mirror of
https://github.com/appwrite/appwrite.git
synced 2026-11-18 20:36:03 +00:00
fix(auth): default the breach service DSN to none
A server that has not been told which breach service to ask should ask nobody, rather than call the public Have I Been Pwned API on its own: `_APP_PWNED_PASSWORDS_DSN` now defaults to `none://localhost`. The policy stays enabled by default per project, but it protects nothing until an operator points the DSN at a service, which the variable description now says first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
40ead5aa94
commit
ccf4aea37f
3 files changed
+9
-7
No files matched your search
@@ -486,9 +486,9 @@ return [
|
||||
],
|
||||
[
|
||||
'name' => '_APP_PWNED_PASSWORDS_DSN',
|
||||
'description' => "DSN of the service the password pwned project policy asks whether a password has been breached. The scheme picks the adapter.\n\nExamples:\n- Have I Been Pwned: `hibp://localhost` — the public range API, which only ever receives the first five characters of the password SHA-1 hash. No other detail is read from the DSN\n- [Appwrite Pwned](https://github.com/appwrite-labs/pwned): `appwrite://SECRET@appwrite-pwned/v1/detection` — a service you run yourself, which answers from its own copy of the Have I Been Pwned corpus, so nothing about the password leaves your network. It receives the whole password, authenticated with `SECRET` as a Bearer token, which must match the service's `APPWRITE_PWNED_SECRET`, so only point it at a service on your own network or behind TLS. The path defaults to `v1/detection` and the connection is plain HTTP unless you add `?tls=true`\n- None: `none://localhost` — reports every password as safe without asking anyone, for a server that must not or cannot reach a breach service. Projects can still enable the policy, but it protects nothing until you point the server at a real service\n- Testing: `mock://localhost` — reports a fixed list of passwords as breached without leaving the process. Refused on a production server, since it would report every real password as safe",
|
||||
'description' => "DSN of the service the password pwned project policy asks whether a password has been breached. The scheme picks the adapter. Nothing is asked until you set it: the default, `none://localhost`, reports every password as safe, so the policy protects nothing until this points at a service.\n\nOptions:\n- None: `none://localhost` — the default. Reports every password as safe without asking anyone, for a server that must not or cannot reach a breach service\n- Have I Been Pwned: `hibp://localhost` — the public range API, which only ever receives the first five characters of the password SHA-1 hash. No other detail is read from the DSN\n- [Appwrite Pwned](https://github.com/appwrite-labs/pwned): `appwrite://SECRET@appwrite-pwned/v1/detection` — a service you run yourself, which answers from its own copy of the Have I Been Pwned corpus, so nothing about the password leaves your network. It receives the whole password, authenticated with `SECRET` as a Bearer token, which must match the service's `APPWRITE_PWNED_SECRET`, so only point it at a service on your own network or behind TLS. The path defaults to `v1/detection` and the connection is plain HTTP unless you add `?tls=true`\n- Testing: `mock://localhost` — reports a fixed list of passwords as breached without leaving the process. Refused on a production server, since it would report every real password as safe",
|
||||
'introduction' => 'TBD',
|
||||
'default' => 'hibp://localhost',
|
||||
'default' => 'none://localhost',
|
||||
'required' => false,
|
||||
'question' => '',
|
||||
'filter' => ''
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -679,7 +679,8 @@ return function (Container $context): void {
|
||||
}, ['user', 'store', 'proofForToken']);
|
||||
|
||||
$context->set('pwnedPasswords', function (Cache $cache) {
|
||||
$dsn = new DSN(System::getEnv('_APP_PWNED_PASSWORDS_DSN', 'hibp://localhost'));
|
||||
// Nothing is asked until an operator points this at a service
|
||||
$dsn = new DSN(System::getEnv('_APP_PWNED_PASSWORDS_DSN', 'none://localhost'));
|
||||
|
||||
return match ($dsn->getScheme()) {
|
||||
'hibp' => new PasswordPwnedHIBP($cache),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,10 +7,11 @@ use Appwrite\Auth\Validator\PasswordPwned;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Reports every password as safe, without asking anyone.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For a server that must not, or cannot, reach a breach service, such as an
|
||||
* air-gapped installation. Projects can still switch the policy on, but it
|
||||
* protects nothing until the server is pointed at a real service, and every
|
||||
* checked user reads as clean.
|
||||
* The default until an operator points `_APP_PWNED_PASSWORDS_DSN` at a
|
||||
* service, and the right choice for a server that must not, or cannot, reach
|
||||
* one, such as an air-gapped installation. Projects can still switch the
|
||||
* policy on, but it protects nothing until the server is pointed at a real
|
||||
* service, and every checked user reads as clean.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* DSN: `none://localhost`, no details are read.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user