Files
async-http-client/Sources/AsyncHTTPClient/RequestValidation.swift
T
Cory Benfield 7f05a8da46 Merge pull request from GHSA-v3r5-pjpm-mwgq
Motivation

Allowing arbitrary data in outbound header field values allows for the
possibility that users of AHC will accidentally pass untrusted data into
those values. That untrusted data can substantially alter the parsing
and content of the HTTP requests, which is extremely dangerous. The
result of this is vulnerability to CRLF injection.

Modifications

Add validation of outbound header field values.

Result

No longer vulnerable to CRLF injection
2023-01-17 11:06:08 +00:00

181 lines
7.2 KiB
Swift

//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
//
// This source file is part of the AsyncHTTPClient open source project
//
// Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Apple Inc. and the AsyncHTTPClient project authors
// Licensed under Apache License v2.0
//
// See LICENSE.txt for license information
// See CONTRIBUTORS.txt for the list of AsyncHTTPClient project authors
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
import NIOCore
import NIOHTTP1
extension HTTPHeaders {
mutating func validateAndSetTransportFraming(
method: HTTPMethod,
bodyLength: RequestBodyLength
) throws -> RequestFramingMetadata {
try self.validateFieldNames()
try self.validateFieldValues()
if case .TRACE = method {
switch bodyLength {
case .known(0):
break
case .unknown, .known:
// A client MUST NOT send a message body in a TRACE request.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-4.3.8
throw HTTPClientError.traceRequestWithBody
}
}
self.setTransportFraming(method: method, bodyLength: bodyLength)
let connectionClose = self[canonicalForm: "connection"].lazy.map { $0.lowercased() }.contains("close")
switch bodyLength {
case .unknown:
return .init(connectionClose: connectionClose, body: .stream)
case .known(let length):
return .init(connectionClose: connectionClose, body: .fixedSize(length))
}
}
private func validateFieldNames() throws {
let invalidFieldNames = self.compactMap { name, _ -> String? in
let satisfy = name.utf8.allSatisfy { char -> Bool in
switch char {
case UInt8(ascii: "a")...UInt8(ascii: "z"),
UInt8(ascii: "A")...UInt8(ascii: "Z"),
UInt8(ascii: "0")...UInt8(ascii: "9"),
UInt8(ascii: "!"),
UInt8(ascii: "#"),
UInt8(ascii: "$"),
UInt8(ascii: "%"),
UInt8(ascii: "&"),
UInt8(ascii: "'"),
UInt8(ascii: "*"),
UInt8(ascii: "+"),
UInt8(ascii: "-"),
UInt8(ascii: "."),
UInt8(ascii: "^"),
UInt8(ascii: "_"),
UInt8(ascii: "`"),
UInt8(ascii: "|"),
UInt8(ascii: "~"):
return true
default:
return false
}
}
return satisfy ? nil : name
}
guard invalidFieldNames.count == 0 else {
throw HTTPClientError.invalidHeaderFieldNames(invalidFieldNames)
}
}
private func validateFieldValues() throws {
let invalidValues = self.compactMap { _, value -> String? in
let satisfy = value.utf8.allSatisfy { char -> Bool in
/// Validates a byte of a given header field value against the definition in RFC 9110.
///
/// The spec in [RFC 9110](https://httpwg.org/specs/rfc9110.html#fields.values) defines the valid
/// characters as the following:
///
/// ```
/// field-value = *field-content
/// field-content = field-vchar
/// [ 1*( SP / HTAB / field-vchar ) field-vchar ]
/// field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
/// obs-text = %x80-FF
/// ```
///
/// Additionally, it makes the following note:
///
/// "Field values containing CR, LF, or NUL characters are invalid and dangerous, due to the
/// varying ways that implementations might parse and interpret those characters; a recipient
/// of CR, LF, or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of
/// those characters with SP before further processing or forwarding of that message. Field
/// values containing other CTL characters are also invalid; however, recipients MAY retain
/// such characters for the sake of robustness when they appear within a safe context (e.g.,
/// an application-specific quoted string that will not be processed by any downstream HTTP
/// parser)."
///
/// As we cannot guarantee the context is safe, this code will reject all ASCII control characters
/// directly _except_ for HTAB, which is explicitly allowed.
switch char {
case UInt8(ascii: "\t"):
// HTAB, explicitly allowed.
return true
case 0...0x1f, 0x7F:
// ASCII control character, forbidden.
return false
default:
// Printable or non-ASCII, allowed.
return true
}
}
return satisfy ? nil : value
}
guard invalidValues.count == 0 else {
throw HTTPClientError.invalidHeaderFieldValues(invalidValues)
}
}
private mutating func setTransportFraming(
method: HTTPMethod,
bodyLength: RequestBodyLength
) {
self.remove(name: "Content-Length")
self.remove(name: "Transfer-Encoding")
switch bodyLength {
case .known(0):
// if we don't have a body we might not need to send the Content-Length field
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.3.2
switch method {
case .GET, .HEAD, .DELETE, .CONNECT, .TRACE:
// A user agent SHOULD NOT send a Content-Length header field when the request
// message does not contain a payload body and the method semantics do not
// anticipate such a body.
break
default:
// A user agent SHOULD send a Content-Length in a request message when
// no Transfer-Encoding is sent and the request method defines a meaning
// for an enclosed payload body.
self.add(name: "Content-Length", value: "0")
}
case .known(let length):
self.add(name: "Content-Length", value: String(length))
case .unknown:
self.add(name: "Transfer-Encoding", value: "chunked")
}
}
}
extension HTTPHeaders {
mutating func addHostIfNeeded(for url: DeconstructedURL) {
// if no host header was set, let's use the url host
guard !self.contains(name: "host"),
var host = url.connectionTarget.host
else {
return
}
// if the request uses a non-default port, we need to add it after the host
if let port = url.connectionTarget.port,
port != url.scheme.defaultPort {
host += ":\(port)"
}
self.add(name: "host", value: host)
}
}