@ -173,28 +179,28 @@ int CBB_flush(CBB *cbb) {
return 0;
}
if (cbb->child == NULL || cbb->pending_len_len == 0) {
if (cbb->child == NULL || cbb->child->pending_len_len == 0) {
return 1;
}
child_start = cbb->offset + cbb->pending_len_len;
child_start = cbb->child->offset + cbb->child->pending_len_len;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb->child) ||
child_start < cbb->offset ||
child_start < cbb->child->offset ||
cbb->base->len < child_start) {
return 0;
}
len = cbb->base->len - child_start;
if (cbb->pending_is_asn1) {
if (cbb->child->pending_is_asn1) {
/* For ASN.1 we assume that we'll only need a single byte for the length.
* If that turned out to be incorrect, we have to move the contents along
* in order to make space. */
size_t len_len;
uint8_t initial_length_byte;
assert (cbb->pending_len_len == 1);
assert (cbb->child->pending_len_len == 1);
if (len > 0xfffffffe) {
/* Too large. */
@@ -226,12 +232,13 @@ int CBB_flush(CBB *cbb) {
memmove(cbb->base->buf + child_start + extra_bytes,
cbb->base->buf + child_start, len);
}
cbb->base->buf[cbb->offset++] = initial_length_byte;
cbb->pending_len_len = len_len - 1;
cbb->base->buf[cbb->child->offset++] = initial_length_byte;
cbb->child->pending_len_len = len_len - 1;
}
for (i = cbb->pending_len_len - 1; i < cbb->pending_len_len; i--) {
cbb->base->buf[cbb->offset + i] = len;
for (i = cbb->child->pending_len_len - 1; i < cbb->child->pending_len_len;
i--) {
cbb->base->buf[cbb->child->offset + i] = len;
len >>= 8;
}
if (len != 0) {
@@ -240,17 +247,15 @@ int CBB_flush(CBB *cbb) {
cbb->child->base = NULL;
cbb->child = NULL;
cbb->pending_len_len = 0;
cbb->pending_is_asn1 = 0;
cbb->offset = 0;
return 1;
}
size_t CBB_len(const CBB *cbb) {
assert(cbb->child == NULL);
assert(cbb->offset + cbb->pending_len_len <= cbb->base->len);
return cbb->base->len;
return cbb->base->len - cbb->offset - cbb->pending_len_len;
}
static int cbb_add_length_prefixed(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents,
@@ -261,7 +266,7 @@ static int cbb_add_length_prefixed(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents,
return 0;
}
cbb->offset = cbb->base->len;
size_t offset = cbb->base->len;
if (!cbb_buffer_add(cbb->base, &prefix_bytes, len_len)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -270,8 +275,9 @@ static int cbb_add_length_prefixed(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents,
memset(out_contents, 0, sizeof(CBB));
out_contents->base = cbb->base;
cbb->child = out_contents;
cbb->pending_len_len = len_len;
cbb->pending_is_asn1 = 0;
cbb->child->offset = offset;
cbb->child->pending_len_len = len_len;
cbb->child->pending_is_asn1 = 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -299,7 +305,7 @@ int CBB_add_asn1(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents, uint8_t tag) {
return 0;
}
cbb->offset = cbb->base->len;
size_t offset = cbb->base->len;
if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, 0)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -307,8 +313,9 @@ int CBB_add_asn1(CBB *cbb, CBB *out_contents, uint8_t tag) {
memset(out_contents, 0, sizeof(CBB));
out_contents->base = cbb->base;
cbb->child = out_contents;
cbb->pending_len_len = 1;
cbb->pending_is_asn1 = 1;
cbb->child->offset = offset;
cbb->child->pending_len_len = 1;
cbb->child->pending_is_asn1 = 1;
return 1;
}
@@ -356,6 +363,17 @@ int CBB_add_u24(CBB *cbb, uint32_t value) {
return cbb_buffer_add_u(cbb->base, value, 3);
}
void CBB_discard_child(CBB *cbb) {
if (cbb->child == NULL) {
return;
}
cbb->base->len = cbb->child->offset;
cbb->child->base = NULL;
cbb->child = NULL;
}
int CBB_add_asn1_uint64(CBB *cbb, uint64_t value) {
CBB child;
size_t i;
+17 -3
View File
@@ -137,6 +137,15 @@ int CBS_get_bytes(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, size_t len) {
return 1;
}
int CBS_copy_bytes(CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
const uint8_t *v;
if (!cbs_get(cbs, &v, len)) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(out, v, len);
return 1;
}
static int cbs_get_length_prefixed(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, size_t len_len) {
uint32_t len;
if (!cbs_get_u(cbs, &len, len_len)) {
@@ -320,14 +329,19 @@ int CBS_get_asn1_uint64(CBS *cbs, uint64_t *out) {
}
int CBS_get_optional_asn1(CBS *cbs, CBS *out, int *out_present, unsigned tag) {
int present = 0;
if (CBS_peek_asn1_tag(cbs, tag)) {
if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, out, tag)) {
return 0;
}
*out_present = 1;
} else {
*out_present = 0;
present = 1;
}
if (out_present != NULL) {
*out_present = present;
}
return 1;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "arm")
set(
+7 -10
View File
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ static const uint8_t sigma[16] = { 'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 'd', ' ', '3',
#if defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
/* Defined in chacha_vec.c */
void CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[8],
size_t counter);
const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[12],
uint32_t counter);
#endif
/* chacha_core performs 20 rounds of ChaCha on the input words in
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ static void chacha_core(uint8_t output[64], const uint32_t input[16]) {
}
void CRYPTO_chacha_20(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[8],
size_t counter) {
const uint8_t key[32], const uint8_t nonce[12],
uint32_t counter) {
uint32_t input[16];
uint8_t buf[64];
size_t todo, i;
@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ void CRYPTO_chacha_20(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(key + 28);
input[12] = counter;
input[13] = ((uint64_t)counter) >> 32;
input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(nonce + 0);
input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(nonce + 4);
input[13] = U8TO32_LITTLE(nonce + 0);
input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(nonce + 4);
input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(nonce + 8);
while (in_len > 0) {
todo = sizeof(buf);
@@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ void CRYPTO_chacha_20(uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
in_len -= todo;
input[12]++;
if (input[12] == 0) {
input[13]++;
}
}
}
+12 -16
View File
@@ -154,12 +154,12 @@ void CRYPTO_chacha_20(
const uint8_t *in,
size_t inlen,
const uint8_t key[32],
const uint8_t nonce[8],
size_t counter)
const uint8_t nonce[12],
uint32_t counter)
{
unsigned iters, i, *op=(unsigned *)out, *ip=(unsigned *)in, *kp;
#if defined(__ARM_NEON__)
uint32_t np[2];
uint32_t np[3];
uint8_t alignment_buffer[16] __attribute__((aligned(16)));
#endif
vec s0, s1, s2, s3;
@@ -167,20 +167,16 @@ void CRYPTO_chacha_20(
{0x61707865,0x3320646E,0x79622D32,0x6B206574};
kp = (unsigned *)key;
#if defined(__ARM_NEON__)
memcpy(np, nonce, 8);
memcpy(np, nonce, 12);
#endif
s0 = LOAD_ALIGNED(chacha_const);
s1 = LOAD(&((vec*)kp)[0]);
s2 = LOAD(&((vec*)kp)[1]);
s3 = (vec){
counter & 0xffffffff,
#if __ARM_NEON__ || defined(OPENSSL_X86)
0, /* can't right-shift 32 bits on a 32-bit system. */
#else
counter >> 32,
#endif
counter,
((uint32_t*)nonce)[0],
((uint32_t*)nonce)[1]
((uint32_t*)nonce)[1],
((uint32_t*)nonce)[2]
};
for (iters = 0; iters < inlen/(BPI*64); iters++)
@@ -212,8 +208,8 @@ void CRYPTO_chacha_20(
x2 = chacha_const[2]; x3 = chacha_const[3];
x4 = kp[0]; x5 = kp[1]; x6 = kp[2]; x7 = kp[3];
x8 = kp[4]; x9 = kp[5]; x10 = kp[6]; x11 = kp[7];
x12 = counter+BPI*iters+(BPI-1); x13 = 0;
x14 = np[0]; x15 = np[1];
x12 = counter+BPI*iters+(BPI-1); x13 = np[0];
x14 = np[1]; x15 = np[2];
#endif
for (i = CHACHA_RNDS/2; i; i--)
{
@@ -265,9 +261,9 @@ void CRYPTO_chacha_20(
op[10] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[10]) ^ (x10 + kp[6]));
op[11] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[11]) ^ (x11 + kp[7]));
op[12] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[12]) ^ (x12 + counter+BPI*iters+(BPI-1)));
op[13] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[13]) ^ (x13));
op[14] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[14]) ^ (x14 + np[0]));
op[15] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[15]) ^ (x15 + np[1]));
op[13] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[13]) ^ (x13 + np[0]));
op[14] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[14]) ^ (x14 + np[1]));
op[15] = REVW_BE(REVW_BE(ip[15]) ^ (x15 + np[2]));
s3 += ONE;
ip += 16;
op += 16;
+313 -294
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
# /opt/gcc-linaro-4.9-2014.11-x86_64_arm-linux-gnueabihf/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc -O3 -mcpu=cortex-a8 -mfpu=neon -fpic -DASM_GEN -I ../../include -S chacha_vec.c -o -
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
#if defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
#if defined(__arm__)
.syntax unified
.cpu cortex-a8
@@ -60,137 +60,138 @@
.thumb_func
.type CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon, %function
CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
@ args = 8, pretend = 0, frame = 152
@ args = 8, pretend = 0, frame = 160
@ frame_needed = 1, uses_anonymous_args = 0
push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, fp, lr}
mov r8, r3
mov r9, r3
vpush.64 {d8, d9, d10, d11, d12, d13, d14, d15}
mov r9, r2
mov r10, r2
ldr r4, .L91+16
mov fp, r0
mov r10, r1
mov lr, r8
mov fp, r1
mov r8, r9
.LPIC16:
add r4, pc
sub sp, sp, #156
sub sp, sp, #164
add r7, sp, #0
sub sp, sp, #112
add r6, r7, #144
str r0, [r7, #88]
add lr, r7, #148
str r0, [r7, #80]
str r1, [r7, #12]
str r2, [r7, #8]
ldmia r4, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
add r4, sp, #15
bic r4, r4, #15
ldr ip, [r7, #256]
str r4, [r7, #84]
ldr r6, [r7, #264]
str r4, [r7, #88]
mov r5, r4
adds r4, r4, #64
adds r5, r5, #80
str r8, [r7, #68]
add ip, r5, #80
str r9, [r7, #56]
stmia r4, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
movw r4, #43691
ldr r0, [ip] @ unaligned
ldr r0, [r6] @ unaligned
movt r4, 43690
ldr r1, [ip, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
ldr r2, [r8, #8] @ unaligned
mov r8, #0
stmia r6!, {r0, r1}
mov r6, r5
ldr r1, [lr, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r0, [lr] @ unaligned
vldr d24, [r3, #64]
vldr d25, [r3, #72]
ldr r3, [lr, #12] @ unaligned
str r5, [r7, #80]
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r0, [lr, #16]! @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r7, #84]
umull r4, r5, r9, r4
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r9, #12] @ unaligned
str ip, [r7, #84]
stmia lr!, {r0, r1, r2}
mov lr, ip
ldr r1, [r9, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r9, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r0, [r9] @ unaligned
vldr d24, [r5, #64]
vldr d25, [r5, #72]
umull r4, r5, r10, r4
stmia ip!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r0, [r8, #16]! @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r7, #88]
ldr r4, [r7, #268]
ldr r1, [r8, #4] @ unaligned
vldr d26, [r2, #80]
vldr d27, [r2, #88]
ldr r1, [lr, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [lr, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [lr, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r4, [r7, #260]
stmia r6!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r3, [ip]
ldr r1, [r7, #84]
ldr r2, [ip, #4]
str r3, [r7, #64]
vldr d28, [r1, #80]
vldr d29, [r1, #88]
str r3, [r7, #136]
ldr r3, [r8, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r8, #8] @ unaligned
stmia lr!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r3, [r6]
ldr r1, [r6, #4]
ldr r6, [r6, #8]
str r3, [r7, #68]
str r3, [r7, #132]
lsrs r3, r5, #7
str r6, [r7, #140]
str r6, [r7, #60]
ldr r6, [r7, #88]
str r4, [r7, #128]
str r2, [r7, #140]
str r8, [r7, #132]
str r2, [r7, #60]
str r1, [r7, #136]
str r1, [r7, #64]
vldr d28, [r6, #80]
vldr d29, [r6, #88]
vldr d22, [r7, #128]
vldr d23, [r7, #136]
beq .L26
mov r5, r6
lsls r2, r3, #8
ldr r5, [r1, #64]
sub r3, r2, r3, lsl #6
ldr r2, [r1, #68]
ldr r2, [r5, #68]
ldr r6, [r6, #64]
vldr d0, .L91
vldr d1, .L91+8
adds r4, r4, #2
str r5, [r7, #56]
str r2, [r7, #52]
ldr r5, [r1, #72]
ldr r2, [r1, #76]
str r2, [r7, #48]
ldr r2, [r5, #72]
str r3, [r7, #4]
str r5, [r7, #48]
str r6, [r7, #52]
str r2, [r7, #44]
mov r2, fp
str r4, [r7, #72]
adds r2, r4, #2
str r2, [r7, #72]
ldr r2, [r5, #76]
str fp, [r7, #76]
str r2, [r7, #40]
ldr r2, [r7, #80]
adds r3, r2, r3
str r10, [r7, #76]
str r3, [r7, #16]
.L4:
ldr r5, [r7, #68]
add r8, r7, #44
ldr r4, [r7, #72]
ldr r5, [r7, #56]
add r8, r7, #40
ldr r4, [r7, #68]
vadd.i32 q3, q11, q0
ldmia r8, {r8, r9, r10, fp}
vmov q8, q14 @ v4si
mov r1, r5
ldr r2, [r5, #4]
vmov q1, q13 @ v4si
vmov q8, q14 @ v4si
ldr r3, [r5]
vmov q1, q13 @ v4si
ldr r6, [r1, #28]
vmov q9, q12 @ v4si
ldr lr, [r5, #20]
vmov q2, q11 @ v4si
mov r0, r2
ldr r2, [r5, #8]
str r3, [r7, #108]
mov r3, r5
ldr ip, [r5, #16]
vmov q15, q14 @ v4si
mov r1, r2
ldr r2, [r5, #12]
ldr r5, [r5, #24]
vmov q5, q13 @ v4si
ldr r6, [r3, #28]
vmov q10, q12 @ v4si
ldr r3, [r7, #64]
str r5, [r7, #116]
movs r5, #10
str r6, [r7, #120]
str r4, [r7, #112]
movs r1, #10
ldr r4, [r7, #72]
vmov q2, q11 @ v4si
ldr lr, [r5, #20]
vmov q15, q14 @ v4si
str r3, [r7, #108]
vmov q5, q13 @ v4si
str r2, [r7, #116]
vmov q10, q12 @ v4si
ldr r2, [r5, #12]
ldr ip, [r5, #16]
ldr r3, [r7, #64]
ldr r5, [r5, #24]
str r6, [r7, #120]
str r1, [r7, #92]
ldr r6, [r7, #60]
str r4, [r7, #100]
ldr r1, [r7, #116]
ldr r4, [r7, #108]
str r8, [r7, #96]
mov r8, r10
ldr r4, [r7, #108]
mov r10, r9
ldr r9, [r7, #116]
str lr, [r7, #104]
mov r10, r9
mov lr, r3
str r5, [r7, #92]
movs r5, #0
mov r9, r5
str r6, [r7, #124]
str r5, [r7, #100]
b .L92
.L93:
.align 3
@@ -213,25 +214,24 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
str r5, [r7, #116]
add r10, r10, r1
vrev32.16 q3, q3
eor lr, lr, r10
str r6, [r7, #108]
vadd.i32 q8, q8, q3
vrev32.16 q2, q2
vadd.i32 q15, q15, q2
mov fp, r3
ldr r3, [r7, #112]
ldr r3, [r7, #100]
veor q4, q8, q1
str r6, [r7, #112]
veor q6, q15, q5
add fp, fp, r2
eors r3, r3, r5
mov r5, r6
ldr r6, [r7, #100]
ldr r6, [r7, #112]
vshl.i32 q1, q4, #12
vshl.i32 q5, q6, #12
add fp, fp, r2
eors r6, r6, r5
ror r3, r3, #16
eors r6, r6, r5
eor lr, lr, r10
vsri.32 q1, q4, #20
ror lr, lr, #16
mov r5, r6
ldr r6, [r7, #124]
vsri.32 q5, q6, #20
@@ -239,25 +239,26 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
eor r6, r6, fp
ror r5, r5, #16
vadd.i32 q9, q9, q1
add r9, r9, lr
ror lr, lr, #16
ror r3, r6, #16
ldr r6, [r7, #124]
vadd.i32 q10, q10, q5
str r3, [r7, #108]
add r9, r9, lr
veor q4, q9, q3
add ip, ip, r6
ldr r6, [r7, #104]
veor q6, q10, q2
eor r4, ip, r4
eor r1, r9, r1
str r3, [r7, #104]
vshl.i32 q3, q4, #8
eor r1, r9, r1
mov r8, r6
ldr r6, [r7, #120]
vshl.i32 q2, q6, #8
ror r4, r4, #20
add r6, r6, r3
vsri.32 q3, q4, #24
str r6, [r7, #104]
str r6, [r7, #100]
eors r2, r2, r6
ldr r6, [r7, #116]
vsri.32 q2, q6, #24
@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
eor r0, r8, r0
vadd.i32 q15, q15, q2
mov r3, r6
ldr r6, [r7, #112]
ldr r6, [r7, #108]
veor q6, q4, q1
ror r0, r0, #20
str r3, [r7, #112]
@@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
ror r1, r1, #20
eors r5, r5, r6
vsri.32 q8, q6, #25
ldr r6, [r7, #108]
ldr r6, [r7, #104]
ror r3, r3, #24
ror r5, r5, #24
vsri.32 q1, q5, #25
@@ -297,7 +298,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
vext.32 q8, q8, q8, #1
str ip, [r7, #124]
add ip, r5, r8
ldr r5, [r7, #104]
ldr r5, [r7, #100]
eor lr, r10, lr
ror r6, r6, #24
vext.32 q1, q1, q1, #1
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
veor q6, q15, q1
ldr r3, [r7, #116]
vshl.i32 q1, q4, #7
str r2, [r7, #112]
str r2, [r7, #100]
add r3, r3, r2
str r3, [r7, #120]
vshl.i32 q5, q6, #7
@@ -423,7 +424,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
vsri.32 q5, q6, #25
ldr r3, [r7, #92]
ror r4, r4, #25
str r6, [r7, #100]
str r6, [r7, #112]
ror r0, r0, #25
subs r3, r3, #1
str r5, [r7, #104]
@@ -437,308 +438,325 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
vext.32 q5, q5, q5, #3
vext.32 q1, q1, q1, #3
bne .L3
ldr r3, [r7, #80]
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
vadd.i32 q4, q12, q10
str r9, [r7, #116]
str r9, [r7, #92]
mov r9, r10
mov r10, r8
ldr r8, [r7, #96]
str lr, [r7, #96]
mov lr, r5
ldr r5, [r7, #56]
ldr r5, [r7, #52]
vadd.i32 q5, q13, q5
ldr r6, [r7, #76]
vadd.i32 q15, q14, q15
add fp, fp, r5
ldr r5, [r7, #52]
str r4, [r7, #108]
ldr r5, [r7, #48]
str r3, [r7, #104]
vadd.i32 q7, q14, q8
ldr r4, [r7, #112]
add r5, r10, r5
str r3, [r7, #112]
vadd.i32 q2, q11, q2
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
vadd.i32 q6, q12, q9
str r0, [r7, #92]
vadd.i32 q1, q13, q1
add r10, r10, r5
str r0, [r7, #36]
vadd.i32 q2, q11, q2
ldr r0, [r6] @ unaligned
vadd.i32 q6, q12, q9
ldr r5, [r7, #104]
vadd.i32 q1, q13, q1
str r1, [r7, #116]
vadd.i32 q11, q11, q0
str r1, [r7, #40]
str r2, [r7, #36]
vadd.i32 q3, q11, q3
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
vadd.i32 q11, q11, q0
str r2, [r7, #32]
vadd.i32 q3, q11, q3
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
str r5, [r7, #104]
vadd.i32 q11, q11, q0
ldr r5, [r7, #112]
ldr r10, [r7, #80]
str r4, [r7, #108]
ldr r4, [r7, #100]
vadd.i32 q11, q11, q0
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r5, r10
ldr r0, [r7, #84]
ldr r2, [r7, #48]
ldr r3, [r7, #72]
vldr d20, [r0, #80]
vldr d21, [r0, #88]
add r9, r9, r2
ldr r2, [r7, #88]
ldr r3, [r7, #44]
ldr r5, [r7, #84]
vldr d20, [r2, #80]
vldr d21, [r2, #88]
add r3, r9, r3
str r3, [r7, #104]
veor q10, q10, q4
ldr r2, [r7, #44]
ldr r3, [r7, #40]
add r3, r8, r3
str r3, [r7, #100]
ldr r3, [r7, #72]
vstr d20, [r2, #80]
vstr d21, [r2, #88]
adds r1, r4, r3
str r1, [r7, #28]
add r2, r8, r2
str r2, [r7, #32]
vstr d20, [r0, #80]
vstr d21, [r0, #88]
ldmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r4, [r7, #68]
ldr r5, [r7, #112]
ldr r8, [r7, #84]
add r5, r5, r4
ldr r4, [r7, #96]
str r5, [r7, #24]
ldr r5, [r7, #64]
add r4, r4, r5
ldr r5, [r7, #124]
ldr r5, [r7, #60]
str r4, [r7, #96]
ldr r4, [r7, #60]
add r5, r5, r4
ldr r4, [r7, #88]
str r5, [r7, #24]
mov r5, r10
ldr r4, [r7, #124]
add r4, r4, r5
str r4, [r7, #20]
ldr r4, [r7, #80]
mov r5, r8
str r0, [r4] @ unaligned
mov r0, r4
str r1, [r4, #4] @ unaligned
mov r8, r0
mov r4, r8
str r2, [r0, #8] @ unaligned
mov r4, r10
mov r8, r0
str r3, [r0, #12] @ unaligned
mov r9, r4
ldr r0, [r6, #16]! @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r6, [r7, #76]
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r5, r10
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
mov r5, r8
ldr r3, [r7, #88]
vldr d20, [r3, #80]
vldr d21, [r3, #88]
veor q10, q10, q5
vstr d20, [r3, #80]
vstr d21, [r3, #88]
ldmia r4!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r4, r8
mov r4, r9
str r0, [r8, #16] @ unaligned
str r1, [r8, #20] @ unaligned
str r2, [r8, #24] @ unaligned
str r3, [r8, #28] @ unaligned
mov r8, r4
mov r8, r5
ldr r0, [r6, #32]! @ unaligned
str r10, [r7, #124]
mov r5, r9
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r6, [r7, #76]
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r5, r10
ldr r2, [r7, #84]
vldr d16, [r2, #80]
vldr d17, [r2, #88]
mov r5, r8
ldr r1, [r7, #88]
vldr d16, [r1, #80]
vldr d17, [r1, #88]
veor q15, q8, q15
vstr d30, [r2, #80]
vstr d31, [r2, #88]
ldmia r10!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
str r0, [r4, #32] @ unaligned
str r1, [r4, #36] @ unaligned
str r2, [r4, #40] @ unaligned
str r3, [r4, #44] @ unaligned
vstr d30, [r1, #80]
vstr d31, [r1, #88]
ldmia r4!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r4, r9
str r0, [r8, #32] @ unaligned
str r1, [r8, #36] @ unaligned
str r2, [r8, #40] @ unaligned
str r3, [r8, #44] @ unaligned
mov r8, r5
ldr r0, [r6, #48]! @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r6, [r7, #76]
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r1, [r7, #84]
stmia r4!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r4, r9
ldr r1, [r7, #88]
str r9, [r7, #112]
vldr d18, [r1, #80]
vldr d19, [r1, #88]
veor q9, q9, q2
vstr d18, [r1, #80]
vstr d19, [r1, #88]
ldr r3, [r7, #112]
ldr r5, [r7, #80]
mov r10, r3
ldmia r10!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
str r0, [r4, #48] @ unaligned
str r1, [r4, #52] @ unaligned
str r2, [r4, #56] @ unaligned
str r3, [r4, #60] @ unaligned
ldmia r9!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
str r0, [r5, #48] @ unaligned
str r1, [r5, #52] @ unaligned
str r2, [r5, #56] @ unaligned
str r3, [r5, #60] @ unaligned
ldr r0, [r6, #64]! @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r6, [r7, #76]
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r1, [r7, #84]
ldr r3, [r7, #112]
ldr r5, [r7, #80]
mov r9, r6
mov r6, r4
stmia r6!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r6, r4
ldr r1, [r7, #88]
vldr d18, [r1, #80]
vldr d19, [r1, #88]
veor q9, q9, q6
mov r10, r3
str r5, [r7, #20]
vstr d18, [r1, #80]
vstr d19, [r1, #88]
ldmia r10!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
str r1, [r4, #68] @ unaligned
str r2, [r4, #72] @ unaligned
str r3, [r4, #76] @ unaligned
str r0, [r4, #64] @ unaligned
ldr r0, [r6, #80]! @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldmia r4!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r4, r6
str r3, [r5, #76] @ unaligned
mov r3, r9
str r2, [r5, #72] @ unaligned
str r0, [r5, #64] @ unaligned
str r1, [r5, #68] @ unaligned
mov r5, r4
ldr r0, [r3, #80]! @ unaligned
mov r9, r3
ldr r1, [r9, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r9, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r9, #12] @ unaligned
mov r9, r4
ldr r6, [r7, #76]
str r9, [r7, #124]
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r1, [r7, #84]
ldr r3, [r7, #20]
ldr r5, [r7, #80]
mov r5, r8
ldr r1, [r7, #88]
vldr d18, [r1, #80]
vldr d19, [r1, #88]
veor q1, q9, q1
mov r10, r3
vstr d2, [r1, #80]
vstr d3, [r1, #88]
ldmia r10!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r10, r5
str r0, [r4, #80] @ unaligned
str r1, [r4, #84] @ unaligned
str r2, [r4, #88] @ unaligned
str r3, [r4, #92] @ unaligned
ldmia r4!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r4, r9
str r0, [r8, #80] @ unaligned
str r1, [r8, #84] @ unaligned
str r2, [r8, #88] @ unaligned
str r3, [r8, #92] @ unaligned
ldr r0, [r6, #96]! @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
ldr r6, [r7, #76]
stmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r5, r10
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
stmia r4!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r4, r9
ldr r3, [r7, #88]
vldr d16, [r3, #80]
vldr d17, [r3, #88]
veor q8, q8, q7
vstr d16, [r3, #80]
vstr d17, [r3, #88]
ldmia r10!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
str r0, [r4, #96] @ unaligned
str r1, [r4, #100] @ unaligned
str r2, [r4, #104] @ unaligned
str r3, [r4, #108] @ unaligned
ldmia r9!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
str r0, [r5, #96] @ unaligned
str r1, [r5, #100] @ unaligned
str r2, [r5, #104] @ unaligned
str r3, [r5, #108] @ unaligned
ldr r0, [r6, #112]! @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r6, #4] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r6, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
mov r6, r5
mov r6, r4
stmia r6!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
mov r6, r5
ldr r3, [r7, #88]
vldr d16, [r3, #80]
vldr d17, [r3, #88]
veor q8, q8, q3
vstr d16, [r3, #80]
vstr d17, [r3, #88]
ldmia r5!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
str r1, [r4, #116] @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r7, #76]
str r0, [r4, #112] @ unaligned
str r2, [r4, #120] @ unaligned
str r3, [r4, #124] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r1, #128]
ldr r2, [r7, #104]
ldmia r4!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
mov r4, r5
mov r8, r4
str r2, [r5, #120] @ unaligned
ldr r2, [r7, #76]
str r0, [r5, #112] @ unaligned
str r1, [r5, #116] @ unaligned
str r3, [r5, #124] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r2, #128]
ldr r1, [r7, #104]
eor r3, fp, r3
str r3, [r4, #128]
ldr r3, [r1, #132]
eors r2, r2, r3
str r2, [r8, #132]
ldr r3, [r1, #136]
ldr r5, [r7, #68]
ldr r6, [r7, #32]
eor r3, r9, r3
str r3, [r4, #136]
ldr r3, [r1, #140]
ldr r0, [r7, #92]
eors r3, r3, r6
ldr r6, [r7, #108]
str r3, [r5, #128]
ldr r3, [r2, #132]
mov r5, r2
eor r3, r10, r3
str r3, [r6, #132]
ldr r3, [r2, #136]
mov r6, r5
eors r1, r1, r3
str r1, [r8, #136]
ldr r1, [r7, #56]
ldr r3, [r2, #140]
ldr r2, [r7, #100]
ldr r0, [r7, #108]
eors r3, r3, r2
str r3, [r4, #140]
ldr r3, [r5]
ldr r2, [r1, #144]
add r6, r6, r3
eors r2, r2, r6
ldr r3, [r1]
ldr r2, [r5, #144]
mov r8, r0
add r8, r8, r3
mov r5, r6
mov r3, r8
eors r2, r2, r3
str r2, [r4, #144]
ldr r2, [r5, #4]
ldr r3, [r1, #148]
add r0, r0, r2
ldr r3, [r6, #148]
ldr r2, [r1, #4]
ldr r6, [r7, #36]
eors r3, r3, r0
ldr r0, [r7, #40]
str r3, [r4, #148]
ldr r2, [r5, #8]
ldr r3, [r1, #152]
add r0, r0, r2
eors r3, r3, r0
str r3, [r4, #152]
ldr r2, [r5, #12]
mov r0, r4
ldr r3, [r1, #156]
mov r4, r1
add r6, r6, r2
mov r1, r0
eors r3, r3, r6
str r3, [r0, #156]
ldr r2, [r5, #16]
ldr r3, [r4, #160]
mov r6, r1
str r3, [r4, #148]
ldr r2, [r1, #8]
ldr r1, [r7, #116]
ldr r3, [r5, #152]
mov r8, r1
add r8, r8, r2
ldr r1, [r7, #32]
mov r2, r8
eors r3, r3, r2
str r3, [r4, #152]
mov r8, r4
ldr r2, [r6, #12]
ldr r3, [r5, #156]
add r1, r1, r2
eors r3, r3, r1
str r3, [r4, #156]
ldr r2, [r6, #16]
mov r1, r4
ldr r3, [r5, #160]
mov r4, r5
add ip, ip, r2
mov r5, r6
eor r3, ip, r3
str r3, [r1, #160]
ldr r2, [r5, #20]
ldr r2, [r6, #20]
ldr r3, [r4, #164]
add lr, lr, r2
ldr r2, [r7, #116]
ldr r2, [r7, #92]
eor r3, lr, r3
str r3, [r1, #164]
ldr r6, [r5, #24]
mov lr, r4
ldr r3, [r4, #168]
add r2, r2, r6
mov r6, r4
ldr r6, [r7, #120]
eors r3, r3, r2
str r3, [r1, #168]
ldr r5, [r5, #28]
mov r2, r1
ldr r3, [r4, #172]
ldr r0, [r7, #120]
add r0, r0, r5
ldr r5, [r7, #24]
eors r3, r3, r0
add r6, r6, r5
eors r3, r3, r6
str r3, [r1, #172]
ldr r3, [r7, #72]
ldr r4, [r4, #176]
ldr r1, [r7, #28]
eors r4, r4, r1
adds r1, r3, #3
str r4, [r2, #176]
ldr r3, [r7, #100]
ldr r0, [r7, #28]
ldr r5, [r7, #24]
eors r4, r4, r0
str r4, [r8, #176]
ldr r0, [lr, #180]
str r1, [r7, #72]
eors r3, r3, r0
mov r0, r3
mov r3, r2
str r0, [r2, #180]
adds r3, r3, #192
ldr r1, [lr, #184]
ldr r2, [r7, #96]
eors r0, r0, r5
str r0, [r8, #180]
ldr r1, [lr, #184]
ldr r4, [r7, #20]
eors r1, r1, r2
str r1, [r3, #-8]
str r1, [r8, #184]
ldr r2, [lr, #188]
mov r1, r6
adds r1, r1, #192
str r1, [r7, #76]
eors r2, r2, r5
str r2, [r3, #-4]
add r1, lr, #192
ldr r3, [r7, #72]
eors r2, r2, r4
str r2, [r8, #188]
ldr r2, [r7, #16]
str r3, [r7, #88]
adds r3, r3, #3
str r3, [r7, #72]
mov r3, r8
adds r3, r3, #192
str r1, [r7, #76]
cmp r2, r3
str r3, [r7, #80]
bne .L4
ldr r3, [r7, #12]
ldr r2, [r7, #4]
@@ -757,8 +775,8 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
beq .L6
ldr r5, [r7, #12]
ldr r4, [r7, #16]
ldr r6, [r7, #84]
ldr lr, [r7, #80]
ldr r6, [r7, #88]
ldr lr, [r7, #84]
vldr d30, .L94
vldr d31, .L94+8
str fp, [r7, #120]
@@ -964,7 +982,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
mov r9, r5
bhi .L88
vadd.i32 q12, q12, q10
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
ldr r3, [r7, #88]
vst1.64 {d24-d25}, [r3:128]
.L14:
ldr r3, [r7, #8]
@@ -1001,7 +1019,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
movcs r1, ip
cmp r1, #0
beq .L17
ldr r5, [r7, #84]
ldr r5, [r7, #88]
cmp r1, #1
ldrb r0, [r0] @ zero_extendqisi2
add r3, r2, #1
@@ -1136,7 +1154,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
ldr r5, [r7, #16]
cmp r6, #1
add r0, r1, r2
ldr r1, [r7, #84]
ldr r1, [r7, #88]
add r1, r1, r2
vld1.64 {d18-d19}, [r0:64]
add r2, r2, r5
@@ -1174,7 +1192,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
add r3, r3, lr
beq .L1
.L19:
ldr r4, [r7, #84]
ldr r4, [r7, #88]
adds r2, r3, #1
ldr r1, [r7, #12]
cmp r2, r9
@@ -1289,7 +1307,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
eor r1, r1, r0
strb r1, [r5, r2]
bls .L1
ldr r2, [r7, #84]
ldr r2, [r7, #88]
ldrb r1, [r2, r3] @ zero_extendqisi2
ldr r2, [r7, #12]
ldrb r2, [r2, r3] @ zero_extendqisi2
@@ -1297,7 +1315,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
ldr r1, [r7, #16]
strb r2, [r1, r3]
.L1:
adds r7, r7, #156
adds r7, r7, #164
mov sp, r7
@ sp needed
vldm sp!, {d8-d15}
@@ -1305,7 +1323,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
.L88:
ldr r5, [r7, #12]
vadd.i32 q12, q12, q10
ldr r4, [r7, #80]
ldr r4, [r7, #84]
cmp r9, #31
ldr r0, [r5] @ unaligned
ldr r1, [r5, #4] @ unaligned
@@ -1313,7 +1331,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
ldr r2, [r5, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r5, #12] @ unaligned
stmia r6!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r2, [r7, #84]
ldr r2, [r7, #88]
ldr r6, [r7, #16]
vldr d18, [r2, #80]
vldr d19, [r2, #88]
@@ -1328,7 +1346,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
str r3, [r6, #12] @ unaligned
bhi .L89
vadd.i32 q13, q13, q15
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
ldr r3, [r7, #88]
vstr d26, [r3, #16]
vstr d27, [r3, #24]
b .L14
@@ -1337,7 +1355,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
ldr r2, [r7, #12]
add r2, r2, r9
mov r5, r2
ldr r2, [r7, #84]
ldr r2, [r7, #88]
add r2, r2, r3
mov r3, r2
.L24:
@@ -1347,17 +1365,18 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
eor r2, r2, r1
strb r2, [r4], #1
bne .L24
adds r7, r7, #156
adds r7, r7, #164
mov sp, r7
@ sp needed
vldm sp!, {d8-d15}
pop {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, fp, pc}
.L26:
str fp, [r7, #16]
ldr r3, [r7, #80]
str r3, [r7, #16]
b .L2
.L89:
mov r3, r5
ldr r4, [r7, #80]
ldr r4, [r7, #84]
ldr r0, [r3, #16]! @ unaligned
add lr, r1, #16
mov r5, r1
@@ -1368,7 +1387,7 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
ldr r2, [r3, #8] @ unaligned
ldr r3, [r3, #12] @ unaligned
stmia r6!, {r0, r1, r2, r3}
ldr r2, [r7, #84]
ldr r2, [r7, #88]
vldr d18, [r2, #80]
vldr d19, [r2, #88]
veor q13, q9, q13
@@ -1381,16 +1400,16 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
str r3, [lr, #12] @ unaligned
bhi .L90
vadd.i32 q8, q14, q8
ldr r3, [r7, #84]
ldr r3, [r7, #88]
vstr d16, [r3, #32]
vstr d17, [r3, #40]
b .L14
.L90:
ldr r3, [r7, #12]
add lr, r5, #32
ldr r4, [r7, #80]
ldr r4, [r7, #84]
vadd.i32 q8, q14, q8
ldr r5, [r7, #84]
ldr r5, [r7, #88]
vadd.i32 q11, q11, q3
ldr r0, [r3, #32]! @ unaligned
mov r6, r4
@@ -1424,5 +1443,5 @@ CRYPTO_chacha_20_neon:
.ident "GCC: (Linaro GCC 2014.11) 4.9.3 20141031 (prerelease)"
.section .note.GNU-stack,"",%progbits
#endif /* __arm__ || __aarch64__ */
#endif /* __arm__ */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
+6 -3
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,10 @@
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
// This package generates chacha_vec_arm.S from chacha_vec.c.
// This package generates chacha_vec_arm.S from chacha_vec.c. Install the
// arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc compiler as described in BUILDING.md. Then:
// `(cd crypto/chacha && go run chacha_vec_arm_generate.go)`.
package main
import (
@@ -53,7 +56,7 @@ func main() {
output.WriteString(" ")
output.WriteString(strings.Join(args, " "))
output.WriteString("\n\n#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)\n")
output.WriteString("#if defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)\n\n")
output.WriteString("#if defined(__arm__)\n\n")
cmd := exec.Command(compiler, args...)
cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
@@ -145,6 +148,6 @@ const attr28Block = `
`
const trailer = `
#endif /* __arm__ || __aarch64__ */
#endif /* __arm__ */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
`
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
cipher
@@ -37,3 +37,4 @@ add_executable(
target_link_libraries(cipher_test crypto)
target_link_libraries(aead_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests cipher_test aead_test)
+13
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ size_t EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->overhead; }
size_t EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len(const EVP_AEAD *aead) { return aead->max_tag_len; }
void EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD_CTX));
}
int EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_AEAD *aead,
const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
ENGINE *impl) {
@@ -152,3 +156,12 @@ int EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const RC4_KEY **out_key)
return ctx->aead->get_rc4_state(ctx, out_key);
}
int EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv,
size_t *out_len) {
if (ctx->aead->get_iv == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return ctx->aead->get_iv(ctx, out_iv, out_len);
}
+32 -56
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/stl_compat.h"
#include "../test/scoped_types.h"
// This program tests an AEAD against a series of test vectors from a file,
@@ -35,18 +35,6 @@
// CT: 5294265a60
// TAG: 1d45758621762e061368e68868e2f929
// EVP_AEAD_CTX lacks a zero state, so it doesn't fit easily into
// ScopedOpenSSLContext.
class EVP_AEAD_CTXScoper {
public:
EVP_AEAD_CTXScoper(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) : ctx_(ctx) {}
~EVP_AEAD_CTXScoper() {
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(ctx_);
}
private:
EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx_;
};
static bool TestAEAD(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
const EVP_AEAD *aead = reinterpret_cast<const EVP_AEAD*>(arg);
@@ -60,22 +48,19 @@ static bool TestAEAD(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
return false;
}
EVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(&ctx, aead, bssl::vector_data(&key),
key.size(), tag.size(),
evp_aead_seal)) {
ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx;
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx.get(), aead, key.data(), key.size(),
tag.size(), evp_aead_seal)) {
t->PrintLine("Failed to init AEAD.");
return false;
}
EVP_AEAD_CTXScoper cleanup(&ctx);
std::vector<uint8_t> out(in.size() + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead));
if (!t->HasAttribute("NO_SEAL")) {
size_t out_len;
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&ctx, bssl::vector_data(&out), &out_len, out.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&nonce), nonce.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&in), in.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&ad), ad.size())) {
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx.get(), out.data(), &out_len, out.size(),
nonce.data(), nonce.size(), in.data(), in.size(),
ad.data(), ad.size())) {
t->PrintLine("Failed to run AEAD.");
return false;
}
@@ -86,36 +71,31 @@ static bool TestAEAD(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
(unsigned)(ct.size() + tag.size()));
return false;
}
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(bssl::vector_data(&ct), ct.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&out), ct.size()) ||
!t->ExpectBytesEqual(bssl::vector_data(&tag), tag.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&out) + ct.size(), tag.size())) {
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(ct.data(), ct.size(), out.data(), ct.size()) ||
!t->ExpectBytesEqual(tag.data(), tag.size(), out.data() + ct.size(),
tag.size())) {
return false;
}
} else {
out.resize(ct.size() + tag.size());
memcpy(bssl::vector_data(&out), bssl::vector_data(&ct), ct.size());
memcpy(bssl::vector_data(&out) + ct.size(), bssl::vector_data(&tag),
tag.size());
memcpy(out.data(), ct.data(), ct.size());
memcpy(out.data() + ct.size(), tag.data(), tag.size());
}
// The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
// reset after each operation.
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(&ctx, aead, bssl::vector_data(&key),
key.size(), tag.size(),
evp_aead_open)) {
ctx.Reset();
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx.get(), aead, key.data(), key.size(),
tag.size(), evp_aead_open)) {
t->PrintLine("Failed to init AEAD.");
return false;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> out2(out.size());
size_t out2_len;
int ret = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&ctx,
bssl::vector_data(&out2), &out2_len, out2.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&nonce), nonce.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&out), out.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&ad), ad.size());
int ret = EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(),
nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(),
out.size(), ad.data(), ad.size());
if (t->HasAttribute("FAILS")) {
if (ret) {
t->PrintLine("Decrypted bad data.");
@@ -130,17 +110,15 @@ static bool TestAEAD(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
return false;
}
out2.resize(out2_len);
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(bssl::vector_data(&in), in.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&out2), out2.size())) {
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(in.data(), in.size(), out2.data(), out2.size())) {
return false;
}
// The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
// reset after each operation.
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(&ctx, aead, bssl::vector_data(&key),
key.size(), tag.size(),
evp_aead_open)) {
ctx.Reset();
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx.get(), aead, key.data(), key.size(),
tag.size(), evp_aead_open)) {
t->PrintLine("Failed to init AEAD.");
return false;
}
@@ -148,10 +126,9 @@ static bool TestAEAD(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
// Garbage at the end isn't ignored.
out.push_back(0);
out2.resize(out.size());
if (EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&ctx, bssl::vector_data(&out2), &out2_len, out2.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&nonce), nonce.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&out), out.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&ad), ad.size())) {
if (EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(),
nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(), out.size(),
ad.data(), ad.size())) {
t->PrintLine("Decrypted bad data with trailing garbage.");
return false;
}
@@ -159,10 +136,9 @@ static bool TestAEAD(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
// The "stateful" AEADs for implementing pre-AEAD cipher suites need to be
// reset after each operation.
EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(&ctx, aead, bssl::vector_data(&key),
key.size(), tag.size(),
evp_aead_open)) {
ctx.Reset();
if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(ctx.get(), aead, key.data(), key.size(),
tag.size(), evp_aead_open)) {
t->PrintLine("Failed to init AEAD.");
return false;
}
@@ -171,10 +147,9 @@ static bool TestAEAD(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
out[0] ^= 0x80;
out.resize(out.size() - 1);
out2.resize(out.size());
if (EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&ctx, bssl::vector_data(&out2), &out2_len, out2.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&nonce), nonce.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&out), out.size(),
bssl::vector_data(&ad), ad.size())) {
if (EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(ctx.get(), out2.data(), &out2_len, out2.size(),
nonce.data(), nonce.size(), out.data(), out.size(),
ad.data(), ad.size())) {
t->PrintLine("Decrypted bad data with corrupted byte.");
return false;
}
@@ -226,6 +201,7 @@ static const struct AEADName kAEADs[] = {
{ "aes-128-gcm", EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm },
{ "aes-256-gcm", EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm },
{ "chacha20-poly1305", EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305 },
{ "chacha20-poly1305-old", EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_old },
{ "rc4-md5-tls", EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls },
{ "rc4-sha1-tls", EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_tls },
{ "aes-128-cbc-sha1-tls", EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls },
+18 -14
View File
@@ -63,12 +63,17 @@
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/scoped_types.h"
#include "../test/stl_compat.h"
static const EVP_CIPHER *GetCipher(const std::string &name) {
if (name == "DES-CBC") {
return EVP_des_cbc();
} else if (name == "DES-ECB") {
return EVP_des_ecb();
} else if (name == "DES-EDE") {
return EVP_des_ede();
} else if (name == "DES-EDE-CBC") {
return EVP_des_ede_cbc();
} else if (name == "DES-EDE3-CBC") {
return EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
} else if (name == "RC4") {
@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ static bool TestOperation(FileTest *t,
}
if (is_aead && !encrypt &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, tag.size(),
const_cast<uint8_t*>(bssl::vector_data(&tag)))) {
const_cast<uint8_t*>(tag.data()))) {
return false;
}
// The ciphers are run with no padding. For each of the ciphers we test, the
@@ -156,10 +161,10 @@ static bool TestOperation(FileTest *t,
// |EVP_CipherUpdate| calls when empty.
int unused, result_len1 = 0, result_len2;
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx.get(), key.size()) ||
!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, bssl::vector_data(&key),
bssl::vector_data(&iv), -1) ||
!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, key.data(), iv.data(),
-1) ||
(!aad.empty() &&
!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &unused, bssl::vector_data(&aad),
!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr, &unused, aad.data(),
aad.size())) ||
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0)) {
t->PrintLine("Operation failed.");
@@ -169,28 +174,27 @@ static bool TestOperation(FileTest *t,
for (size_t i = 0; i < in->size(); i++) {
uint8_t c = (*in)[i];
int len;
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), bssl::vector_data(&result) + result_len1,
&len, &c, 1)) {
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), result.data() + result_len1, &len, &c,
1)) {
t->PrintLine("Operation failed.");
return false;
}
result_len1 += len;
}
} else if (!in->empty() &&
!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), bssl::vector_data(&result),
&result_len1, bssl::vector_data(in),
in->size())) {
!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), result.data(), &result_len1,
in->data(), in->size())) {
t->PrintLine("Operation failed.");
return false;
}
if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx.get(), bssl::vector_data(&result) + result_len1,
if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx.get(), result.data() + result_len1,
&result_len2)) {
t->PrintLine("Operation failed.");
return false;
}
result.resize(result_len1 + result_len2);
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(bssl::vector_data(out), out->size(),
bssl::vector_data(&result), result.size())) {
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(out->data(), out->size(), result.data(),
result.size())) {
return false;
}
if (encrypt && is_aead) {
@@ -201,7 +205,7 @@ static bool TestOperation(FileTest *t,
}
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tag.size(),
rtag) ||
!t->ExpectBytesEqual(bssl::vector_data(&tag), tag.size(), rtag,
!t->ExpectBytesEqual(tag.data(), tag.size(), rtag,
tag.size())) {
return false;
}
+75 -68
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
#include <openssl/cpu.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
@@ -64,7 +63,7 @@
#include "../modes/internal.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
#include "../arm_arch.h"
#include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
#endif
@@ -111,7 +110,6 @@ static char bsaes_capable(void) {
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
#include "../arm_arch.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && __ARM_MAX_ARCH__ >= 7
#define BSAES
@@ -121,8 +119,8 @@ static char bsaes_capable(void) {
#endif
#define HWAES
static char hwaes_capable(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES) != 0;
static int hwaes_capable(void) {
return CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_AES_capable();
}
int aes_v8_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, const int bits,
@@ -152,13 +150,14 @@ static char bsaes_capable(void) {
/* On other platforms, bsaes_capable() will always return false and so the
* following will never be called. */
void bsaes_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], int enc) {
static void bsaes_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t ivec[16], int enc) {
abort();
}
void bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t ivec[16]) {
static void bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
const uint8_t ivec[16]) {
abort();
}
#endif
@@ -181,20 +180,22 @@ static char vpaes_capable(void) {
/* On other platforms, vpaes_capable() will always return false and so the
* following will never be called. */
int vpaes_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
static int vpaes_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *userKey, int bits,
AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
int vpaes_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
static int vpaes_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *userKey, int bits,
AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
void vpaes_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
static void vpaes_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
void vpaes_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
static void vpaes_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int enc) {
static void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int enc) {
abort();
}
#endif
@@ -202,34 +203,38 @@ void vpaes_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
#if !defined(HWAES)
/* If HWAES isn't defined then we provide dummy functions for each of the hwaes
* functions. */
int hwaes_capable(void) {
static int hwaes_capable(void) {
return 0;
}
int aes_v8_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits,
AES_KEY *key) {
static int aes_v8_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits,
AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
int aes_v8_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
static int aes_v8_set_decrypt_key(const uint8_t *user_key, int bits,
AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
void aes_v8_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
static void aes_v8_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
const AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
void aes_v8_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
static void aes_v8_decrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
const AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
void aes_v8_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int enc) {
static void aes_v8_cbc_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t length,
const AES_KEY *key, uint8_t *ivec, int enc) {
abort();
}
void aes_v8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t ivec[16]) {
static void aes_v8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
size_t len, const AES_KEY *key,
const uint8_t ivec[16]) {
abort();
}
#endif
@@ -267,14 +272,16 @@ void gcm_ghash_avx(uint64_t Xi[2], const u128 Htable[16], const uint8_t *in,
/* On other platforms, aesni_capable() will always return false and so the
* following will never be called. */
void aesni_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
static void aesni_encrypt(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *userKey, int bits, AES_KEY *key) {
static int aesni_set_encrypt_key(const uint8_t *userKey, int bits,
AES_KEY *key) {
abort();
}
void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t blocks,
const void *key, const uint8_t *ivec) {
static void aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
size_t blocks, const void *key,
const uint8_t *ivec) {
abort();
}
@@ -473,14 +480,14 @@ static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
iv = gctx->iv;
}
if (iv) {
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
}
gctx->key_set = 1;
} else {
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
if (gctx->key_set) {
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
} else {
memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
@@ -584,7 +591,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) {
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) {
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) {
arg = gctx->ivlen;
}
@@ -601,19 +608,13 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY: {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = out->cipher_data;
if (gctx->gcm.key) {
if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks) {
return 0;
}
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
if (gctx->iv == c->iv) {
gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
} else {
@@ -655,24 +656,24 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, res)) {
return -1;
}
bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, gctx->gcm.key,
bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, &gctx->ks.ks,
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
bulk += res;
}
#endif
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in + bulk,
out + bulk, len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) {
return -1;
}
} else {
size_t bulk = 0;
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
len - bulk)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in + bulk,
out + bulk, len - bulk)) {
return -1;
}
}
@@ -683,24 +684,24 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, res)) {
return -1;
}
bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, gctx->gcm.key,
bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res, out + res, len - res, &gctx->ks.ks,
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
bulk += res;
}
#endif
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in + bulk,
out + bulk, len - bulk, gctx->ctr)) {
return -1;
}
} else {
size_t bulk = 0;
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
len - bulk)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in + bulk,
out + bulk, len - bulk)) {
return -1;
}
}
@@ -894,14 +895,14 @@ static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
iv = gctx->iv;
}
if (iv) {
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
}
gctx->key_set = 1;
} else {
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
if (gctx->key_set) {
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen);
} else {
memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
@@ -1101,7 +1102,6 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
size_t bulk = 0;
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
@@ -1115,20 +1115,22 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks;
memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm));
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len);
if (ad_len > 0 && !CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) {
return 0;
}
if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk,
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len,
gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk, in_len - bulk)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len)) {
return 0;
}
}
@@ -1143,7 +1145,6 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
size_t bulk = 0;
const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
size_t plaintext_len;
@@ -1161,22 +1162,22 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks;
memcpy(&gcm, &gcm_ctx->gcm, sizeof(gcm));
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, nonce, nonce_len);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len);
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) {
return 0;
}
if (gcm_ctx->ctr) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
in_len - bulk - gcm_ctx->tag_len,
gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out,
in_len - gcm_ctx->tag_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) {
return 0;
}
} else {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, in + bulk, out + bulk,
in_len - bulk - gcm_ctx->tag_len)) {
if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len - gcm_ctx->tag_len)) {
return 0;
}
}
@@ -1202,6 +1203,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_gcm = {
aead_aes_gcm_seal,
aead_aes_gcm_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm = {
@@ -1215,6 +1217,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_gcm = {
aead_aes_gcm_seal,
aead_aes_gcm_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm(void) { return &aead_aes_128_gcm; }
@@ -1461,7 +1464,8 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_key_wrap = {
aead_aes_key_wrap_cleanup,
aead_aes_key_wrap_seal,
aead_aes_key_wrap_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_key_wrap = {
@@ -1474,7 +1478,8 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_key_wrap = {
aead_aes_key_wrap_cleanup,
aead_aes_key_wrap_seal,
aead_aes_key_wrap_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_key_wrap(void) { return &aead_aes_128_key_wrap; }
@@ -1647,7 +1652,7 @@ static int aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
if (in_len + aes_ctx->tag_len < in_len ||
/* This input is so large it would overflow the 32-bit block counter. */
in_len_64 >= (OPENSSL_U64(1) << 32) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
in_len_64 >= (UINT64_C(1) << 32) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
@@ -1725,6 +1730,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256 = {
aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_seal,
aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_open,
NULL /* get_rc4_state */,
NULL /* get_iv */,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256 = {
@@ -1739,6 +1745,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_ctr_hmac_sha256 = {
aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_seal,
aead_aes_ctr_hmac_sha256_open,
NULL /* get_rc4_state */,
NULL /* get_iv */,
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_ctr_hmac_sha256(void) {
@@ -1753,7 +1760,7 @@ int EVP_has_aes_hardware(void) {
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
return aesni_capable() && crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled();
#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
return hwaes_capable() && (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_PMULL);
return hwaes_capable() && CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable();
#else
return 0;
#endif
+152 -61
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN 8
struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
unsigned char key[32];
@@ -68,18 +67,15 @@ static void aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
OPENSSL_free(c20_ctx);
}
static void poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
size_t j = data_len;
static void poly1305_update_length(poly1305_state *poly1305, size_t data_len) {
uint8_t length_bytes[8];
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
length_bytes[i] = j;
j >>= 8;
length_bytes[i] = data_len;
data_len >>= 8;
}
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
}
@@ -89,18 +85,38 @@ static void poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305,
#define ALIGNED
#endif
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
typedef void (*aead_poly1305_update)(poly1305_state *ctx, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_len);
/* aead_poly1305 fills |tag| with the authentication tag for the given
* inputs, using |update| to control the order and format that the inputs are
* signed/authenticated. */
static void aead_poly1305(aead_poly1305_update update,
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN],
const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx,
const uint8_t nonce[12], const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_len) {
uint8_t poly1305_key[32] ALIGNED;
poly1305_state poly1305;
memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);
poly1305_state ctx;
CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&ctx, poly1305_key);
update(&ctx, ad, ad_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&ctx, tag);
}
static int seal_impl(aead_poly1305_update poly1305_update,
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t nonce[12],
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
* counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
/* |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
* individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
* |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
@@ -121,37 +137,23 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);
CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, nonce, 1);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, out, in_len);
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN] ALIGNED;
CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag);
aead_poly1305(poly1305_update, tag, c20_ctx, nonce, ad, ad_len, out, in_len);
memcpy(out + in_len, tag, c20_ctx->tag_len);
*out_len = in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
static int open_impl(aead_poly1305_update poly1305_update,
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t nonce[12],
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len) {
const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
uint8_t mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
uint8_t poly1305_key[32] ALIGNED;
size_t plaintext_len;
poly1305_state poly1305;
const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) {
@@ -159,8 +161,7 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
* counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
/* |CRYPTO_chacha_20| uses a 32-bit block counter. Therefore we disallow
* individual operations that work on more than 256GB at a time.
* |in_len_64| is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
@@ -171,28 +172,11 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len;
if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
c20_ctx->key, nonce, 0);
CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
uint8_t tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN] ALIGNED;
aead_poly1305(poly1305_update, tag, c20_ctx, nonce, ad, ad_len, in,
plaintext_len);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
@@ -202,9 +186,54 @@ static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 1;
}
static void poly1305_update_padded_16(poly1305_state *poly1305,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
static const uint8_t padding[16] = { 0 }; /* Padding is all zeros. */
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
if (data_len % 16 != 0) {
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, padding, sizeof(padding) - (data_len % 16));
}
}
static void poly1305_update(poly1305_state *ctx, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_len) {
poly1305_update_padded_16(ctx, ad, ad_len);
poly1305_update_padded_16(ctx, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
poly1305_update_length(ctx, ad_len);
poly1305_update_length(ctx, ciphertext_len);
}
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (nonce_len != 12) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
return seal_impl(poly1305_update, ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len, nonce, in,
in_len, ad, ad_len);
}
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (nonce_len != 12) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
return open_impl(poly1305_update, ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len, nonce, in,
in_len, ad, ad_len);
}
static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = {
32, /* key len */
CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN, /* nonce len */
12, /* nonce len */
POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */
POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */
aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
@@ -213,8 +242,70 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = {
aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal,
aead_chacha20_poly1305_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305(void) {
return &aead_chacha20_poly1305;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_rfc7539(void) {
return EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
}
static void poly1305_update_old(poly1305_state *ctx, const uint8_t *ad,
size_t ad_len, const uint8_t *ciphertext,
size_t ciphertext_len) {
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(ctx, ad, ad_len);
poly1305_update_length(ctx, ad_len);
CRYPTO_poly1305_update(ctx, ciphertext, ciphertext_len);
poly1305_update_length(ctx, ciphertext_len);
}
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_old_seal(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (nonce_len != 8) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
uint8_t nonce_96[12];
memset(nonce_96, 0, 4);
memcpy(nonce_96 + 4, nonce, 8);
return seal_impl(poly1305_update_old, ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len,
nonce_96, in, in_len, ad, ad_len);
}
static int aead_chacha20_poly1305_old_open(
const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
if (nonce_len != 8) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
uint8_t nonce_96[12];
memset(nonce_96, 0, 4);
memcpy(nonce_96 + 4, nonce, 8);
return open_impl(poly1305_update_old, ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len,
nonce_96, in, in_len, ad, ad_len);
}
static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305_old = {
32, /* key len */
8, /* nonce len */
POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* overhead */
POLY1305_TAG_LEN, /* max tag length */
aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
NULL, /* init_with_direction */
aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
aead_chacha20_poly1305_old_seal,
aead_chacha20_poly1305_old_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305_old(void) {
return &aead_chacha20_poly1305_old;
}
+74 -2
View File
@@ -96,6 +96,31 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER des_cbc = {
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_cbc(void) { return &des_cbc; }
static int des_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
size_t in_len) {
if (in_len < ctx->cipher->block_size) {
return 1;
}
in_len -= ctx->cipher->block_size;
EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i <= in_len; i += ctx->cipher->block_size) {
DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *) (in + i), (DES_cblock *) (out + i),
&dat->ks.ks, ctx->encrypt);
}
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER des_ecb = {
NID_des_ecb, 8 /* block_size */, 8 /* key_size */,
0 /* iv_len */, sizeof(EVP_DES_KEY), EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
NULL /* app_data */, des_init_key, des_ecb_cipher,
NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */, };
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ecb(void) { return &des_ecb; }
typedef struct {
union {
double align;
@@ -126,10 +151,57 @@ static int des_ede3_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER des3_cbc = {
static const EVP_CIPHER des_ede3_cbc = {
NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8 /* block_size */, 24 /* key_size */,
8 /* iv_len */, sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY), EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
NULL /* app_data */, des_ede3_init_key, des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */, };
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc(void) { return &des3_cbc; }
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede3_cbc(void) { return &des_ede3_cbc; }
static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *) key;
DES_EDE_KEY *dat = (DES_EDE_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
DES_set_key(&deskey[0], &dat->ks.ks[0]);
DES_set_key(&deskey[1], &dat->ks.ks[1]);
DES_set_key(&deskey[0], &dat->ks.ks[2]);
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER des_ede_cbc = {
NID_des_ede_cbc, 8 /* block_size */, 16 /* key_size */,
8 /* iv_len */, sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY), EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
NULL /* app_data */, des_ede_init_key , des_ede3_cbc_cipher,
NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */, };
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede_cbc(void) { return &des_ede_cbc; }
static int des_ede_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
if (in_len < ctx->cipher->block_size) {
return 1;
}
in_len -= ctx->cipher->block_size;
DES_EDE_KEY *dat = (DES_EDE_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i <= in_len; i += ctx->cipher->block_size) {
DES_ecb3_encrypt((DES_cblock *) (in + i), (DES_cblock *) (out + i),
&dat->ks.ks[0], &dat->ks.ks[1], &dat->ks.ks[2],
ctx->encrypt);
}
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER des_ede_ecb = {
NID_des_ede_cbc, 8 /* block_size */, 16 /* key_size */,
0 /* iv_len */, sizeof(DES_EDE_KEY), EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
NULL /* app_data */, des_ede_init_key , des_ede_ecb_cipher,
NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */, };
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_des_ede(void) { return &des_ede_ecb; }
-310
View File
@@ -54,21 +54,13 @@
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <openssl/aead.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/cpu.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/rc4.h>
#include "internal.h"
static int rc4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
const uint8_t *iv, int enc) {
@@ -93,305 +85,3 @@ static const EVP_CIPHER rc4 = {
NULL /* cleanup */, NULL /* ctrl */, };
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4(void) { return &rc4; }
struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx {
RC4_KEY rc4;
MD5_CTX head, tail, md;
size_t payload_length;
unsigned char tag_len;
};
static int
aead_rc4_md5_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len,
size_t tag_len) {
struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx;
size_t i;
uint8_t hmac_key[MD5_CBLOCK];
if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
tag_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
if (tag_len > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
/* The keys consists of |MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH| bytes of HMAC(MD5) key followed
* by some number of bytes of RC4 key. */
if (key_len <= MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
rc4_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx));
if (rc4_ctx == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memset(rc4_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx));
RC4_set_key(&rc4_ctx->rc4, key_len - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
key + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key));
memcpy(hmac_key, key, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) {
hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36;
}
MD5_Init(&rc4_ctx->head);
MD5_Update(&rc4_ctx->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++) {
hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c;
}
MD5_Init(&rc4_ctx->tail);
MD5_Update(&rc4_ctx->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
rc4_ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
ctx->aead_state = rc4_ctx;
return 1;
}
static void aead_rc4_md5_tls_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {
struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
OPENSSL_cleanse(rc4_ctx, sizeof(struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx));
OPENSSL_free(rc4_ctx);
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
#define STITCHED_CALL
/* rc4_md5_enc is defined in rc4_md5-x86_64.pl */
void rc4_md5_enc(RC4_KEY *key, const void *in0, void *out, MD5_CTX *ctx,
const void *inp, size_t blocks);
#endif
static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
MD5_CTX md;
#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
size_t rc4_off, md5_off, blocks;
#else
const size_t rc4_off = 0;
const size_t md5_off = 0;
#endif
uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len < in_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_len < in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->head, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
/* The MAC's payload begins with the additional data. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.1 */
MD5_Update(&md, ad, ad_len);
/* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
* length for legacy ciphers. */
uint8_t ad_extra[2];
ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(in_len >> 8);
ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(in_len & 0xff);
MD5_Update(&md, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra));
#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
/* 32 is $MOD from rc4_md5-x86_64.pl. */
rc4_off = 32 - 1 - (rc4_ctx->rc4.x & (32 - 1));
md5_off = MD5_CBLOCK - md.num;
/* Ensure RC4 is behind MD5. */
if (rc4_off > md5_off) {
md5_off += MD5_CBLOCK;
}
assert(md5_off >= rc4_off);
if (in_len > md5_off && (blocks = (in_len - md5_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) &&
(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) {
/* Process the initial portions of the plaintext normally. */
MD5_Update(&md, in, md5_off);
RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, rc4_off, in, out);
/* Process the next |blocks| blocks of plaintext with stitched routines. */
rc4_md5_enc(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off, &md, in + md5_off,
blocks);
blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK;
rc4_off += blocks;
md5_off += blocks;
md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
md.Nl += blocks <<= 3;
if (md.Nl < (unsigned int)blocks) {
md.Nh++;
}
} else {
rc4_off = 0;
md5_off = 0;
}
#endif
/* Finish computing the MAC. */
MD5_Update(&md, in + md5_off, in_len - md5_off);
MD5_Final(digest, &md);
memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->tail, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
MD5_Update(&md, digest, sizeof(digest));
if (rc4_ctx->tag_len == MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
MD5_Final(out + in_len, &md);
} else {
MD5_Final(digest, &md);
memcpy(out + in_len, digest, rc4_ctx->tag_len);
}
/* Encrypt the remainder of the plaintext and the MAC. */
RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in_len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off);
RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, out + in_len, out + in_len);
*out_len = in_len + rc4_ctx->tag_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len,
const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
MD5_CTX md;
size_t plaintext_len;
#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
unsigned int l;
size_t rc4_off, md5_off, blocks;
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
#else
const size_t rc4_off = 0;
const size_t md5_off = 0;
#endif
uint8_t digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (in_len < rc4_ctx->tag_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
plaintext_len = in_len - rc4_ctx->tag_len;
if (nonce_len != 0) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (max_out_len < in_len) {
/* This requires that the caller provide space for the MAC, even though it
* will always be removed on return. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->head, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
/* The MAC's payload begins with the additional data. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.1 */
MD5_Update(&md, ad, ad_len);
/* To allow for CBC mode which changes cipher length, |ad| doesn't include the
* length for legacy ciphers. */
uint8_t ad_extra[2];
ad_extra[0] = (uint8_t)(plaintext_len >> 8);
ad_extra[1] = (uint8_t)(plaintext_len & 0xff);
MD5_Update(&md, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra));
#if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
rc4_off = 32 - 1 - (rc4_ctx->rc4.x & (32 - 1));
md5_off = MD5_CBLOCK - md.num;
/* Ensure MD5 is a full block behind RC4 so it has plaintext to operate on in
* both normal and stitched routines. */
if (md5_off > rc4_off) {
rc4_off += 2 * MD5_CBLOCK;
} else {
rc4_off += MD5_CBLOCK;
}
if (in_len > rc4_off && (blocks = (in_len - rc4_off) / MD5_CBLOCK) &&
(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 20)) == 0) {
/* Decrypt the initial portion of the ciphertext and digest the plaintext
* normally. */
RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, rc4_off, in, out);
MD5_Update(&md, out, md5_off);
/* Decrypt and digest the next |blocks| blocks of ciphertext with the
* stitched routines. */
rc4_md5_enc(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off, &md, out + md5_off,
blocks);
blocks *= MD5_CBLOCK;
rc4_off += blocks;
md5_off += blocks;
l = (md.Nl + (blocks << 3)) & 0xffffffffU;
if (l < md.Nl) {
md.Nh++;
}
md.Nl = l;
md.Nh += blocks >> 29;
} else {
md5_off = 0;
rc4_off = 0;
}
#endif
/* Process the remainder of the input. */
RC4(&rc4_ctx->rc4, in_len - rc4_off, in + rc4_off, out + rc4_off);
MD5_Update(&md, out + md5_off, plaintext_len - md5_off);
MD5_Final(digest, &md);
/* Calculate HMAC and verify it */
memcpy(&md, &rc4_ctx->tail, sizeof(MD5_CTX));
MD5_Update(&md, digest, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH);
MD5_Final(digest, &md);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(out + plaintext_len, digest, rc4_ctx->tag_len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return 0;
}
*out_len = plaintext_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
const RC4_KEY **out_key) {
struct aead_rc4_md5_tls_ctx *rc4_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
*out_key = &rc4_ctx->rc4;
return 1;
}
static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_md5_tls = {
16 + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* key len (RC4 + MD5) */
0, /* nonce len */
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead */
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
aead_rc4_md5_tls_init,
NULL, /* init_with_direction */
aead_rc4_md5_tls_cleanup,
aead_rc4_md5_tls_seal,
aead_rc4_md5_tls_open,
aead_rc4_md5_tls_get_rc4_state,
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls(void) { return &aead_rc4_md5_tls; }
+41
View File
@@ -307,6 +307,19 @@ static int aead_ssl3_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const RC4_KEY **out_
return 1;
}
static int aead_ssl3_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv,
size_t *out_iv_len) {
AEAD_SSL3_CTX *ssl3_ctx = (AEAD_SSL3_CTX *)ctx->aead_state;
const size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx);
if (iv_len <= 1) {
return 0;
}
*out_iv = ssl3_ctx->cipher_ctx.iv;
*out_iv_len = iv_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_rc4_md5_ssl3_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
@@ -340,6 +353,13 @@ static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
EVP_sha1());
}
static int aead_null_sha1_ssl3_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
return aead_ssl3_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_enc_null(),
EVP_sha1());
}
static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_md5_ssl3 = {
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (MD5 + RC4) */
0, /* nonce len */
@@ -351,6 +371,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_md5_ssl3 = {
aead_ssl3_seal,
aead_ssl3_open,
aead_ssl3_get_rc4_state,
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_sha1_ssl3 = {
@@ -364,6 +385,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_sha1_ssl3 = {
aead_ssl3_seal,
aead_ssl3_open,
aead_ssl3_get_rc4_state,
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = {
@@ -377,6 +399,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = {
aead_ssl3_seal,
aead_ssl3_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
aead_ssl3_get_iv,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = {
@@ -390,6 +413,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = {
aead_ssl3_seal,
aead_ssl3_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
aead_ssl3_get_iv,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = {
@@ -403,6 +427,21 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3 = {
aead_ssl3_seal,
aead_ssl3_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
aead_ssl3_get_iv,
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_null_sha1_ssl3 = {
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* key len */
0, /* nonce len */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (SHA1) */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
NULL, /* init */
aead_null_sha1_ssl3_init,
aead_ssl3_cleanup,
aead_ssl3_seal,
aead_ssl3_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_md5_ssl3(void) { return &aead_rc4_md5_ssl3; }
@@ -420,3 +459,5 @@ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_ssl3(void) {
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3(void) {
return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_ssl3;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_null_sha1_ssl3(void) { return &aead_null_sha1_ssl3; }
+86 -26
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/type_check.h>
@@ -111,7 +112,6 @@ static int aead_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
/* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
return 0;
}
if (in_len + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(ctx->aead) < in_len ||
@@ -146,17 +146,13 @@ static int aead_tls_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
* in-place. */
uint8_t mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned mac_len;
HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&hmac_ctx, &tls_ctx->hmac_ctx) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad, ad_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra)) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, in, in_len) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len)) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad, ad_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_extra, sizeof(ad_extra)) ||
!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, in, in_len) ||
!HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len)) {
return 0;
}
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
/* Configure the explicit IV. */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
@@ -216,7 +212,6 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
/* Unlike a normal AEAD, a TLS AEAD may only be used in one direction. */
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_OPERATION);
return 0;
}
if (in_len < HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx)) {
@@ -324,18 +319,14 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
* implemented. */
assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE);
HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac_ctx);
unsigned mac_len_u;
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&hmac_ctx, &tls_ctx->hmac_ctx) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, ad_fixed, ad_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hmac_ctx, out, data_len) ||
!HMAC_Final(&hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len_u)) {
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, ad_fixed, ad_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, out, data_len) ||
!HMAC_Final(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx, mac, &mac_len_u)) {
return 0;
}
mac_len = mac_len_u;
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hmac_ctx);
assert(mac_len == HMAC_size(&tls_ctx->hmac_ctx));
record_mac = &out[data_len];
@@ -359,6 +350,13 @@ static int aead_tls_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
return 1;
}
static int aead_rc4_md5_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_rc4(), EVP_md5(),
0);
}
static int aead_rc4_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
@@ -433,8 +431,8 @@ static int aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv_init(
EVP_sha1(), 1);
}
static int aead_rc4_sha1_tls_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
const RC4_KEY **out_key) {
static int aead_rc4_tls_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
const RC4_KEY **out_key) {
const AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX*) ctx->aead_state;
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx) != EVP_rc4()) {
return 0;
@@ -444,17 +442,52 @@ static int aead_rc4_sha1_tls_get_rc4_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
return 1;
}
static int aead_tls_get_iv(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv,
size_t *out_iv_len) {
const AEAD_TLS_CTX *tls_ctx = (AEAD_TLS_CTX*) ctx->aead_state;
const size_t iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&tls_ctx->cipher_ctx);
if (iv_len <= 1) {
return 0;
}
*out_iv = tls_ctx->cipher_ctx.iv;
*out_iv_len = iv_len;
return 1;
}
static int aead_null_sha1_tls_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
size_t key_len, size_t tag_len,
enum evp_aead_direction_t dir) {
return aead_tls_init(ctx, key, key_len, tag_len, dir, EVP_enc_null(),
EVP_sha1(), 1 /* implicit iv */);
}
static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_md5_tls = {
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (MD5 + RC4) */
0, /* nonce len */
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead */
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
NULL, /* init */
aead_rc4_md5_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
aead_rc4_tls_get_rc4_state, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_rc4_sha1_tls = {
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA1 + RC4) */
0, /* nonce len */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
NULL, /* init */
NULL, /* init */
aead_rc4_sha1_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
aead_rc4_sha1_tls_get_rc4_state, /* get_rc4_state */
aead_rc4_tls_get_rc4_state, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = {
@@ -468,6 +501,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls = {
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
@@ -481,19 +515,21 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls = {
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 16, /* key len (SHA256 + AES128) */
16, /* nonce len (IV) */
16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
NULL, /* init */
aead_aes_128_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = {
@@ -507,6 +543,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls = {
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
@@ -520,32 +557,35 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls = {
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA256 + AES256) */
16, /* nonce len (IV) */
16 + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA256) */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
NULL, /* init */
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha256_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls = {
SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH + 32, /* key len (SHA384 + AES256) */
16, /* nonce len (IV) */
16 + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (padding + SHA384) */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
NULL, /* init */
aead_aes_256_cbc_sha384_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = {
@@ -559,6 +599,7 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls = {
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
@@ -572,8 +613,25 @@ static const EVP_AEAD aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv = {
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
aead_tls_get_iv, /* get_iv */
};
static const EVP_AEAD aead_null_sha1_tls = {
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* key len */
0, /* nonce len */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* overhead (SHA1) */
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, /* max tag length */
NULL, /* init */
aead_null_sha1_tls_init,
aead_tls_cleanup,
aead_tls_seal,
aead_tls_open,
NULL, /* get_rc4_state */
NULL, /* get_iv */
};
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_md5_tls(void) { return &aead_rc4_md5_tls; }
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_rc4_sha1_tls(void) { return &aead_rc4_sha1_tls; }
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_aes_128_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
@@ -611,3 +669,5 @@ const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls(void) {
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv(void) {
return &aead_des_ede3_cbc_sha1_tls_implicit_iv;
}
const EVP_AEAD *EVP_aead_null_sha1_tls(void) { return &aead_null_sha1_tls; }
+3
View File
@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ struct evp_aead_st {
size_t ad_len);
int (*get_rc4_state)(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const RC4_KEY **out_key);
int (*get_iv)(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t **out_iv,
size_t *out_len);
};
+105
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
# The AES-128-GCM test cases from cipher_test.txt have been merged into this
# file.
KEY: d480429666d48b400633921c5407d1d1
NONCE: 3388c676dc754acfa66e172a
IN:
@@ -424,3 +427,105 @@ IN: 48656c6c6f2c20576f726c64
AD:
CT: cec189d0e8419b90fb16d555
TAG: 32893832a8d609224d77c2e56a922282
# AES GCM test vectors from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-spec.pdf
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: ""
CT: ""
AD: ""
TAG: 58e2fccefa7e3061367f1d57a4e7455a
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: 00000000000000000000000000000000
CT: 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78
AD: ""
TAG: ab6e47d42cec13bdf53a67b21257bddf
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
CT: 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49ce3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa051ba30b396a0aac973d58e091473f5985
AD: ""
TAG: 4d5c2af327cd64a62cf35abd2ba6fab4
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
CT: 42831ec2217774244b7221b784d0d49ce3aa212f2c02a4e035c17e2329aca12e21d514b25466931c7d8f6a5aac84aa051ba30b396a0aac973d58e091
AD: feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
TAG: 5bc94fbc3221a5db94fae95ae7121a47
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: cafebabefacedbad
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
CT: 61353b4c2806934a777ff51fa22a4755699b2a714fcdc6f83766e5f97b6c742373806900e49f24b22b097544d4896b424989b5e1ebac0f07c23f4598
AD: feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
TAG: 3612d2e79e3b0785561be14aaca2fccb
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
CT: 8ce24998625615b603a033aca13fb894be9112a5c3a211a8ba262a3cca7e2ca701e4a9a4fba43c90ccdcb281d48c7c6fd62875d2aca417034c34aee5
AD: feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
TAG: 619cc5aefffe0bfa462af43c1699d050
# local add-ons, primarily streaming ghash tests
# 128 bytes AD
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: ""
CT: ""
AD: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662898015ad
TAG: 5fea793a2d6f974d37e68e0cb8ff9492
# 48 bytes plaintext
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
CT: 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0
AD: ""
TAG: 9dd0a376b08e40eb00c35f29f9ea61a4
# 80 bytes plaintext
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
CT: 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0c94da219118e297d7b7ebcbcc9c388f28ade7d85a8ee35616f7124a9d5270291
AD: ""
TAG: 98885a3a22bd4742fe7b72172193b163
# 128 bytes plaintext
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
CT: 0388dace60b6a392f328c2b971b2fe78f795aaab494b5923f7fd89ff948bc1e0200211214e7394da2089b6acd093abe0c94da219118e297d7b7ebcbcc9c388f28ade7d85a8ee35616f7124a9d527029195b84d1b96c690ff2f2de30bf2ec89e00253786e126504f0dab90c48a30321de3345e6b0461e7c9e6c6b7afedde83f40
AD: ""
TAG: cac45f60e31efd3b5a43b98a22ce1aa1
# 192 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IN: 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
CT: 56b3373ca9ef6e4a2b64fe1e9a17b61425f10d47a75a5fce13efc6bc784af24f4141bdd48cf7c770887afd573cca5418a9aeffcd7c5ceddfc6a78397b9a85b499da558257267caab2ad0b23ca476a53cb17fb41c4b8b475cb4f3f7165094c229c9e8c4dc0a2a5ff1903e501511221376a1cdb8364c5061a20cae74bc4acd76ceb0abc9fd3217ef9f8c90be402ddf6d8697f4f880dff15bfb7a6b28241ec8fe183c2d59e3f9dfff653c7126f0acb9e64211f42bae12af462b1070bef1ab5e3606
AD: ""
TAG: 566f8ef683078bfdeeffa869d751a017
# 288 bytes plaintext, iv is chosen so that initial counter LSB is 0xFF
KEY: 00000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: ffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IN: 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
CT: 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
AD: ""
TAG: 8b307f6b33286d0ab026a9ed3fe1e85f
# 80 bytes plaintext, submitted by Intel
KEY: 843ffcf5d2b72694d19ed01d01249412
NONCE: dbcca32ebf9b804617c3aa9e
IN: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f
AD: 00000000000000000000000000000000101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
CT: 6268c6fa2a80b2d137467f092f657ac04d89be2beaa623d61b5a868c8f03ff95d3dcee23ad2f1ab3a6c80eaf4b140eb05de3457f0fbc111a6b43d0763aa422a3013cf1dc37fe417d1fbfc449b75d4cc5
TAG: 3b629ccfbc1119b7319e1dce2cd6fd6d
+46
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
# The AES-256-GCM test cases from cipher_test.txt have been merged into this
# file.
KEY: e5ac4a32c67e425ac4b143c83c6f161312a97d88d634afdf9f4da5bd35223f01
NONCE: 5bf11a0951f0bfc7ea5c9e58
IN:
@@ -418,3 +421,46 @@ AD: 2134f74e882a44e457c38b6580cd58ce20e81267baeb4a9d50c41ababc2a91ddf300c3996364
CT: 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
TAG: 1976d7e121704ce463a8d4fe1b93d90f
# AES GCM test vectors from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-spec.pdf
KEY: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: ""
CT: ""
AD: ""
TAG: 530f8afbc74536b9a963b4f1c4cb738b
KEY: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
NONCE: 000000000000000000000000
IN: 00000000000000000000000000000000
CT: cea7403d4d606b6e074ec5d3baf39d18
AD: ""
TAG: d0d1c8a799996bf0265b98b5d48ab919
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b391aafd255
CT: 522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662898015ad
AD: ""
TAG: b094dac5d93471bdec1a502270e3cc6c
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: cafebabefacedbaddecaf888
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
CT: 522dc1f099567d07f47f37a32a84427d643a8cdcbfe5c0c97598a2bd2555d1aa8cb08e48590dbb3da7b08b1056828838c5f61e6393ba7a0abcc9f662
AD: feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
TAG: 76fc6ece0f4e1768cddf8853bb2d551b
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: cafebabefacedbad
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
CT: c3762df1ca787d32ae47c13bf19844cbaf1ae14d0b976afac52ff7d79bba9de0feb582d33934a4f0954cc2363bc73f7862ac430e64abe499f47c9b1f
AD: feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
TAG: 3a337dbf46a792c45e454913fe2ea8f2
KEY: feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308feffe9928665731c6d6a8f9467308308
NONCE: 9313225df88406e555909c5aff5269aa6a7a9538534f7da1e4c303d2a318a728c3c0c95156809539fcf0e2429a6b525416aedbf5a0de6a57a637b39b
IN: d9313225f88406e5a55909c5aff5269a86a7a9531534f7da2e4c303d8a318a721c3c0c95956809532fcf0e2449a6b525b16aedf5aa0de657ba637b39
CT: 5a8def2f0c9e53f1f75d7853659e2a20eeb2b22aafde6419a058ab4f6f746bf40fc0c3b780f244452da3ebf1c5d82cdea2418997200ef82e44ae7e3f
AD: feedfacedeadbeeffeedfacedeadbeefabaddad2
TAG: a44a8266ee1c8eb0c8b5d4cf5ae9f19a
@@ -0,0 +1,524 @@
KEY: 9a97f65b9b4c721b960a672145fca8d4e32e67f9111ea979ce9c4826806aeee6
NONCE: 3de9c0da2bd7f91e
IN: ""
AD: ""
CT: ""
TAG: 5a6e21f4ba6dbee57380e79e79c30def
KEY: bcb2639bf989c6251b29bf38d39a9bdce7c55f4b2ac12a39c8a37b5d0a5cc2b5
NONCE: 1e8b4c510f5ca083
IN: 8c8419bc27
AD: 34ab88c265
CT: 1a7c2f33f5
TAG: 2875c659d0f2808de3a40027feff91a4
KEY: 4290bcb154173531f314af57f3be3b5006da371ece272afa1b5dbdd1100a1007
NONCE: cd7cf67be39c794a
IN: 86d09974840bded2a5ca
AD: 87e229d4500845a079c0
CT: e3e446f7ede9a19b62a4
TAG: 677dabf4e3d24b876bb284753896e1d6
KEY: 422a5355b56dcf2b436aa8152858106a88d9ba23cdfe087b5e74e817a52388b3
NONCE: 1d12d6d91848f2ea
IN: 537a645387f22d6f6dbbea568d3feb
AD: bef267c99aec8af56bc238612bfea6
CT: 281a366705c5a24b94e56146681e44
TAG: 38f2b8ee3be44abba3c010d9cab6e042
KEY: ec7b864a078c3d05d970b6ea3ba6d33d6bb73dfa64c622a4727a96ede876f685
NONCE: 2bca0e59e39508d3
IN: b76733895c871edd728a45ed1a21f15a9597d49d
AD: cc1243ea54272db602fb0853c8e7027c56338b6c
CT: 1fb9b2958fce47a5cada9d895fbb0c00d3569858
TAG: 042ad5042c89ebc1aad57d3fb703d314
KEY: 2c4c0fdb611df2d4d5e7898c6af0022795364adb8749155e2c68776a090e7d5c
NONCE: 13ce7382734c4a71
IN: 0dc6ff21a346e1337dd0db81d8f7d9f6fd1864418b98aadcdb
AD: 0115edcb176ab8bfa947d1f7c3a86a845d310bf6706c59a8f9
CT: dad65e4244a1a17ce59d88b00af4f7434bd7830ffdd4c5558f
TAG: ac1437b45d8eacf9c0fe547c84fb82a2
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 5d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: 6dd98710d8a889dceea0d0a936f98617
KEY: a8b9766f404dea8cf7d7dfaf5822f53df9ccd092e332a57f007b301b507d5e14
NONCE: c7f2f7a233104a2d
IN: 4d6faeaee39179a7c892faae3719656cc614c7e6ecd8fcb570a3b82c4dace969090338
AD: c6d83b6a56408a356e68d0494d4eff150530b09551d008373d6dee2b8d6b5619d67fdb
CT: a15443f083316eef627a371f4c9ac654d0dd75255d8a303125e9f51af4233ff4ceb7fe
TAG: 52504e880f6792a60708cc6db72eae42
KEY: 5e8d0e5f1467f7a750c55144d0c670f7d91075f386795b230c9bf1c04ba250bc
NONCE: 88049f44ba61b88f
IN: 51a1eebcc348e0582196a0bce16ed1f8ac2e91c3e8a690e04a9f4b5cf63313d7ad08d1efbff85c89
AD: 5d09bf0be90026f9fc51f73418d6d864b6d197ea030b3de072bd2c2f5cab5860a342abbd29dba9dc
CT: 35aa4bd4537aa611fd7578fc227df50ebcb00c692a1cf6f02e50ed9270bd93af3bc68f4c75b96638
TAG: ccea1cbbc83944cc66df4dbf6fb7fc46
KEY: 21a9f07ec891d488805e9b92bb1b2286f3f0410c323b07fee1dc6f7379e22e48
NONCE: 066215be6567377a
IN: c1b0affaf2b8d7ef51cca9aacf7969f92f928c2e3cc7db2e15f47ee1f65023910d09f209d007b7436ee898133d
AD: dfdfdf4d3a68b47ad0d48828dc17b2585da9c81c3a8d71d826b5fa8020fee002397e91fc9658e9d61d728b93eb
CT: 8ff4ceb600e7d45696d02467f8e30df0d33864a040a41ffb9e4c2da09b92e88b6f6b850e9f7258d827b9aaf346
TAG: 4eeddc99784011f0758ba5ebfba61827
KEY: 54c93db9aa0e00d10b45041c7a7e41ee9f90ab78ae4c1bba18d673c3b370abde
NONCE: 3f2d44e7b352360f
IN: 1241e7d6fbe5eef5d8af9c2fb8b516e0f1dd49aa4ebe5491205194fe5aea3704efaf30d392f44cc99e0925b84460d4873344
AD: f1d1b08dd6fe96c46578c1d1ad38881840b10cb5eae41e5f05fe5287223fa72242aea48cb374a80be937b541f9381efa66bb
CT: 027b86865b80b4c4da823a7d3dbcf5845bf57d58ee334eb357e82369cc628979e2947830d9d4817efd3d0bc4779f0b388943
TAG: 4303fa0174ac2b9916bf89c593baee37
KEY: 808e0e73e9bcd274d4c6f65df2fe957822a602f039d4752616ba29a28926ef4a
NONCE: 1b9cd73d2fc3cb8e
IN: 3436c7b5be2394af7e88320c82326a6db37887ff9de41961c7d654dd22dd1f7d40444d48f5c663b86ff41f3e15b5c8ca1337f97635858f
AD: d57cfbe5f2538044282e53b2f0bb4e86ea2233041fb36adb8338ded092148f8c2e894ef8766a7ec2dd02c6ac5dbab0c3703c5e9119e37c
CT: 9b950b3caf7d25eaf5fca6fa3fe12ed077d80dcd5579851233c766bb8bb613ec91d925a939bb52fb88d5eda803cfe2a8cda2e055b962fd
TAG: 6bf5b718f5bbe1395a5fdfcbbef752f5
KEY: 4adfe1a26c5636536cd7cb72aa5bded0b1aa64487ad0e4078f311e8782768e97
NONCE: d69e54badec11560
IN: 19b3f9411ce875fcb684cbdc07938c4c1347e164f9640d37b22f975b4b9a373c4302ae0e7dfdeba1e0d00ced446e338f4c5bc01b4becef5115825276
AD: bda1b0f6c2f4eb8121dcbd2eebd91a03ae1d6e0523b9b6f34b6f16ceca0d086654fb0552bfd5c8e1887730e1449ea02d7f647ae835bc2dab4bbc65b9
CT: ea765a829d961e08bacaed801237ef4067df38ad3737b7c6de4db587a102a86fc4abbaabea0ee97c95ca7f571c7bab6f38cbae60cd6e6a4ce3c7a320
TAG: b425cdf10cd0123a7e64b347c6b4b1f0
KEY: eb3db86c14b7cc2e494345d0dfb4841bbd3aa1e2bc640cca0c6c405520685639
NONCE: 88b54b28d6da8c81
IN: f75c0a357271430b1ecff07a307b6c29325c6e66935046704a19845e629f87a9e3b8aa6c1df55dd426a487d533bb333e46f0d3418464ac1bef059231f8e87e6284
AD: 34b08bb0df821c573dcb56f5b8b4a9920465067f3b5bf3e3254ea1da1a7fc9847fd38bdfe6b30927945263a91fa288c7cf1bee0fddb0fadf5948c5d83eb4623575
CT: 146ec84f5dc1c9fe9de3307a9182dbaa75965bf85f5e64563e68d039a5b659aa8863b89228edb93ff3d8c3323ab0d03300476aa4aca206d4626a6b269b2078912d
TAG: 0058a8dff32c29935c62210c359bd281
KEY: dd5b49b5953e04d926d664da3b65ebcffbbf06abbe93a3819dfc1abbecbaab13
NONCE: c5c8009459b9e31a
IN: f21f6706a4dc33a361362c214defd56d353bcb29811e5819ab3c5c2c13950c7aa0000b9d1fe69bb46454514dcce88a4a5eda097c281b81e51d6a4dba47c80326ba6cea8e2bab
AD: fe6f4cbb00794adea59e9de8b03c7fdf482e46f6c47a35f96997669c735ed5e729a49416b42468777e6a8d7aa173c18b8177418ded600124a98cbb65489f9c24a04f1e7127ce
CT: 911ead61b2aa81d00c5eff53aeea3ab713709ed571765890d558fb59d3993b45f598a39e5eff4be844c4d4bd1ef9622e60412b21140007d54dcf31b2c0e3e98cf33a00fd27f0
TAG: d38d672665e2c8c4a07954b10ecff7d9
KEY: 3b319e40148a67dc0bb19271d9272b327bc5eee087173d3d134ad56c8c7dc020
NONCE: ce5cf6fef84d0010
IN: 27b5627b17a2de31ad00fc2ecb347da0a399bb75cc6eadd4d6ee02de8fbd6a2168d4763ba9368ba982e97a2db8126df0343cdad06d2bc7d7e12eec731d130f8b8745c1954bfd1d717b4ea2
AD: a026b6638f2939ec9cc28d935fb7113157f3b5b7e26c12f8f25b36412b0cd560b7f11b62788a76bd171342e2ae858bcecb8266ff8482bbaed593afe818b9829e05e8e2b281ae7799580142
CT: 368fb69892447b75778f1c5236e1e9d5d89255c3d68d565a5bba4f524d6ad27de13087f301e2ef4c08f5e2c6128b1d3e26de845c4ac4869e4c8bd8858ad0d26dec3b5d61a9e3666a3911ba
TAG: 2e70564c3999c448d92cc6df29d095c4
KEY: 43bf97407a82d0f684bb85342380d66b85fcc81c3e22f1c0d972cd5bfdf407f4
NONCE: 8b6ba494c540fba4
IN: 4b4c7e292a357f56fdf567c32fc0f33608110d7ce5c69112987d7b5a0bd46d8627a721b0aed070b54ea9726084188c518cba829f3920365afc9382c6a5eb0dd332b84612366735be2479b63c9efc7ff5
AD: 1e0acf4070e8d6758b60d81b6d289a4ecdc30e3de4f9090c13691d5b93d5bbcef984f90956de53c5cf44be6c70440661fa58e65dec2734ff51d6d03f57bddda1f47807247e3194e2f7ddd5f3cafd250f
CT: d0076c88ad4bc12d77eb8ae8d9b5bf3a2c5888a8d4c15297b38ece5d64f673191dc81547240a0cbe066c9c563f5c3424809971b5a07dcc70b107305561ce85aecb0b0ea0e8b4ff4d1e4f84836955a945
TAG: 75c9347425b459af6d99b17345c61ff7
KEY: 12fc0bc94104ed8150bde1e56856ce3c57cd1cf633954d22552140e1f4e7c65d
NONCE: d3875d1b6c808353
IN: 24592082d6e73eb65c409b26ceae032e57f6877514947fc45eb007b8a6034494dde5563ac586ea081dc12fa6cda32266be858e4748be40bb20f71320711bf84c3f0e2783a63ad6e25a63b44c373a99af845cdf452c
AD: b8be08463e84a909d071f5ff87213391b7da889dc56fd2f1e3cf86a0a03e2c8eaa2f539bf73f90f5298c26f27ef4a673a12784833acb4d0861562142c974ee37b09ae7708a19f14d1ad8c402bd1ecf5ea280fab280
CT: 9d9ae6328711fb897a88462d20b8aa1b278134cdf7b23e1f1c809fa408b68a7bfc2be61a790008edaa98823381f45ae65f71042689d88acfa5f63332f0fba737c4772c972eba266640056452903d6522cefd3f264e
TAG: e9c982d4ade7397bcfaa1e4c5a6cd578
KEY: 7b6300f7dc21c9fddeaa71f439d53b553a7bf3e69ff515b5cb6495d652a0f99c
NONCE: 40b32e3fdc646453
IN: 572f60d98c8becc8ba80dd6b8d2d0f7b7bbfd7e4abc235f374abd44d9035c7650a79d1dd545fa2f6fb0b5eba271779913e5c5eb450528e4128909a96d11a652bf3f7ae9d0d17adbf612ec9ca32e73ef6e87d7f4e21fe3412ce14
AD: 9ff377545a35cf1bfb77c734ad900c703aee6c3174fdb3736664863036a3a9d09163c2992f093e2408911b8751f001e493decc41e4eeeed04f698b6daed48452a7e1a74ec3b4f3dcf2151ca249fa568aa084c8428a41f20be5fd
CT: 229da76844426639e2fd3ef253a195e0a93f08452ba37219b6773f103134f3f87b1345f9b4bf8cfc11277c311780a2b6e19a363b6ac2efe6c4cc54a39b144e29c94b9ebbde6fd094c30f59d1b770ebf9fcad2a5c695dc003bf51
TAG: b72acab50131a29558d56ae7b9d48e4e
KEY: 4aeb62f024e187606ee7cc9f5865c391c43df1963f459c87ba00e44bb163a866
NONCE: 9559bd08718b75af
IN: c5d586ceece6f41812c969bcf1e727fe6ff8d1ae8c8c52367c612caa7cdf50e0662f5dffc5ea7d3cc39400dfe3dc1897905f6490fd7747b5f5f9842739c67d07ce7c339a5b3997a7fb4cd0d8e4817ff8916b251c11ef919167f858e41504b9
AD: 51f5b503b73a5de8b96534c2a3f2d859ece0bd063ea6dfa486a7eec99f6c020983f7148cccb86202cf9685cc1cc266930f04e536ad8bc26094252baa4606d883bd2aeed6b430152202e9b6cc797ff24fc365315ed67391374c1357c9a845f2
CT: 252ea42b6e5740306816974a4fe67b66e793ebe0914778ef485d55288eb6c9c45fa34ac853dc7a39252520514c3cb34c72b973b14b32bc257687d398f36f64cc2a668faffa7305ab240171343b5f9f49b6c2197e4fbe187b10540d7cdcfa37
TAG: 711ff33ef8d2b067a1b85c64f32f1814
KEY: 9a19e72f005cae1ae78b8e350d7aabe59fc8845999e8c52fad545b942c225eaf
NONCE: d9dae2ea8d2ffc31
IN: 2110378d856ded07eb2be8e8f43308e0c75bc8a3fcc7b1773b0725b7de49f6a166c4528e64120bdf7c9776615d3ce6feeb03de964a7b919206a77392f80437faceb6745845cafc166e1c13b68e70ca2a1d00c71737b8fcbbbd50902565c32159e05fcd23
AD: 1cd73b72c4e103afbefd7c777e0480f3f5e68c60b85bd2e71ef5caebb175d7fc6535d39f38f92c24f2eb0fe97d878ed3d5967c0bb4394a5d41f7d34cda6e1523d3848f049cde554a7d31e1afeab5d3e6150f85858335cbd28c8a7f87d528058df50eea06
CT: 5f009fbce4ec8e4ca9d8d42258b1a3e4e920b2fbad33d5e9f07557d9595e841025193b521ba440110dd83958e8ee30219d952b418e98a6c624894aa248aedc0678f2d263e7bfaf54ca379fef6c5d2f7ac422ea4b4369408b82d6225a7a2cf9a9f46fd4ef
TAG: aa0a5fa7d3cf717a4704a59973b1cd15
KEY: ba1d0b3329ecc009f1da0fab4c854b00ad944870fdca561838e38bad364da507
NONCE: 8a81c92b37221f2f
IN: 6289944ffa3ccea4bf25cd601b271f64e6deb0eba77d65efb4d69ca93e01996e4727168b6f74f3ccf17bd44715f23ceb8fc030c0e035e77f53263db025021fd2d04b87a1b54b12229c5e860481452a80a125cb0693a2ba1b47e28ee7cbaf9e683c178232c7f6d34f97
AD: e57883961b8d041d9b9eeaddcfd61fa9f59213f66571fadffffdd1498b9b014f1ef2e7e56c3044d7f9fa7a1403a1169e86430a2a782137093f5456e142aad03a5f7a66d38009dd01b7fc02c9cf61642dedaf7cc8d46066c281ee17780674c3a36eae66c58d2d765075
CT: 9c44d9135db0dbf81c862c1f69bec55a279794cdd29a58e61909aa29ec4c120c9c5a508d856b9e56138095714a4bb58402a1ad06774cf4ecdf2273839c0007cb88b5444b25c76f6d2424281101d043fc6369ebb3b2ff63cdb0f11a6ea1b8a7dafc80cdaef2813fa661
TAG: 65c746f659bcbdcd054e768c57c848c9
KEY: 0cf8c73a6cffc1b8b2f5d320da1d859d314374e4a9468db7fd42c8d270b7613a
NONCE: 3c4c6f0281841aff
IN: 4434728d234603c916e2faa06b25d83bad3348990ecde2344368d1a7af1309bd04251bb2e0b72044948f8dea33cce2618283b6af742073a9586b26c1089335fe735141e099785a1235810a3a67ff309e2f0ce68220ba0077ad1a5dc1a4aef898a3b9ff8f5ad7fe60149bd0bd6d83
AD: a38d09a4f1c9241623c639b7688d8d35345ea5824080c9d74e4352919db63c74d318f19e1cbb9b14eebd7c74b0ad0119247651911f3551583e749ea50ff648858dcaaa789b7419d9e93a5bf6c8167188dbac2f36804380db325201982b8b06597efeb7684546b272642941591e92
CT: bdfbfea261b1f4c134445321db9e6e40476e2dd2f4e4dbe86e31d6a116d25830762e065b07b11a3799aab93a94b4f98c31c0faeb77ec52c02048e9579257e67f5a6bae9bc65210c25b37fc16ee93bda88fd5f30a533e470b6188c6ce5739fa3e90f77120b490fc1027964f277f40
TAG: 4993ee9582f58eabdb26b98c4d56a244
KEY: 69f4e5788d486a75adf9207df1bd262dd2fe3dd3a0236420390d16e2a3040466
NONCE: 6255bf5c71bb27d1
IN: c15048ca2941ef9600e767a5045aa98ac615225b805a9fbda3ac6301cd5a66aef611400fa3bc04838ead9924d382bef8251a47f1e487d2f3ca4bccd3476a6ca7f13e94fd639a259ef23cc2f8b8d248a471d30ac9219631c3e6985100dc45e0b59b8fc62046309165ddb6f092da3a4f067c8a44
AD: 0c83039504c8464b49d63b7f944802f0d39c85e9f3745e250f10119fa2c960490f75ae4dced8503b156d072a69f20400e9494ab2fa58446c255d82ff0be4b7e43046580bc1cf34060c6f076c72ea455c3687381a3b908e152b10c95c7b94155b0b4b303b7764a8a27d1db0a885f1040d5dbcc3
CT: f0bb2b73d94f2a7cef70fe77e054f206998eacf2b86c05c4fa3f40f2b8cebf034fe17bcbee4dea821f51c18c0aa85b160f8508bd1dc455cc7f49668b1fb25557cdae147bf2399e07fcacaca18eccded741e026ef25365a6b0f44a6b3dd975ee6bb580f5fccd040b73c18b0fbf8f63199ba10fe
TAG: 4236a8750f0cafee3c4a06a577a85cb3
KEY: ad7b9409147a896648a2a2fe2128f79022a70d96dc482730cd85c70db492b638
NONCE: a28a6dedf3f2b01a
IN: 791d293ff0a3b8510b4d494b30f50b38a01638bf130e58c7601904f12cb8900871e8cf3d50abd4d34fda122c76dfee5b7f82cd6e8590647535c915ae08714e427da52f80aef09f40040036034ca52718ea68313c534e7a045cd51745ec52f2e1b59463db07de7ca401c6f6453841d247f370341b2dbc1212
AD: 9a6defddb9b8d5c24a26dd8096f5b8c3af7a89e1f7d886f560fabbe64f14db838d6eb9d6879f4f0b769fe1f9eebf67fcd47b6f9ceb4840b2dba7587e98dc5cae186ef2a0f8601060e8058d9dda812d91387c583da701d2ba3347f285c5d44385a2b0bf07150cbc95e7fcfa8ae07132849a023c98817c03d2
CT: c2f109d6d94f77a7289c8a2ab33bc6a98d976554721b0c726cbf4121069473e62ba36e7090e02414f3edc25c5d83ac80b49ad528cda1e3ad815b5a8c8ae9ad0753de725319df236983abd3f69ab4465d9b806c075b1896d40bdba72d73ba84c4a530896eb94ffccf5fb67eb59119e66a1861872218f928cf
TAG: e48dc0153d5b0f7edb76fc97a0224987
KEY: 48470da98228c9b53f58747673504f74ca1737d7d4bb6dbf7c0cba6ca42f80b9
NONCE: 56fb4923a97e9320
IN: bc6626d651e2b237f22ee51608ddcffeba5f31c26df72f443f701f2b085d6f34f806e29673584cb21522179edb62a82427d946acabce065b88b2878e9eb87ed1004e55ef58f51ec46375ac542c5782725ff013136cb506fcf99496e13fcd224b8a74a971cc8ddb8b393ccc6ac910bd1906ea9f2ed8a5d066dc639c20cd
AD: df8ab634d3dca14e2e091b15ecc78f91e229a1a13cba5edd6526d182525ec575aa45bc70fb6193ffcd59bad3c347159099c4f139c323c30a230753d070018786b2e59b758dd4a97d1a88e8f672092bef780b451fd66ba7431cbb5660ea7816cdf26e19a6ebb9aadc3088e6923f29f53f877a6758068f79a6f2a182b4bf
CT: a62e313ecf258cc9087cbb94fcc12643eb722d255c3f98c39f130e10058a375f0809662442c7b18044feb1602d89be40facae8e89ca967015f0b7f8c2e4e4a3855dbb46a066e49abf9cef67e6036400c8ff46b241fc99ba1974ba3ba6ea20dc52ec6753f6fc7697adbccd02b0bbea1df8352629b03b43cc3d632576787
TAG: 675287f8143b9b976e50a80f8531bd39
KEY: b62fb85c1decd0faf242ce662140ad1b82975e99a3fa01666cac2385ab91da54
NONCE: 2f4a5ca096a4faf8
IN: 03b14f13c0065e4a4421de62ab1d842bffb80f3da30bf47d115c09857f5bdd5756fd7c9ac3d9af1c9fb94f2640f7f4386cfba74db468e5288dbe4dd78bfe4f69e41480ca6138e8beacc6eaa3374157c713cfa900c07dd836eaecc8827fa3e70e052ae09e8473e2ae1a10b1bb669ef60a8dd957f6553daa8114918e17371f2ac327bd
AD: cfe3b7ab7550b0e8e2e8235fa0dcef95647ce6814abd3dc3f5a3bd7d6d282504660c34ad8341e4d11402c7d46c83a494d7ddb105e1002979023e0e3dc2978c9ae53e10eb8567e7a02b60e51e945c7040d832ca900d132b4205a35034fed939a1b7965183c25654931a9b744401c4649c945710b0d9733b87451348b32ba81de30ea7
CT: 8965db3d3ae4fb483208f147276e7d81b71a86e7202ffc9b1eaade009bc016838dc09ca4bcf30887b2f4243fbd652cd90ebed1ceef8151ff17ea70518d03b0f2a24960aa7de9b30fa65c2e2d57360061aae6d9376e984e9fcd5e5dd0911a4bc8deca832ffb76f252bd7da523076593ba6b174f7d9fb0377e066ecbb6638036241e86
TAG: 3d0fc53e9058c2be32aa0850e0fab5a6
KEY: de9c657258774d4ebc09d109a0fc79d66493ae578797cac4eb8830a6a4b547e0
NONCE: b5e35fe3398efa34
IN: 4d68fb683aa4f4c7a16ba1114fc0b1b8d8898610fa2763e435ded8771b3651078bef73d4dfd14e76a34cd5eb9ef4db4ead4da9e83f4ce50fe059977b2d17d687c29335a04d87389d211f8215449749969f7652dc1935a0f9a94538dc81dc9a39af63446a6517609076987920547d0098a9c6766cf5e704883ea32feaea1889b1554b5eb0ce5ecc
AD: 436ea5a5fee8293b93e4e8488116c94d3269c19f1d5050def23d280515457b931bbed64a542b317cc5023d648330a4b7adca14dd6f3783207b94f86ccaa0a0ac39b7db00ac87a99e3cd8a764ed9c75da8454479636ab2b29e770b166a5b75cacc425c919bf1ce9ac34afe6b4425c3d9fd2e48bc81e7d15516d60e592bfcc2ebefb660f0995f2b5
CT: 97a97b8f0f5420845ae8d57567f9bba693d30e6db916fad0b971f553ad7d993f806f27ab8b458d8046062ced4778c004b4f958a4436141637c6039963308dea2f54008b7feab79650295ed41bf9e65e1a2d75ab1c7b2a70ebb9e9f38d07a9a672d3e95ea78afe9ac02f2566b48b0251aef6eeeca8bd15bd8d43b559426aa9d15d960ee35cb3edf
TAG: e55dbb21851e8a5b365f86d02518331c
KEY: 6885bd333c336c7672db8ebdf24c1a1b605c5a4ae279f0f698162f47e6c73401
NONCE: f0c4a213a6168aab
IN: fa905a2bfa5b5bad767239fb070a7bc0b303d1503ecd2b429418cc8feba843e5444ed89022fdb379c3b155a0f9ceab2979000a0f60292a631771f2fde4ef065aa746426609082969530a9c70ad145308c30ba389ea122fd766081511a031ce3a0bd9f9f583c7000b333b79ac004fbde6ec3eb2d905977ff95dcff77858e3c424fe8932a6a12139e6ec8d5e98
AD: 8ded368f919efb522bb6a9ad009e02ffbc6a16536e34d95cdb34f1153d7cb7b0f3c2b13dd05cedae27cfe68ec3aca8047e0930a29c9d0770c1b83c234dcb0385deae7ae85da73a5f8de3dfb28612a001f4e552c4f67ae0e2ec53853289b7017a58591fd6f70b0e954876bb2f7ec33001e298856a64bb16181017ba924648c09fc63c62eff262c80d614679bd
CT: 0cb3d6c31e0f4029eca5524f951244df042fc637c4162511fea512a52d3f7581af097eb642e79e48666cb1086edbd38c4777c535a20945fabc23e7c9277e2b960aac46865f1026eb6da82759108b9baece5da930ccfc1052b1656b0eadaa120ed0c45ad04b24ae8cdb22ceab76c5f180b46a392ab45b1b99c612546e6b947f4d5c06ad5abee92ff96345ad43
TAG: d3b541ac446c84626daf800c0172eec6
KEY: fbc978abb1240a6937ccc16735b8d6ed5411cdbc1897214165a174e16f4e699b
NONCE: 7968379a8ce88117
IN: 1a8196cd4a1389ec916ef8b7da5078a2afa8e9f1081223fa72f6524ac0a1a8019e44a09563a953615587429295052cc904b89f778ef446ed341430d7d8f747cf2db4308478524639f44457253ae5a4451c7efca8ae0b6c5c051aaa781e9c505489b381a6dcba87b157edc7f820a8fbaf2a52e484dc121f33d9d8b9ac59d4901d6ed8996ed4f62d9d4d82274c449cd74efa
AD: 3913cd01299b8a4e507f067d887d7e9a6ded16dd9f9bb3115c5779aa14239fd33ee9f25756d45262dc3011069356425b5c81a4729594e17c9747119f81463e85625d5603d05e00f568b0c800bb181eb717be8d7a93166a504ce1bc817e15530c5bd2b3df1d4222245ea78a38bc10f66c5cf68d661503131f11af885c8a910b6dce70bc3a7448dfae00595beb707fe054d3
CT: d152bcb4c24c3711b0fad28548dc4db605bbc89237cdbea7dbf956b8855d1161a0781f27bd56d798141e2ace339955efb98fe05d9b44cd011e645106bf47726183958cb6df34ce5766695f60bc70b6fe0fabb9afa009a8ef043dbf75f861881368fa07726625448fe608d578cdc48277f2dc53eaaf1bdc075269a42f9302a57cad387a82c6969608acacda20e1cac4596c
TAG: 945dca73cf2f007ae243991c4fbe0479
KEY: 77d1a857fbadfe01aba7974eea2dfb3dc7bf41de73686aece403993e5016c714
NONCE: fdd913a321c40eb0
IN: db8915bfe651e2ecb3ce0b27d99a6bfa7a7c507cfcb2987293018636c365a459c6a138b4428be538413db15bda69e697cbb92b154b7f4d2cbb07965225aa6865d7dcd1ba2c17c484b00b1986fed63e889f25a4966dc3ed4273f1577768f665362d7d3e824484f0dded7f82b8be8797ad951719719365e45abbf76324bc7d657799d4d4f4bb1dba67d96ab1c88519a5bee704f7214814
AD: 3cb2c06c20cb0832bbacebfc205d77393ca1816346ea2681de4d3ab1fadb774ad273e4713290454496f5281ebc65e04cfe84ed37cd0aedc4bbe3decbd8d79d04a4e434876650e0d64309e336bfb10e924066a64acb92260b2dbd96735d03af03909aa6a80a6e89fda81037257aec21fe9be7e91a64e88e0a58fa38ecba4c4c4cffb61958f3c486cbb0b1d0b0014a2d1d3df248eec1ca
CT: acb825e6023b44b03b2efc265603e887954e8612b2ee134bdcb61501cfb9492952bf67be597c3a005b09af74d9e421a576d2c65e98104780feab838d8cb1bd135452ea39dc8907a4c1a6a9161805e4fa3e16989e6a418a7eea2582bf895da967028eab7c95d846a6de4b9980785814cf00484baa2f6de609912fff689bce6e854261ffe866bd8e63274605c7c5ad677bd7897ade543e
TAG: 938478a41a3223a2199f9276d116210f
KEY: b7e9b90dc02b5cd6df5df7283ef293ed4dc07513d9e67331b606f4d42dec7d29
NONCE: a6c191f6d1818f8e
IN: 2ada0e3c7ca6db1f780ce8c79472af4e8e951ddc828e0d6e8a67df520638ff5f14a2f95a5e5931749ae2c4e9946ae4d5eb5de42fb5b77d2236e2e2bd817df51be40b1b8a6c21015a7c79fe06dba4a08b34013dfa02747b5f03930268404c455dc54a74d9c6e35485e10026da573cb41cd50b64cfafe4cfcdf3c9684ef877e45d84e22bd5e15fa6c8fd5be921366ff0dc6fe2df45f7252972c9b303
AD: 0f4269ed5ef0bfff7be39946a4e86e8bf79f84b70cd0b14fecb7be3c071316ce86de3d99d6871e0ba5667d9d7bba7dcaba10cb2a36668b6c3e2fb6c102938b75008bb9c213ebf9b85b5e91a802df0d31d7f11d764b2289f6225212694ab6b7c0e3ff36e84245d9f4f43fc5f98e654dea7ba9bd918658879c5bb4a1642af0d83113e3cf935d3c0d5208318f66f654eb17d8c28a602543e77ad3e815
CT: 22586fe7338e99cdaad9f85bd724ba4cfe6249b8a71399f9a3707b5c4323b8d96679568dfc8d230aefb453df596e13eb3e8a439249bd64bc93a58f95089a62b94f6562b821c83d91f56c55147381e9de4beb4ae81bd6fe7caef7e7e9a2078f2fba8f3e70d4910da9accc92b8e81a61b0fefbece4bd89443e66e8ddda8e47a66a62f17fd0e7d0a4852ce1a4d43d72a0b5e8914bbec698f060f2b092
TAG: c082470297da8c5f682a169d28bc0239
KEY: 6b2cb2678d1102f2fbbd028794a79f14585c223d405e1ae904c0361e9b241e99
NONCE: 7b3ae31f8f938251
IN: b3cb745930e05f3ab8c926c0a343a6eb14809fd21b8390a6fcc58adb5579e5432021765b2d249a0ecf6ba678634c4f53f71495865f031ee97aa159f9ead3a3fcb823ee5238bdf12706a9c6137d236e2e7110ce650c321e41daf0afd62bab2a8fe55d7018de49a14efe6d83a15b2f256d595e998d25309f23633360f5745c50c4e5af8ccc9a8a2cb47064105a023e919c7795d2dc331d3f2afb8c42e5c0bcc26d
AD: 1c32fd3df22b3e440e2a3c7a7624990194cb16a5f74af36f87fd6ca7d410ce9064316a2d091945deef7d9b35ceec8396069307caced2b80afd7d53ec479c35cedf2dfd4c95c3dd8400f71ad34028c6e4f8681d93d0774064ba38f3fb9b0c1dfa1f5f0c7d20676a5911d999fb6a1d41367a8e99d852bf3d3b7b3f4c233249ed1ca135389a674ff48232ded3f6800a97b6d409c40e6cd70d09bf9d2ad25d9b9485
CT: ef70c7de98ab1d4ad817024a970be463443640eb0cd7ff234bdd00e653074a77a1d5749e698bd526dc709f82df06f4c0e64046b3dc5f3c7044aef53aebb807d32239d0652dd990362c44ec25bf5aeae641e27bf716e0c4a1c9fbd37bbf602bb0d0c35b0638be20dd5d5891d446137e842f92c0ee075c68225e4dbacb63cc6fb32442b4bcda5e62cb500a4df2741a4059034d2ccb71b0b8b0112bf1c4ca6eec74
TAG: 393ae233848034248c191ac0e36b6123
KEY: 4dbc80a402c9fceaa755e1105dc49ef6489016776883e06fcf3aed93bf7f6af7
NONCE: 2358ae0ce3fb8e9f
IN: 197c06403eb896d2fa6465e4d64426d24cc7476aa1ae4127cd2bd8a48ce2c99c16b1cbf3064856e84073b6cf12e7406698ef3dd1240c026cbd1ab04ee603e1e6e735c9b7551fd0d355202b4f64b482dd4a7c7d82c4fe2eb494d0d5e17788982d704c1356c41a94655530deda23118cba281d0f717e149fbeb2c59b22d0c0574c1a2e640afad1a6ceb92e1bf1dde71752a1c991e9a5517fe98688a16b073dbf6884cfde61ac
AD: cf6ce7b899fb700a90d2a5466d54d31358ecf0562e02b330a27ba0138006b342b7ed6349d73c4c5c6d29bde75a25089b11dac5b27adea7e7640ca1a7ceb050e3aae84a47e11640a6e485bd54ae9fdb547edc7313d24a0328429fcffd8b18f39880edd616447344ebeec9eadb2dcb1fa7e67179e7f913c194ebd8f5a58aea73b0c5d1133561245b6d9c5cfd8bb0c25b38ffb37db5e2de5cdded6b57355e9d215cb095b8731f
CT: aa87f9a83048b6919c8f2b050315db4e2adae4a9c2ca0109b81961b520e63299dcb028cec0b9d3249a945ee67dd029b40f361245c740f004f8cf0d2214fcfa65e6124a3e74b78aa94345c46fdc158d34823ed249ee550431eaae9218367321cdd6e6a477650469bb3cc137a8f48d9cf27934b16703608b383d2145659922fb83bb2e7ee2ef938a90f2ff846a4a949129b1fb74dde55c5ae013c2f285de84f7dac7d1662f23
TAG: 06b4318ac7f65d556f781428a0514ffe
KEY: 9e4a62016dae4b3223fed1d01d0787e31d30694f79e8142224fe4c4735248a83
NONCE: 263a2fc06a2872e7
IN: 5a46946601f93a0cee5993c69575e599cc24f51aafa2d7c28d816a5b9b4decda2e59c111075fb60a903d701ad2680bb14aeda14af2ae9c07a759d8388b30446f28b85f0a05cd150050bd2e715ff550ebbd24da3ebb1eac15aba23d448659de34be962ab3ab31cb1758db76c468b5bb8ce44b06c4e4db9bd2f0615b1e727f053f6b4ffb6358d248f022bcad6ca973044bed23d3920906a89a9a9c5d8024ec67d7f061f64529a955ce16b3
AD: 4cd65f68f9f88c0516231f2a425c8f8a287de47d409d5ecde3ad151e906b3839fb01bb91a456f20ea9d394d4b06604ab1f9009ef29019af7968d965d1643161ab33a5354cda2fdc9f1d21ec9cb71c325c65964a14f9b26eb16560beb9792075a1597394000fd5f331bd8b7d20d88e5f89cf8d0b33e4e78e4904bb59c9c8d5d31ac86b893e4a0667af1be85fdb77f7ec3e2594a68048d20c2fb9422f5879078772ee26a1c560cbcbb2113
CT: e944bb2ab06d138ad633c16ce82706ecf0ef5d119be1f3460c9ce101d9c4e04ef1677707fca40d1f8ca181e07273707b06624d6d7063c3b7b0bb0151b757b3e5237fb8004c161233d8bc7e5f28ea1c18da1874b3d54c5ad6ff0835eed35c8853704585cf83996e5e7cec68180af414e04f08134d3b0384ebdf0393c9310b55d8698fe10cb362defc0995e9a13b48b42cff61ffd9fe4c3c8c6dab355713b88f6e98a02e7231a0c6644ec4
TAG: 27de0d4ca7648f6396d5419a7b1243b7
KEY: 18ca3ea3e8baeed1b341189297d33cef7f4e0a2fab40ec3b6bb67385d0969cfe
NONCE: b6aef34c75818e7c
IN: ef6d1bb4094782f602fcf41561cba4970679661c63befe35ff2ca7ad1a280bf6b1e7f153fa848edfeffe25153f540b71253e8baba9aeb719a02752cda60ea5938aab339eead5aabf81b19b0fc5c1ed556be6ad8970ea43c303d3046205b12c419dea71c4245cfedd0a31b0f4150b5a9fe80052790188529ab32f5e61d8ccde5973ed30bdf290cbfbd5f073c0c6a020eac0332fced17a9a08cef6f9217bd6bef68c1505d6eed40953e15508d87f08fc
AD: f40f03beaa023db6311bad9b4d5d0d66a58d978e0bcbbf78acebde1f4eb9a284095628955a0b15afc454152f962ec3ea2b9a3b089b99658e68ede4dee5acd56672025eb7323bcbc6ba5d91c94310f18c918e3914bbbf869e1b8721476f9def31b9d32c471a54132481aa89f6c735ab193369496d8dbeb49b130d85fbff3f9cb7dccea4c1da7a2846eef5e6929d9009a9149e39c6c8ec150c9ab49a09c18c4749a0a9fcba77057cdea6efd4d142256c
CT: c531633c0c98230dcf059c1081d1d69c96bab71c3143ae60f9fc2b9cd18762314496ab6e90bf6796252cb9f667a1f08da47fc2b0eecda813228cae00d4c0d71f5e01b6ce762fa636efffe55d0e89fdc89ba42521cc019ab9d408fcd79c14914e8bbf0ea44d8a1d35743ad628327e432fdcfeb0b6679ddca8c92b998473732abd55dba54eefff83c78488eee5f92b145a74b6866531476fc46279d4fde24d049c1ce2b42358ff3ab2ba3a8866e547af
TAG: a0a5242759a6d9b1aa5baf9a4ef895a2
KEY: 95fdd2d3d4296069055b6b79e5d1387628254a7be647baafdf99dd8af354d817
NONCE: cd7ed9e70f608613
IN: 0248284acffa4b2c46636bdf8cc70028dd151a6d8e7a5a5bc2d39acc1020e736885031b252bfe9f96490921f41d1e174bf1ac03707bc2ae5088a1208a7c664583835e8bb93c787b96dea9fc4b884930c57799e7b7a6649c61340376d042b9f5faee8956c70a63cf1cff4fc2c7cb8535c10214e73cec6b79669d824f23ff8c8a2ca1c05974dd6189cfee484d0906df487b6bd85671ce2b23825052e44b84803e2839a96391abc25945cb867b527cdd9b373fbfb83
AD: 24a45a3a0076a5bcfd5afe1c54f7b77496117d29f4c0909f1e6940b81dde3abacb71ec71f0f4db8a7e540bd4c2c60faee21dd3ce72963855be1b0ce54fb20ad82dbc45be20cd6c171e2bebb79e65e7d01567ad0eeb869883e4e814c93688607a12b3b732c1703b09566c308d29ce676a5c762a85700639b70d82aaef408cf98821a372c6a0614a73ba9918a7951ea8b2bb77cd9896d26988086d8586d72edc92af2042ff5e5f1429a22f61065e03cfcd7edc2a93
CT: 40c6318d9e383e107cdd3e1c8951562193c3ef64ee442432a63e2edefc78f32ab07772aeac172cb67ecf4d21f8b448423527bbeb9d8ddd0b46bdb27f74096ceb24e41963b4cdca176676a75bdbe3abc270b349ac0c6cbd9c3a5cd5bce20202fc5cc0c1bdd4fd25e121e0a24bd7bbeb9b19b1912467bf5338ee2ce88aa383c082b42cc399c9654ca325f35523e81438beb3f8926be79c378822d7c8f785614408a5f7cac49e4543188725643e6c1a70b46d0ec400
TAG: 5801e84192c7267f66b0e04607a39a3e
KEY: 6ae1102f84ed4dc114bb9d63f4dc78d7dbb1ab63f1659dd95f47940a7b7a811f
NONCE: c965d578ba91d227
IN: b82a8a9209618f1f5be9c2c32aba3dc45b4947007b14c851cd694456b303ad59a465662803006705673d6c3e29f1d3510dfc0405463c03414e0e07e359f1f1816c68b2434a19d3eee0464873e23c43f3ab60a3f606a0e5be81e3ab4aa27fb7707a57b949f00d6cd3a11ae4827d4889dd455a0b6d39e99012fd40db23fb50e79e11f8a6451669beb2fbd913effd49ad1b43926311f6e13a6e7a09cf4bebb1c0bf63ce59cd5a08e4b8d8dbf9d002e8a3d9e80c7995bb0b485280
AD: dfd4ac3e80b2904623ff79ea8ee87862268939decf5306c07a175b6b9da0eb13ac209b4d164755929e03240a0fe26599f136fb2afdffd12bb20354aa1d20e5799839abb68ae46d50c8974e13e361d87ef550fe6d82e8b5b172cf5cd08482efdef793ede3530d24667faf3a1e96348867c2942641f4c036981b83f50236b8e8a10b83ebf6909aad0076302f1083f72de4cf4a1a3183fe6ec6bfe2e73e2af8e1e8c9d85079083fd179ccc2ee9ff002f213dbd7333053a46c5e43
CT: a9aeb8f0a2b3ca141ac71a808dcc0c9798ac117c5d2bd09b3cfe622693a9f8ca62e841b58bddb2042f888e3099b53638b88dfc930b7a6ee4272d77e4b1d7e442bab6afbde96ab0b432f0092d9ca50eef42f63c60c09e7b8de019b32ebe4030c37b8183cc1e3b913b0ce4ee4d744398fa03f9af1c070bed8cdafd65b3a84140cb4deadc70184de757332ce3780af84353f540755227e886a8d7ad980f3dd6fd68263d82e93f883381dec888bc9f4f48349aa2b4c342cb9f48c6
TAG: f26b3af8a45c416291ce66330733b2f8
KEY: 405bb7b94715b875df068655f00513cb1ae23ffaac977ce273e57d3f83b43663
NONCE: 5c6da1259451119a
IN: f9f143c0c52c94b4ba7b0608b144156a49e7b5d27c97315743d171911e3645ab7957c80924e3c6b9c22ab7a1cac4b7e9c0de84e49fd5e4a2d1ab51d764fc5670318688ec942f7ab34c331dce8f90fea6972e07f0dadec29d8eb3b7b6521ddd678a6527a962f4d8af78c077e27f7a0b2ef7eabd19e92b7f8c1e8fb166d4763ce9c40c888cf49aa9cdfc3e997c8fe1cce3fe802441bbd698de269ff316f31c196e62d12c6bb5cd93fb3c79ca6369f8c1ac9102daf818975ea7f513bb38576a
AD: 6fe6446505677bf08b385e2f6d83ef70e1547712208d9cebc010cba8c16ea4ece058d73c72273eed650afdc9f954f35aa1bdf90f1118b1173368acbc8d38d93ebf85bd30d6dc6d1b90913790c3efa55f34d31531f70c958759b2ba6f956c6fcdd289b58cb4c26e9515bf550f0fd71ab8527f062c9505cbb16e8e037d34de1756bef02a133dbf4a9c00ac03befc3fb7f137af04e12595ce9560f98b612480fcdba3b8be01db56ebec40f9deae532c3b0370b5c23a2a6b02a4de69efa8900c
CT: 1a4b073881922c6366680cc9c2a127b26f264148651b29abb0c388cf6c9b1865dba5a991e1f8309efbdb91bce44b278772c58fd41273526c33fec84beb53d1689b9da8483f71be6db73a73417069bb4cd3f195236e8d0a00d124eed3a6b6f89415b19a27fbe35774f6a1a6ee4bd4350b252b975f0db2d2eea82f4836350850d6290901e726e8af13644e2d98bc1d569c20800521e6affe976bd407049a2e6d9dd23f88d52e651391ecd2fc45b864310824aaadfa203762a77c1d64562dae
TAG: 0060026d3efc120f11c0739959ae0066
KEY: 8c602bd94c630cd00c7a9c508067a5a9f133d12f06d9f6fe2a7b68dce4786d8a
NONCE: 760de0f7b7cb67e2
IN: c3ff559cf1d6ba6c0cc793ca09a0ba573a28359386a6ec93e1bacd8e630209e0b477a20aedec3c9cbf513ee6a1e3887112218d6155b9875f7e6c4bbba2c31972e905d19f529f4f0f9502996199f94f8728ba8d6424bb15f87fcacd88bb42c63fcc513759712bd0172b1e87c9da122f1993ffb7efd3a5c34b240dd3db89dddea36dbeb2836d9f8648f8e7cd428c0f948097af753b35f9876059e7702027bb00dc69071206e785f48fcbf81b39cc0343974ac70784a2e60c0df93b40379bea4ad8cac625
AD: 9e14907c3a8e96c2636db1f3d78eb1f673d6ef043cbbb349467f1fe29bf60f23d5d5d1c3b133a8ad72065d822347541c13d1574baf737eb3cc3382fb479e6d5193b9c8e7d2444c66971ef099dc7f37f6cd97b9f7959d46e2cf25e8a5b3111b4d9e2ef906d905f0ee2d17587f7082d7c8e9a51509bde03d3d64338e1838d71700f1b4fcb100b5e0402969da462f26f974b4f9e766121f8fd54be99fc10beb9a606e13fbb1f960062815d19e67f80093360324013095719273c65542b0e31b1a2a3d928f
CT: 2794e6e133f6892f23837fff60cf7c28ee9942f8982ef8089db117903d0143293fdf12ea1cc014bcd8806fb83c19570eed7af522db0de489bbc87133a13434518bcfb9cda4d9f6d832a69209657a447abf8afd816ae15f313c7ea95ec4bc694efc2386cdd8d915dc475e8fadf3421fbb0319a3c0b3b6dfa80ca3bb22c7aab07fe14a3fea5f0aee17ab1302338eeac010a04e505e20096a95f3347dc2b4510f62d6a4c1fae6b36939503a6ac22780a62d72f2fc3849d4ef21267fffdef23196d88fbb9b
TAG: 457cce6e075ffdb180765ab2e105c707
KEY: bd68ff5eb296c71cfe6bc903c14907f7726bcb1331f0c75f7801cd1b7948f3a1
NONCE: 65a748004b352ba6
IN: 52bf78c00f6e5dca2fc60e2e9a52e827df97808e9cf727773860cafc89f4b64178a19b30b46ed813fe00c8f09b25a6a1b6e350d5b005122934a59bfbd5e6e0c635c84a5226c3f2f7dcf951560f18ac220453d583015fdb2e446c69c6e6fdecf2e595e04fab1b0c506e3c6bd5e4414a35f15021e97f447aa334f54a8f1ef942dec6273511b5668b696fca97188ff15ed84b2f46145cce031c1a7f00bd88bb83d90797edc46161b3fda7a2299173496d73b812139556e8b4eb318078b9eb2ae5046e83b79dd3d45950
AD: 5557b08a5010cbc9f46bb140c2505f68684eb24889324bff44b27234fd7a95a99cfb4ff90a8f9982085b725f78ac42eca6ce7f3314e457dc41f404008681a9d29ba765660de2e05bb679d65b81f5e797d8417b94eb9aabbd0576b5c57f86eae25f6050a7918e4c8021a85b47f7a83b4c8446898441c5cc4e0229776ef3e809cb085d71f3c75ec03378730cb066150f07e60f96aec983c0e7e72bf6bf87ae42228dfda195f97855fcdf4e6d1c4479d978abcfa276d16ed60ecbfbfc664041335ce65a40a2ca3424df
CT: a5c8cf42287d4760fca755e2111817b981c47e85b0047de270ec301ca5f7b3679f4749210892b6ea6568f3a6a4344734a0efc0120ffedecf212d55cbcbb67815ac964875af45f735b70092a8f8435f52fc01b981ae971d486026fb69a9c3927acfe1f2eab0340ae95f8dbee41b2548e400805ece191db5fd1f0804053f1dbfaf7f8d6fded3874cb92d99a2729d3faaa60522060cf0b8101b463b3eb35b380fcddb6406c027d73fe701a5090c8dd531c203ce979e26b9ced3431e2b726a7244a20d9377bd62951bf5
TAG: 4579fa1fdb4c674cc3cd232b8da52a97
KEY: 934fd043c32d16a88fad01c3506469b077cb79d258b5664fa55ad8521afdcaa2
NONCE: c7091f6afbbeb360
IN: 2bdd1fc4f011ef97ea52ec643819941c7e0fb39023c2f3c7683804a0ddee14a5d1784a5246966d533b3538edc7d8742d27061c3cab88df0318ab242102de3a54d03632eeb871b72c7e8f8065b49f4a91e95e15f3f46b29fd76b8fcea0d23570c5530e3bbb8a6aafa9ae32c1b3eac653c5ed5fdb2da5a986075808f6385870c85b1913e26042a9d8e78f5bc2ea6de5a64f8aeafa22adcffc7f6932d543c29bb3a04614783f948680e433a71573568d2ce984d249fb4fc06a9f358c76aa3e64a357f4eae924c1356bd5baccf7e0f
AD: f737dd85638eb324dd3891219c5eef7c2dd053cfd055d447a411eba304a4b27dce981d112c4540590933c153d603022c91ebd2b4a58069d27e6ca17a462ef822ca41bffa80b43a68b1b564644cb3c5a7f0fddf7a13a30ff24437fddd8ef93c6f6f205d054f81890d982bd4d4ece0b1563677e843fe48c1f54e9a57ed4da66061482712e710a401073be5080d5b8b96525bffa67de5af31d50385fbbf1a87c21bf0e0a1fdff69ec32c7b7103e0b8ee6c844245e0fc84b9f89fcce62966cea68e2871d3b82e8df424c76309fc88d
CT: dd13fbf22c8d18354d774bcd18f7eb814e9b528e9e424abc4e3f2463195e8018576565d16ab48845d11c9277f2865ebb4dc412fd5b27078f8325eadf971e6944c66542e34d9dda971e2aba70dbd3e94a1e638d521477a027776b52acf90520ca229ebc760b73128879475d1cbe1f70fc598b549cd92d8a9ac6833e500c138c56474db84cb3d70b7aa4f293a4c2b4d818b0ff9fd85918dc590a12a8c0e375c4d98b7fc87596547eb960676aad5559834588f00f251a9d53f95c47af4df3c4299175d5211779c148cfc988a5e9d9
TAG: 476616ea15190c1093fdc4a087643cae
KEY: f9f6eb9ad736a8f66e7459fef5ec2890188dc26baf34a95f6f0384e79f5c6559
NONCE: 7858dfc084fe4b0f
IN: a644ca6e7cc076e87eb2929fd257693fce0f6fb64fd632f7f07c648ebd03696c8e262e6a810d7b7c4e5eef8c65b5323c99dbba50a70b4a9e5c2a9e7315973cd67f35d8052ce9a85a206416dd3031929f4f929b13d0a5fb10cb73c65f6c0ace019da146b51c5274a099f44e3669d26add6f2ff081e886f3cf952fe0dbbe6b0534c23e307574bd35fbd657f5fcbd5dc19fb382a1dc0a2dc8285a0350f71554e4c601497749e35567dd4a273cddc9a48ce53a5f1d297fd8baf8d1b9feb35d9151114345abada4d90db947bb9a743c175f5653d1
AD: 2048d1c2ddfb5ec385b201832c7a993f229ba72ec16d6ebf723ef0c5032b9966209a9e8a63151b40412e96b82f86728ea6588c7e8e11ac71cc8eabab8c4b54de866658d9c5011def61fb3dbe4e630158a45ea41a2ed55ebd1efb1abeda7637de6fa5fd2f151c6d2f385bf6cd002ca8b4a2896e0d65944ee913e3c784669dd201b1985ef3577f7f123a5f9bcffa176c8f557c4f729133cac518642f27d9b22ca9b97faaafe5b669a10b79ace4a7d5727df146c77ce681357d69f9c2d65b4401bd73cd113387e3b3a05d897adad7a24c485e7b
CT: 4146faffd7313f5d9f625370d20413cc62ab65f4acfa3c7ee1125b937dd7a39f638fc46c8ed004fb525698de5d8620ec153435571817c3de257b0d0e648ebb92940c86a98262d54e764f28cbdd4f7d9bea970291f2110414f62064d7229c6332236c507b3dac742e651d85a2a22fb243c0cc7cc2d016e5bea38f33f9a9ce048944a5fe8b078d71d23168e12dfe5a0f0b829771edc7073fb96032b7be471337a37aca0cf7c0cdd543eed686cd34934717fd79a3f18492eef72f9f450b880aa7e2e1b65e3b04c22e72301338b43aa32ceec2e6
TAG: 10ffaf2be316676da02d7473a9df87b9
KEY: 29b19636cdd32507fd98ec4ee26caab1a917646fb8f05b0dc01728a9f4a127f0
NONCE: 06699d245916686d
IN: 5fdf913aceab1d6dbaf7d9a29352fa8a3eb22718043a79cffa2fe8c35c820aec7c07644b8785dcf7a433b4189abb257fb12b06fae0662641011a069873c3e3c5ccc78e7358184a62c2005c44b8a92254958eb5ff460d73cd80284d6daba22c3faba046c5426fe8b7cacec64b235a8f8d3e2641e5bc378830594bcfb27c177aea745951ee5780a63705727ef42c4ad3abf556d88e3830f3db6b09e93edd09485cbf907f79de61f8dc5cb5fb7665ffa0ef53cb48702f6a81d8ad421cef20c1dbdf402b8fafed56a5361b2f93f914a2380fdd0557faf1f4de
AD: 39116c49cc13adb065b92cb7635f73d5f6bf6b5ccbf72a3f65a5df6bd4a661105015358d9e69f42e98aed795e8161282bc113058b7ef3b9e23fcd8eeab34a392e03f4d6329c112cb968385ec52a7afc98bb8695785af6b27b700973cc952630b7247ce226b4fbb99b8a486370bf6345d4516c52c64e33f407c4f2d1ba90545c88732d98bbd97972ac5e94c694624a9b3782b0099824651cb7567914d25b3e13181a791dbcd40e76e836b3350d310a52151bf835d3c357c9871482c2928e8404c6e533406d4d6fa8f63366f2c4ed828141f1ff00f01a536
CT: 01e237220b619054a1f3670928fe67d40484b5af40fbd04d032500aac5acaa3b4584dd99a58c390627636a50de5d744f76a56a33205f9e3b00e16162eb47ff3333e1e208ca200f1a5338a86e17bd92dd2d16af8bb022a7dc05b923d019e05247f1a0d0b4bfcfce58dd6d83830705707676d55739abee89fcd5cb94b8fde006a5da02df64b00a467f45970b5ca440f22319b9735a55d454b9fba0588fef0c59d3d83823eba6e0601a96e10233826c5adeea6b2a51d386a07a9e047ad405b23d4c3d89f30c31e3199f0c8f927bfac43ceea1f969de0a8c0f
TAG: 092f9f3c5d4f2570c9946c87967f4579
KEY: bae06b9b5456707551c7b0e207aae02a19b4848ad8ca4ce40705bf8c856a6e52
NONCE: 9c27065c3ef2d522
IN: 50cdd88137ff428a88e87b5845be4924f6387537bb5c0b654c80107ab5698db75b2e131848e7aec156d31aed0766d31c379fece4095d38264c6d5945974d25f729c3b0ba11ea853e9cebdb6f03bb670fce08adff74d0a8f02d633fb34e0fb7337a8e66e1c12084d914fb6173b8105684db822752c6751a372bb16690284d661b8b8bc6a6dfbddf45ebc2219596f9f2f878c118df69030de38b4d99dde43b9b9e20a3dab691645dd518342f49b06a0fe0a397adf261e99f07af5b0b3798b1022ba0939c42a54d3b93641cffa3c2e174bce9ab7ad7e7c7924308d1a77a
AD: 5d5590db1bd316eb7a0e30e4c7a6dfdbef9d3287fdb8d824389599c3c2ee262b2192eb5b9708e66e22dbc7eca83fa1a995da3ce64c86fe5aa08b826d476dc439497e2d12e2702c63c8d27aa7f09fedee816dc8bffe1351d53271a34d4292b613b7efcedb7e3cf3e6ad389eef12471e9e20e38e7ae22a323abbadfe8f2e84271bffb1819feb4f77b82843cb8757cfae293631bc6d39669107e7015c85d7343ffa6fc1bbe6f5ab4de30cd752a281e03061ea89de2a3f5e90e20da22fd6e8525c100738667f42212b2cf45fcb23bbb54b21c117484b22c6e514685314df
CT: 66b7f69ac49fab4e5975aeb6fa9287d8eac02ac312c4de78f77f59da16cbcf87274e66801c4b862c33ea79cdc76528862bb2956c06db8b8acfac4794ebf39e35ac03cc73a4351a4ff762f681a48d6f25cad36e2814c9b5c40b9ae92509e58429106847789454d376836936bebc7a80e6c66e7aa52936d6b361378a41f849ad4e48f9ee2d3e92217a908fa8eb35736ac8ada7d32ae05391f2d807be3512543c36138a5fe660dd4cd4cd184bb43b6ba6bc0bae634e2fa9669304cd510ed5103f630068ff76d3375738de60a381842b421477e25a490cdd6894b2704125
TAG: c9998a677dfb0e91924aec9de0afd585
KEY: 2cb374cb048c168f2e43597f028d9e73cade1b458284ffc260d4fc6b9011c414
NONCE: 9fb909169bc9f4e9
IN: 39eb929482784b463546f5d84f80510f2019923d465b99d194246d68c7ae343f91971d8f7059cebb86aa5dd099289aa648248b8c5ca04e66ac5e9bf06776e3883495397618a0227f035666806e636836b47d3d2d255a49db79866cf00d9ddabda259c4f968a1e01e651c7811cebbee2ee71803ea1d9d23487eb221f2d9555756800aba5e6abbefd6fb72b3151cc99ced599cd86df2a9b1ce94f89f347eeb124d9e7f0d9cc48d3dedd819e6d3dbac57ecee199547b266116a2035c9acc4c8ca3271ac74952372897c4a5f2cb84e2d81817fec9d6774f6d8a5b2021684132db4fca3
AD: 0c7bd4f3a30ee944ccf9489181e6911684dcffad4593a9b65a67dfc80718c69b35897d01281016b7731e12c15cad8482e79458e08a755622e3f3f22a23ef6c8487a36ad1771ba06c641f06f85de0db3776cc6df06ad8fe3b4d60d58508de943083f17cbb9dc0d390ac94d8429e8c6fcfe063f424fbde0f62f6a7f91a626d195dc498a6e69bd93109c4e9ba13e7330aba456d710a4b0cc279d4045660406e26d61dff70d4a33c4f1052869f9248024e7a0f85f1effb32f6f7ccb1f860f3ef04e8f7b29096e6bcf9d4b3e0ce703e9bf228fdf515c2ff9cbabd16987be0f9babd3d8a
CT: 91ddadb86b7ebef798ddaa59da51d71316fcf6c9678143178227d778750dc9827fc6cc21e605c505023e6db25849df7fb6fc1ca4d223aa215f8c85b724643c83bf8218815a9f9e2952384e0ca6a80a3760b39daf91a3c6154c4728c2371fd181fa3764753d0b0c23808a82cd8f0497246e3a0f17f8906a07c725d2891ce968a9d432c2b102d85c05510b28e715bb60d0403a77490e7f18be81218bc4f39287b9bb09f50227dd2f55e4fb70c4438da8ba3c8ffbced87d90155913faa9979fc57e6cbeddfaba3d3ab4163c0eebc7d94279c27d3ed56338893dba542eaefba30f8c3b
TAG: 728e60f8124effbac234f70da925881c
KEY: f0f16b6f12b3840bbd1c4a6a0811eef237f1521b45de9986daec9f28fca6485c
NONCE: 7ac93e754e290323
IN: 0530556424d823f90a7f1c524c4baa706aad2807e289e9479301e3e7a71f2a5e14e6232ea785f339c669af2e6d25f1d5a261096a548d23864945c3a589b67b09b0304a784d61b42b2419139485242e0d51fcbe9e8fed996d214de8717e6a71f8987ccad65eb92e66707034a5ae38e6486e26eb4374c565aad5df949dab209f7f7bcd8eb6fc52761a26cfe5d01fd349e59f4042e6dbe6b232f9301b971dee121d8aa1e62d40f043a42f3aa859d867eb809b1ced5ae1ec62cacf94a69fafd0631a8b5dfd66d855900fb295eec90ae5fcbf77beae267a79d24081bb322d8c4e0630fed252541b36
AD: 13bfcc17b810099cda31ca53a1323db9b07633ceb2088a42263a4cbd6a4d47978776005c9a20203319c3a3ae434e9a26fb541047dc9df38dc36c095267272e203d0b24d119a70a7e96041b6d82b7c4d5570e1e4a1cf2f6e44ae63fe005a1f5b900778c482f7bd89e2e02305e35b8f61b7bb2c78a13aebfce0145d1c5aa0bf1d10d23616d5a3a446de550302f56f81dc56fe4f3700f14242688d9b92d8a427979b403c8de8c493a2cde510eaf6b285e6675b173aa0314a386b635c7577d5aff0d868a0cb3f73c8d2005f8c7c9dab5a060ef80102c9d4a4af988838afe87aff04c0689e8c3c7f9
CT: 2c14c3931e98e84507c4c165c2ed47ad4a178f0e216cd7ac2453bbbf9f85dd06bd8ef54a9ff1fd3dd8e0cafb635d8f2de861a0db5b14d03f17aaea8c89b3010797c71c13a0e666899d7ff6e53c4f08be8ddb3e37688b5afa088079b6c7519b833e16560073e699530302028a3496e05edddec01a23a4c7983956250e8d9e616f7b940856955cde81c1efabf6b7b92f153d03f4cd17e7f7d2907670cfc84d45c1d7936775a3fce47968504278ffaecacea0871b227f250e2979516f6fa310fec0d8df1af7872e5a534e82870aa05f43ef0a455846b93ce938064fa33e92de262e4156dae56775
TAG: d95d73bf9aeb71eba9042396f3725424
KEY: 3792943c0396f1840496917ce8ad89608385007e796febeea3805f3f4cbeccf7
NONCE: 23b2f9068b2c4c85
IN: be6b67eb943ee7b5c785cd882f653e73a8f75b4a41a2a7c56ae5a10f729caf39948fe48ad0e51240e2e7aa43193c7ec6ce7f4909fc94c9f99e38e6a0ad7e98eb29c5c2e61c99e9cbe890f154185cec213a74725d23c1a4e4d0cb9b1a36b78c87e5eee20d2aa29aae80d4759eb0c51c5dc3a95bdbbf7e14eb434419a6c88a954ac03d0c98739f4211b8732acd71c297f578b8cb64ccac45f7235ddc7f2a3f5f997525c1ed39dc550126cdf9cedaf55425489085e91b170be6205a5a395f2dd4084a3e8dbc4fd8b13252f7effae067b571cb94a1e54aba45b1b9841308db0cc75b03cfce4ddafe89ce20f2d1
AD: 7eb6d7b7bbaaa3c202a4f0f1de2263767169eb4a64853240d48c0f8d5d31b08d5baf42977614a57aad99426cde76d242cb37d2956d8c77dc4fd62a3abf30e8ac6cd58c8ef35e67497022960138c57787818892460f3bfc16e37ff388b1edc6ce2bc53c22717edc7a03d4c78b0dbbe9121c7fd8a3e3993b87a4fe389bff13bdae3b349de0b6db561602c53f746022aeb4483c723b67825042f4af20b7dd1e6031cf54215266295c524ac8e1370424c5c5e607fb3e23e97c8eebe64656775edf616422a8b974e1acf13ab45c9a367a7dd9b2d62f48bbc05819b65eccb813ca813f57b22ee4c280dbb5a9d8d5
CT: 0b316ab2bcf5359900fa4082d5d253b49ad94b70e3fab544f98bd111cbcef6766cf953deec08cae1f489fe12f7acc0032db8a6b0c0eee0c206ea5fb973feaebf90f690e840094db5e13fdd7157ba127368c995b426529435a1bcdd1f14ce9125b8a0e4c96b6ec09e3c36a180adf81941c002d19c19d53c2009be803b987504606b7d43bdee5e0b32ff23c466b6cccfcd0d4e88fd1332e73712b5ab725c1a383e584f34f80daff29d285ae5e43cf1d0cc7a828e75c25daced3a581a93d7a50f313b33f38dddfaa23cd5b9914797db820ee2400d52bf5fa982277fe9b5881ac42981633b3957b0e935051828
TAG: 01973ee2e81cef22751a6a8831d752ef
KEY: fe4be6054773f634356ac328591fbc6f833b0d1beeb38dd5b6feb7481b4489d4
NONCE: 0b3f16f898a5a7d5
IN: 76ced1ade6d1ef4069afddb32e7432d4ff2fd06685121f7b16464e7a72d365744f547d2ccf53486310e38b42d8bacaf711e54c5458d2d68c4dbcc8de31ab6732f4430e88a64565f5b287640775aaa2af1cc461d3e415bb275c6246b1b58517aa72667eae291a2982eda175d1b22c5a58e6fec2b3743d55712f201ca24ba5c0ae8c25724871b2ec2fb914a8da5a52670ab9b43a83b8568ce74db5c634061cb80530c8070c38b8f48c33ba136cb9f2158ee7eda8b65f2192fc94d1291f182f101795b7190c74b319d2d3e02a97c824d9c9471a83797e4936310b207e3a1e0bcf75f7c3e3ee48a747641cdc4377f2d55082
AD: 834cd775cbefe4b33a3ca53a00c06a3c4a666983e4115a029f15729460daa45d1505e95172d3695625a186b28b8be173a925af04665f209267b3c5123e8be13da447ee1ae856bb0925f35aaa76e04a7bca8460f76c2024de2149f38a8cfba81694b854885d72568105571b6b213a0bc188a44cc7fe13153cbf261401b238cf12a95e23cb56f240114f16e2f1e3a514615aab4449c0c49e4d900b0e17d1a8dabb53d43dca32fa052d576b73dd9b40856b515d6d7efc2a5c17e0ebcb17bd59dc86f22ce909301a2652f134e82ef0e4519487ed12d51536024f2ae8f75d937c42d003076e5dea8de0c684cda1f34253d8fc
CT: f8defb6fe95dfec499b909996a1f75a198a90e4d6c6464d00a357a555311c42fe92dbbc4b79c935e4f0b1a95e44fdbc1380bebabca28db4dd0d2870daaafc38ef27908c3509e945714801cc51f1a07b2430c74fa64f2a7c2f7fd1551d258c9c3be020873fc1bf19f33ab6c660911dcf2317195d0efee82d20ec26d22611f9cf86c51a64e28b3a1f344500018e0855c88dae3c07acaeaa10b60388484dce93e16e6e1a6e69e899806648a92568c8780e9f4baacd98cbb353ac2f908e775d92303cfab843f15be0e0c322a958802fb1a60fcc7631f151f4c2b8cb965d2d296acef250275a2fecc0cea803ce7c058b12dd2
TAG: ade515091930dd7861b27f78a87ef60c
KEY: a288b11ce5382ec724ce4ab2d7efa8e777e91ebd04367935e15f9dac483e9596
NONCE: 874144dbf648b325
IN: 4c9195280a79a509919af4947e9e07231695fd7c5088539f23936ce88770ce07d9ad3ae4a463b3a57d0634d3a77ceaadf347a334682b04be8e58b8e86fb94a1f93255132b8cdb0df86f5bea354eea4e8315fea83e3fdf6e58aa9f26e93caa08e5e2551a94bd916a51fed29ec16f66800cda6a0aa24ec308bf5fb885afba272685de27c1edcdd3668048ef07b06e90d464a8aa28664903cac45e154e8e1e39c257e1ff506b9d95cef4f300bb73b899e7828602c3c1d290b8cf55ee5fd72ecce9e6efc9293aebf674a70e2a7673e75629c12950622dff71d3ec0992e57776c788c6927d30b4e24b749191c3ce8017f0ada6276e43720
AD: 04abe8588c8c8c39a182092e5e7840442bd1c1149da102c4ee412bd8b82baa5087ef7291b5cd077c177c42770b0023e0e462b06e7553f191bcb0315a34918dcdbffe2b99c3e011b4220cc1775debcc0db55fa60df9b52234f3d3fa9606508badc26f30b47cdb4f1c0f4708d417b6853e66c2f1f67f6200daf760ceb64ffc43db27f057ad3ee973e31d7e5d5deb050315c1c687980c0c148ee1a492d47acfcd6132334176c11258c89b19ba02e6acc55d852f87b6a2169ed34a6147caa60906ac8c0813c0f05522af7b7f0faddb4bc297405e28ecf5a0f6aac6258422d29cfe250d61402840f3c27d0ce39b3e2d5f1e520541d2965e
CT: 0afce770a12f15d67ac104ba0640aab95922390607473cbda71321156a5559906be933fb0980da56f27e89796eaa1054f5aacf1668d9f273cc69071b9e8e22af6a205a6a88f7ad918e22f616bddbb07c78913c7e056e769e6fcf91c7600c2740212e3a176e4110cac9e361a59a773457064d2dc652dd115d04f1c3756c0e1d39f6737a16b4508663e310934c49c58058b3c7b9af7bb2334c8a163608c42499658986927cda365e2aead3ac29de16e47e954383ea566f8fb245a4e5a934c767bb3bf7e0eb8a477fd0e1f61bcb238462a0d19c5cea9293ca58ade76829413216a7882cd2846323046694f78cd8b0347792ebb75abdc1
TAG: 973e58b1b8adb176a6f1e5c963bfdc5c
KEY: 65b63ed53750c88c508c44881ae59e6fff69c66288f3c14cfec503391262cafc
NONCE: 7f5e560a1de434ba
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: e4d18a701b8308697b5e79141ed783c1
KEY: 4986fd62d6cb86b2eaf219174bec681bebcdef86c8be291f27d3e5dc69e2feba
NONCE: d08d486620ed2e84
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: fd5e29332832a14a31a9ce2ca8568498
KEY: 7d28a60810e43d3dfa32e97c07957ec069fc80cc6a50061830aa29b3aa777dfc
NONCE: 47738ac8f10f2c3a
IN: b50278ae0f0fa2f918bb9a5ed3a0797c328e452974d33cbf26a1e213aa20c03d0d89490869754abf84dbbe231d7bccdced77d53fd4527356d8e02b681fc89a535ae87308bf7fbc26197a5ea85bdb3aa033b8da5cd197ea6d72f96f63b03f4ecc7adedf399a5043776cdb32c08f30b77f34df85f8adb8e02649a04b020b03e17d445ca63e4ed73ae432c481392e031eba2f9d2f7f981d1e50917822bd6ff71c239d33444ada3523a59dfbce5457eadec1ab926c9e6c5299c7521e3f204b96901a712504fcc782e8cea80ba12a7f7e71cec3d0871899b6ca059061da037715f7d13fed01c9cade1e687b4fbb1f4ac4b040db3b43800f112fb900e4f772d61b921cbce4da6f
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 1fdd2dcd935f55822bf7231a516ca841
KEY: a76e9b916f5a67b78a5949651c8c3a9741a1bc3c41cdf85fd2c8f3e9a0616098
NONCE: 0808da8292dc14e0
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: b45df119043d29008fcef36a169ef886
KEY: 98cd2477a7a072c69f375b88d09ed9d7b9c3df3f87e36ce621726f76e3b41a1d
NONCE: 77d185aaf715aa48
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: f613b65226afb64c614fe60d9c71ed74
KEY: 2f0f4631ab1c1bcf8f3ad0559c818d50e0af7d8cd63faa357f2069f30881d9cb
NONCE: 7d0ced2fdb1c9173
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 0fd7419c54bc84265ed310a3411a3f2e
KEY: a48b9b6df475e566aba7671fbd76772cb0eff0b12499967978ce3e25fac92feb
NONCE: 2ccbf0d6c40cb302
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 2aabff35611b3e0013f6ae0df130799b
KEY: 923d4b086b9e43b986f7b65e4cea6113a3d8aabefa89323c5e4d5b6f158bb7e0
NONCE: a0f73297b87f5deb
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: fa8ee13400fb3f63b899df582f2fec45
KEY: df73adab2768559ea983cce85453fe81d79be3b3c57f202b31b94d6635cf2e4b
NONCE: e7a87e6bf6b5a354
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 184095b7a8190abec08bb72d19eeb103
KEY: 55a4be2448b464c2ea52a2f2664ed6aba865c14ea1fea77f4689331fd105c8d4
NONCE: db37c0a405b4626d
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: f7d3b58a34a86e99267e5db206f17bbe
KEY: 3304e4917ad7777b86c26a636292c9cc4c10d32003c49e07209eb0ef8505031a
NONCE: 4d572d116fbd8c4d
IN: 2f242c2ba33790ecef862b0e077ff8b15eb9d10cf2ff621ed65902494431dcbd
AD: e699bbf250cdd93d229d0740e433897e2d19132e2b722df8b69bb6a7c2cf3b93
CT: fb81e30436e437c7f686f86b1b65c73549a9d09db810d320785c3634934150b3
TAG: 8b
KEY: ed6057bb163f1609ff28b938122f495e3d5ae4ec3dbd7456c9b5c82e28e952dc
NONCE: e6ff6852f3a3afde
IN: 3c50edc967eb0b3b2355f6400e0a036e796c8b7d72c5e583a86e820d53e76c43
AD: 2441db55148e14e9e241d68296eb60d529408f0534143089671bce546db96d88
CT: 6ecabccee31519374d4bed11296e7483d1cb759bea3f4446a96bda8b4ca6d7ac
TAG: 355f
KEY: 73568183c1f9725af30e0f2067606ce802c3fe3ab5cff8d02b3db8c35176ee0d
NONCE: 0bc9e19321b3d00a
IN: ec2590af5ccd226a32ff750c1b029c11e3dd76c469a5579da9418e4c3fdc0d41
AD: df30160ae0cbf2cf8992221bd62dffe691dd602afa784ca691479e957af3acf1
CT: 9e8d8ac30626f8b831448d6976933aa5bb8c6dbc794e1f4b7eeb0e4a59342c07
TAG: 9fd36a
KEY: 273bcb3f8c067da4ec3418799ad40e7e4aee74ad7e629499d646df4a7e585025
NONCE: f60be3eb894b4030
IN: 697498ba964d5ef401da4d94844fab1efc635e7157d0831a325bb5a4cf1fbd34
AD: 9129715deab14f02c76ba8172571b1fa9d50365cd795bfccdfc28e7e7b4f66fc
CT: bd4cd5af83be1c13933302675d9fcaf1c4cacdf269f6ff441d1ea2211c54e7ed
TAG: 7ab12a37
KEY: ad39610c2e6a6d0961207390e076e972c2edadca885c92965fa648b2ce34fdbf
NONCE: a90db690bba83b78
IN: 31c49e3cd3d80a82e6b90316dfb94b38b8a23042519bf40c8181fec873c99002
AD: ddbd7d821d18d44c66295abf245b227b5cf4366811b7b34c07679600abdbfc29
CT: 94628fc303a0546edd51e966f2bd87968f37800c607d5e5a91f727fc1fec406f
TAG: c22ec4e4c8
KEY: 29984954060ba06ece1bcfc0e50195f4632c6df48da1e02ae6c14f7065668971
NONCE: cce53a25aeeaf747
IN: b9b87433a9894f3c9ca8212623d62369a565a2edcddd276e07d611eda3597426
AD: 19fa9aa59697559d8b46d9cd49c3b763c0b73b26b9e334a3eeac2c86fdbaca8d
CT: b68c83397770c36f073710882fa86d43b0e54e8efef0ff75075604d0d7ec4e1b
TAG: 40d4ab752f3d
KEY: 5c3b838b84100b2a818c0842e9fe19a7c50cf5f3ea73364c816ef588e500ff3f
NONCE: fdf6b0229e4bcc2a
IN: 2ba91904c143be99297b39f52856904af41705c176c8c6554b6bc89bddffbcc1
AD: 3539d9dd821f004f4ced1637071f4be6abd7fe98f017f0a8ce3f49dc8d496f46
CT: ff9d6d924e737a1df8c2bd3047e40ab401f903aa0e5b51acb991bac38ac2cc4d
TAG: 1bcaa415a6a3c7
KEY: 6d65e627cab6d5eb1a088b25bd6c3a8a004a7a19cccae909d62fed3559c812f7
NONCE: 7ff00a8798b792de
IN: 6848ee4ac820291a2e1dc3baad97f1ad8b7160dfeaa1bc83b2700ae42b5a366b
AD: d2437b1306bf0ea211449fac863ca0d1074d84caee9009c5d54b9e9bdc8de6b1
CT: 2da0abe2a71e1c0b1ab309c160a8cebe45c6e16170aa5561806484ba2b5b9a9a
TAG: 566003e1f78d2a90
KEY: 63401046a96efbc8c6483a2c396b2a593d3fae0db565525b85999fae13a46b6a
NONCE: 051393d775e635ee
IN: 2b4b6477580382aae782f8b5772c0948a444d8d95caacd85c0856c7e4393fe09
AD: 3d84d2e70e9c062d1f511eb685a9a90c8d5fa50eadf8455c7148666b3e7155e0
CT: 880c1123e54fd8ffb3c293720dd174913572e619ef46504cdaa64fc451b0ec1c
TAG: 339274339c88d50ac0
KEY: 291fccfce0782f1787d62d4b9293d2ada4c04d37a8288ba9ba9aae0d31aad204
NONCE: 7450bbd62e4aba7b
IN: adc251e793181e5d4c4bd983b853eb13f2096ccb340996b6eca4cd2157efcec7
AD: 4c598f6deedc8c1d97da33654763495cca3517430eec4edb006b10c95e031ae6
CT: 28bda22e4922cd8ff6739cd8a6bdafce036d9c61a145a65ca1b86f6d4d3206a1
TAG: d98fd43fe7ac74d4b016
KEY: fa3a9674d4a0eb36b2f7547c956443d09e6b4e4acfc9deda838eb7ebdb999a8d
NONCE: 0a2572592c3bbbf6
IN: ae27f70fda9f5a5be0f704a27f0b8a9c04ce83d3c2e0d7ec152da25f473b0c8a
AD: 6ee8705a9a3655d198497ad410da02005872ecbe397824851b80f4050bfdd311
CT: f356cbd88e4e2aff62d91e3f914032085388955bbba995fde013758b8702e38f
TAG: 00324c76fecd3f50e1e3b8
KEY: 471ec87b992b104d369748d96856b5f66149cb45ca05c17f29d24eb9526fe6db
NONCE: 23a2df9ed0b47439
IN: 2b9452bca0f48e5519ec3d0736597608df6ad9ce799eba913cff71573d79c092
AD: a56722ddfaee5f1b64398c225ee8bcdcfde5c2127101c363bfac52bc409c1082
CT: 7bbc464aac5dd29c25262fe0b116c176d827c2cc8dd63428393b0a9110f3c194
TAG: 2e87f4a6663a62e47c7e197f
KEY: a29d1cfd4ccdc18803fbca9500f4bb29ce99cfcbf8acc41b8208dae4b7ee5d64
NONCE: 634f99e88e237ef0
IN: 09ee5982c5743f396d0c29c13e3fbb8fb89f61705da05466291e010effd51a5c
AD: 564dddfcc3227b413244f1105b610f192decf15c4cfa067f4d7fcd6bd7af11b8
CT: 32916b67a6f32733623344c98c49773f3e721dc2ded105fb245799525bc9c84c
TAG: ff463c07e7ef831321d3fd775f
KEY: 08ba23616d911188f91da063278bef1237dcbf17f52585e53c2c4b6cf3ac9f0d
NONCE: 989ae593eddd3874
IN: 749152c9478944c8271c0c11e07bc1c569eec01493e65b3b94842a1bf5d721f8
AD: a12d1a45b7c9b91ab08751a70b753714052ad24e0b2619fe8c3be303c65f2dbc
CT: 34c40538ee1d22ddf8ac290dd7d423dfc622b5cf8f3412a5343e277822aea713
TAG: 014c7c678e0949e88071d1fe3531
KEY: c2ba8bed8634156afc6bfe3754c91744d4131de39d059f3a866399f916553b5c
NONCE: 80fbf7b433a4cd9c
IN: 419be6623e7964f9f26068dd969e4a139617e67c5ffb269b3013c433fe771c77
AD: 3937592db78a61ff469691b6800792019bc2b3d42512f23c1b1a66a8274495cb
CT: 9d5bd1c7e766763eb00684c038043111d8c6390a8d6e17a15ef97c02ab16f09c
TAG: a64d0eeb4a01481ec0cee8c1c357e3
+266 -212
View File
@@ -1,524 +1,578 @@
# Test vector from RFC 7539 Section 2.8.1.
KEY: 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
NONCE: 070000004041424344454647
IN: "Ladies and Gentlemen of the class of '99: If I could offer you only one tip for the future, sunscreen would be it."
AD: 50515253c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7
CT: d31a8d34648e60db7b86afbc53ef7ec2a4aded51296e08fea9e2b5a736ee62d63dbea45e8ca9671282fafb69da92728b1a71de0a9e060b2905d6a5b67ecd3b3692ddbd7f2d778b8c9803aee328091b58fab324e4fad675945585808b4831d7bc3ff4def08e4b7a9de576d26586cec64b6116
TAG: 1ae10b594f09e26a7e902ecbd0600691
# Test padding AD with 15 zeros in the tag calculation.
KEY: 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
NONCE: 070000004041424344454647
IN: "123456789abcdef0"
AD: "1"
CT: ae49da6934cb77822c83ed9852e46c9e
TAG: dac9c841c168379dcf8f2bb8e22d6da2
# Test padding IN with 15 zeros in the tag calculation.
KEY: 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
NONCE: 070000004041424344454647
IN: "1"
AD: "123456789abcdef0"
CT: ae
TAG: 3ed2f824f901a8994052f852127c196a
# Test padding AD with 1 zero in the tag calculation.
KEY: 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
NONCE: 070000004041424344454647
IN: "123456789abcdef0"
AD: "123456789abcdef"
CT: ae49da6934cb77822c83ed9852e46c9e
TAG: 2e9c9b1689adb5ec444002eb920efb66
# Test padding IN with 1 zero in the tag calculation.
KEY: 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
NONCE: 070000004041424344454647
IN: "123456789abcdef"
AD: "123456789abcdef0"
CT: ae49da6934cb77822c83ed9852e46c
TAG: 05b2937f8bbc64fed21f0fb74cd7147c
# Test maximal nonce value.
KEY: 808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f909192939495969798999a9b9c9d9e9f
NONCE: ffffffffffffffffffffffff
IN: "123456789abcdef0"
AD: "123456789abcdef0"
CT: e275aeb341e1fc9a70c4fd4496fc7cdb
TAG: 41acd0560ea6843d3e5d4e5babf6e946
# Test vectors from chacha20_poly1305_old_tests.txt, modified for the RFC 7539
# AEAD construction.
KEY: 9a97f65b9b4c721b960a672145fca8d4e32e67f9111ea979ce9c4826806aeee6
NONCE: 3de9c0da2bd7f91e
IN:
AD:
CT:
NONCE: 000000003de9c0da2bd7f91e
IN: ""
AD: ""
CT: ""
TAG: 5a6e21f4ba6dbee57380e79e79c30def
KEY: bcb2639bf989c6251b29bf38d39a9bdce7c55f4b2ac12a39c8a37b5d0a5cc2b5
NONCE: 1e8b4c510f5ca083
NONCE: 000000001e8b4c510f5ca083
IN: 8c8419bc27
AD: 34ab88c265
CT: 1a7c2f33f5
TAG: 2875c659d0f2808de3a40027feff91a4
TAG: 2a63876a887f4f080c9df418813fc1fd
KEY: 4290bcb154173531f314af57f3be3b5006da371ece272afa1b5dbdd1100a1007
NONCE: cd7cf67be39c794a
NONCE: 00000000cd7cf67be39c794a
IN: 86d09974840bded2a5ca
AD: 87e229d4500845a079c0
CT: e3e446f7ede9a19b62a4
TAG: 677dabf4e3d24b876bb284753896e1d6
TAG: 356d9eda66d08016b853d87c08b5c1b3
KEY: 422a5355b56dcf2b436aa8152858106a88d9ba23cdfe087b5e74e817a52388b3
NONCE: 1d12d6d91848f2ea
NONCE: 000000001d12d6d91848f2ea
IN: 537a645387f22d6f6dbbea568d3feb
AD: bef267c99aec8af56bc238612bfea6
CT: 281a366705c5a24b94e56146681e44
TAG: 38f2b8ee3be44abba3c010d9cab6e042
TAG: 59143dab187449060a3ec2a1681613cc
KEY: ec7b864a078c3d05d970b6ea3ba6d33d6bb73dfa64c622a4727a96ede876f685
NONCE: 2bca0e59e39508d3
NONCE: 000000002bca0e59e39508d3
IN: b76733895c871edd728a45ed1a21f15a9597d49d
AD: cc1243ea54272db602fb0853c8e7027c56338b6c
CT: 1fb9b2958fce47a5cada9d895fbb0c00d3569858
TAG: 042ad5042c89ebc1aad57d3fb703d314
TAG: 219b4252deb16a43b292165aabc5d5ce
KEY: 2c4c0fdb611df2d4d5e7898c6af0022795364adb8749155e2c68776a090e7d5c
NONCE: 13ce7382734c4a71
NONCE: 0000000013ce7382734c4a71
IN: 0dc6ff21a346e1337dd0db81d8f7d9f6fd1864418b98aadcdb
AD: 0115edcb176ab8bfa947d1f7c3a86a845d310bf6706c59a8f9
CT: dad65e4244a1a17ce59d88b00af4f7434bd7830ffdd4c5558f
TAG: ac1437b45d8eacf9c0fe547c84fb82a2
TAG: 7ae32f186cf9ec59b41b764b34307d4f
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 5d9856060c54ab06
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: 6dd98710d8a889dceea0d0a936f98617
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a84138648a5919a
KEY: a8b9766f404dea8cf7d7dfaf5822f53df9ccd092e332a57f007b301b507d5e14
NONCE: c7f2f7a233104a2d
NONCE: 00000000c7f2f7a233104a2d
IN: 4d6faeaee39179a7c892faae3719656cc614c7e6ecd8fcb570a3b82c4dace969090338
AD: c6d83b6a56408a356e68d0494d4eff150530b09551d008373d6dee2b8d6b5619d67fdb
CT: a15443f083316eef627a371f4c9ac654d0dd75255d8a303125e9f51af4233ff4ceb7fe
TAG: 52504e880f6792a60708cc6db72eae42
TAG: 63c2b4e0973096299488b0a66ffa54c1
KEY: 5e8d0e5f1467f7a750c55144d0c670f7d91075f386795b230c9bf1c04ba250bc
NONCE: 88049f44ba61b88f
NONCE: 0000000088049f44ba61b88f
IN: 51a1eebcc348e0582196a0bce16ed1f8ac2e91c3e8a690e04a9f4b5cf63313d7ad08d1efbff85c89
AD: 5d09bf0be90026f9fc51f73418d6d864b6d197ea030b3de072bd2c2f5cab5860a342abbd29dba9dc
CT: 35aa4bd4537aa611fd7578fc227df50ebcb00c692a1cf6f02e50ed9270bd93af3bc68f4c75b96638
TAG: ccea1cbbc83944cc66df4dbf6fb7fc46
TAG: 4461139c4055333106cf7f7556fd4171
KEY: 21a9f07ec891d488805e9b92bb1b2286f3f0410c323b07fee1dc6f7379e22e48
NONCE: 066215be6567377a
NONCE: 00000000066215be6567377a
IN: c1b0affaf2b8d7ef51cca9aacf7969f92f928c2e3cc7db2e15f47ee1f65023910d09f209d007b7436ee898133d
AD: dfdfdf4d3a68b47ad0d48828dc17b2585da9c81c3a8d71d826b5fa8020fee002397e91fc9658e9d61d728b93eb
CT: 8ff4ceb600e7d45696d02467f8e30df0d33864a040a41ffb9e4c2da09b92e88b6f6b850e9f7258d827b9aaf346
TAG: 4eeddc99784011f0758ba5ebfba61827
TAG: b2ad07b86aca1b3ab34033c12d6a08cc
KEY: 54c93db9aa0e00d10b45041c7a7e41ee9f90ab78ae4c1bba18d673c3b370abde
NONCE: 3f2d44e7b352360f
NONCE: 000000003f2d44e7b352360f
IN: 1241e7d6fbe5eef5d8af9c2fb8b516e0f1dd49aa4ebe5491205194fe5aea3704efaf30d392f44cc99e0925b84460d4873344
AD: f1d1b08dd6fe96c46578c1d1ad38881840b10cb5eae41e5f05fe5287223fa72242aea48cb374a80be937b541f9381efa66bb
CT: 027b86865b80b4c4da823a7d3dbcf5845bf57d58ee334eb357e82369cc628979e2947830d9d4817efd3d0bc4779f0b388943
TAG: 4303fa0174ac2b9916bf89c593baee37
TAG: 6de01091d749f189c4e25aa315b31495
KEY: 808e0e73e9bcd274d4c6f65df2fe957822a602f039d4752616ba29a28926ef4a
NONCE: 1b9cd73d2fc3cb8e
NONCE: 000000001b9cd73d2fc3cb8e
IN: 3436c7b5be2394af7e88320c82326a6db37887ff9de41961c7d654dd22dd1f7d40444d48f5c663b86ff41f3e15b5c8ca1337f97635858f
AD: d57cfbe5f2538044282e53b2f0bb4e86ea2233041fb36adb8338ded092148f8c2e894ef8766a7ec2dd02c6ac5dbab0c3703c5e9119e37c
CT: 9b950b3caf7d25eaf5fca6fa3fe12ed077d80dcd5579851233c766bb8bb613ec91d925a939bb52fb88d5eda803cfe2a8cda2e055b962fd
TAG: 6bf5b718f5bbe1395a5fdfcbbef752f5
TAG: 0887ec7d5e1a4e532746ec247a30825a
KEY: 4adfe1a26c5636536cd7cb72aa5bded0b1aa64487ad0e4078f311e8782768e97
NONCE: d69e54badec11560
NONCE: 00000000d69e54badec11560
IN: 19b3f9411ce875fcb684cbdc07938c4c1347e164f9640d37b22f975b4b9a373c4302ae0e7dfdeba1e0d00ced446e338f4c5bc01b4becef5115825276
AD: bda1b0f6c2f4eb8121dcbd2eebd91a03ae1d6e0523b9b6f34b6f16ceca0d086654fb0552bfd5c8e1887730e1449ea02d7f647ae835bc2dab4bbc65b9
CT: ea765a829d961e08bacaed801237ef4067df38ad3737b7c6de4db587a102a86fc4abbaabea0ee97c95ca7f571c7bab6f38cbae60cd6e6a4ce3c7a320
TAG: b425cdf10cd0123a7e64b347c6b4b1f0
TAG: a27f18846f5a4f7fcc724656c91cf4f3
KEY: eb3db86c14b7cc2e494345d0dfb4841bbd3aa1e2bc640cca0c6c405520685639
NONCE: 88b54b28d6da8c81
NONCE: 0000000088b54b28d6da8c81
IN: f75c0a357271430b1ecff07a307b6c29325c6e66935046704a19845e629f87a9e3b8aa6c1df55dd426a487d533bb333e46f0d3418464ac1bef059231f8e87e6284
AD: 34b08bb0df821c573dcb56f5b8b4a9920465067f3b5bf3e3254ea1da1a7fc9847fd38bdfe6b30927945263a91fa288c7cf1bee0fddb0fadf5948c5d83eb4623575
CT: 146ec84f5dc1c9fe9de3307a9182dbaa75965bf85f5e64563e68d039a5b659aa8863b89228edb93ff3d8c3323ab0d03300476aa4aca206d4626a6b269b2078912d
TAG: 0058a8dff32c29935c62210c359bd281
TAG: 854cbb42bade86a09597482c8604681a
KEY: dd5b49b5953e04d926d664da3b65ebcffbbf06abbe93a3819dfc1abbecbaab13
NONCE: c5c8009459b9e31a
NONCE: 00000000c5c8009459b9e31a
IN: f21f6706a4dc33a361362c214defd56d353bcb29811e5819ab3c5c2c13950c7aa0000b9d1fe69bb46454514dcce88a4a5eda097c281b81e51d6a4dba47c80326ba6cea8e2bab
AD: fe6f4cbb00794adea59e9de8b03c7fdf482e46f6c47a35f96997669c735ed5e729a49416b42468777e6a8d7aa173c18b8177418ded600124a98cbb65489f9c24a04f1e7127ce
CT: 911ead61b2aa81d00c5eff53aeea3ab713709ed571765890d558fb59d3993b45f598a39e5eff4be844c4d4bd1ef9622e60412b21140007d54dcf31b2c0e3e98cf33a00fd27f0
TAG: d38d672665e2c8c4a07954b10ecff7d9
TAG: 2865d2a26f413cc92416340f9491e1be
KEY: 3b319e40148a67dc0bb19271d9272b327bc5eee087173d3d134ad56c8c7dc020
NONCE: ce5cf6fef84d0010
NONCE: 00000000ce5cf6fef84d0010
IN: 27b5627b17a2de31ad00fc2ecb347da0a399bb75cc6eadd4d6ee02de8fbd6a2168d4763ba9368ba982e97a2db8126df0343cdad06d2bc7d7e12eec731d130f8b8745c1954bfd1d717b4ea2
AD: a026b6638f2939ec9cc28d935fb7113157f3b5b7e26c12f8f25b36412b0cd560b7f11b62788a76bd171342e2ae858bcecb8266ff8482bbaed593afe818b9829e05e8e2b281ae7799580142
CT: 368fb69892447b75778f1c5236e1e9d5d89255c3d68d565a5bba4f524d6ad27de13087f301e2ef4c08f5e2c6128b1d3e26de845c4ac4869e4c8bd8858ad0d26dec3b5d61a9e3666a3911ba
TAG: 2e70564c3999c448d92cc6df29d095c4
TAG: 1414f1b91966340417c38226ccca9d3d
KEY: 43bf97407a82d0f684bb85342380d66b85fcc81c3e22f1c0d972cd5bfdf407f4
NONCE: 8b6ba494c540fba4
NONCE: 000000008b6ba494c540fba4
IN: 4b4c7e292a357f56fdf567c32fc0f33608110d7ce5c69112987d7b5a0bd46d8627a721b0aed070b54ea9726084188c518cba829f3920365afc9382c6a5eb0dd332b84612366735be2479b63c9efc7ff5
AD: 1e0acf4070e8d6758b60d81b6d289a4ecdc30e3de4f9090c13691d5b93d5bbcef984f90956de53c5cf44be6c70440661fa58e65dec2734ff51d6d03f57bddda1f47807247e3194e2f7ddd5f3cafd250f
CT: d0076c88ad4bc12d77eb8ae8d9b5bf3a2c5888a8d4c15297b38ece5d64f673191dc81547240a0cbe066c9c563f5c3424809971b5a07dcc70b107305561ce85aecb0b0ea0e8b4ff4d1e4f84836955a945
TAG: 75c9347425b459af6d99b17345c61ff7
TAG: c5ca34599c6a8b357c6723ee12b24da8
KEY: 12fc0bc94104ed8150bde1e56856ce3c57cd1cf633954d22552140e1f4e7c65d
NONCE: d3875d1b6c808353
NONCE: 00000000d3875d1b6c808353
IN: 24592082d6e73eb65c409b26ceae032e57f6877514947fc45eb007b8a6034494dde5563ac586ea081dc12fa6cda32266be858e4748be40bb20f71320711bf84c3f0e2783a63ad6e25a63b44c373a99af845cdf452c
AD: b8be08463e84a909d071f5ff87213391b7da889dc56fd2f1e3cf86a0a03e2c8eaa2f539bf73f90f5298c26f27ef4a673a12784833acb4d0861562142c974ee37b09ae7708a19f14d1ad8c402bd1ecf5ea280fab280
CT: 9d9ae6328711fb897a88462d20b8aa1b278134cdf7b23e1f1c809fa408b68a7bfc2be61a790008edaa98823381f45ae65f71042689d88acfa5f63332f0fba737c4772c972eba266640056452903d6522cefd3f264e
TAG: e9c982d4ade7397bcfaa1e4c5a6cd578
TAG: e84211b6cfd43543f8b1b4db07a494d1
KEY: 7b6300f7dc21c9fddeaa71f439d53b553a7bf3e69ff515b5cb6495d652a0f99c
NONCE: 40b32e3fdc646453
NONCE: 0000000040b32e3fdc646453
IN: 572f60d98c8becc8ba80dd6b8d2d0f7b7bbfd7e4abc235f374abd44d9035c7650a79d1dd545fa2f6fb0b5eba271779913e5c5eb450528e4128909a96d11a652bf3f7ae9d0d17adbf612ec9ca32e73ef6e87d7f4e21fe3412ce14
AD: 9ff377545a35cf1bfb77c734ad900c703aee6c3174fdb3736664863036a3a9d09163c2992f093e2408911b8751f001e493decc41e4eeeed04f698b6daed48452a7e1a74ec3b4f3dcf2151ca249fa568aa084c8428a41f20be5fd
CT: 229da76844426639e2fd3ef253a195e0a93f08452ba37219b6773f103134f3f87b1345f9b4bf8cfc11277c311780a2b6e19a363b6ac2efe6c4cc54a39b144e29c94b9ebbde6fd094c30f59d1b770ebf9fcad2a5c695dc003bf51
TAG: b72acab50131a29558d56ae7b9d48e4e
TAG: 55e025a1eb87bc84d4be00c775c92ad2
KEY: 4aeb62f024e187606ee7cc9f5865c391c43df1963f459c87ba00e44bb163a866
NONCE: 9559bd08718b75af
NONCE: 000000009559bd08718b75af
IN: c5d586ceece6f41812c969bcf1e727fe6ff8d1ae8c8c52367c612caa7cdf50e0662f5dffc5ea7d3cc39400dfe3dc1897905f6490fd7747b5f5f9842739c67d07ce7c339a5b3997a7fb4cd0d8e4817ff8916b251c11ef919167f858e41504b9
AD: 51f5b503b73a5de8b96534c2a3f2d859ece0bd063ea6dfa486a7eec99f6c020983f7148cccb86202cf9685cc1cc266930f04e536ad8bc26094252baa4606d883bd2aeed6b430152202e9b6cc797ff24fc365315ed67391374c1357c9a845f2
CT: 252ea42b6e5740306816974a4fe67b66e793ebe0914778ef485d55288eb6c9c45fa34ac853dc7a39252520514c3cb34c72b973b14b32bc257687d398f36f64cc2a668faffa7305ab240171343b5f9f49b6c2197e4fbe187b10540d7cdcfa37
TAG: 711ff33ef8d2b067a1b85c64f32f1814
TAG: ab1d8a5a1f3eda9b5609c0028737477f
KEY: 9a19e72f005cae1ae78b8e350d7aabe59fc8845999e8c52fad545b942c225eaf
NONCE: d9dae2ea8d2ffc31
NONCE: 00000000d9dae2ea8d2ffc31
IN: 2110378d856ded07eb2be8e8f43308e0c75bc8a3fcc7b1773b0725b7de49f6a166c4528e64120bdf7c9776615d3ce6feeb03de964a7b919206a77392f80437faceb6745845cafc166e1c13b68e70ca2a1d00c71737b8fcbbbd50902565c32159e05fcd23
AD: 1cd73b72c4e103afbefd7c777e0480f3f5e68c60b85bd2e71ef5caebb175d7fc6535d39f38f92c24f2eb0fe97d878ed3d5967c0bb4394a5d41f7d34cda6e1523d3848f049cde554a7d31e1afeab5d3e6150f85858335cbd28c8a7f87d528058df50eea06
CT: 5f009fbce4ec8e4ca9d8d42258b1a3e4e920b2fbad33d5e9f07557d9595e841025193b521ba440110dd83958e8ee30219d952b418e98a6c624894aa248aedc0678f2d263e7bfaf54ca379fef6c5d2f7ac422ea4b4369408b82d6225a7a2cf9a9f46fd4ef
TAG: aa0a5fa7d3cf717a4704a59973b1cd15
TAG: 1c6bdff7d8b9554dc7bf40e50b37d352
KEY: ba1d0b3329ecc009f1da0fab4c854b00ad944870fdca561838e38bad364da507
NONCE: 8a81c92b37221f2f
NONCE: 000000008a81c92b37221f2f
IN: 6289944ffa3ccea4bf25cd601b271f64e6deb0eba77d65efb4d69ca93e01996e4727168b6f74f3ccf17bd44715f23ceb8fc030c0e035e77f53263db025021fd2d04b87a1b54b12229c5e860481452a80a125cb0693a2ba1b47e28ee7cbaf9e683c178232c7f6d34f97
AD: e57883961b8d041d9b9eeaddcfd61fa9f59213f66571fadffffdd1498b9b014f1ef2e7e56c3044d7f9fa7a1403a1169e86430a2a782137093f5456e142aad03a5f7a66d38009dd01b7fc02c9cf61642dedaf7cc8d46066c281ee17780674c3a36eae66c58d2d765075
CT: 9c44d9135db0dbf81c862c1f69bec55a279794cdd29a58e61909aa29ec4c120c9c5a508d856b9e56138095714a4bb58402a1ad06774cf4ecdf2273839c0007cb88b5444b25c76f6d2424281101d043fc6369ebb3b2ff63cdb0f11a6ea1b8a7dafc80cdaef2813fa661
TAG: 65c746f659bcbdcd054e768c57c848c9
TAG: 689a141bc11159d306dad7a4ecf6ad9d
KEY: 0cf8c73a6cffc1b8b2f5d320da1d859d314374e4a9468db7fd42c8d270b7613a
NONCE: 3c4c6f0281841aff
NONCE: 000000003c4c6f0281841aff
IN: 4434728d234603c916e2faa06b25d83bad3348990ecde2344368d1a7af1309bd04251bb2e0b72044948f8dea33cce2618283b6af742073a9586b26c1089335fe735141e099785a1235810a3a67ff309e2f0ce68220ba0077ad1a5dc1a4aef898a3b9ff8f5ad7fe60149bd0bd6d83
AD: a38d09a4f1c9241623c639b7688d8d35345ea5824080c9d74e4352919db63c74d318f19e1cbb9b14eebd7c74b0ad0119247651911f3551583e749ea50ff648858dcaaa789b7419d9e93a5bf6c8167188dbac2f36804380db325201982b8b06597efeb7684546b272642941591e92
CT: bdfbfea261b1f4c134445321db9e6e40476e2dd2f4e4dbe86e31d6a116d25830762e065b07b11a3799aab93a94b4f98c31c0faeb77ec52c02048e9579257e67f5a6bae9bc65210c25b37fc16ee93bda88fd5f30a533e470b6188c6ce5739fa3e90f77120b490fc1027964f277f40
TAG: 4993ee9582f58eabdb26b98c4d56a244
TAG: 780cc54bb6f1c9b78545c1562cd9d550
KEY: 69f4e5788d486a75adf9207df1bd262dd2fe3dd3a0236420390d16e2a3040466
NONCE: 6255bf5c71bb27d1
NONCE: 000000006255bf5c71bb27d1
IN: c15048ca2941ef9600e767a5045aa98ac615225b805a9fbda3ac6301cd5a66aef611400fa3bc04838ead9924d382bef8251a47f1e487d2f3ca4bccd3476a6ca7f13e94fd639a259ef23cc2f8b8d248a471d30ac9219631c3e6985100dc45e0b59b8fc62046309165ddb6f092da3a4f067c8a44
AD: 0c83039504c8464b49d63b7f944802f0d39c85e9f3745e250f10119fa2c960490f75ae4dced8503b156d072a69f20400e9494ab2fa58446c255d82ff0be4b7e43046580bc1cf34060c6f076c72ea455c3687381a3b908e152b10c95c7b94155b0b4b303b7764a8a27d1db0a885f1040d5dbcc3
CT: f0bb2b73d94f2a7cef70fe77e054f206998eacf2b86c05c4fa3f40f2b8cebf034fe17bcbee4dea821f51c18c0aa85b160f8508bd1dc455cc7f49668b1fb25557cdae147bf2399e07fcacaca18eccded741e026ef25365a6b0f44a6b3dd975ee6bb580f5fccd040b73c18b0fbf8f63199ba10fe
TAG: 4236a8750f0cafee3c4a06a577a85cb3
TAG: 2ecccea4607d14dbb2d2475792aeb468
KEY: ad7b9409147a896648a2a2fe2128f79022a70d96dc482730cd85c70db492b638
NONCE: a28a6dedf3f2b01a
NONCE: 00000000a28a6dedf3f2b01a
IN: 791d293ff0a3b8510b4d494b30f50b38a01638bf130e58c7601904f12cb8900871e8cf3d50abd4d34fda122c76dfee5b7f82cd6e8590647535c915ae08714e427da52f80aef09f40040036034ca52718ea68313c534e7a045cd51745ec52f2e1b59463db07de7ca401c6f6453841d247f370341b2dbc1212
AD: 9a6defddb9b8d5c24a26dd8096f5b8c3af7a89e1f7d886f560fabbe64f14db838d6eb9d6879f4f0b769fe1f9eebf67fcd47b6f9ceb4840b2dba7587e98dc5cae186ef2a0f8601060e8058d9dda812d91387c583da701d2ba3347f285c5d44385a2b0bf07150cbc95e7fcfa8ae07132849a023c98817c03d2
CT: c2f109d6d94f77a7289c8a2ab33bc6a98d976554721b0c726cbf4121069473e62ba36e7090e02414f3edc25c5d83ac80b49ad528cda1e3ad815b5a8c8ae9ad0753de725319df236983abd3f69ab4465d9b806c075b1896d40bdba72d73ba84c4a530896eb94ffccf5fb67eb59119e66a1861872218f928cf
TAG: e48dc0153d5b0f7edb76fc97a0224987
TAG: 17ec6cf2b172f01e3c456ad047196805
KEY: 48470da98228c9b53f58747673504f74ca1737d7d4bb6dbf7c0cba6ca42f80b9
NONCE: 56fb4923a97e9320
NONCE: 0000000056fb4923a97e9320
IN: bc6626d651e2b237f22ee51608ddcffeba5f31c26df72f443f701f2b085d6f34f806e29673584cb21522179edb62a82427d946acabce065b88b2878e9eb87ed1004e55ef58f51ec46375ac542c5782725ff013136cb506fcf99496e13fcd224b8a74a971cc8ddb8b393ccc6ac910bd1906ea9f2ed8a5d066dc639c20cd
AD: df8ab634d3dca14e2e091b15ecc78f91e229a1a13cba5edd6526d182525ec575aa45bc70fb6193ffcd59bad3c347159099c4f139c323c30a230753d070018786b2e59b758dd4a97d1a88e8f672092bef780b451fd66ba7431cbb5660ea7816cdf26e19a6ebb9aadc3088e6923f29f53f877a6758068f79a6f2a182b4bf
CT: a62e313ecf258cc9087cbb94fcc12643eb722d255c3f98c39f130e10058a375f0809662442c7b18044feb1602d89be40facae8e89ca967015f0b7f8c2e4e4a3855dbb46a066e49abf9cef67e6036400c8ff46b241fc99ba1974ba3ba6ea20dc52ec6753f6fc7697adbccd02b0bbea1df8352629b03b43cc3d632576787
TAG: 675287f8143b9b976e50a80f8531bd39
TAG: d29a8968067aeb457ffc114c3a9efb95
KEY: b62fb85c1decd0faf242ce662140ad1b82975e99a3fa01666cac2385ab91da54
NONCE: 2f4a5ca096a4faf8
NONCE: 000000002f4a5ca096a4faf8
IN: 03b14f13c0065e4a4421de62ab1d842bffb80f3da30bf47d115c09857f5bdd5756fd7c9ac3d9af1c9fb94f2640f7f4386cfba74db468e5288dbe4dd78bfe4f69e41480ca6138e8beacc6eaa3374157c713cfa900c07dd836eaecc8827fa3e70e052ae09e8473e2ae1a10b1bb669ef60a8dd957f6553daa8114918e17371f2ac327bd
AD: cfe3b7ab7550b0e8e2e8235fa0dcef95647ce6814abd3dc3f5a3bd7d6d282504660c34ad8341e4d11402c7d46c83a494d7ddb105e1002979023e0e3dc2978c9ae53e10eb8567e7a02b60e51e945c7040d832ca900d132b4205a35034fed939a1b7965183c25654931a9b744401c4649c945710b0d9733b87451348b32ba81de30ea7
CT: 8965db3d3ae4fb483208f147276e7d81b71a86e7202ffc9b1eaade009bc016838dc09ca4bcf30887b2f4243fbd652cd90ebed1ceef8151ff17ea70518d03b0f2a24960aa7de9b30fa65c2e2d57360061aae6d9376e984e9fcd5e5dd0911a4bc8deca832ffb76f252bd7da523076593ba6b174f7d9fb0377e066ecbb6638036241e86
TAG: 3d0fc53e9058c2be32aa0850e0fab5a6
TAG: 28a5284696ed82714eaa94c9ebe6e815
KEY: de9c657258774d4ebc09d109a0fc79d66493ae578797cac4eb8830a6a4b547e0
NONCE: b5e35fe3398efa34
NONCE: 00000000b5e35fe3398efa34
IN: 4d68fb683aa4f4c7a16ba1114fc0b1b8d8898610fa2763e435ded8771b3651078bef73d4dfd14e76a34cd5eb9ef4db4ead4da9e83f4ce50fe059977b2d17d687c29335a04d87389d211f8215449749969f7652dc1935a0f9a94538dc81dc9a39af63446a6517609076987920547d0098a9c6766cf5e704883ea32feaea1889b1554b5eb0ce5ecc
AD: 436ea5a5fee8293b93e4e8488116c94d3269c19f1d5050def23d280515457b931bbed64a542b317cc5023d648330a4b7adca14dd6f3783207b94f86ccaa0a0ac39b7db00ac87a99e3cd8a764ed9c75da8454479636ab2b29e770b166a5b75cacc425c919bf1ce9ac34afe6b4425c3d9fd2e48bc81e7d15516d60e592bfcc2ebefb660f0995f2b5
CT: 97a97b8f0f5420845ae8d57567f9bba693d30e6db916fad0b971f553ad7d993f806f27ab8b458d8046062ced4778c004b4f958a4436141637c6039963308dea2f54008b7feab79650295ed41bf9e65e1a2d75ab1c7b2a70ebb9e9f38d07a9a672d3e95ea78afe9ac02f2566b48b0251aef6eeeca8bd15bd8d43b559426aa9d15d960ee35cb3edf
TAG: e55dbb21851e8a5b365f86d02518331c
TAG: 4ef49e8a0c2ef85826d7f03e81c577f2
KEY: 6885bd333c336c7672db8ebdf24c1a1b605c5a4ae279f0f698162f47e6c73401
NONCE: f0c4a213a6168aab
NONCE: 00000000f0c4a213a6168aab
IN: fa905a2bfa5b5bad767239fb070a7bc0b303d1503ecd2b429418cc8feba843e5444ed89022fdb379c3b155a0f9ceab2979000a0f60292a631771f2fde4ef065aa746426609082969530a9c70ad145308c30ba389ea122fd766081511a031ce3a0bd9f9f583c7000b333b79ac004fbde6ec3eb2d905977ff95dcff77858e3c424fe8932a6a12139e6ec8d5e98
AD: 8ded368f919efb522bb6a9ad009e02ffbc6a16536e34d95cdb34f1153d7cb7b0f3c2b13dd05cedae27cfe68ec3aca8047e0930a29c9d0770c1b83c234dcb0385deae7ae85da73a5f8de3dfb28612a001f4e552c4f67ae0e2ec53853289b7017a58591fd6f70b0e954876bb2f7ec33001e298856a64bb16181017ba924648c09fc63c62eff262c80d614679bd
CT: 0cb3d6c31e0f4029eca5524f951244df042fc637c4162511fea512a52d3f7581af097eb642e79e48666cb1086edbd38c4777c535a20945fabc23e7c9277e2b960aac46865f1026eb6da82759108b9baece5da930ccfc1052b1656b0eadaa120ed0c45ad04b24ae8cdb22ceab76c5f180b46a392ab45b1b99c612546e6b947f4d5c06ad5abee92ff96345ad43
TAG: d3b541ac446c84626daf800c0172eec6
TAG: fad7d5a5193dfb121c68529ba8c0c35d
KEY: fbc978abb1240a6937ccc16735b8d6ed5411cdbc1897214165a174e16f4e699b
NONCE: 7968379a8ce88117
NONCE: 000000007968379a8ce88117
IN: 1a8196cd4a1389ec916ef8b7da5078a2afa8e9f1081223fa72f6524ac0a1a8019e44a09563a953615587429295052cc904b89f778ef446ed341430d7d8f747cf2db4308478524639f44457253ae5a4451c7efca8ae0b6c5c051aaa781e9c505489b381a6dcba87b157edc7f820a8fbaf2a52e484dc121f33d9d8b9ac59d4901d6ed8996ed4f62d9d4d82274c449cd74efa
AD: 3913cd01299b8a4e507f067d887d7e9a6ded16dd9f9bb3115c5779aa14239fd33ee9f25756d45262dc3011069356425b5c81a4729594e17c9747119f81463e85625d5603d05e00f568b0c800bb181eb717be8d7a93166a504ce1bc817e15530c5bd2b3df1d4222245ea78a38bc10f66c5cf68d661503131f11af885c8a910b6dce70bc3a7448dfae00595beb707fe054d3
CT: d152bcb4c24c3711b0fad28548dc4db605bbc89237cdbea7dbf956b8855d1161a0781f27bd56d798141e2ace339955efb98fe05d9b44cd011e645106bf47726183958cb6df34ce5766695f60bc70b6fe0fabb9afa009a8ef043dbf75f861881368fa07726625448fe608d578cdc48277f2dc53eaaf1bdc075269a42f9302a57cad387a82c6969608acacda20e1cac4596c
TAG: 945dca73cf2f007ae243991c4fbe0479
TAG: 96ae06cd7c72456e5568a42317046158
KEY: 77d1a857fbadfe01aba7974eea2dfb3dc7bf41de73686aece403993e5016c714
NONCE: fdd913a321c40eb0
NONCE: 00000000fdd913a321c40eb0
IN: db8915bfe651e2ecb3ce0b27d99a6bfa7a7c507cfcb2987293018636c365a459c6a138b4428be538413db15bda69e697cbb92b154b7f4d2cbb07965225aa6865d7dcd1ba2c17c484b00b1986fed63e889f25a4966dc3ed4273f1577768f665362d7d3e824484f0dded7f82b8be8797ad951719719365e45abbf76324bc7d657799d4d4f4bb1dba67d96ab1c88519a5bee704f7214814
AD: 3cb2c06c20cb0832bbacebfc205d77393ca1816346ea2681de4d3ab1fadb774ad273e4713290454496f5281ebc65e04cfe84ed37cd0aedc4bbe3decbd8d79d04a4e434876650e0d64309e336bfb10e924066a64acb92260b2dbd96735d03af03909aa6a80a6e89fda81037257aec21fe9be7e91a64e88e0a58fa38ecba4c4c4cffb61958f3c486cbb0b1d0b0014a2d1d3df248eec1ca
CT: acb825e6023b44b03b2efc265603e887954e8612b2ee134bdcb61501cfb9492952bf67be597c3a005b09af74d9e421a576d2c65e98104780feab838d8cb1bd135452ea39dc8907a4c1a6a9161805e4fa3e16989e6a418a7eea2582bf895da967028eab7c95d846a6de4b9980785814cf00484baa2f6de609912fff689bce6e854261ffe866bd8e63274605c7c5ad677bd7897ade543e
TAG: 938478a41a3223a2199f9276d116210f
TAG: bcf523a9bcf772e157941753c6d7401e
KEY: b7e9b90dc02b5cd6df5df7283ef293ed4dc07513d9e67331b606f4d42dec7d29
NONCE: a6c191f6d1818f8e
NONCE: 00000000a6c191f6d1818f8e
IN: 2ada0e3c7ca6db1f780ce8c79472af4e8e951ddc828e0d6e8a67df520638ff5f14a2f95a5e5931749ae2c4e9946ae4d5eb5de42fb5b77d2236e2e2bd817df51be40b1b8a6c21015a7c79fe06dba4a08b34013dfa02747b5f03930268404c455dc54a74d9c6e35485e10026da573cb41cd50b64cfafe4cfcdf3c9684ef877e45d84e22bd5e15fa6c8fd5be921366ff0dc6fe2df45f7252972c9b303
AD: 0f4269ed5ef0bfff7be39946a4e86e8bf79f84b70cd0b14fecb7be3c071316ce86de3d99d6871e0ba5667d9d7bba7dcaba10cb2a36668b6c3e2fb6c102938b75008bb9c213ebf9b85b5e91a802df0d31d7f11d764b2289f6225212694ab6b7c0e3ff36e84245d9f4f43fc5f98e654dea7ba9bd918658879c5bb4a1642af0d83113e3cf935d3c0d5208318f66f654eb17d8c28a602543e77ad3e815
CT: 22586fe7338e99cdaad9f85bd724ba4cfe6249b8a71399f9a3707b5c4323b8d96679568dfc8d230aefb453df596e13eb3e8a439249bd64bc93a58f95089a62b94f6562b821c83d91f56c55147381e9de4beb4ae81bd6fe7caef7e7e9a2078f2fba8f3e70d4910da9accc92b8e81a61b0fefbece4bd89443e66e8ddda8e47a66a62f17fd0e7d0a4852ce1a4d43d72a0b5e8914bbec698f060f2b092
TAG: c082470297da8c5f682a169d28bc0239
TAG: bd05336ed6426de412aac37661953052
KEY: 6b2cb2678d1102f2fbbd028794a79f14585c223d405e1ae904c0361e9b241e99
NONCE: 7b3ae31f8f938251
NONCE: 000000007b3ae31f8f938251
IN: b3cb745930e05f3ab8c926c0a343a6eb14809fd21b8390a6fcc58adb5579e5432021765b2d249a0ecf6ba678634c4f53f71495865f031ee97aa159f9ead3a3fcb823ee5238bdf12706a9c6137d236e2e7110ce650c321e41daf0afd62bab2a8fe55d7018de49a14efe6d83a15b2f256d595e998d25309f23633360f5745c50c4e5af8ccc9a8a2cb47064105a023e919c7795d2dc331d3f2afb8c42e5c0bcc26d
AD: 1c32fd3df22b3e440e2a3c7a7624990194cb16a5f74af36f87fd6ca7d410ce9064316a2d091945deef7d9b35ceec8396069307caced2b80afd7d53ec479c35cedf2dfd4c95c3dd8400f71ad34028c6e4f8681d93d0774064ba38f3fb9b0c1dfa1f5f0c7d20676a5911d999fb6a1d41367a8e99d852bf3d3b7b3f4c233249ed1ca135389a674ff48232ded3f6800a97b6d409c40e6cd70d09bf9d2ad25d9b9485
CT: ef70c7de98ab1d4ad817024a970be463443640eb0cd7ff234bdd00e653074a77a1d5749e698bd526dc709f82df06f4c0e64046b3dc5f3c7044aef53aebb807d32239d0652dd990362c44ec25bf5aeae641e27bf716e0c4a1c9fbd37bbf602bb0d0c35b0638be20dd5d5891d446137e842f92c0ee075c68225e4dbacb63cc6fb32442b4bcda5e62cb500a4df2741a4059034d2ccb71b0b8b0112bf1c4ca6eec74
TAG: 393ae233848034248c191ac0e36b6123
TAG: d48657033095db3f873c33445fec8d35
KEY: 4dbc80a402c9fceaa755e1105dc49ef6489016776883e06fcf3aed93bf7f6af7
NONCE: 2358ae0ce3fb8e9f
NONCE: 000000002358ae0ce3fb8e9f
IN: 197c06403eb896d2fa6465e4d64426d24cc7476aa1ae4127cd2bd8a48ce2c99c16b1cbf3064856e84073b6cf12e7406698ef3dd1240c026cbd1ab04ee603e1e6e735c9b7551fd0d355202b4f64b482dd4a7c7d82c4fe2eb494d0d5e17788982d704c1356c41a94655530deda23118cba281d0f717e149fbeb2c59b22d0c0574c1a2e640afad1a6ceb92e1bf1dde71752a1c991e9a5517fe98688a16b073dbf6884cfde61ac
AD: cf6ce7b899fb700a90d2a5466d54d31358ecf0562e02b330a27ba0138006b342b7ed6349d73c4c5c6d29bde75a25089b11dac5b27adea7e7640ca1a7ceb050e3aae84a47e11640a6e485bd54ae9fdb547edc7313d24a0328429fcffd8b18f39880edd616447344ebeec9eadb2dcb1fa7e67179e7f913c194ebd8f5a58aea73b0c5d1133561245b6d9c5cfd8bb0c25b38ffb37db5e2de5cdded6b57355e9d215cb095b8731f
CT: aa87f9a83048b6919c8f2b050315db4e2adae4a9c2ca0109b81961b520e63299dcb028cec0b9d3249a945ee67dd029b40f361245c740f004f8cf0d2214fcfa65e6124a3e74b78aa94345c46fdc158d34823ed249ee550431eaae9218367321cdd6e6a477650469bb3cc137a8f48d9cf27934b16703608b383d2145659922fb83bb2e7ee2ef938a90f2ff846a4a949129b1fb74dde55c5ae013c2f285de84f7dac7d1662f23
TAG: 06b4318ac7f65d556f781428a0514ffe
TAG: 298f84c8312029a7b1f38c5ea6021f57
KEY: 9e4a62016dae4b3223fed1d01d0787e31d30694f79e8142224fe4c4735248a83
NONCE: 263a2fc06a2872e7
NONCE: 00000000263a2fc06a2872e7
IN: 5a46946601f93a0cee5993c69575e599cc24f51aafa2d7c28d816a5b9b4decda2e59c111075fb60a903d701ad2680bb14aeda14af2ae9c07a759d8388b30446f28b85f0a05cd150050bd2e715ff550ebbd24da3ebb1eac15aba23d448659de34be962ab3ab31cb1758db76c468b5bb8ce44b06c4e4db9bd2f0615b1e727f053f6b4ffb6358d248f022bcad6ca973044bed23d3920906a89a9a9c5d8024ec67d7f061f64529a955ce16b3
AD: 4cd65f68f9f88c0516231f2a425c8f8a287de47d409d5ecde3ad151e906b3839fb01bb91a456f20ea9d394d4b06604ab1f9009ef29019af7968d965d1643161ab33a5354cda2fdc9f1d21ec9cb71c325c65964a14f9b26eb16560beb9792075a1597394000fd5f331bd8b7d20d88e5f89cf8d0b33e4e78e4904bb59c9c8d5d31ac86b893e4a0667af1be85fdb77f7ec3e2594a68048d20c2fb9422f5879078772ee26a1c560cbcbb2113
CT: e944bb2ab06d138ad633c16ce82706ecf0ef5d119be1f3460c9ce101d9c4e04ef1677707fca40d1f8ca181e07273707b06624d6d7063c3b7b0bb0151b757b3e5237fb8004c161233d8bc7e5f28ea1c18da1874b3d54c5ad6ff0835eed35c8853704585cf83996e5e7cec68180af414e04f08134d3b0384ebdf0393c9310b55d8698fe10cb362defc0995e9a13b48b42cff61ffd9fe4c3c8c6dab355713b88f6e98a02e7231a0c6644ec4
TAG: 27de0d4ca7648f6396d5419a7b1243b7
TAG: 6234e81e089b779d0d509d14e566b5d7
KEY: 18ca3ea3e8baeed1b341189297d33cef7f4e0a2fab40ec3b6bb67385d0969cfe
NONCE: b6aef34c75818e7c
NONCE: 00000000b6aef34c75818e7c
IN: ef6d1bb4094782f602fcf41561cba4970679661c63befe35ff2ca7ad1a280bf6b1e7f153fa848edfeffe25153f540b71253e8baba9aeb719a02752cda60ea5938aab339eead5aabf81b19b0fc5c1ed556be6ad8970ea43c303d3046205b12c419dea71c4245cfedd0a31b0f4150b5a9fe80052790188529ab32f5e61d8ccde5973ed30bdf290cbfbd5f073c0c6a020eac0332fced17a9a08cef6f9217bd6bef68c1505d6eed40953e15508d87f08fc
AD: f40f03beaa023db6311bad9b4d5d0d66a58d978e0bcbbf78acebde1f4eb9a284095628955a0b15afc454152f962ec3ea2b9a3b089b99658e68ede4dee5acd56672025eb7323bcbc6ba5d91c94310f18c918e3914bbbf869e1b8721476f9def31b9d32c471a54132481aa89f6c735ab193369496d8dbeb49b130d85fbff3f9cb7dccea4c1da7a2846eef5e6929d9009a9149e39c6c8ec150c9ab49a09c18c4749a0a9fcba77057cdea6efd4d142256c
CT: c531633c0c98230dcf059c1081d1d69c96bab71c3143ae60f9fc2b9cd18762314496ab6e90bf6796252cb9f667a1f08da47fc2b0eecda813228cae00d4c0d71f5e01b6ce762fa636efffe55d0e89fdc89ba42521cc019ab9d408fcd79c14914e8bbf0ea44d8a1d35743ad628327e432fdcfeb0b6679ddca8c92b998473732abd55dba54eefff83c78488eee5f92b145a74b6866531476fc46279d4fde24d049c1ce2b42358ff3ab2ba3a8866e547af
TAG: a0a5242759a6d9b1aa5baf9a4ef895a2
TAG: e3b4192f6e50528c4f4f70267f094c56
KEY: 95fdd2d3d4296069055b6b79e5d1387628254a7be647baafdf99dd8af354d817
NONCE: cd7ed9e70f608613
NONCE: 00000000cd7ed9e70f608613
IN: 0248284acffa4b2c46636bdf8cc70028dd151a6d8e7a5a5bc2d39acc1020e736885031b252bfe9f96490921f41d1e174bf1ac03707bc2ae5088a1208a7c664583835e8bb93c787b96dea9fc4b884930c57799e7b7a6649c61340376d042b9f5faee8956c70a63cf1cff4fc2c7cb8535c10214e73cec6b79669d824f23ff8c8a2ca1c05974dd6189cfee484d0906df487b6bd85671ce2b23825052e44b84803e2839a96391abc25945cb867b527cdd9b373fbfb83
AD: 24a45a3a0076a5bcfd5afe1c54f7b77496117d29f4c0909f1e6940b81dde3abacb71ec71f0f4db8a7e540bd4c2c60faee21dd3ce72963855be1b0ce54fb20ad82dbc45be20cd6c171e2bebb79e65e7d01567ad0eeb869883e4e814c93688607a12b3b732c1703b09566c308d29ce676a5c762a85700639b70d82aaef408cf98821a372c6a0614a73ba9918a7951ea8b2bb77cd9896d26988086d8586d72edc92af2042ff5e5f1429a22f61065e03cfcd7edc2a93
CT: 40c6318d9e383e107cdd3e1c8951562193c3ef64ee442432a63e2edefc78f32ab07772aeac172cb67ecf4d21f8b448423527bbeb9d8ddd0b46bdb27f74096ceb24e41963b4cdca176676a75bdbe3abc270b349ac0c6cbd9c3a5cd5bce20202fc5cc0c1bdd4fd25e121e0a24bd7bbeb9b19b1912467bf5338ee2ce88aa383c082b42cc399c9654ca325f35523e81438beb3f8926be79c378822d7c8f785614408a5f7cac49e4543188725643e6c1a70b46d0ec400
TAG: 5801e84192c7267f66b0e04607a39a3e
TAG: 874875c9a0ba3060a0680291c3dc85a2
KEY: 6ae1102f84ed4dc114bb9d63f4dc78d7dbb1ab63f1659dd95f47940a7b7a811f
NONCE: c965d578ba91d227
NONCE: 00000000c965d578ba91d227
IN: b82a8a9209618f1f5be9c2c32aba3dc45b4947007b14c851cd694456b303ad59a465662803006705673d6c3e29f1d3510dfc0405463c03414e0e07e359f1f1816c68b2434a19d3eee0464873e23c43f3ab60a3f606a0e5be81e3ab4aa27fb7707a57b949f00d6cd3a11ae4827d4889dd455a0b6d39e99012fd40db23fb50e79e11f8a6451669beb2fbd913effd49ad1b43926311f6e13a6e7a09cf4bebb1c0bf63ce59cd5a08e4b8d8dbf9d002e8a3d9e80c7995bb0b485280
AD: dfd4ac3e80b2904623ff79ea8ee87862268939decf5306c07a175b6b9da0eb13ac209b4d164755929e03240a0fe26599f136fb2afdffd12bb20354aa1d20e5799839abb68ae46d50c8974e13e361d87ef550fe6d82e8b5b172cf5cd08482efdef793ede3530d24667faf3a1e96348867c2942641f4c036981b83f50236b8e8a10b83ebf6909aad0076302f1083f72de4cf4a1a3183fe6ec6bfe2e73e2af8e1e8c9d85079083fd179ccc2ee9ff002f213dbd7333053a46c5e43
CT: a9aeb8f0a2b3ca141ac71a808dcc0c9798ac117c5d2bd09b3cfe622693a9f8ca62e841b58bddb2042f888e3099b53638b88dfc930b7a6ee4272d77e4b1d7e442bab6afbde96ab0b432f0092d9ca50eef42f63c60c09e7b8de019b32ebe4030c37b8183cc1e3b913b0ce4ee4d744398fa03f9af1c070bed8cdafd65b3a84140cb4deadc70184de757332ce3780af84353f540755227e886a8d7ad980f3dd6fd68263d82e93f883381dec888bc9f4f48349aa2b4c342cb9f48c6
TAG: f26b3af8a45c416291ce66330733b2f8
TAG: f6dcad5412b95994f5e4d6829c2eba98
KEY: 405bb7b94715b875df068655f00513cb1ae23ffaac977ce273e57d3f83b43663
NONCE: 5c6da1259451119a
NONCE: 000000005c6da1259451119a
IN: f9f143c0c52c94b4ba7b0608b144156a49e7b5d27c97315743d171911e3645ab7957c80924e3c6b9c22ab7a1cac4b7e9c0de84e49fd5e4a2d1ab51d764fc5670318688ec942f7ab34c331dce8f90fea6972e07f0dadec29d8eb3b7b6521ddd678a6527a962f4d8af78c077e27f7a0b2ef7eabd19e92b7f8c1e8fb166d4763ce9c40c888cf49aa9cdfc3e997c8fe1cce3fe802441bbd698de269ff316f31c196e62d12c6bb5cd93fb3c79ca6369f8c1ac9102daf818975ea7f513bb38576a
AD: 6fe6446505677bf08b385e2f6d83ef70e1547712208d9cebc010cba8c16ea4ece058d73c72273eed650afdc9f954f35aa1bdf90f1118b1173368acbc8d38d93ebf85bd30d6dc6d1b90913790c3efa55f34d31531f70c958759b2ba6f956c6fcdd289b58cb4c26e9515bf550f0fd71ab8527f062c9505cbb16e8e037d34de1756bef02a133dbf4a9c00ac03befc3fb7f137af04e12595ce9560f98b612480fcdba3b8be01db56ebec40f9deae532c3b0370b5c23a2a6b02a4de69efa8900c
CT: 1a4b073881922c6366680cc9c2a127b26f264148651b29abb0c388cf6c9b1865dba5a991e1f8309efbdb91bce44b278772c58fd41273526c33fec84beb53d1689b9da8483f71be6db73a73417069bb4cd3f195236e8d0a00d124eed3a6b6f89415b19a27fbe35774f6a1a6ee4bd4350b252b975f0db2d2eea82f4836350850d6290901e726e8af13644e2d98bc1d569c20800521e6affe976bd407049a2e6d9dd23f88d52e651391ecd2fc45b864310824aaadfa203762a77c1d64562dae
TAG: 0060026d3efc120f11c0739959ae0066
TAG: 90fcc2544880250f1c3abe8a3761ba08
KEY: 8c602bd94c630cd00c7a9c508067a5a9f133d12f06d9f6fe2a7b68dce4786d8a
NONCE: 760de0f7b7cb67e2
NONCE: 00000000760de0f7b7cb67e2
IN: c3ff559cf1d6ba6c0cc793ca09a0ba573a28359386a6ec93e1bacd8e630209e0b477a20aedec3c9cbf513ee6a1e3887112218d6155b9875f7e6c4bbba2c31972e905d19f529f4f0f9502996199f94f8728ba8d6424bb15f87fcacd88bb42c63fcc513759712bd0172b1e87c9da122f1993ffb7efd3a5c34b240dd3db89dddea36dbeb2836d9f8648f8e7cd428c0f948097af753b35f9876059e7702027bb00dc69071206e785f48fcbf81b39cc0343974ac70784a2e60c0df93b40379bea4ad8cac625
AD: 9e14907c3a8e96c2636db1f3d78eb1f673d6ef043cbbb349467f1fe29bf60f23d5d5d1c3b133a8ad72065d822347541c13d1574baf737eb3cc3382fb479e6d5193b9c8e7d2444c66971ef099dc7f37f6cd97b9f7959d46e2cf25e8a5b3111b4d9e2ef906d905f0ee2d17587f7082d7c8e9a51509bde03d3d64338e1838d71700f1b4fcb100b5e0402969da462f26f974b4f9e766121f8fd54be99fc10beb9a606e13fbb1f960062815d19e67f80093360324013095719273c65542b0e31b1a2a3d928f
CT: 2794e6e133f6892f23837fff60cf7c28ee9942f8982ef8089db117903d0143293fdf12ea1cc014bcd8806fb83c19570eed7af522db0de489bbc87133a13434518bcfb9cda4d9f6d832a69209657a447abf8afd816ae15f313c7ea95ec4bc694efc2386cdd8d915dc475e8fadf3421fbb0319a3c0b3b6dfa80ca3bb22c7aab07fe14a3fea5f0aee17ab1302338eeac010a04e505e20096a95f3347dc2b4510f62d6a4c1fae6b36939503a6ac22780a62d72f2fc3849d4ef21267fffdef23196d88fbb9b
TAG: 457cce6e075ffdb180765ab2e105c707
TAG: 7fa630c9bcb455e89f13d7a99d5e8dbe
KEY: bd68ff5eb296c71cfe6bc903c14907f7726bcb1331f0c75f7801cd1b7948f3a1
NONCE: 65a748004b352ba6
NONCE: 0000000065a748004b352ba6
IN: 52bf78c00f6e5dca2fc60e2e9a52e827df97808e9cf727773860cafc89f4b64178a19b30b46ed813fe00c8f09b25a6a1b6e350d5b005122934a59bfbd5e6e0c635c84a5226c3f2f7dcf951560f18ac220453d583015fdb2e446c69c6e6fdecf2e595e04fab1b0c506e3c6bd5e4414a35f15021e97f447aa334f54a8f1ef942dec6273511b5668b696fca97188ff15ed84b2f46145cce031c1a7f00bd88bb83d90797edc46161b3fda7a2299173496d73b812139556e8b4eb318078b9eb2ae5046e83b79dd3d45950
AD: 5557b08a5010cbc9f46bb140c2505f68684eb24889324bff44b27234fd7a95a99cfb4ff90a8f9982085b725f78ac42eca6ce7f3314e457dc41f404008681a9d29ba765660de2e05bb679d65b81f5e797d8417b94eb9aabbd0576b5c57f86eae25f6050a7918e4c8021a85b47f7a83b4c8446898441c5cc4e0229776ef3e809cb085d71f3c75ec03378730cb066150f07e60f96aec983c0e7e72bf6bf87ae42228dfda195f97855fcdf4e6d1c4479d978abcfa276d16ed60ecbfbfc664041335ce65a40a2ca3424df
CT: a5c8cf42287d4760fca755e2111817b981c47e85b0047de270ec301ca5f7b3679f4749210892b6ea6568f3a6a4344734a0efc0120ffedecf212d55cbcbb67815ac964875af45f735b70092a8f8435f52fc01b981ae971d486026fb69a9c3927acfe1f2eab0340ae95f8dbee41b2548e400805ece191db5fd1f0804053f1dbfaf7f8d6fded3874cb92d99a2729d3faaa60522060cf0b8101b463b3eb35b380fcddb6406c027d73fe701a5090c8dd531c203ce979e26b9ced3431e2b726a7244a20d9377bd62951bf5
TAG: 4579fa1fdb4c674cc3cd232b8da52a97
TAG: 82c6194de4d27aac4c54b023b9831634
KEY: 934fd043c32d16a88fad01c3506469b077cb79d258b5664fa55ad8521afdcaa2
NONCE: c7091f6afbbeb360
NONCE: 00000000c7091f6afbbeb360
IN: 2bdd1fc4f011ef97ea52ec643819941c7e0fb39023c2f3c7683804a0ddee14a5d1784a5246966d533b3538edc7d8742d27061c3cab88df0318ab242102de3a54d03632eeb871b72c7e8f8065b49f4a91e95e15f3f46b29fd76b8fcea0d23570c5530e3bbb8a6aafa9ae32c1b3eac653c5ed5fdb2da5a986075808f6385870c85b1913e26042a9d8e78f5bc2ea6de5a64f8aeafa22adcffc7f6932d543c29bb3a04614783f948680e433a71573568d2ce984d249fb4fc06a9f358c76aa3e64a357f4eae924c1356bd5baccf7e0f
AD: f737dd85638eb324dd3891219c5eef7c2dd053cfd055d447a411eba304a4b27dce981d112c4540590933c153d603022c91ebd2b4a58069d27e6ca17a462ef822ca41bffa80b43a68b1b564644cb3c5a7f0fddf7a13a30ff24437fddd8ef93c6f6f205d054f81890d982bd4d4ece0b1563677e843fe48c1f54e9a57ed4da66061482712e710a401073be5080d5b8b96525bffa67de5af31d50385fbbf1a87c21bf0e0a1fdff69ec32c7b7103e0b8ee6c844245e0fc84b9f89fcce62966cea68e2871d3b82e8df424c76309fc88d
CT: dd13fbf22c8d18354d774bcd18f7eb814e9b528e9e424abc4e3f2463195e8018576565d16ab48845d11c9277f2865ebb4dc412fd5b27078f8325eadf971e6944c66542e34d9dda971e2aba70dbd3e94a1e638d521477a027776b52acf90520ca229ebc760b73128879475d1cbe1f70fc598b549cd92d8a9ac6833e500c138c56474db84cb3d70b7aa4f293a4c2b4d818b0ff9fd85918dc590a12a8c0e375c4d98b7fc87596547eb960676aad5559834588f00f251a9d53f95c47af4df3c4299175d5211779c148cfc988a5e9d9
TAG: 476616ea15190c1093fdc4a087643cae
TAG: aeb0a4eb29886f0a7a12ec0516bd4af5
KEY: f9f6eb9ad736a8f66e7459fef5ec2890188dc26baf34a95f6f0384e79f5c6559
NONCE: 7858dfc084fe4b0f
NONCE: 000000007858dfc084fe4b0f
IN: a644ca6e7cc076e87eb2929fd257693fce0f6fb64fd632f7f07c648ebd03696c8e262e6a810d7b7c4e5eef8c65b5323c99dbba50a70b4a9e5c2a9e7315973cd67f35d8052ce9a85a206416dd3031929f4f929b13d0a5fb10cb73c65f6c0ace019da146b51c5274a099f44e3669d26add6f2ff081e886f3cf952fe0dbbe6b0534c23e307574bd35fbd657f5fcbd5dc19fb382a1dc0a2dc8285a0350f71554e4c601497749e35567dd4a273cddc9a48ce53a5f1d297fd8baf8d1b9feb35d9151114345abada4d90db947bb9a743c175f5653d1
AD: 2048d1c2ddfb5ec385b201832c7a993f229ba72ec16d6ebf723ef0c5032b9966209a9e8a63151b40412e96b82f86728ea6588c7e8e11ac71cc8eabab8c4b54de866658d9c5011def61fb3dbe4e630158a45ea41a2ed55ebd1efb1abeda7637de6fa5fd2f151c6d2f385bf6cd002ca8b4a2896e0d65944ee913e3c784669dd201b1985ef3577f7f123a5f9bcffa176c8f557c4f729133cac518642f27d9b22ca9b97faaafe5b669a10b79ace4a7d5727df146c77ce681357d69f9c2d65b4401bd73cd113387e3b3a05d897adad7a24c485e7b
CT: 4146faffd7313f5d9f625370d20413cc62ab65f4acfa3c7ee1125b937dd7a39f638fc46c8ed004fb525698de5d8620ec153435571817c3de257b0d0e648ebb92940c86a98262d54e764f28cbdd4f7d9bea970291f2110414f62064d7229c6332236c507b3dac742e651d85a2a22fb243c0cc7cc2d016e5bea38f33f9a9ce048944a5fe8b078d71d23168e12dfe5a0f0b829771edc7073fb96032b7be471337a37aca0cf7c0cdd543eed686cd34934717fd79a3f18492eef72f9f450b880aa7e2e1b65e3b04c22e72301338b43aa32ceec2e6
TAG: 10ffaf2be316676da02d7473a9df87b9
TAG: 61c6d4d6918b04fc1b72a7a0e9a3b799
KEY: 29b19636cdd32507fd98ec4ee26caab1a917646fb8f05b0dc01728a9f4a127f0
NONCE: 06699d245916686d
NONCE: 0000000006699d245916686d
IN: 5fdf913aceab1d6dbaf7d9a29352fa8a3eb22718043a79cffa2fe8c35c820aec7c07644b8785dcf7a433b4189abb257fb12b06fae0662641011a069873c3e3c5ccc78e7358184a62c2005c44b8a92254958eb5ff460d73cd80284d6daba22c3faba046c5426fe8b7cacec64b235a8f8d3e2641e5bc378830594bcfb27c177aea745951ee5780a63705727ef42c4ad3abf556d88e3830f3db6b09e93edd09485cbf907f79de61f8dc5cb5fb7665ffa0ef53cb48702f6a81d8ad421cef20c1dbdf402b8fafed56a5361b2f93f914a2380fdd0557faf1f4de
AD: 39116c49cc13adb065b92cb7635f73d5f6bf6b5ccbf72a3f65a5df6bd4a661105015358d9e69f42e98aed795e8161282bc113058b7ef3b9e23fcd8eeab34a392e03f4d6329c112cb968385ec52a7afc98bb8695785af6b27b700973cc952630b7247ce226b4fbb99b8a486370bf6345d4516c52c64e33f407c4f2d1ba90545c88732d98bbd97972ac5e94c694624a9b3782b0099824651cb7567914d25b3e13181a791dbcd40e76e836b3350d310a52151bf835d3c357c9871482c2928e8404c6e533406d4d6fa8f63366f2c4ed828141f1ff00f01a536
CT: 01e237220b619054a1f3670928fe67d40484b5af40fbd04d032500aac5acaa3b4584dd99a58c390627636a50de5d744f76a56a33205f9e3b00e16162eb47ff3333e1e208ca200f1a5338a86e17bd92dd2d16af8bb022a7dc05b923d019e05247f1a0d0b4bfcfce58dd6d83830705707676d55739abee89fcd5cb94b8fde006a5da02df64b00a467f45970b5ca440f22319b9735a55d454b9fba0588fef0c59d3d83823eba6e0601a96e10233826c5adeea6b2a51d386a07a9e047ad405b23d4c3d89f30c31e3199f0c8f927bfac43ceea1f969de0a8c0f
TAG: 092f9f3c5d4f2570c9946c87967f4579
TAG: b9fec6da464c7b85b2a4726694562fe9
KEY: bae06b9b5456707551c7b0e207aae02a19b4848ad8ca4ce40705bf8c856a6e52
NONCE: 9c27065c3ef2d522
NONCE: 000000009c27065c3ef2d522
IN: 50cdd88137ff428a88e87b5845be4924f6387537bb5c0b654c80107ab5698db75b2e131848e7aec156d31aed0766d31c379fece4095d38264c6d5945974d25f729c3b0ba11ea853e9cebdb6f03bb670fce08adff74d0a8f02d633fb34e0fb7337a8e66e1c12084d914fb6173b8105684db822752c6751a372bb16690284d661b8b8bc6a6dfbddf45ebc2219596f9f2f878c118df69030de38b4d99dde43b9b9e20a3dab691645dd518342f49b06a0fe0a397adf261e99f07af5b0b3798b1022ba0939c42a54d3b93641cffa3c2e174bce9ab7ad7e7c7924308d1a77a
AD: 5d5590db1bd316eb7a0e30e4c7a6dfdbef9d3287fdb8d824389599c3c2ee262b2192eb5b9708e66e22dbc7eca83fa1a995da3ce64c86fe5aa08b826d476dc439497e2d12e2702c63c8d27aa7f09fedee816dc8bffe1351d53271a34d4292b613b7efcedb7e3cf3e6ad389eef12471e9e20e38e7ae22a323abbadfe8f2e84271bffb1819feb4f77b82843cb8757cfae293631bc6d39669107e7015c85d7343ffa6fc1bbe6f5ab4de30cd752a281e03061ea89de2a3f5e90e20da22fd6e8525c100738667f42212b2cf45fcb23bbb54b21c117484b22c6e514685314df
CT: 66b7f69ac49fab4e5975aeb6fa9287d8eac02ac312c4de78f77f59da16cbcf87274e66801c4b862c33ea79cdc76528862bb2956c06db8b8acfac4794ebf39e35ac03cc73a4351a4ff762f681a48d6f25cad36e2814c9b5c40b9ae92509e58429106847789454d376836936bebc7a80e6c66e7aa52936d6b361378a41f849ad4e48f9ee2d3e92217a908fa8eb35736ac8ada7d32ae05391f2d807be3512543c36138a5fe660dd4cd4cd184bb43b6ba6bc0bae634e2fa9669304cd510ed5103f630068ff76d3375738de60a381842b421477e25a490cdd6894b2704125
TAG: c9998a677dfb0e91924aec9de0afd585
TAG: 94118ccc68de1921d480aab43d1ef0d1
KEY: 2cb374cb048c168f2e43597f028d9e73cade1b458284ffc260d4fc6b9011c414
NONCE: 9fb909169bc9f4e9
NONCE: 000000009fb909169bc9f4e9
IN: 39eb929482784b463546f5d84f80510f2019923d465b99d194246d68c7ae343f91971d8f7059cebb86aa5dd099289aa648248b8c5ca04e66ac5e9bf06776e3883495397618a0227f035666806e636836b47d3d2d255a49db79866cf00d9ddabda259c4f968a1e01e651c7811cebbee2ee71803ea1d9d23487eb221f2d9555756800aba5e6abbefd6fb72b3151cc99ced599cd86df2a9b1ce94f89f347eeb124d9e7f0d9cc48d3dedd819e6d3dbac57ecee199547b266116a2035c9acc4c8ca3271ac74952372897c4a5f2cb84e2d81817fec9d6774f6d8a5b2021684132db4fca3
AD: 0c7bd4f3a30ee944ccf9489181e6911684dcffad4593a9b65a67dfc80718c69b35897d01281016b7731e12c15cad8482e79458e08a755622e3f3f22a23ef6c8487a36ad1771ba06c641f06f85de0db3776cc6df06ad8fe3b4d60d58508de943083f17cbb9dc0d390ac94d8429e8c6fcfe063f424fbde0f62f6a7f91a626d195dc498a6e69bd93109c4e9ba13e7330aba456d710a4b0cc279d4045660406e26d61dff70d4a33c4f1052869f9248024e7a0f85f1effb32f6f7ccb1f860f3ef04e8f7b29096e6bcf9d4b3e0ce703e9bf228fdf515c2ff9cbabd16987be0f9babd3d8a
CT: 91ddadb86b7ebef798ddaa59da51d71316fcf6c9678143178227d778750dc9827fc6cc21e605c505023e6db25849df7fb6fc1ca4d223aa215f8c85b724643c83bf8218815a9f9e2952384e0ca6a80a3760b39daf91a3c6154c4728c2371fd181fa3764753d0b0c23808a82cd8f0497246e3a0f17f8906a07c725d2891ce968a9d432c2b102d85c05510b28e715bb60d0403a77490e7f18be81218bc4f39287b9bb09f50227dd2f55e4fb70c4438da8ba3c8ffbced87d90155913faa9979fc57e6cbeddfaba3d3ab4163c0eebc7d94279c27d3ed56338893dba542eaefba30f8c3b
TAG: 728e60f8124effbac234f70da925881c
TAG: 8980e8e4fe796428b733f4f8e1954a45
KEY: f0f16b6f12b3840bbd1c4a6a0811eef237f1521b45de9986daec9f28fca6485c
NONCE: 7ac93e754e290323
NONCE: 000000007ac93e754e290323
IN: 0530556424d823f90a7f1c524c4baa706aad2807e289e9479301e3e7a71f2a5e14e6232ea785f339c669af2e6d25f1d5a261096a548d23864945c3a589b67b09b0304a784d61b42b2419139485242e0d51fcbe9e8fed996d214de8717e6a71f8987ccad65eb92e66707034a5ae38e6486e26eb4374c565aad5df949dab209f7f7bcd8eb6fc52761a26cfe5d01fd349e59f4042e6dbe6b232f9301b971dee121d8aa1e62d40f043a42f3aa859d867eb809b1ced5ae1ec62cacf94a69fafd0631a8b5dfd66d855900fb295eec90ae5fcbf77beae267a79d24081bb322d8c4e0630fed252541b36
AD: 13bfcc17b810099cda31ca53a1323db9b07633ceb2088a42263a4cbd6a4d47978776005c9a20203319c3a3ae434e9a26fb541047dc9df38dc36c095267272e203d0b24d119a70a7e96041b6d82b7c4d5570e1e4a1cf2f6e44ae63fe005a1f5b900778c482f7bd89e2e02305e35b8f61b7bb2c78a13aebfce0145d1c5aa0bf1d10d23616d5a3a446de550302f56f81dc56fe4f3700f14242688d9b92d8a427979b403c8de8c493a2cde510eaf6b285e6675b173aa0314a386b635c7577d5aff0d868a0cb3f73c8d2005f8c7c9dab5a060ef80102c9d4a4af988838afe87aff04c0689e8c3c7f9
CT: 2c14c3931e98e84507c4c165c2ed47ad4a178f0e216cd7ac2453bbbf9f85dd06bd8ef54a9ff1fd3dd8e0cafb635d8f2de861a0db5b14d03f17aaea8c89b3010797c71c13a0e666899d7ff6e53c4f08be8ddb3e37688b5afa088079b6c7519b833e16560073e699530302028a3496e05edddec01a23a4c7983956250e8d9e616f7b940856955cde81c1efabf6b7b92f153d03f4cd17e7f7d2907670cfc84d45c1d7936775a3fce47968504278ffaecacea0871b227f250e2979516f6fa310fec0d8df1af7872e5a534e82870aa05f43ef0a455846b93ce938064fa33e92de262e4156dae56775
TAG: d95d73bf9aeb71eba9042396f3725424
TAG: 16c972829819b8fb030b2c5f40dab717
KEY: 3792943c0396f1840496917ce8ad89608385007e796febeea3805f3f4cbeccf7
NONCE: 23b2f9068b2c4c85
NONCE: 0000000023b2f9068b2c4c85
IN: be6b67eb943ee7b5c785cd882f653e73a8f75b4a41a2a7c56ae5a10f729caf39948fe48ad0e51240e2e7aa43193c7ec6ce7f4909fc94c9f99e38e6a0ad7e98eb29c5c2e61c99e9cbe890f154185cec213a74725d23c1a4e4d0cb9b1a36b78c87e5eee20d2aa29aae80d4759eb0c51c5dc3a95bdbbf7e14eb434419a6c88a954ac03d0c98739f4211b8732acd71c297f578b8cb64ccac45f7235ddc7f2a3f5f997525c1ed39dc550126cdf9cedaf55425489085e91b170be6205a5a395f2dd4084a3e8dbc4fd8b13252f7effae067b571cb94a1e54aba45b1b9841308db0cc75b03cfce4ddafe89ce20f2d1
AD: 7eb6d7b7bbaaa3c202a4f0f1de2263767169eb4a64853240d48c0f8d5d31b08d5baf42977614a57aad99426cde76d242cb37d2956d8c77dc4fd62a3abf30e8ac6cd58c8ef35e67497022960138c57787818892460f3bfc16e37ff388b1edc6ce2bc53c22717edc7a03d4c78b0dbbe9121c7fd8a3e3993b87a4fe389bff13bdae3b349de0b6db561602c53f746022aeb4483c723b67825042f4af20b7dd1e6031cf54215266295c524ac8e1370424c5c5e607fb3e23e97c8eebe64656775edf616422a8b974e1acf13ab45c9a367a7dd9b2d62f48bbc05819b65eccb813ca813f57b22ee4c280dbb5a9d8d5
CT: 0b316ab2bcf5359900fa4082d5d253b49ad94b70e3fab544f98bd111cbcef6766cf953deec08cae1f489fe12f7acc0032db8a6b0c0eee0c206ea5fb973feaebf90f690e840094db5e13fdd7157ba127368c995b426529435a1bcdd1f14ce9125b8a0e4c96b6ec09e3c36a180adf81941c002d19c19d53c2009be803b987504606b7d43bdee5e0b32ff23c466b6cccfcd0d4e88fd1332e73712b5ab725c1a383e584f34f80daff29d285ae5e43cf1d0cc7a828e75c25daced3a581a93d7a50f313b33f38dddfaa23cd5b9914797db820ee2400d52bf5fa982277fe9b5881ac42981633b3957b0e935051828
TAG: 01973ee2e81cef22751a6a8831d752ef
TAG: c549aa944d6d97e52e0793ed572682c0
KEY: fe4be6054773f634356ac328591fbc6f833b0d1beeb38dd5b6feb7481b4489d4
NONCE: 0b3f16f898a5a7d5
NONCE: 000000000b3f16f898a5a7d5
IN: 76ced1ade6d1ef4069afddb32e7432d4ff2fd06685121f7b16464e7a72d365744f547d2ccf53486310e38b42d8bacaf711e54c5458d2d68c4dbcc8de31ab6732f4430e88a64565f5b287640775aaa2af1cc461d3e415bb275c6246b1b58517aa72667eae291a2982eda175d1b22c5a58e6fec2b3743d55712f201ca24ba5c0ae8c25724871b2ec2fb914a8da5a52670ab9b43a83b8568ce74db5c634061cb80530c8070c38b8f48c33ba136cb9f2158ee7eda8b65f2192fc94d1291f182f101795b7190c74b319d2d3e02a97c824d9c9471a83797e4936310b207e3a1e0bcf75f7c3e3ee48a747641cdc4377f2d55082
AD: 834cd775cbefe4b33a3ca53a00c06a3c4a666983e4115a029f15729460daa45d1505e95172d3695625a186b28b8be173a925af04665f209267b3c5123e8be13da447ee1ae856bb0925f35aaa76e04a7bca8460f76c2024de2149f38a8cfba81694b854885d72568105571b6b213a0bc188a44cc7fe13153cbf261401b238cf12a95e23cb56f240114f16e2f1e3a514615aab4449c0c49e4d900b0e17d1a8dabb53d43dca32fa052d576b73dd9b40856b515d6d7efc2a5c17e0ebcb17bd59dc86f22ce909301a2652f134e82ef0e4519487ed12d51536024f2ae8f75d937c42d003076e5dea8de0c684cda1f34253d8fc
CT: f8defb6fe95dfec499b909996a1f75a198a90e4d6c6464d00a357a555311c42fe92dbbc4b79c935e4f0b1a95e44fdbc1380bebabca28db4dd0d2870daaafc38ef27908c3509e945714801cc51f1a07b2430c74fa64f2a7c2f7fd1551d258c9c3be020873fc1bf19f33ab6c660911dcf2317195d0efee82d20ec26d22611f9cf86c51a64e28b3a1f344500018e0855c88dae3c07acaeaa10b60388484dce93e16e6e1a6e69e899806648a92568c8780e9f4baacd98cbb353ac2f908e775d92303cfab843f15be0e0c322a958802fb1a60fcc7631f151f4c2b8cb965d2d296acef250275a2fecc0cea803ce7c058b12dd2
TAG: ade515091930dd7861b27f78a87ef60c
TAG: baf9a51180f172e5c0cc2c946ce55055
KEY: a288b11ce5382ec724ce4ab2d7efa8e777e91ebd04367935e15f9dac483e9596
NONCE: 874144dbf648b325
NONCE: 00000000874144dbf648b325
IN: 4c9195280a79a509919af4947e9e07231695fd7c5088539f23936ce88770ce07d9ad3ae4a463b3a57d0634d3a77ceaadf347a334682b04be8e58b8e86fb94a1f93255132b8cdb0df86f5bea354eea4e8315fea83e3fdf6e58aa9f26e93caa08e5e2551a94bd916a51fed29ec16f66800cda6a0aa24ec308bf5fb885afba272685de27c1edcdd3668048ef07b06e90d464a8aa28664903cac45e154e8e1e39c257e1ff506b9d95cef4f300bb73b899e7828602c3c1d290b8cf55ee5fd72ecce9e6efc9293aebf674a70e2a7673e75629c12950622dff71d3ec0992e57776c788c6927d30b4e24b749191c3ce8017f0ada6276e43720
AD: 04abe8588c8c8c39a182092e5e7840442bd1c1149da102c4ee412bd8b82baa5087ef7291b5cd077c177c42770b0023e0e462b06e7553f191bcb0315a34918dcdbffe2b99c3e011b4220cc1775debcc0db55fa60df9b52234f3d3fa9606508badc26f30b47cdb4f1c0f4708d417b6853e66c2f1f67f6200daf760ceb64ffc43db27f057ad3ee973e31d7e5d5deb050315c1c687980c0c148ee1a492d47acfcd6132334176c11258c89b19ba02e6acc55d852f87b6a2169ed34a6147caa60906ac8c0813c0f05522af7b7f0faddb4bc297405e28ecf5a0f6aac6258422d29cfe250d61402840f3c27d0ce39b3e2d5f1e520541d2965e
CT: 0afce770a12f15d67ac104ba0640aab95922390607473cbda71321156a5559906be933fb0980da56f27e89796eaa1054f5aacf1668d9f273cc69071b9e8e22af6a205a6a88f7ad918e22f616bddbb07c78913c7e056e769e6fcf91c7600c2740212e3a176e4110cac9e361a59a773457064d2dc652dd115d04f1c3756c0e1d39f6737a16b4508663e310934c49c58058b3c7b9af7bb2334c8a163608c42499658986927cda365e2aead3ac29de16e47e954383ea566f8fb245a4e5a934c767bb3bf7e0eb8a477fd0e1f61bcb238462a0d19c5cea9293ca58ade76829413216a7882cd2846323046694f78cd8b0347792ebb75abdc1
TAG: 973e58b1b8adb176a6f1e5c963bfdc5c
TAG: eb9b2ee43e9a3ae1e33561800169d868
KEY: 65b63ed53750c88c508c44881ae59e6fff69c66288f3c14cfec503391262cafc
NONCE: 7f5e560a1de434ba
NONCE: 000000007f5e560a1de434ba
IN: 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
AD: 51a3588398808e1d6a98505c6e5601ae2a2766f1f28f8f69d1ccbcad18038c157b41525be58ae4527a073748b7a04809e52a5df0c7988417607738e63d7ead47db795a346b04e740186e73ccad79f725b58ee22dc6e30d1f0a218eda1791e2229b253d4ab2b963a43e12318c8b0785c20fca3abcf220c08745d9f9602f0ece544a05736d76b12d249699c9e3e99f3f13cf4e5dc13a04125c949a5b30d034b23cb364c8781964bc6c30e5e5ca9673d517ef5f35965d8a8cf1be017e343df97b6bee37b30638b154286d1f36d2f9a0eaa23cc484eac5a05b15d9efc537d989dbc8b3106c0dc1a56e97e6aec2eff54a82cf7ae9df2af46b4c860f83
CT: 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
TAG: e4d18a701b8308697b5e79141ed783c1
TAG: e0bf9b6837428843f5a233ee5ddb8a1e
KEY: 4986fd62d6cb86b2eaf219174bec681bebcdef86c8be291f27d3e5dc69e2feba
NONCE: d08d486620ed2e84
NONCE: 00000000d08d486620ed2e84
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: c40180afd53001663ff4834110f56e6b0f178cd3c0e7f7de5d0089ee41d8403ffb98e84922706544a344d7e2625b12cf66b9c966f9f57d7b94e3e4b34e6f0aaed1763ce012782e2f5e1682e6c343fc7961fedddd0919d0b910e9923c17e36406979b256b85aec24ee352f03b48c1302eab419c83dccc5372cc059e9de596224fa70098eb32fc9579e97917b923914fa2efc30ab29b457bf14e45583b3771486bdc0876f3ea6e1a646746c4f8c5cb2641a1557c8473e6ea67d4811a67485ae9a678ff3a2408ca845c3b51957e189eef47dfc1d46bde4b9d754d7df13f828ddadb06e4ebddb5f0dafbdb28de4c5e6078926f20cdf9e97ecd58e309e640f74f06
TAG: fd5e29332832a14a31a9ce2ca8568498
TAG: 2e8eb9ff4467c0f61c2abf6ca10893ef
KEY: 7d28a60810e43d3dfa32e97c07957ec069fc80cc6a50061830aa29b3aa777dfc
NONCE: 47738ac8f10f2c3a
NONCE: 0000000047738ac8f10f2c3a
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 1fdd2dcd935f55822bf7231a516ca841
TAG: ce507bdb0c71f8e89f5078495f7995b8
KEY: a76e9b916f5a67b78a5949651c8c3a9741a1bc3c41cdf85fd2c8f3e9a0616098
NONCE: 0808da8292dc14e0
NONCE: 000000000808da8292dc14e0
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: b45df119043d29008fcef36a169ef886
TAG: 73b00b1705602479aab944dcc1b282a2
KEY: 98cd2477a7a072c69f375b88d09ed9d7b9c3df3f87e36ce621726f76e3b41a1d
NONCE: 77d185aaf715aa48
NONCE: 0000000077d185aaf715aa48
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: f613b65226afb64c614fe60d9c71ed74
TAG: 69302888812eea030d621b640e7bcf7c
KEY: 2f0f4631ab1c1bcf8f3ad0559c818d50e0af7d8cd63faa357f2069f30881d9cb
NONCE: 7d0ced2fdb1c9173
NONCE: 000000007d0ced2fdb1c9173
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 0fd7419c54bc84265ed310a3411a3f2e
TAG: 19bbacfac768bb0ce71e39c5d4d3e9a0
KEY: a48b9b6df475e566aba7671fbd76772cb0eff0b12499967978ce3e25fac92feb
NONCE: 2ccbf0d6c40cb302
NONCE: 000000002ccbf0d6c40cb302
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 2aabff35611b3e0013f6ae0df130799b
TAG: 0fa4cb2bab84336409aa4349ab99a8bd
KEY: 923d4b086b9e43b986f7b65e4cea6113a3d8aabefa89323c5e4d5b6f158bb7e0
NONCE: a0f73297b87f5deb
NONCE: 00000000a0f73297b87f5deb
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: f2e21052eebbb86a4f5e803360855d8632aa727dca6f5e79dd74d7aff106e442001928d113005b030f8446f8eff2ee951db663978abe43090dd5ad2c51ba97a0ecf988c607d95e486d02524f690fa3c28d5c48c1f75c1f555e7b43fe7e46f2ca2b9fdb408ec4ba18b6cdde2af673183cb7b1a3c23ae77eddd4cac75e1ea14743fc571f8d31ce2e96787524cd48aadaa474181c096a032184574ddc25a6e0ac8441c212bc36298708e33c963ae931e6c6241d1affeef7b6ef759495df44b6ab647447693cf703569e69aa72f1def9a342b8978c1edea9703a421ca75b92cac4de14b88c693200022b8a2ed22b1c4678b99f4d695e080dd1196d7168e14f0d0f8ff880d742e97b9f6d00af1f7118e10b77c5ef3ea6c52f84a20fd6ea46dc
TAG: fa8ee13400fb3f63b899df582f2fec45
TAG: 9bd8b7743c056bb2334833afd6143e18
KEY: df73adab2768559ea983cce85453fe81d79be3b3c57f202b31b94d6635cf2e4b
NONCE: e7a87e6bf6b5a354
NONCE: 00000000e7a87e6bf6b5a354
IN: 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
AD: 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
CT: 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
TAG: 184095b7a8190abec08bb72d19eeb103
TAG: ee1ec36804e1d5cdbddb52608c711fd8
KEY: 55a4be2448b464c2ea52a2f2664ed6aba865c14ea1fea77f4689331fd105c8d4
NONCE: db37c0a405b4626d
NONCE: 00000000db37c0a405b4626d
IN: 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
AD: fd6a3fdd879f8880843eac20ae01c1b9dc3487d270a806572088ef2ddc1f1e0de495e71d4813bf5c501ad31e5d791c4b5b3a0a71b63fdddcc8de4b056064ef467989ecccc5d0160d403bf3a025d4892b3b1de3e062bc3581d4410f273338311eb4637529e4a680a6e4a5e26e308630a5b6d49ead6d543f8f2bf9050aa94ce091318721e1d8b96e279f34b9759b65037bec4bf6ccda6929705aeeeebe49e327e4d7a916620c9faf3765120658af34c53fbb97ec07657b3f088fcbdc401aa7949ddeda34d885018c2c23f4f0bb8218bf0d4fc90643658b4d8834f4a8c08e590c2a790995baa9e77627c342d283e454f84fcc05be15e9627a2d9be340c9d72f222bbdfc47905f56616cd9f936d49e4732f319f020513340fb8b22828db251b102b6b137c9533936d6
CT: 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
TAG: f7d3b58a34a86e99267e5db206f17bbe
TAG: 296a397d280d026fc3627f4718971be9
KEY: 3304e4917ad7777b86c26a636292c9cc4c10d32003c49e07209eb0ef8505031a
NONCE: 4d572d116fbd8c4d
IN: 2f242c2ba33790ecef862b0e077ff8b15eb9d10cf2ff621ed65902494431dcbd
AD: e699bbf250cdd93d229d0740e433897e2d19132e2b722df8b69bb6a7c2cf3b93
CT: fb81e30436e437c7f686f86b1b65c73549a9d09db810d320785c3634934150b3
TAG: 8b
# Tag truncation tests.
KEY: ed6057bb163f1609ff28b938122f495e3d5ae4ec3dbd7456c9b5c82e28e952dc
NONCE: e6ff6852f3a3afde
IN: 3c50edc967eb0b3b2355f6400e0a036e796c8b7d72c5e583a86e820d53e76c43
AD: 2441db55148e14e9e241d68296eb60d529408f0534143089671bce546db96d88
CT: 6ecabccee31519374d4bed11296e7483d1cb759bea3f4446a96bda8b4ca6d7ac
TAG: 355f
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3
KEY: 73568183c1f9725af30e0f2067606ce802c3fe3ab5cff8d02b3db8c35176ee0d
NONCE: 0bc9e19321b3d00a
IN: ec2590af5ccd226a32ff750c1b029c11e3dd76c469a5579da9418e4c3fdc0d41
AD: df30160ae0cbf2cf8992221bd62dffe691dd602afa784ca691479e957af3acf1
CT: 9e8d8ac30626f8b831448d6976933aa5bb8c6dbc794e1f4b7eeb0e4a59342c07
TAG: 9fd36a
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7
KEY: 273bcb3f8c067da4ec3418799ad40e7e4aee74ad7e629499d646df4a7e585025
NONCE: f60be3eb894b4030
IN: 697498ba964d5ef401da4d94844fab1efc635e7157d0831a325bb5a4cf1fbd34
AD: 9129715deab14f02c76ba8172571b1fa9d50365cd795bfccdfc28e7e7b4f66fc
CT: bd4cd5af83be1c13933302675d9fcaf1c4cacdf269f6ff441d1ea2211c54e7ed
TAG: 7ab12a37
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9
KEY: ad39610c2e6a6d0961207390e076e972c2edadca885c92965fa648b2ce34fdbf
NONCE: a90db690bba83b78
IN: 31c49e3cd3d80a82e6b90316dfb94b38b8a23042519bf40c8181fec873c99002
AD: ddbd7d821d18d44c66295abf245b227b5cf4366811b7b34c07679600abdbfc29
CT: 94628fc303a0546edd51e966f2bd87968f37800c607d5e5a91f727fc1fec406f
TAG: c22ec4e4c8
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c2
KEY: 29984954060ba06ece1bcfc0e50195f4632c6df48da1e02ae6c14f7065668971
NONCE: cce53a25aeeaf747
IN: b9b87433a9894f3c9ca8212623d62369a565a2edcddd276e07d611eda3597426
AD: 19fa9aa59697559d8b46d9cd49c3b763c0b73b26b9e334a3eeac2c86fdbaca8d
CT: b68c83397770c36f073710882fa86d43b0e54e8efef0ff75075604d0d7ec4e1b
TAG: 40d4ab752f3d
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295
KEY: 5c3b838b84100b2a818c0842e9fe19a7c50cf5f3ea73364c816ef588e500ff3f
NONCE: fdf6b0229e4bcc2a
IN: 2ba91904c143be99297b39f52856904af41705c176c8c6554b6bc89bddffbcc1
AD: 3539d9dd821f004f4ced1637071f4be6abd7fe98f017f0a8ce3f49dc8d496f46
CT: ff9d6d924e737a1df8c2bd3047e40ab401f903aa0e5b51acb991bac38ac2cc4d
TAG: 1bcaa415a6a3c7
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f3
KEY: 6d65e627cab6d5eb1a088b25bd6c3a8a004a7a19cccae909d62fed3559c812f7
NONCE: 7ff00a8798b792de
IN: 6848ee4ac820291a2e1dc3baad97f1ad8b7160dfeaa1bc83b2700ae42b5a366b
AD: d2437b1306bf0ea211449fac863ca0d1074d84caee9009c5d54b9e9bdc8de6b1
CT: 2da0abe2a71e1c0b1ab309c160a8cebe45c6e16170aa5561806484ba2b5b9a9a
TAG: 566003e1f78d2a90
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374
KEY: 63401046a96efbc8c6483a2c396b2a593d3fae0db565525b85999fae13a46b6a
NONCE: 051393d775e635ee
IN: 2b4b6477580382aae782f8b5772c0948a444d8d95caacd85c0856c7e4393fe09
AD: 3d84d2e70e9c062d1f511eb685a9a90c8d5fa50eadf8455c7148666b3e7155e0
CT: 880c1123e54fd8ffb3c293720dd174913572e619ef46504cdaa64fc451b0ec1c
TAG: 339274339c88d50ac0
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f37465
KEY: 291fccfce0782f1787d62d4b9293d2ada4c04d37a8288ba9ba9aae0d31aad204
NONCE: 7450bbd62e4aba7b
IN: adc251e793181e5d4c4bd983b853eb13f2096ccb340996b6eca4cd2157efcec7
AD: 4c598f6deedc8c1d97da33654763495cca3517430eec4edb006b10c95e031ae6
CT: 28bda22e4922cd8ff6739cd8a6bdafce036d9c61a145a65ca1b86f6d4d3206a1
TAG: d98fd43fe7ac74d4b016
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a
KEY: fa3a9674d4a0eb36b2f7547c956443d09e6b4e4acfc9deda838eb7ebdb999a8d
NONCE: 0a2572592c3bbbf6
IN: ae27f70fda9f5a5be0f704a27f0b8a9c04ce83d3c2e0d7ec152da25f473b0c8a
AD: 6ee8705a9a3655d198497ad410da02005872ecbe397824851b80f4050bfdd311
CT: f356cbd88e4e2aff62d91e3f914032085388955bbba995fde013758b8702e38f
TAG: 00324c76fecd3f50e1e3b8
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a84
KEY: 471ec87b992b104d369748d96856b5f66149cb45ca05c17f29d24eb9526fe6db
NONCE: 23a2df9ed0b47439
IN: 2b9452bca0f48e5519ec3d0736597608df6ad9ce799eba913cff71573d79c092
AD: a56722ddfaee5f1b64398c225ee8bcdcfde5c2127101c363bfac52bc409c1082
CT: 7bbc464aac5dd29c25262fe0b116c176d827c2cc8dd63428393b0a9110f3c194
TAG: 2e87f4a6663a62e47c7e197f
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a8413
KEY: a29d1cfd4ccdc18803fbca9500f4bb29ce99cfcbf8acc41b8208dae4b7ee5d64
NONCE: 634f99e88e237ef0
IN: 09ee5982c5743f396d0c29c13e3fbb8fb89f61705da05466291e010effd51a5c
AD: 564dddfcc3227b413244f1105b610f192decf15c4cfa067f4d7fcd6bd7af11b8
CT: 32916b67a6f32733623344c98c49773f3e721dc2ded105fb245799525bc9c84c
TAG: ff463c07e7ef831321d3fd775f
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a841386
KEY: 08ba23616d911188f91da063278bef1237dcbf17f52585e53c2c4b6cf3ac9f0d
NONCE: 989ae593eddd3874
IN: 749152c9478944c8271c0c11e07bc1c569eec01493e65b3b94842a1bf5d721f8
AD: a12d1a45b7c9b91ab08751a70b753714052ad24e0b2619fe8c3be303c65f2dbc
CT: 34c40538ee1d22ddf8ac290dd7d423dfc622b5cf8f3412a5343e277822aea713
TAG: 014c7c678e0949e88071d1fe3531
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a84138648
KEY: c2ba8bed8634156afc6bfe3754c91744d4131de39d059f3a866399f916553b5c
NONCE: 80fbf7b433a4cd9c
IN: 419be6623e7964f9f26068dd969e4a139617e67c5ffb269b3013c433fe771c77
AD: 3937592db78a61ff469691b6800792019bc2b3d42512f23c1b1a66a8274495cb
CT: 9d5bd1c7e766763eb00684c038043111d8c6390a8d6e17a15ef97c02ab16f09c
TAG: a64d0eeb4a01481ec0cee8c1c357e3
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a84138648a5
KEY: c66e89fbab01208f6a60847f4f34b38d27b554c119cf8d9e0b118aa7266ab865
NONCE: 000000005d9856060c54ab06
IN: f9e3e9b5ed07b2080db8c1ffc37e4a6cb3cd544608921e18610d00b17c6e
AD: 85c112a1efe0a20ef3a550526a7afbc98f6367ebbede4e703099abd78f51
CT: b5cc754f6dd19ef2d66f90e6bc9a322ddf216ef248cbe76b5ab6dd53bc36
TAG: d3f7b9c295f374651a84138648a591
+53
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,22 @@ Plaintext = 37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000
Ciphertext = 3FE301C962AC01D02213763C1CBD4CDC799657C064ECF5D41C673812CFDE9675
# DES EDE CBC tests
Cipher = DES-EDE-CBC
Key = 0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786
IV = fedcba9876543210
Plaintext = 37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000
Ciphertext = 7948C0DA4FE91CD815DCA96DBC9B60A857EB954F4DEB08EB98722642AE69257B
# DES EDE tests
Cipher = DES-EDE
Key = 0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786
IV = fedcba9876543210
Plaintext = 37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000
Ciphertext = 22E889402E28422F8167AD279D90A566DA75B734E12C671FC2669AECB3E4FE8F
# AES 128 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
Cipher = AES-128-ECB
Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
@@ -542,3 +558,40 @@ Cipher = AES-192-ECB
Key = 8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B
Plaintext = F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710
Ciphertext = 9A4B41BA738D6C72FB16691603C18E0E
# DES ECB tests
Cipher = DES-ECB
Key = 0000000000000000
Plaintext = 0000000000000000
Ciphertext = 8CA64DE9C1B123A7
Cipher = DES-ECB
Key = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Plaintext = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Ciphertext = 7359B2163E4EDC58
Cipher = DES-ECB
Key = 3000000000000000
Plaintext = 1000000000000001
Ciphertext = 958E6E627A05557B
Cipher = DES-ECB
Key = 1111111111111111
Plaintext = 1111111111111111
Ciphertext = F40379AB9E0EC533
Cipher = DES-ECB
Key = 0123456789ABCDEF
Plaintext = 1111111111111111
Ciphertext = 17668DFC7292532D
Cipher = DES-ECB
Key = 1111111111111111
Plaintext = 0123456789ABCDEF
Ciphertext = 8A5AE1F81AB8F2DD
Cipher = DES-ECB
Key = FEDCBA9876543210
Plaintext = 0123456789ABCDEF
Ciphertext = ED39D950FA74BCC4
+5 -5
View File
@@ -229,11 +229,11 @@ void EVP_tls_cbc_copy_mac(uint8_t *out, unsigned md_size,
* typically does. */
static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, uint8_t *md_out) {
SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx;
u32toBE(sha1->h0, md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h1, md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h2, md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h3, md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h4, md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[0], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[1], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[2], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[3], md_out);
u32toBE(sha1->h[4], md_out);
}
#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA_CTX
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
cmac
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(cmac_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests cmac_test)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
conf
+20 -16
View File
@@ -111,6 +111,16 @@ CONF *NCONF_new(void *method) {
return conf;
}
CONF_VALUE *CONF_VALUE_new(void) {
CONF_VALUE *v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE));
if (!v) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CONF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(v, 0, sizeof(CONF_VALUE));
return v;
}
static void value_free_contents(CONF_VALUE *value) {
if (value->section) {
OPENSSL_free(value->section);
@@ -137,29 +147,26 @@ void NCONF_free(CONF *conf) {
return;
}
lh_CONF_VALUE_doall(conf->data, value_free_contents);
lh_CONF_VALUE_doall(conf->data, value_free);
lh_CONF_VALUE_free(conf->data);
OPENSSL_free(conf);
}
CONF_VALUE *NCONF_new_section(const CONF *conf, const char *section) {
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sk = NULL;
int ok = 0, i;
int ok = 0;
CONF_VALUE *v = NULL, *old_value;
sk = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null();
v = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE));
v = CONF_VALUE_new();
if (sk == NULL || v == NULL) {
goto err;
}
i = strlen(section) + 1;
v->section = OPENSSL_malloc(i);
v->section = OPENSSL_strdup(section);
if (v->section == NULL) {
goto err;
}
memcpy(v->section, section, i);
v->section[i-1] = 0;
v->name = NULL;
v->value = (char *)sk;
@@ -372,11 +379,12 @@ const char *NCONF_get_string(const CONF *conf, const char *section,
return value->value;
}
int add_string(const CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section, CONF_VALUE *value) {
static int add_string(const CONF *conf, CONF_VALUE *section,
CONF_VALUE *value) {
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section_stack = (STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)*) section->value;
CONF_VALUE *old_value;
value->section = section->section;
value->section = OPENSSL_strdup(section->section);
if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(section_stack, value)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -509,12 +517,11 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
goto err;
}
section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10);
section = OPENSSL_strdup("default");
if (section == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CONF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10);
sv = NCONF_new_section(conf, section);
if (sv == NULL) {
@@ -639,20 +646,17 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *out_error_line) {
p++;
*p = '\0';
if (!(v = (CONF_VALUE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CONF_VALUE)))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CONF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (!(v = CONF_VALUE_new())) {
goto err;
}
if (psection == NULL) {
psection = section;
}
v->name = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(pname) + 1);
v->value = NULL;
v->name = OPENSSL_strdup(pname);
if (v->name == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CONF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BUF_strlcpy(v->name, pname, strlen(pname) + 1);
if (!str_copy(conf, psection, &(v->value), start)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -12,6 +12,20 @@
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
/* This header is linked to under the names of several headers that have been
* removed. It's possible to put a #error in here in order to catch that an
* clean up older code. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_CONF_INTERNAL_H
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_CONF_INTERNAL_H
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
#endif
/* CONF_VALUE_new returns a freshly allocated and zeroed |CONF_VALUE|. */
CONF_VALUE *CONF_VALUE_new(void);
#if defined(__cplusplus)
} /* extern C */
#endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_CONF_INTERNAL_H */
+18 -8
View File
@@ -14,17 +14,16 @@
#include <openssl/cpu.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
#if (defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <string.h>
#if !defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)
#include <setjmp.h>
#include <signal.h>
#endif
#include "arm_arch.h"
#include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
/* We can't include <sys/auxv.h> because the Android SDK version against which
@@ -33,7 +32,9 @@
unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long type) __attribute__((weak));
char CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable(void) {
extern uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P;
char CRYPTO_is_NEON_capable_at_runtime(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_NEON) != 0;
}
@@ -62,7 +63,15 @@ void CRYPTO_set_NEON_functional(char neon_functional) {
}
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_ARM) && !defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_AES_capable(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_AES) != 0;
}
int CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable(void) {
return (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV8_PMULL) != 0;
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && defined(OPENSSL_ARM)
static sigjmp_buf sigill_jmp;
@@ -120,7 +129,7 @@ static int probe_for_NEON(void) {
return 0;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ASM && OPENSSL_ARM && !OPENSSL_TRUSTY */
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ASM && OPENSSL_ARM */
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
if (getauxval == NULL) {
@@ -186,4 +195,5 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {
}
}
#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) */
#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) &&
!defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) */
+39 -11
View File
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/cpu.h>
#include "internal.h"
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || \
defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64))
/* x86, x86_64 and the ARMs need to record the result of a cpuid call for the
@@ -55,9 +57,29 @@
uint32_t OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[4] = {0};
#elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
#include "arm_arch.h"
#include <openssl/arm_arch.h>
#if defined(__ARM_NEON__)
#if defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP)
uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P =
#if defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_NEON) || defined(__ARM_NEON__)
ARMV7_NEON | ARMV7_NEON_FUNCTIONAL |
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_AES)
ARMV8_AES |
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_SHA1)
ARMV8_SHA1 |
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_SHA256)
ARMV8_SHA256 |
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_STATIC_ARMCAP_PMULL)
ARMV8_PMULL |
#endif
0;
#elif defined(__ARM_NEON__)
uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P = ARMV7_NEON | ARMV7_NEON_FUNCTIONAL;
#else
uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P = ARMV7_NEON_FUNCTIONAL;
@@ -66,22 +88,22 @@ uint32_t OPENSSL_armcap_P = ARMV7_NEON_FUNCTIONAL;
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS) && !defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
#define OPENSSL_CDECL __cdecl
#else
#define OPENSSL_CDECL
#endif
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
static void do_library_init(void) __attribute__ ((constructor));
#else
#if defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
static CRYPTO_once_t once = CRYPTO_ONCE_INIT;
#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#pragma section(".CRT$XCU", read)
static void __cdecl do_library_init(void);
__declspec(allocate(".CRT$XCU")) void(*library_init_constructor)(void) =
do_library_init;
#else
static void do_library_init(void) __attribute__ ((constructor));
#endif
#endif /* !BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER */
/* do_library_init is the actual initialization function. If
* BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER isn't defined, this is set as a static
@@ -97,9 +119,9 @@ static void OPENSSL_CDECL do_library_init(void) {
void CRYPTO_library_init(void) {
/* TODO(davidben): It would be tidier if this build knob could be replaced
* with an internal lazy-init mechanism that would handle things correctly
* in-library. */
* in-library. https://crbug.com/542879 */
#if defined(BORINGSSL_NO_STATIC_INITIALIZER)
do_library_init();
CRYPTO_once(&once, do_library_init);
#endif
}
@@ -110,3 +132,9 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int unused) {
unsigned long SSLeay(void) {
return OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER;
}
int CRYPTO_malloc_init(void) {
return 1;
}
void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void) {}
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
include_directories(../../include)
if (${ARCH} STREQUAL "arm")
set(
CURVE25519_ARCH_SOURCES
asm/x25519-arm.S
)
endif()
add_library(
curve25519
OBJECT
curve25519.c
${CURVE25519_ARCH_SOURCES}
)
add_executable(
ed25519_test
ed25519_test.cc
$<TARGET_OBJECTS:test_support>
)
target_link_libraries(ed25519_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests ed25519_test)
add_executable(
x25519_test
x25519_test.cc
)
target_link_libraries(x25519_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests x25519_test)
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include "../test/file_test.h"
static bool TestSignature(FileTest *t, void *arg) {
std::vector<uint8_t> private_key, public_key, message, expected_signature;
if (!t->GetBytes(&private_key, "PRIV") ||
private_key.size() != 64 ||
!t->GetBytes(&public_key, "PUB") ||
public_key.size() != 32 ||
!t->GetBytes(&message, "MESSAGE") ||
!t->GetBytes(&expected_signature, "SIG") ||
expected_signature.size() != 64) {
return false;
}
uint8_t signature[64];
if (!ED25519_sign(signature, message.data(), message.size(),
private_key.data())) {
t->PrintLine("ED25519_sign failed");
return false;
}
if (!t->ExpectBytesEqual(expected_signature.data(), expected_signature.size(),
signature, sizeof(signature))) {
return false;
}
if (!ED25519_verify(message.data(), message.size(), signature,
public_key.data())) {
t->PrintLine("ED25519_verify failed");
return false;
}
return true;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (argc != 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s <test input.txt>\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
return FileTestMain(TestSignature, nullptr, argv[1]);
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
static bool TestX25519() {
/* Taken from
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-11#section-5.2 */
static const uint8_t kScalar1[32] = {
0xa5, 0x46, 0xe3, 0x6b, 0xf0, 0x52, 0x7c, 0x9d, 0x3b, 0x16, 0x15,
0x4b, 0x82, 0x46, 0x5e, 0xdd, 0x62, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0xc1, 0xfc,
0x5a, 0x18, 0x50, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x44, 0xba, 0x44, 0x9a, 0xc4,
};
static const uint8_t kPoint1[32] = {
0xe6, 0xdb, 0x68, 0x67, 0x58, 0x30, 0x30, 0xdb, 0x35, 0x94, 0xc1,
0xa4, 0x24, 0xb1, 0x5f, 0x7c, 0x72, 0x66, 0x24, 0xec, 0x26, 0xb3,
0x35, 0x3b, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x03, 0xa6, 0xd0, 0xab, 0x1c, 0x4c,
};
uint8_t out[32];
X25519(out, kScalar1, kPoint1);
static const uint8_t kExpected1[32] = {
0xc3, 0xda, 0x55, 0x37, 0x9d, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0x90, 0x8e, 0x94, 0xea,
0x4d, 0xf2, 0x8d, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x32, 0xec, 0xcf, 0x03, 0x49, 0x1c,
0x71, 0xf7, 0x54, 0xb4, 0x07, 0x55, 0x77, 0xa2, 0x85, 0x52,
};
if (memcmp(kExpected1, out, sizeof(out)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "X25519 test one failed.\n");
return false;
}
static const uint8_t kScalar2[32] = {
0x4b, 0x66, 0xe9, 0xd4, 0xd1, 0xb4, 0x67, 0x3c, 0x5a, 0xd2, 0x26,
0x91, 0x95, 0x7d, 0x6a, 0xf5, 0xc1, 0x1b, 0x64, 0x21, 0xe0, 0xea,
0x01, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xa4, 0x16, 0x9e, 0x79, 0x18, 0xba, 0x0d,
};
static const uint8_t kPoint2[32] = {
0xe5, 0x21, 0x0f, 0x12, 0x78, 0x68, 0x11, 0xd3, 0xf4, 0xb7, 0x95,
0x9d, 0x05, 0x38, 0xae, 0x2c, 0x31, 0xdb, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x6f, 0xc0,
0x3c, 0x3e, 0xfc, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x49, 0xc7, 0x15, 0xa4, 0x93,
};
X25519(out, kScalar2, kPoint2);
static const uint8_t kExpected2[32] = {
0x95, 0xcb, 0xde, 0x94, 0x76, 0xe8, 0x90, 0x7d, 0x7a, 0xad, 0xe4,
0x5c, 0xb4, 0xb8, 0x73, 0xf8, 0x8b, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x68, 0x79, 0x9f,
0xa1, 0x52, 0xe6, 0xf8, 0xf7, 0x64, 0x7a, 0xac, 0x79, 0x57,
};
if (memcmp(kExpected2, out, sizeof(out)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "X25519 test two failed.\n");
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool TestX25519SmallOrder() {
static const uint8_t kSmallOrderPoint[32] = {
0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae, 0x16, 0x56, 0xe3,
0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a, 0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32,
0xb1, 0xfd, 0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8,
};
uint8_t out[32], private_key[32];
memset(private_key, 0x11, sizeof(private_key));
if (X25519(out, private_key, kSmallOrderPoint)) {
fprintf(stderr, "X25519 returned success with a small-order input.\n");
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool TestX25519Iterated() {
/* Taken from
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-11#section-5.2 */
uint8_t scalar[32] = {9}, point[32] = {9}, out[32];
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
X25519(out, scalar, point);
memcpy(point, scalar, sizeof(point));
memcpy(scalar, out, sizeof(scalar));
}
static const uint8_t kExpected[32] = {
0x68, 0x4c, 0xf5, 0x9b, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x09, 0x55, 0x28, 0x00, 0xef,
0x56, 0x6f, 0x2f, 0x4d, 0x3c, 0x1c, 0x38, 0x87, 0xc4, 0x93, 0x60,
0xe3, 0x87, 0x5f, 0x2e, 0xb9, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x53, 0x2c, 0x51,
};
if (memcmp(kExpected, scalar, sizeof(kExpected)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Iterated X25519 test failed\n");
return false;
}
return true;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
if (!TestX25519() ||
!TestX25519Iterated() ||
!TestX25519SmallOrder()) {
return 1;
}
printf("PASS\n");
return 0;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
des
-2
View File
@@ -499,7 +499,6 @@ static void DES_encrypt2(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc) {
data[1] = ROTATE(r, 3) & 0xffffffffL;
}
/* DES_encrypt3 is not static because it's used in decrepit. */
void DES_encrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2, const DES_key_schedule *ks3) {
uint32_t l, r;
@@ -519,7 +518,6 @@ void DES_encrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
data[1] = r;
}
/* DES_decrypt3 is not static because it's used in decrepit. */
void DES_decrypt3(uint32_t *data, const DES_key_schedule *ks1,
const DES_key_schedule *ks2, const DES_key_schedule *ks3) {
uint32_t l, r;
-17
View File
@@ -202,24 +202,7 @@ how to use xors :-) I got it to its final state.
#define ITERATIONS 16
#define HALF_ITERATIONS 8
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#define ROTATE(a, n) (_lrotr(a, n))
#elif defined(__ICC)
#define ROTATE(a, n) (_rotr(a, n))
#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
!defined(__STRICT_ANSI__) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64))
#define ROTATE(a, n) \
({ \
unsigned int ret; \
asm("rorl %1,%0" : "=r"(ret) : "I"(n), "0"(a) : "cc"); \
ret; \
})
#endif
#ifndef ROTATE
#define ROTATE(a, n) (((a) >> (n)) + ((a) << (32 - (n))))
#endif
#if defined(__cplusplus)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
include_directories(. .. ../../include)
include_directories(../../include)
add_library(
dh
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ add_library(
OBJECT
dh.c
dh_impl.c
params.c
check.c
dh_asn1.c
@@ -21,3 +20,4 @@ add_executable(
)
target_link_libraries(dh_test crypto)
add_dependencies(all_tests dh_test)
+263 -52
View File
@@ -69,13 +69,11 @@
#include "../internal.h"
extern const DH_METHOD DH_default_method;
#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
DH *DH_new(void) { return DH_new_method(NULL); }
DH *DH_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
DH *DH_new(void) {
DH *dh = (DH *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH));
if (dh == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -84,29 +82,10 @@ DH *DH_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
memset(dh, 0, sizeof(DH));
if (engine) {
dh->meth = ENGINE_get_DH_method(engine);
}
if (dh->meth == NULL) {
dh->meth = (DH_METHOD*) &DH_default_method;
}
METHOD_ref(dh->meth);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
dh->references = 1;
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data)) {
OPENSSL_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
if (dh->meth->init && !dh->meth->init(dh)) {
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
METHOD_unref(dh->meth);
OPENSSL_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dh->ex_data);
return dh;
}
@@ -120,46 +99,278 @@ void DH_free(DH *dh) {
return;
}
if (dh->meth->finish) {
dh->meth->finish(dh);
}
METHOD_unref(dh->meth);
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
if (dh->method_mont_p) BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
if (dh->p != NULL) BN_clear_free(dh->p);
if (dh->g != NULL) BN_clear_free(dh->g);
if (dh->q != NULL) BN_clear_free(dh->q);
if (dh->j != NULL) BN_clear_free(dh->j);
if (dh->seed) OPENSSL_free(dh->seed);
if (dh->counter != NULL) BN_clear_free(dh->counter);
if (dh->pub_key != NULL) BN_clear_free(dh->pub_key);
if (dh->priv_key != NULL) BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
BN_clear_free(dh->p);
BN_clear_free(dh->g);
BN_clear_free(dh->q);
BN_clear_free(dh->j);
OPENSSL_free(dh->seed);
BN_clear_free(dh->counter);
BN_clear_free(dh->pub_key);
BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
OPENSSL_free(dh);
}
int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
if (dh->meth->generate_parameters) {
return dh->meth->generate_parameters(dh, prime_bits, generator, cb);
/* We generate DH parameters as follows
* find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
* p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
* For this case, g is a generator if
* g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
* Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
* g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
*
* Having said all that,
* there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
* for 2, p mod 24 == 11
* for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
* for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
*
* Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
* special generators and for answering some of my questions.
*
* I've implemented the second simple method :-).
* Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
* this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
*/
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
* It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
* order-q subgroup.
*/
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
return DH_default_method.generate_parameters(dh, prime_bits, generator, cb);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements */
if (dh->p == NULL) {
dh->p = BN_new();
if (dh->p == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (dh->g == NULL) {
dh->g = BN_new();
if (dh->g == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
/* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
* out on these ones :-( */
g = 5;
} else {
/* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
* generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
* it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
* which both is OK */
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
if (dh->meth->generate_key) {
return dh->meth->generate_key(dh);
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM local_priv;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
return DH_default_method.generate_key(dh);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
generate_new_key = 1;
} else {
priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
} else {
pub_key = dh->pub_key;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (generate_new_key) {
if (dh->q) {
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key));
} else {
/* secret exponent length */
DH_check_standard_parameters(dh);
l = dh->priv_length ? dh->priv_length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1;
if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, 0, 0)) {
goto err;
}
}
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(pub_key, dh->g, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
goto err;
}
dh->pub_key = pub_key;
dh->priv_key = priv_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
BN_free(pub_key);
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
BN_free(priv_key);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
if (dh->meth->compute_key) {
return dh->meth->compute_key(dh, out, peers_key);
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_key;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
BIGNUM local_priv;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
return DH_default_method.compute_key(dh, out, peers_key);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(shared_key, peers_key, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx,
mont)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ret;
}
int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); }
@@ -233,20 +444,20 @@ DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
return ret;
}
int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
int index;
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, new_func,
dup_func, free_func)) {
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, dup_func,
free_func)) {
return -1;
}
return index;
}
int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) {
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg));
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) {
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx));
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
}
-326
View File
@@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/thread.h>
#include "internal.h"
#define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
static int generate_parameters(DH *ret, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
/* We generate DH parameters as follows
* find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
* p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
* For this case, g is a generator if
* g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
* Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
* g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
*
* Having said all that,
* there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
* for 2, p mod 24 == 11
* for 3, p mod 12 == 5 <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
* for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
*
* Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
* special generators and for answering some of my questions.
*
* I've implemented the second simple method :-).
* Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
* this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
*/
/* Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
* It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
* order-q subgroup.
*/
BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
int g, ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Make sure 'ret' has the necessary elements */
if (!ret->p && ((ret->p = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!ret->g && ((ret->g = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (generator <= 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
goto err;
}
g = 2;
} else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
goto err;
}
/* BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
* out on these ones :-( */
g = 5;
} else {
/* in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
* generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
* it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
* which both is OK */
if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
goto err;
}
g = generator;
}
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(ret->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
goto err;
}
if (!BN_set_word(ret->g, g)) {
goto err;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ok;
}
static int generate_key(DH *dh) {
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM local_priv;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
if (priv_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
generate_new_key = 1;
} else {
priv_key = dh->priv_key;
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = BN_new();
if (pub_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
} else {
pub_key = dh->pub_key;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (generate_new_key) {
if (dh->q) {
do {
if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q)) {
goto err;
}
} while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key));
} else {
/* secret exponent length */
DH_check_standard_parameters(dh);
l = dh->priv_length ? dh->priv_length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1;
if (!BN_rand(priv_key, l, 0, 0)) {
goto err;
}
}
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(pub_key, dh->g, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
goto err;
}
dh->pub_key = pub_key;
dh->priv_key = priv_key;
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok != 1) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
}
if (dh->pub_key == NULL) {
BN_free(pub_key);
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
BN_free(priv_key);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
static int compute_key(DH *dh, unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *pub_key) {
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_key;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
BIGNUM local_priv;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (shared_key == NULL) {
goto err;
}
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
}
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
dh->p, ctx);
if (!mont) {
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
BN_with_flags(&local_priv, dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(shared_key, pub_key, &local_priv, dh->p, ctx,
mont)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
err:
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return ret;
}
const struct dh_method DH_default_method = {
{
0 /* references */,
1 /* is_static */,
},
NULL /* app_data */,
NULL /* init */,
NULL /* finish */,
generate_parameters,
generate_key,
compute_key,
};
+6 -7
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@
#include "internal.h"
#include "../test/scoped_types.h"
#include "../test/stl_compat.h"
static bool RunBasicTests();
@@ -167,7 +166,7 @@ static bool RunBasicTests() {
printf("\n");
std::vector<uint8_t> key1(DH_size(a.get()));
int ret = DH_compute_key(bssl::vector_data(&key1), b->pub_key, a.get());
int ret = DH_compute_key(key1.data(), b->pub_key, a.get());
if (ret < 0) {
return false;
}
@@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ static bool RunBasicTests() {
printf("\n");
std::vector<uint8_t> key2(DH_size(b.get()));
ret = DH_compute_key(bssl::vector_data(&key2), a->pub_key, b.get());
ret = DH_compute_key(key2.data(), a->pub_key, b.get());
if (ret < 0) {
return false;
}
@@ -458,17 +457,17 @@ static bool RunRFC5114Tests() {
std::vector<uint8_t> Z2(DH_size(dhB.get()));
/* Work out shared secrets using both sides and compare
* with expected values. */
int ret1 = DH_compute_key(bssl::vector_data(&Z1), dhB->pub_key, dhA.get());
int ret2 = DH_compute_key(bssl::vector_data(&Z2), dhA->pub_key, dhB.get());
int ret1 = DH_compute_key(Z1.data(), dhB->pub_key, dhA.get());
int ret2 = DH_compute_key(Z2.data(), dhA->pub_key, dhB.get());
if (ret1 < 0 || ret2 < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "DH_compute_key error RFC5114 set %u\n", i + 1);
return false;
}
if (static_cast<size_t>(ret1) != td->Z_len ||
memcmp(bssl::vector_data(&Z1), td->Z, td->Z_len) != 0 ||
memcmp(Z1.data(), td->Z, td->Z_len) != 0 ||
static_cast<size_t>(ret2) != td->Z_len ||
memcmp(bssl::vector_data(&Z2), td->Z, td->Z_len) != 0) {
memcmp(Z2.data(), td->Z, td->Z_len) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed RFC5114 set %u\n", i + 1);
return false;
}

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